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SOME ASPECTS OF THE *VERBUM* IN THE TEXTS OF ST. THOMAS

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The scope of this investigation will be restricted to an examination of the relevant texts of St. Thomas Aquinas in which he discusses the *verbum* in human intellectual knowledge.¹ What is the *verbum* in itself? How does it arise in the knowing process? How does it function in different knowing situations? Careful textual analysis can help to shed some light on St. Thomas's answers to these questions and contribute to the stabilization of a Thomistic realism.

The immanent act of knowing is subsequent to, and distinct from, the series of transitive causations instituted by, and originating directly from, the external object. This psychologically preliminary series of acts terminates at the production of the intelligible *species*. It is at this point that we can begin our study of the *verbum* itself.²

Through the co-ordinate active causality of the agent intellect and the phantasm, a *species* is impressed on the possible intellect. This is the first intellective moment in the psychological process, such that once the *species* is produced, the possible intellect is ready for its immanent operation of intellection. The *species*, in this instance, is something like a form,³ which actuates the potency of the possible intellect. When the intellect has been thus informed, it passes into second act and performs the operation of intellection.⁴ The actual act of understanding forms, as a term of its operation, an immanently produced object, which is the *verbum* or mental word.⁵ The mental word, as an object of intellection, is distinct both from the thing which is being known and from the impressed intelligible *species*, which functions as a principle of the knowing operation in which the mental word is formed.⁶ Such an immanently produced object is

necessary in intellectual knowledge because the object of intellection is often something that is not present, or it is something that cannot exist in reality in the way that it is understood. Thus the intellect understands things as abstracted from material conditions. The point is that the mental word is necessary to complete the metaphysical requirements for the intellectual operation.⁷

¹We want to focus our attention on St. Thomas's treatment of the *verbum* itself. Many relevant issues are involved in the understanding of St. Thomas's development of his doctrine. Most of these issues are handled in Father Lonergan's studies on the *verbum*. See B. Lonergan, S.J., "The Concept of the *Verbum* in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas," *Theological Studies*, vii (1946), 349-92; viii (1947), 35-79 and 404-44; x (1949), 3-40 and 359-93. For a brief appraisal of these early studies, see M. J. O'Connell, S.J., "St. Thomas and the *Verbum*: An Interpretation," *THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN*, xxiv (1946-47), 224-34. Our investigation will be restricted to the *verbum humanum* and will leave the problems involved in the *verbum divinum* untouched.

²The treatment of the causal complex of psychological acts which lead up to the *verbum* can be passed over quickly, so that we can take up our consideration of the *verbum* itself. An extensive development of these psychological preliminaries can be found in G. P. Klubertanz, S.J., *The Philosophy of Human Nature* (Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953), pp. 59-85. Our consideration of the *verbum* must be seen in this more extensive context.

³The word "form" is a misleading translation for the Latin *species* in this connection. It is used to indicate the determining character of the *species* in relation to the possible intellect. But the *species* must not be thought to be an intellectual representative for the substantial form or accidental form of real being. The *species* also includes matter in the sense of common matter. "Ad secundum dicendum quod quidam putaverunt quod species rei naturalis sit forma solum, et quod materia non sit pars speciei. Sed secundum hoc, in definitionibus rerum naturalium non poneretur materia. Et ideo aliter dicen-

dum est, quod materia est duplex, scilicet communis, et signata vel individualis: communis quidem, ut caro et os; individualis autem, ut hae carnes et hae ossa. Intellectus igitur abstrahit speciem rei naturalis a materia sensibili individuali, non autem a materia sensibili communi. Sicut speciem hominis abstrahit ab his carnibus et his ossibus, quae non sunt de ratione speciei, sed sunt partes individui, ut dicitur in VII *Metaph.*; et ideo sine eis considerari potest. Sed species hominis non potest abstrahi per intellectum a carnibus et ossibus" (ST, I, q. 85, a. 1, ad 2).

⁴"Intellectus autem ipse, secundum quod est per speciem intelligibilem in actu, consideratur absolute. Et similiter intelligere, quod ita se habet ad intellectum in actu, sicut esse ad ens in actu" (*ibid.*, q. 34, a. 1, ad 2). "Sicut enim supra dictum est, intelligere non est actio progrediens ad aliquid extrinsecum, sed manet in operante sicut actus et perfectio ejus, prout esse est perfectio existentis: sicut enim esse consequitur formam, ita intelligere sequitur speciem intelligibilem" (*ibid.*, q. 14, a. 4).

⁵"Ulterius autem considerandum est quod intellectus, per speciem rei formatus, intelligendo format in seipso quandam intentionem rei intellectae quae est ratio ipsius, quam significat definitio" (GG, I, cap. 53). "Ad tertium dicendum quod in parte sensitiva invenitur duplex operatio. . . . Et utraque haec operatio coniungitur in intellectu. Nam primo quidem consideratur passio intellectus possibilis secundum quod informatur specie intelligibili. Qua quidem formatus, format secundo vel definitionem vel divisionem vel compositionem, quae per vocem significatur. Unde ratio quam significat nomen, est definitio; et enuntiatio significat compositionem et divisionem intellectus" (ST, I, q. 85, a. 2, ad 3).

⁶"Haec autem intentio intellecta, cum

The production of the mental word is of a kind peculiar to intellectual generation. In the very act of understanding, the intellect produces the immanent term of its operation by a sort of emanation.* The mental word proceeds from the intellect, wholly and entirely, and is constituted by the intellect in its knowing act, flowing from

sit quasi terminus intelligibilis operationis, est aliud a specie intelligibili, quae facit intellectum in actu, quam oportet considerari ut intelligibilis operationis principium: licet utrumque sit rei intellectae similitudo. Per hoc enim quod species intelligibilis quae est forma intellectus et intelligendi principium, est similitudo rei exterioris, sequitur quod intellectus intentionem formet illi rei similem: quia *quale est unumquodque, talia operatur*. Et ex hoc quod intentio intellecta est similis alicui rei, sequitur quod intellectus, formando huiusmodi intentionem, rem illam intelligat" (CG, I, cap. 53). "Quae quidem conceptio a tribus praedictis differt. A *re* quidem intellecta, quia res intellecta est interdum extra intellectum, conceptio autem intellectus non est nisi in intellectu; et iterum conceptio intellectus ordinatur ad rem intellectam sicut ad finem: propter hoc enim intellectus conceptionem rei in se format ut rem intellectam cognoscat. Differt autem a *specie* intelligibili: nam species intelligibilis, qua fit intellectus in actu, consideratur ut principium actionis intellectus, cum omne agens agit secundum quod est in actu; actu autem fit per aliquam formam, quam oportet esse actionis principium. Differt autem ab *actione* intellectus: quia praedicta conceptio consideratur ut terminus actionis et quasi quoddam per ipsam constitutum" (De Pot., q. 8, a. 1). "Manifestum est autem quod omnis operatio intellectus procedit ab eo secundum quod est factus in actu per speciem intelligibilem, quia nihil operatur nisi secundum quod est actu. Unde necesse est quod species intelligibilis, quae est principium operationis intellectualis, differt a verbo cordis, quod est per operationem intellectus formatum; quamvis ipsum verbum possit dici forma vel species intelligibilis, sicut per intellectum constituta, prout forma artis quam

intellectus adinvenit, dicitur quaedam species intelligibilis" (Quodlibet., V, a. 9).

This last text provides a clear instance of St. Thomas's use of *species intelligibilis* as referring to the *verbum*, as well as to the impressed intelligible *species*. This would suggest that the expression may offer difficulty in the interpretation of certain texts and that care must be taken in judging the context in which the term *species* occurs.

In general, the other terms which St. Thomas uses to refer to these two different *species* are readily distinguishable. The impressed intelligible *species* will be referred to as *species intelligibilis*, *forma intelligibilis* and sometimes as *notitia*. The mental word has a wider variety of terms which apply to it; among them are commonly found *verbum*, *verbum cordis*, *verbum mentis* or *mentale*, *verbum intelligibile*, *verbum interius*, *intentio*, *intentio intellecta*, *conceptio*, *ratio*, *ratio intellecta*, *intellectum*. An expression which he applies to both, *species* and *verbum*, besides the *species intelligibilis* mentioned above, is that of *similitudo rei intellectae*. This last parallel reference is of some significance.

"Et hoc quidem necessarium est: eo quod intellectus intelligit indifferenter rem absentem et praesentem, in quo cum intellectu imaginatio convenit; sed intellectus hoc amplius habet, quod etiam intelligit rem ut separatam a conditionibus materialibus, sine quibus in rerum natura non existit; et hoc non posset esse nisi intellectus sibi intentionem praedictam formaret" (CG, I, cap. 53).

"... sed verbum dicit quandam emanationem intellectus, et exitum in manifestationem sui" (In I Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 1, ad 1). "Sicut enim in cogitatione est exitus rationis ab uno in

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it as from its principle.⁹ The procession is not of the act of knowing but that which is produced by and in the act of knowing, the immanent object of intellection.¹⁰

If every act of intellection consists in the necessary production of its proper intellectual object as immediate term of that operation, it

aliud per collationem, ita etiam ratio verbi, ut dictum est, completur in quadam emanatione et exitu ab intellectu; unde addit supra simplicem intuitum intellectus aliquid cogitationi simile" (*ibid.*, a. 1, ad 3). See also *ST*, I, q. 34, a. 1, ad 2, and a. 2.

⁹"Verbum enim manifestationem quamdam importat; manifestatio autem per se non invenitur nisi in intellectu. Si enim aliquid quod est extra intellectum manifestare dicatur, hoc non est nisi secundum quod ex ipso aliquid in intellectu relinquitur, quod postea est principium manifestativum in eo. Proximum ergo manifestans est in intellectu: sed remotum potest etiam esse extra eum; et ideo nomen verbi proprie dicitur de eo quod procedit ab intellectu. Quod vero ab intellectu non procedit, non potest verbum dici, nisi metaphorice, inquantum, scilicet, est aliquomodo manifestans . . ." (*De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 3). "Verumtamen proprie loquendo, verbum non dicitur nisi quod procedit ut conceptus ab intellectu, ad quod sequitur procedere in similitudinem speciei" (*In Hebr.*, cap. 1, lect. 2). "Quicumque enim intelligit, ex hoc ipso quod intelligit, procedit aliquid intra ipsum, quod est conceptio rei intellectae, ex vi intellectiva proveniens, et ex ejus notitia procedens. . . . Non ergo accipienda est processio secundum quod est in corporalibus, vel per motum localem, vel per actionem alicujus causae in exterioriorem effectum; sed secundum emanationem intelligibilem, utpote verbi intelligibilis a dicente, quod manet in ipso" (*ST*, I, q. 27, a. 1). See also *In I Sent.*, d. 13, q. 1, a. 1, sol.; *ibid.*, ad 3; *ibid.*, a. 3, ad 2; *De Pot.*, q. 9, a. 9; *ibid.*, q. 10, a. 1; *ibid.*, ad 1; *De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 4, ad 7; *ST*, I, q. 27, a. 1, ad 2; *ibid.*, q. 30, a. 2, ad 2.

¹⁰"Haec autem est differentia inter intellectum et voluntatem: quod operatio

voluntatis terminatur ad rem, in quibus est bonum et malum; sed operatio intellectus terminatur in mente, in qua est verum et falsum, ut dicitur in *VI Metaphys.* Et ideo voluntas non habet aliquid progrediens a seipsa, quod in ea sit nisi per modum operationis; sed intellectus habet in seipso aliquid progrediens ab eo, non solum per modum operationis, sed etiam per modum rei operatae. Et ideo verbum significatur ut res procedens, sed amor ut operatio procedens" (*De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 2, ad 7).

¹¹"Dicunt igitur quod huic actui non respondet verbum nisi inquantum ad secundum modum dicendi; et ideo quamvis dicere dicatur essentialiter et personaliter, tamen verbum non dicitur nisi personaliter. Sed hoc non videtur verum: quia non est intelligibile quod aliquid dicatur et non sit verbum; unde oportet quod quoties dicitur intelligere toties dicatur verbum. Alii dicunt, quod dicere nihil illud est in universali quam manifestare intellectum suum. Potest autem homo manifestare intellectum suum vel alteri, sicut verbo vocali, vel sibi ipsi, sicut verbo cordis. . . . Unde dicunt, quod verbum dictum de Deo semper est personale. Sed hoc non videtur verum: quia si inquiratur quid sit istud verbum quo aliquis sibi loquitur, non invenitur esse nisi conceptio intellectus. Conceptio autem intellectus est vel operatio ipsa quae est intelligere, vel species intellecta. Unde oportet quod verbum vel dicatur ipsa operatio intelligendi, vel ipsa species quae est similitudo rei intellectae; et sine utroque istorum non potest quis intelligere: utrumque enim istorum est id quo quis intelligit formaliter. Et ideo impossibile est quod accipiendo hoc modo verbum aliquis intelligat nisi verbo intellectus sui, quod sit vel operatio ejus, vel ratio operationis ad eam sicut medium cognoscendi se habens, quae est species rei intellectae" (*In I Sent.*, d. 27, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 1). "Ad primum ergo dicen-

would follow that every act of actual understanding would require a mental word.¹¹ However, in evaluating St. Thomas's teaching on this point, it is important to remember that *intelligere*, in its proper meaning, can be nothing other than the actual immanent operation of understanding. Neither the reception of the impressed *species* nor the possession of knowledge in a habitual state demands a mental word, but the actual *intelligere* in second act is equivalently a *dicere* or expression in the intellect of the mental word.¹² There is no

dum quod cum verbum interius sit id quod intellectum est, nec hoc sit in nobis nisi secundum quod actu intelligimus verbum interius semper requirit intellectum in actu suo, qui est intelligere" (*De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 1, ad 1). "Ad nonum dicendum, quod quantum ad rationem verbi pertinet, non differt utrum aliquid intelligatur per similitudinem vel essentiam. Constat enim quod interius verbum significat omne illud quod intelligi potest, sive per essentiam sive per similitudinem intelligatur; et ideo omne intellectum, sive per similitudinem sive per essentiam intelligatur, potest verbum interius dici" (*ibid.*, ad 9). "Est autem de ratione interioris verbi, quod est intentio intellecta, quod procedat ab intelligente secundum suum intelligere, cum sit quasi terminus intellectualis operationis; intellectus enim intelligendo concipit et format intentionem sive rationem intellectam, quae est interius verbum . . ." (*CG*, IV, cap. 11). "Est enim considerandum quod ipsum intelligere ex virtute intellectus procedit. Secundum autem quod intellectus actu intelligat, est in ipso id quod intelligitur. Hoc igitur quod est intellectum esse in intelligente, procedit ex virtute intellectiva intellectus, et hoc est verbum ipsius, ut supra dictum est" (*Compend. Theol.*, cap. 49). See also *In II Sent.*, d. 11, q. 2, a. 3, sol. 3; *De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 2; *ibid.*, q. 10, a. 3; *ST*, I, q. 93, a. 7.

¹² . . . dicere autem nihil est aliud quam ex se emittere verbum. . . . Sed Anselmus accipit dicere communiter pro intelligere, et verbum proprie; et potuisset facere e converso si placuisset ei" (*De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 2, ad 4). "Ipsium enim intelligere non perficitur nisi ali-

quid in mente intelligentis concipiatur, quod dicitur *verbum*; non enim dicimur intelligere, sed cogitare ad intelligendum, antequam conceptio aliqua in mente nostra stabiliatur" (*De Pot.*, q. 9, a. 9). "Ad octavum dicendum, quod *dicere* potest dupliciter sumi: uno modo proprie secundum quod dicere idem est quod verbum concipere; et sic dicit Augustinus quod *non singulus quisque in divinis, sed solus Pater est dicens*. Alio modo communiter, prout dicere nihil est aliud quam intelligere; et sic dicit Anselmus, quod non solum Pater est dicens, sed etiam Filius et Spiritus Sanctus; et tamen licet sint tres dicentes, est unum solum verbum—quod est Filius—quia solus Filius est conceptus Patris intelligentis et concipientis verbum" (*ibid.*, ad 8).

The distinction made in these texts between *dicere* and *intelligere* is elucidated somewhat by the following: "Anselmus vero improprie accepit dicere pro intelligere. Quae tamen differunt. Nam intelligere importat solam habitudinem intelligentis ad rem intellectam; in qua nulla ratio ordinis importatur, sed solum informatio quaedam in intellectu nostro, prout intellectus noster fit in actu per formam rei intellectae. . . . Sed dicere importat principaliter habitudinem ad verbum conceptum: nihil enim est aliud dicere quam proferre verbum. Sed mediante verbo importat habitudinem ad rem intellectam, quae in verbo prolato manifestatur intelligenti" (*ST*, I, q. 34, a. 1, ad 3). "Sicut enim ex hoc quod aliquid rem aliquam intelligit, pervenit quaedam intellectualis conceptio rei intellectae in intelligente, quae dicitur verbum. . . . Sed ex parte intellectus, sunt vocabula adinventata ad significandum re-

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succession in this production of the mental word, in the sense that it passes from potency to act. The intellect itself may pass from potency to act, but the mental word arises fully and actually in the very conceiving.¹³

It follows from what we have said already that the mental word must be distinct from the intellect itself. The mental word in human knowledge has its very existence from the act of understanding, such that for it *to be* is for it *to be understood*. Thus the limited character

spectrum intelligentis ad rem intellectam, ut patet in hoc quod dico *intelligere*: et sunt etiam alia vocabula adinventata ad significandum processum intellectualis conceptionis, scilicet ipsum *dicere* et *verbum*" (*ibid.*, q. 37, a. 1). "Respondeo dicendum, quod sicut Augustinus dicit, XV de Trin., Verbum Dei representatur aliquantulum per verbum nostri intellectus, quod nihil est aliud quam quaedam acceptio actualis nostrae notitiae: cum enim id quod scimus, actu considerando concipimus, hoc verbum nostri intellectus est, et hoc est quod verbo exteriori significamus" (*Quodlibet.*, IV, a. 6).

Intelligere, then, can be applied to either the first or second act of knowing. When it is equivalent to *dicere*, however, St. Thomas will mean it as indicating the second act of actual intellection as we have pointed out. St. Thomas seems to think that this is the case, ultimately because of the finite state of our intellects as separated from their objects: "Ad quintum dicendum, quod in nobis, *dicere* non solum significat intelligere, sed intelligere, cum hoc quod est ex se exprimere aliquam conceptionem; nec aliter possumus intelligere, nisi huiusmodi conceptionem exprimendo; et ideo omne intelligere in nobis, proprie loquendo, est dicere. Sed Deus potest intelligere sine hoc quod aliquid ex ipso procedat secundum rem, quia in eo idem est intellectus et intellectum et intelligere: quod in nobis non accidit; et ideo non omne *intelligere* in Deo, proprie loquendo, dicitur *dicere*" (*De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 2, ad 5).

¹³"Necesse est igitur in corporalibus quod id quod concipitur, nondum sit: et id quod parturitur, in parturiendo non sit a parturiente distinctum. Conceptio autem et partus intelligibilis verbi non

est cum motu, nec cum successione: unde simul dum concipitur, est; et simul dum parturitur, distinctum est; sicut quod illuminatur, simul dum illuminatur, illuminatum est, eo quod in illuminatione successio nulla est. Et cum hoc inveniatur in intelligibili verbo nostro, multo magis competit Verbo Dei. . . ." (*CG*, IV, cap. 11). "Similiter etiam verbum quod in mente nostra concipitur, non exit de potentia in actum nisi quatenus intellectus noster procedit de potentia in actum. Nec tamen verbum oritur ex intellectu nostro nisi prout existit in actu: simul autem cum in actu existit, est in eo verbum conceptum" (*ibid.*, cap. 14).

¹⁴"Dico autem *intentionem intellectam* id quod intellectus in seipso concipit de re intellecta. Quae quidem in nobis neque est ipsa res quae intelligitur, neque est ipsa substantia intellectus; sed est quaedam similitudo concepta in intellectu de re intellecta, quam voces exteriores significant. . . . Quod autem intentio intellecta non sit ipse intellectus in nobis, ex hoc patet quod esse intentionis intellectae in ipso intelligi consistit: non autem esse intellectus nostri, cuius esse non est suum intelligere. Cum ergo in Deo sit idem esse et intelligere, intentio intellecta in ipso est ipse ejus intellectus. Et . . . in eo est res intellecta, intelligendo enim se intelligit omnia alia, ut in Primo ostensum est; relinquitur quod in Deo intelligente Seipsum sit idem intellectus, et res quae intelligitur, et intentio intellecta. . . . Verbum igitur Dei est ipsum esse divinum et essentia ejus, et ipse verus Deus. Non autem sic est de verbo intellectus humani. Cum enim intellectus noster seipsum intelligit, aliud est esse intellectus, et aliud ipsum ejus

of the human mental word follows from the difference of *esse* and *intelligere* in the finite intellect. For the being of intellect is an *esse* properly so called, whereas the being of the mental word is none other than *intelligi*, which is the act of intellect. In God, however, *esse* and *intelligere* are identified, and thus the *Verbum divinum* possesses the fullness of the divine nature.¹⁴

The mental word is conceived within the mind and is ordered to the expression of the content of the mind. Man expresses his thoughts by words, pronounced vocally, and these external words immediately represent the *verbum interius* of the intellect, and, secondly, through the mental word, they refer to the existing things of reality.¹⁵ In

intelligere: substantia enim intellectus erat in potentia intelligens antequam intelligeret actu. Sequitur ergo quod aliud sit esse intentionis intellectae, et aliud intellectus ipsius: cum intentionis intellectae esse sit ipsum intelligi. Unde oportet quod in homine intelligente seipsum verbum interius conceptum non sit homo verus, naturale esse hominis habens; sed sit *homo intellectus* tantum, quasi quaedam similitudo hominis veri ab intellectu apprehensa" (*ibid.*, cap. 11). "Considerandum est autem, quod cum in nobis sit aliud esse naturale et intelligere, oportet quod verbum in nostro intellectu conceptum, quod habet esse intelligibile tantum, alterius naturae sit quam intellectus noster, qui habet esse naturale. In Deo autem idem est esse et intelligere. Verbum igitur Dei, quod est in Deo, cuius verbum est secundum esse intelligibile, idem esse habet cum Deo, cuius est verbum" (*Compend. Theol.*, cap. 41). "Hujusmodi autem verbum nostri intellectus, est quidem extrinsecum ab esse ipsius intellectus (non enim est de essentia, sed est quasi passio ipsius), non tamen est extrinsecum ab ipso intelligere intellectus, cum ipsum intelligere compleri non possit sine verbo praedicto" (*De Pot.*, q. 8. a. 1). The same doctrine is expressed in practically the same words in *ibid.*, q. 9 a. 5, and in *In Joannem*, cap. 1, lect. 1.

¹⁵"Sed nunc sermo est de vocibus significativis ex institutione humana; et ideo oportet passiones animae hic intelligere

intellectus conceptiones, quas nomina et verba et orationes significant immediate secundum sententiam Aristotelis. Non enim potest esse quod significet immediate ipsas res, ut ex ipso modo significandi apparet: significat enim hoc nomen 'homo' naturam humanam in abstractione a singularibus. Unde non potest esse quod significet hominem immediate singularem, ut Platonici posuerunt, quod significaret ipsam ideam hominis separatam. Sed quia hoc secundum suam abstractionem non subsistit realiter secundum sententiam Aristotelis, sed est in solo intellectu; ideo necesse fuit Aristoteli dicere quod voces significant intellectus conceptiones immediate, et eis mediantibus, res" (*In I Periherm.*, lect. 2). "Ad quintum dicendum, quod quamvis apud nos manifestatio, quae est ad alterum, non fiat nisi per verbum vocale, tamen manifestatio ad seipsum fit etiam per verbum cordis; et haec manifestatio aliam praecedit; et ideo etiam verbum interius dicitur verbum per prius" (*De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 1, ad 5). "Ad sextum dicendum, quod Verbum incarnatum habet aliquid simile cum verbo vocis, et aliquid dissimile. Hoc quidem simile est in utroque, ratione cuius alteri comparatur: quod sicut vox manifestat verbum interius, ita per carnem manifestatum est Verbum aeternum. Sed quantum ad hoc est dissimile: quia ipsa caro assumpta a Verbo aeterno, non dicitur Verbum, sed ipsa vox quae assumitur ad manifestationem verbi interioris, dicitur verbum; et ideo ver-

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discussing the relation of external to internal word, St. Thomas expressly denies that the external word represents or signifies the impressed intelligible *species* or anything else in the intellectual process except the mental word.¹⁶ The term *verbum*, then, can be applied to each of the three levels of vocal expression. The *verbum*

bum vocis est aliud a verbo cordis; sed Verbum incarnatum est idem quod Verbum aeternum, sicut et verbum significatum per vocem, est idem quod verbum cordis" (*ibid.*, ad 6). "Sic igitur et id quod Verbo efficitur, verbi accipit nomen: nam et in nobis expressio interioris verbi per vocem, dicitur verbum, quasi sit *verbum verbi*, quia est interioris verbi ostensivum. Sic igitur non solum divini intellectus conceptio dicitur Verbum quod est Filius, sed etiam explicatio divini conceptus per opera exteriora, verbum Verbi nominatur . . ." (*CG*, IV, cap. 13). "Intellectus autem prout est in intelligente, est verbum quoddam intellectus: hoc enim exteriori verbo significamus quod interius in intellectu comprehendimus: sunt enim, secundum Philosophum, voces signa intellectuum" (*Compend. Theol.*, cap. 37). "Ad secundum dicendum quod circa verbum quodcumque duo possunt considerari, scilicet ipsum verbum, et ea quae verbo exprimuntur. Verbum enim vocale est quiddam ab ore hominis prolatum; sed hoc verbo exprimuntur quae verbis humanis significantur. Et eadem ratio est de verbo hominis mentali, quod nihil est aliud quam quiddam mentis conceptum, quo homo exprimit mentaliter ea de quibus cogitat" (*ST*, I-II, q. 93, a. 1, ad 2). See also *In I Sent.*, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2; *ibid.*, ad 1; *De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 1, ad 12; *ibid.*, a. 7; *Quodlibet.*, IV, a. 6; *ibid.*, ad 2; *ST*, I, q. 34, a. 1, ad 1.

¹⁶"Hoc autem sic ab intellectu conceptum dicitur *verbum interius*, hoc enim est quod significatur per vocem; non enim vox exterior significat ipsum intellectum, aut formam ipsius intelligibilem, aut ipsum intelligere, sed conceptum intellectus quo mediante significat rem: ut cum dico 'homo' vel 'homo est animal'. Et quantum ad hoc non differt utrum intellectus intelligat se, vel intelligat aliud a se. Sicut enim cum intelligit aliud a se, format conceptum illius rei quae voce significatur, ita cum intelligit

seipsum, format conceptum sui, quod voce etiam potest exprimere" (*De Pot.*, q. 9, a. 5). "De necessitate autem oportet quod illud extrinsecum animae nostrae, quod significatur exteriori verbo nostro, verbum vocetur. Utrum autem per prius conveniat nomen verbi rei exteriori voce prolatae, vel ipsi conceptioni mentis, nihil refert ad praesens. Planum est tamen quod illud quod voce significatur, interius existens in anima, prius est quam ipsum verbum exteriori voce prolatum, utpote causa ejus existens. Si ergo volumus scire quid est interius verbum mentis, videamus quid significat quod exteriori voce profertur. In intellectu autem nostro sunt tria: scilicet ipsa potentia intellectus; species rei intellectae, quae est forma ejus, se habens ad ipsum intellectum sicut species coloris ad pupillam; et tertio ipsa operatio intellectus, quae est intelligere. Nullum autem istorum significatur verbo exteriori voce prolato: nam hoc nomen *lapis* non significat substantiam intellectus, quia hoc non intendit dicere nominans; nec significat speciem, quae est qua intellectus intelligit, cum etiam hoc non sit intentio nominantis; non significat etiam ipsum intelligere, cum intelligere non sit actio exterioris progrediens ab intelligente, sed in ipso manens" (*In Joannem*, cap. 1, lect. 1). "Non ergo voces significant ipsas species intelligibiles; sed ea quae intellectus sibi format ad judicandum de rebus exterioribus" (*ST*, I, q. 85, a. 2, ad 3).

¹⁷"Ad cujus intellectum sciendum est, quod in nobis, ut quaedam Glossa super Joan., c. 1, dicit, invenitur triplex verbum: scilicet cordis, et vocis, et quod habet imaginem vocis; cujus necessitas est, quod cum locutio nostra sit quaedam corporalis operatio, oportet quod ad ipsum concurrant ea quae ad omnem motum corporalem exiguntur. . . . Si ergo accipiat locutio secundum quod est in parte intellectiva tantum, sic est verbum cordis quod etiam ab aliis dicitur verbum rei, quia est immediata simili-

mentis is the concept formed in the intellect. The *verbum imaginis* is the image formed in the imagination of the words by which the concept is to be expressed. The *verbum vocis*, finally, is the orally expressed word.¹⁷ The *verbum cordis* or *mentis* is related to the externally expressed words of human speech as a sort of final and efficient or active cause. For the *verbum vocis* is ordered to the expression of the *verbum cordis* and signifies it as an intellectual exemplar.¹⁸

tudo ipsius rei; et a Damasceno dicitur, lib. I *Fid. Orth.*, quod est naturalis intellectus motus, velut lux ejus et splendor; et ab Augustino dicitur, lib. IX de *Trin.*, Verbum animo impressum. Secundum autem quod est in imaginatione, quando scilicet quis imaginatur voces quibus intellectus conceptum proferre valeat, sic est verbum quod habet imaginem vocis, et a Damasceno dicitur verbum in corde enuntiatum, et ab Augustino dicitur verbum cum syllabis cogitatum. Secundum autem quod iam est in corporali actione per motum linguae et aliorum instrumentorum corporalium dicitur verbum vocis; et a Damasceno verbum quod est angelus, scilicet nuntius, intelligentiae, et ab Augustino verbum cum syllabis pronuntiatum" (*In I Sent.*, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1, sol.). "Et ideo, sicut in artifice tria consideramus, scilicet finem artificii, et exemplar ipsius, et ipsum artificium iam productum, ita etiam in loquente triplex verbum invenitur: scilicet *id quod* per intellectum concipitur, ad quod significandum verbum exterius profertur: et hoc est *verbum cordis* sine voce prolatum; item *exemplar* exterioris verbi, et hoc dicitur *verbum interius* quod habet imaginem vocis; et *verbum exterius expressum*, quod dicitur *verbum vocis*. Et sicut in artifice praecedit intentio finis, et deinde sequitur excogitatio formae artificii, et ultimo artificiatum in esse producit; ita verbum cordis in loquente est prius verbo quod habet imaginem vocis, et postremum est verbum vocis" (*De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 1). "Respondeo dicendum quod nomen Verbi in divinis, si proprie sumatur, est nomen personale, et nullo modo essentiale. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est quod *verbum* tripliciter quidem in nobis proprie dicitur: quarto

autem modo, dicitur improprie sive figurative. Manifestius autem et communius in nobis dicitur verbum quod voce profertur. Quod quidem ab interiore procedit quantum ad duo quae in verbo exteriori inveniuntur, scilicet vox ipsa, et significatio vocis. Vox enim significat intellectus conceptum, secundum Philosophum, in libro I *Periherm.*; et iterum vox ex imaginatione procedit, ut in libro *de Anima* dicitur. Vox autem quae non est significativa, verbum dici non potest. Ex hoc ergo dicitur verbum vox exterior, quia significat interiorem mentis conceptum. Sic igitur primo et principaliter interior mentis conceptus verbum dicitur: secundario vero, ipsa vox interioris conceptus significativa: tertio vero, ipsa imaginatio vocis verbum dicitur . . ." (*ST*, I, q. 34, a. 1).

¹⁸"Et ideo, quia verbum exterius, cum sit sensibile, est magis notum nobis quam interius secundum nominis impositionem, per prius vocale verbum dicitur verbum quam verbum interius, quamvis verbum interius naturaliter sit prius, utpote exterioris causa efficiens et finalis. Finalis quidem, quia verbum vocale ad hoc a nobis exprimitur, ut interius verbum manifestetur, unde oportet quod verbum interius sit illud quod significatur per verbum exterius. Verbum autem quod exterius profertur, significat id quod intellectum est, non ipsum intelligere, neque hoc intellectum quod est habitus vel potentia, nisi quatenus et haec intellecta sunt: unde verbum interius est ipsum interius intellectum. Efficiens autem, quia verbum prolatum exterius, cum sit significativum ad placitum, ejus principium est voluntas, sicut et ceterorum artificiatio-

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The operations of the human intellect, in which it attains to real understanding of its object, are the simple grasp of a quiddity and the more complex operation of judgment.¹⁹ The intellect performs its judicial function of affirming or denying by the composition or division of the mental words which have been previously grasped by simple apprehension.²⁰ The simple grasp of a quiddity constitutes a definition, and the composition or division of the intelligibilities constitutes a complex *verbum* of judicial affirmation or negation.²¹

rum; et ideo, sicut aliorum artificiatorum praeexistit in mente artificis imago quaedam exterioris artificii, ita in mente proferentis verbum exterius, praeexistit quoddam exemplar exterioris verbi" (*De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 1). "Ad septimum dicendum, quod ratio signi per prius convenit effectui quam causae, quando causa est effectui causa essendi, non autem significandi, sicut in exemplo proposito accidit. Sed quando effectus habet a causa non solum quod sit, sed etiam quod significet, tunc, sicut causa est prius quam effectus in essendo, ita in significando; et ideo verbum interius per prius habet rationem significationis quam verbum exterius, quia verbum exterius non instituitur ad significandum nisi per interius verbum" (*ibid.*, ad 7).

¹⁹"Intellectum autem, sive res intellecta, se habet ut constitutum vel formatum per operationem intellectus: sive hoc sit quidditas simplex, sive sit compositio et divisio propositionis. Has enim duas operationes intellectus Aristoteles assignat in *II de Anima*. Unam scilicet quam vocat *intelligentiam indivisibilem* qua videlicet intellectus apprehendit quod quid est alicujus rei, et hanc Arabes vocant formationem, vel imaginationem per intellectum. Aliam vero ponit, scilicet compositionem et divisionem intellectuum, quam Arabes vocant credulitatem vel fidem" (*De Spirit. Creat.*, a. 9, ad 6). This classic doctrine is repeated in *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, sol.; *ibid.*, ad 7; *In III Sent.*, d. 23, q. 2, a. 2 sol. 1; *De Ver.*, q. 14, a. 1; *In Boetii de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 3.

²⁰That the compositional character of judgment in reference to previous apprehensions cannot be taken as univocal will be seen later. See pp. 17-20.

²¹"Hoc ergo est primum et per se

intellectum, quod intellectus in seipso concipit de re intellecta, sive illud sit definitio, sive enuntiatio, secundum quod ponuntur duae operationes intellectus, in *III de Anima*" (*De Pot.*, q. 9, a. 5). "Illud ergo proprie dicitur verbum interius quod intelligens intelligendo format. Intellectus autem duo format, secundum duas ejus operationes: nam secundum operationem suam quae dicitur indivisibilem intelligentia, format definitionem; secundum vero operationem suam qua componit et dividit, format enuntiationem, vel aliquid hujusmodi: et ideo illud sic formatum et expressum per operationem intellectus, vel definientis vel enuntiantis, exteriore voce significatur. Unde dicit Philosophus, quod ratio quam significat nomen, est definitio" (*In Joannem*, cap. 1, lect. 1). "Est autem duplex operatio intellectus, secundum Philosophum in *III de Anima*. Una quidem quae vocatur indivisibilem intelligentia, per quam intellectus format in seipso definitionem, vel conceptum alicujus incomplexi. *Alia* autem operatio est intellectus componentis et dividit, secundum quam format enuntiationem. Et utrumque istorum per operationem intellectus constitutorum vocatur verbum cordis, quorum primum significatur per terminum incomplexum, secundum vero significatur per orationem" (*Quodlibet.*, V, a. 9). "Nam primo quidem consideratur passio intellectus possibilis secundum quod informatur specie intelligibili. Qua quidem formatus, format secundo vel definitionem vel divisionem vel compositionem. quae per vocem significatur. Unde ratio quam significat nomen, est definitio; et enuntiatio significat compositionem et divisionem intellectus" (*ST*, I, q. 85, a. 2, ad 3).

Only in this complex operation of the understanding is the full complement of reflexivity obtained. Formal truth, which is the understood adequation of intellectual knowledge and reality, is consummated only when the intellect is intentionally conformed with its real object and when the intellect is, in that very act, knowing this conformity.²² Such a known conformity requires that the intellect, in its very act of judging, should reflect on that act and thus express the conformity of act and reality.²³ It should be stressed that

²²"Dicendum est quod sicut verum per prius invenitur in intellectu quam in rebus, ita etiam per prius invenitur in actu intellectus componentis et dividendi quam in actu intellectus quidditates rerum formantis. Veri enim ratio consistit in adequatione rei et intellectus; idem autem non adaequatur sibi ipsi, sed aequalitas diversorum est; unde ibi primo invenitur ratio veritatis in intellectu ubi primo intellectus incipit aliquid proprium habere quod res extra animam non habet, sed aliquid ei correspondens, inter quae adaequatio attendi potest. Intellectus autem formans quidditates, non habet nisi similitudinem rei existentis extra animam, sicut et sensus in quantum accipit speciem rei sensibilis; sed quando incipit judicare de re apprehensa, tunc ipsum iudicium intellectus est quoddam proprium ei, quod non invenitur extra in re. Sed quando adaequatur ei quod est extra in re, dicitur iudicium verum esse" (*De Ver.*, q. 1. a. 3). "Respondeo dicendum quod verum, sicut dictum est, secundum sui primam rationem est in intellectu. Cum autem omnis res sit vera secundum quod habet propriam formam naturae suae, necesse est quod intellectus, in quantum est cognoscens, sit verus in quantum habet similitudinem rei cognitae, quae est forma ejus in quantum est cognoscens. Et propter hoc per conformitatem intellectus et rei veritas definitur. Unde conformitatem istam cognoscere est cognoscere veritatem. Hanc autem nullo modo sensus cognoscit: licet enim visus habeat similitudinem visibilis, non tamen agnoscit comparationem quae est inter rem visam et id quod ipse apprehendit de ea.

Intellectus autem conformitatem sui ad rem intelligibilem cognoscere potest: sed tamen non apprehendit eam secundum quod cognoscit de aliquo quod quid est, sed quando iudicat rem ita se habere sicut est forma quam de re apprehendit, tunc primo cognoscit et dicit verum. Et hoc facit componendo et dividendo: nam in omni propositione aliquam formam significatam per praedicatum, vel applicat alicui rei significatae per subjectum, vel removel ab ea. Et ideo bene invenitur quod sensus est verus de aliqua re, vel intellectus cognoscendo quod quid est: sed non quod cognoscat aut dicat verum. Et similiter est de vocibus complexis aut incomplexis. Veritas quidem igitur potest esse in sensu, vel in intellectu cognoscente quod quid est, ut in quadam re vera: non autem ut cognitum in cognoscente, quod importat nomen veri; perfectio enim intellectus est verum ut cognitum. Et ideo proprie loquendo, veritas est in intellectu componente et dividente: non autem in sensu, neque in intellectu cognoscente quod quid est" (*ST*, I, q. 16. a. 2).

The same doctrine is proposed in *In VI Metaphys.*, lect. 4; *In IX Metaphys.*, lect. 11; *In III de Anima*, lect. 11; *ST*, I, q. 16. a. 1; *ibid.*, q. 84, a. 6, ad 1; *ST*, II-II, q. 1, a. 2.

²³"Respondeo dicendum quod veritas est in intellectu et in sensu, licet non eodem modo. In intellectu enim est sicut consequens actum intellectus et sicut cognita per intellectum. Consequitur namque intellectus operationem, secundum quod iudicium intellectus est de re secundum quod est. Cognoscitur autem ab intellectu secun-

the reflective moment is in no way subsequent, or consequent to, the act of judging, but it is a constitutive moment of the judgment itself.²⁴ However, the act of judging cannot function as an object of reflection but is itself known only by the necessary formation in it of

dum quod intellectus reflectitur supra suum actum, non solum secundum quod cognoscit actum suum, sed secundum quod cognoscit proportionem ejus ad rem: quod quidem cognosci non potest nisi cognita natura ipsius actus; quae cognosci non potest, nisi cognoscatur natura principii activi, quod est ipse intellectus, in cuius natura est ut rebus conformetur; unde secundum hoc cognoscit veritatem intellectus quod supra seipsum reflectitur" (*De Ver.*, q. 1, a. 9).

²⁴The text cited in the previous note, *De Ver.*, q. 1, a. 9, presents some difficulties. One of the most prominent interpretations of this text is that of Boyer. See C. Boyer, S.J., "Le sens d'un texte de St. Thomas: *De Ver.*, 1, 9." *Gregorianum*, v (1924), 424-43. This interpretation has been endorsed by other Thomists, like Garrigou-LaGrange and Father Hoenen. See P. Hoenen, S.J., *La théorie du jugement d'après St. Thomas d'Aquin* (Rome, 1953), pp. 2-3: "Voici le résultat de cette analyse pénétrante; selon St. Thomas le jugement prend naissance d'un retour, *reditus* ou *reflexio*, de l'intelligence sur une opération précédente de l'esprit, une simple appréhension, *simplex apprehensio*. . . . L'étude du P. Boyer a donc établi e.a. deux points. Le premier est celui-ci: l'opération sur laquelle l'esprit réfléchit pour parvenir à un jugement, n'est pas un jugement précédent—d'ailleurs ceci ne serait pas possible pour *tout* jugement—mais c'est vraiment une 'prima mentis operatio,' une appréhension simple. La réflexion se fait avant *tout* jugement, pas seulement avant un jugement qui est le résultat d'une recherche critique philosophique. Le second point établi par le P. Boyer se réduit à ceci: l'homme ne parvient à juger, affirmativement ou négativement, qu'après un retour critique sur ce qui est dans sa conscience pendant cette opération précédente qui est une appréhension, retour qui lui révèle la nature de cet acte d'appréhen-

sion comme nous avons dit; cette condition elle aussi concerne *tout* jugement humain."

According to this position the first contact of mind with reality is in the simple apprehension, in which the intellect attains only to the *quod quid est*. Subsequent to this act, the intellect reflects upon the already received content of the apprehension and affirms the then known conformity between apprehension and thing. The text in question says "In intellectu enim est sicut consequens actum intellectus, et sicut cognita per intellectum. Consequitur namque intellectus operationem, secundum quod iudicium intellectus est de re secundum quod est." These words do not refer to any sequence of intellectual acts. They indicate only that truth in the intellect is a consequence of the act of the intellect judging insofar as in such judgment the intellect is conformed to the thing. The very act of intellectual judgment is reflective.

The danger in this interpretation has been pointed out by A. M. Krapiec, O.P., "Analysis Formationis Conceptus Entis Existentialiter Considerati," *Divus Thomas*, LIX (1956), 320-50. If existence is attained by the sort of subsequent reflection of judgment which is proposed in this interpretation, we have no proof of the reality or aposteriority of our concepts. This raises the further difficult question of whether quidditative concepts would be anything more than mere subjective categories of mind. Further, in regard to being itself, the priority of apprehension involves difficulties which tend to make the intelligibility of the real distinction rather tenuous. All this means that the primitive contact of intellect with being must be at once existential and essential, apprehensive and judicial. For the primitive grasp of real being is never quidditative and nonexistent, nor existential and nonquidditative, but both quidditative and existential.

the necessary object of judgment, the mental word. Further, it would seem that the only possible locus for discerning the conformity of thing and thought is in the mental word itself, as the *similitudo rei intellectae*. On these grounds, it seems reasonable to suggest that the mental word is conformed to the reality expressed in the judgment and that it is precisely this conformity as reflectively cognized by the judging intellect that constitutes formal truth.

The essential point concerning the two acts of the intellect in relation to the formation of the mental word is that only when the intellect has reached the term of its operation is the immanent object produced. Thus, only when the mind is able to form a definition or posit a judgment is there question of a mental word. This is merely an explication of the previous observation that the intellect produces a mental word only in the actual operation of understanding. Understanding consists in a certain penetration or intuition by which the intellect grasps the essential intelligibility of a being or of the immediately known first principles;²⁵ or it may be the assertion of composition or division in a thing on the more complex level of judgment and the conformity of truth.²⁶

²⁵"Respondeo dicendum, quod hoc nomen intellectus sumitur ex hoc quod intima rei cognoscit; est enim intelligere quasi *intus legere*: sensus enim et imaginatio sola exteriora accidentia cognoscunt; solus autem intellectus ad essentiam rei pertingit. Sed ulterius intellectus ex essentiis rerum comprehensio diversimode negotiatur ratiocinando et inquirendo. Nomen ergo intellectus dupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo secundum quod se habet ad hoc tantum a quo primo nomen impositum fuit; et sic dicitur proprie intelligere cum apprehendimus quidditates rerum, vel cum intelligimus illa quae statim nota sunt intellectui notis rerum quidditatibus, sicut sunt prima principia, quae cognoscimus cum terminos cognoscimus; unde et intellectus habitus principiorum dicitur" (*De Ver.*, q. 1, a. 12). "Cognito enim quid est totum et quid pars, statim scitur quod omne totum est maius sua parte. Dicitur autem intellectus ex eo quod *intus legit*

intuendo essentiam rei. Unde et in III *de Anima* dicitur, quod objectum proprium intellectus est quod quid est. Et sic convenienter cognitio principiorum quae statim innotescunt cognito quod quid est, intellectus nominatur" (*In VI Ethic.*, lect. 5).

²⁶"Respondeo dicendum quod nomen intellectus quandam intimam cognitionem importat; dicitur enim intellectus quasi *intus legere*. Et hoc manifeste patet considerantibus differentiam intellectus et sensus: nam cognitio sensitiva occupatur circa qualitates sensibiles exteriores; cognitio autem intellectiva penetrat usque ad essentiam rei, objectum enim intellectus est *quod quid est*, ut dicitur in II *de Anima*. Sunt autem multa genera eorum quae interius latent, ad quae oportet cognitionem hominis quasi intrinsecus penetrare. Nam sub accidentibus latet natura rerum substantialis, sub verbis latent significata verborum, sub similitudinibus et figuris latet veritas figurata: res

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It is characteristic of the operation of our intellects that the intellectual intuition, which constitutes the *intelligere*, properly speaking, is often arrived at only after a series of reasoned steps. The first principles of knowledge are grasped and understood immediately and naturally, without any discursive reasoning. By successive compositions and divisions, the intellect moves from step to step of the reasoning process. At each step a new mental word arises, which serves as a stepping stone to the next composition, until the desired conclusion is reached. Thus the intellect moves from understanding to understanding through the successive formation and development of mental words. The understanding is terminated when we judge the conclusion by the naturally known first principles.²⁷

etiam intelligibiles sunt quodammodo interiores respectu rerum sensibilibus quae exterius sentiuntur, et in causis latent effectus et e converso. Unde respectu horum omnium potest dici intellectus. Sed cum cognitio hominis a sensu incipiat, quasi ab exteriori, manifestum est quod quanto lumen intellectus est fortius, tanto potest magis ad intima penetrare. Lumen autem naturale nostri intellectus est finitae virtutis: unde usque ad determinatum aliquid pertingere potest. Indiget igitur homo supernaturali lumine ut ulterius penetret ad cognoscendum quaedam quae per lumen naturale cognoscere non valet" (ST, II-II, q. 8, a. 1).

²⁷"... intentiones a conditionibus materiae separatas differunt autem in modo: quia in cognitione veritatis ratio inquirendo pervenit, quam intellectus simplici intuitu videt; unde ratio ad intellectum terminatur; unde etiam in demonstrationibus certitudo est per resolutionem ad prima principia, quorum est intellectus" (In II Sent., d. 9, q. 1, a. 8, ad 1). "Sciendum est autem, quod hoc Verbum differt a nostro verbo in tribus. Prima differentia est, secundum Augustinum, quia verbum nostrum prius est formabile, quam formatum; nam cum volo concipere rationem lapidis, oportet quod ad ipsam ratiocinando perveniam; et sic est in omnibus aliis quae a nobis intelliguntur; nisi forte in primis principiis, quae cum sint simpliciter nota, absque discursu rationis statim sciuntur: quam-

diu ergo sic ratiocinando intellectus jactatur hac vel illac, nec dum formatio perfecta est, nisi quando ipsam rationem rei perfecte conceperit; et tunc primo habet rationem verbi. Et inde est quod in anima nostra est cogitatio, per quam significatur ipse discursus inquisitionis, et verbum, quod est iam formatum secundum perfectam contemplationem veritatis. Sic ergo verbum nostrum primo est in potentia quam in actu" (In Joannem, cap. 1, lect. 1). "Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut in intellectu ratiocinante comparatur conclusio ad principium, ita in intellectu componente et dividente comparatur praedicatum ad subjectum. Si enim intellectus statim in ipso principio videret conclusionis veritatem, numquam intelligeret discurrendo vel ratiocinando. Similiter si intellectus statim in apprehensione quidditatis subjecti, haberet notitiam de omnibus quae possunt attribui subjecto vel removeri ab eo, numquam intelligeret componendo et dividendo, sed solum intelligendo quod quid est. Sic igitur patet quod ex eodem provenit quod intellectus noster intelligit discurrendo, et componendo et dividendo: ex hoc scilicet, quod non statim in prima apprehensione alicujus primi apprehensi, potest inspicere quidquid in eo virtute continetur. Quod contingit ex debilitate luminis intellectualis in nobis, sicut dictum est" (ST, I, q. 58, a. 4). "Ad hujus autem evidentiam, considerandum est quod, sicut supra dictum est, ratiocinatio hominis, cum sit

The ultimate reason why intellectual knowledge is forced to grow and form itself in this way is that the human intellect is a finite and imperfect instrument. In its operations, the intellect passes from potency to act. Its limited capacity will not permit it to express all of its knowledge in one mental word, but it must content itself with partial and imperfect expressions. It must grow in knowledge only by the successive formation of more and more perfect but always partial and limited expressions. For each thing that it understands, it must form a distinct mental word.²³ This limitation on the

quidam motus, ab intellectu progreditur aliquorum, scilicet naturaliter notorum absque investigatione rationis, sicut a quodam principio immobili: et ad intellectum etiam terminatur, inquantum judicamus per principia per se naturaliter nota, de his quae ratiocinando invenimus" (*ibid.*, q. 79, a. 12). "Respondeo dicendum quod intellectus humanus necesse habet intelligere componendo et dividendo. Cum enim intellectus humanus exeat de potentia in actum, similitudinem quandam habet cum rebus generabilibus, quae non statim perfectionem suam habent, sed eam successive acquirunt. Et similiter intellectus humanus non statim in prima apprehensione capit perfectam rei cognitionem; sed primo apprehendit aliquid de ipsa, puta quidditatem ipsius rei, quae est primum et proprium objectum intellectus; et deinde intelligit proprietates et accidentia et habitudines circumstantes rei essentiam. Et secundum hoc, necesse habet unum apprehensum alii componere vel dividere; et ex una compositione vel divisione ad aliam procedere, quod est ratiocinari" (*ibid.*, q. 85, a. 5). "Ad secundum dicendum quod discursus rationis semper incipit ab intellectu et terminatur ad intellectum: ratiocinamur enim procedendo ex quibusdam intellectis, et tunc rationis discursus perficitur quando ad hoc pervenimus ut intelligamus illud quod prius erat ignotum. Quod ergo ratiocinamur ex aliquo praecedenti intellectu procedit . . ." (*ST*, II-II, q. 8, a. 1, ad 2). See also *In I Sent.*, d. 3, q. 4, a. 5, sol.; *In III Sent.*, d. 35, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 1;

De Ver., q. 8, a. 15; *ibid.*, q. 15, a. 1; *ST*, I, q. 58, a. 3; *ibid.*, q. 79, a. 8; *ST*, II-II, q. 2, a. 1.

²³"Et similis differentia invenitur in processu qui est per viam intellectus. Verbum enim quod in nobis exprimitur per actualem considerationem quasi exortum ex aliqua principiorum consideratione, vel saltem cognitione habituali, non totum in se recipit quod est in eo a quo oritur: non enim quidquid habituali tenemus cognitioni, hoc exprimit intellectus in unius verbi conceptione, sed aliquid ejus. Similiter in consideratione unius conclusionis non exprimitur totum id quod erat in virtute principii" (*De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 4). "Sed quia nos non totum id quod habitu scimus, actu mente concipimus sed de uno intelligibili movemur ad aliud; inde est quod in nobis non est unum solum verbum mentale: sed multa, quorum nulum adaequale nostram scientiam. Sed Deus quidquid scit actu intelligit; et ideo in mente ejus non succedit verbum verba" (*Quodlibet.*, IV, a. 6). "Scimus enim primo quod in Deo est tantum unum intelligere, non multiplex sicut in nobis: aliud enim est intelligere nostrum quo intelligimus lapidem et quo intelligimus plantam; sed unum est Dei intelligere, quo Deus intelligit et se et omnia alia. Et ideo intellectus noster concipit multa verba, sed verbum conceptum a Deo est unum tantum. Iterum intellectus noster imperfecte plerumque intelligit et seipsum et alia; intelligere autem divinum non potest esse imperfectum. Unde verbum divinum est perfectum, perfecte omnia

character of our mental operations relates back to the *species* by which the intellective potency is informed. The intelligible *species* is derived from determinate material things and obtains its intelligible status only through the causality of the agent intellect. It is likewise the nature of our intellect, as ordered to the knowledge of material quiddities, that it can accommodate only one of these *species* at a time. The *species*, acting as a sort of informing principle, exhausts the intellective potency of the possible intellect, so that in any actual consideration or intellection, the intellect is informed by only one determinate *species*. Thus, if the intellective power is to extend itself to more than one object, it must compose them into one and understand them as one.²⁹ The intellect can simultaneously understand subject and predicate by combining them into one proposition and holding that proposition as a single intelligible object.³⁰ There

representans: verbum autem nostrum frequenter est imperfectum" (*De Pot.*, q. 9, a. 5). "Secundo vero differentia verbi nostri ad Verbum divinum est, quia verbum nostrum est imperfectum; sed Verbum divinum est perfectissimum: quia enim nos non possumus omnes nostras conceptiones uno verbo exprimere, ideo oportet quod plura verba imperfecta formemus, per quae divisim exprimamus omnia quae in scientia nostra sunt" (*In Joannem*, cap. 1, lect. 1). "Verbum autem in mente conceptum, est representativum omnis ejus quod actu intelligitur. Unde in nobis sunt diversa verba, secundum diversa quae intelligimus" (*ST*, I, q. 34, a. 3).

²⁹"Intellectus enim noster simul multa actu intelligere non potest quia, cum intellectus in actu sit intellectum in actu, si plura simul actu intelligeret, sequeretur quod intellectus simul esset plura secundum unum genus, quod est impossibile. Dico autem *secundum unum genus*: quia nihil prohibet idem subjectum informari diversis formis diversorum generum, sicut idem corpus est figuratum et coloratum. Species autem intelligibiles, quibus intellectus formatur ad hoc quod sit ipsa intellecta in actu, omnes sunt unius generis: habent enim unam rationem essendi secundum esse intelligibile, licet res quarum sunt species in una essendi non convenient ratione; unde nec contrariae

sunt per contrarietatem rerum quae sunt extra animam. Et inde est quod, quando aliqua multa accipiuntur quocumque modo unita, simul intelliguntur: simul enim intelligit totum continuum, non partem post partem (*CG*, I, cap. 55). "Respondeo dicendum quod intellectus quidem potest multa intelligere per modum unius, non autem multa per modum multorum: dico autem per modum unius vel multorum, per unam, vel plures species intelligibiles. Nam modus cujusque actionis consequitur formam quae est actionis principium. Quaecumque ergo intellectus potest intelligere sub una specie, simul intelligere potest: et inde est quod Deus omnia simul videt per unum, quia omnia videt per unum, quod est essentia sua. Quaecumque vero intellectus per diversas species intelligit, non simul intelligit. Et hujus ratio est, quia impossibile est idem subjectum perfici simul pluribus formis unius generis et diversarum specierum . . . Impossibile est ergo quod idem intellectus simul perficiatur diversis speciebus intelligibilibus, ad intelligendum diversa in actu" (*ST*, I, q. 85, a. 4). See also *In III Sent.*, d. 14, q. 1, a. 2, qa. 4, ad 1; *Quodlibet.*, VII, 2; *De An.*, a. 18, ad 5; *ST*, I, q. 12, a. 10.

³⁰" . . . simul enim intelligit totum continuum, non partem post partem; et similiter simul intelligit propositionem,

are differences in this matter not only among intellects at different levels of the hierarchy of being—for example, between angels and men; but even on the level of purely human cognition, superior intellects are capable of knowing more objects with fewer *species*. Thus, bright students need only a few examples in order to understand a principle, whereas particular examples must be multiplied for the duller ones.³¹

Thus the human intellect reasons and understands by the successive formation of mental words. There is a different mental word for the subject and for each accident which is found inhering in it. By the composition of these diverse mental words, they are united into the complex mental word of a proposition. The mind moves from proposition to proposition in its reasoning, and from understanding to

non prius subjectum et postea praedicatum; quia secundum unam totius speciem omnes partes cognoscit. Ex his igitur accipere possumus quod quaecumque plura una specie cognoscuntur, simul possunt intelligi” (CG, I, cap. 55). “Contingit autem aliqua accipi ut plura, et ut unum; sicut partes alicujus continui. Si enim unaquaeque per se accipiat, plures sunt; unde et non una operatione, nec simul accipiuntur per sensum et intellectum. Alio modo accipiuntur secundum quod sunt unum in toto: et sic simul et una operatione cognoscuntur tam per sensum quam per intellectum, dum totum continuum consideratur, ut dicitur in III de Anima. Et sic etiam intellectus noster simul intelligit subjectum et praedicatum prout sunt partes unius propositionis; et duo comparata, secundum quod conveniunt in una comparatione. Ex quo patet quod multa secundum quod sunt distincta, non possunt simul intelligi; sed secundum quod uniuntur in uno intelligibili, sic simul intelliguntur” (ST, I, q. 58, a. 2). On this composite knowing of the *verbum propositionis*, see *In III Sent.*, d. 14, q. 1, a. 2, qa. 4, sol.; *De Ver.*, q. 8, a. 14.

³¹“Similiter etiam in cognoscitivis, aliquis qui est elevioris intellectus, ex paucis principiis penes se retentis habet in promptu procedere ad varias conclusiones, ad quas pervenire non possunt qui sunt hebetioris ingenii, nisi per

varias inductiones, et per principia particulariter coaptata conclusionibus” (*De Ver.*, q. 8, a. 10). “Exemplum igitur hujus, ut dictum est, in duobus extremis accipere possumus, scilicet in intellectu divino et humano. Deus enim per unum, quod est sua essentia, cognoscit omnia; homo autem ad diversa cognoscenda diversas similitudines requirit. Qui etiam, quanto altioris fuerit intellectus, tanto ex paucioribus plura cognoscere potest: unde his qui sunt tardi intellectus, oportet exempla particularia adducere ad cognitionem de rebus sumendam” (CG, II, cap. 98). “Qui habet intellectum elevatum, statim, uno principio demonstrativo proposito, ex ipso multarum conclusionum cognitionem accipit: quod non convenit ei qui debilioris intellectus est; sed oportet quod ei singula explanentur. Ille igitur intellectus potest in causa cognoscere omnes causae effectus, et omnes rationes effectuum, qui causam totaliter comprehendit” (ST, I, q. 12, a. 8). “Et de hoc exemplum aliquantulum perspicui potest. Sunt enim quidam, qui veritatem intelligibilem capere non possunt, nisi eis particulatim per singula explicetur: et hoc quidem ex debilitate intellectus eorum contingit. Alii vero, qui sunt fortioris intellectus, ex paucis multa capere possunt” (*ibid.*, q. 55, a. 3). See also *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 3, a. 2, sol.

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understanding. All learning in some way flows from a pre-existing understanding, ultimately the immediate and natural knowledge of the first principles.³²

This sort of discussion leaves little to be desired, when it is question of the mere combination of essential concepts. But even in the simplest types of enuntiation, there is a third element that enters into the picture. When I say, "Socrates is white," I can form a concept of "Socrates" and a second concept of "white." By the simple composition of these two mental words, I can form a complex enuntiation, which I express by the proposition in question. In this case, St. Thomas seems to think of the "is" of the proposition as merely serving to indicate the connection of the predicate to the subject. The "is" is attached to the predicate and for that reason is called *tertium adjacens*. When "is" is predicated of the subject by itself, as when I say "Socrates is," the intention of the proposition is to

³²"Sed tamen differenter se habet circa hoc intellectus divinus ab intellectu nostro. Quia intellectus noster diversas conceptiones format ad cognoscendum subjectum et accidens, et ad cognoscendum diversa accidentia; et ideo discurrit de cognitione substantiae ad cognitionem accidentis; et iterum ad hoc quod inhaerentiam unius ad alterum cognoscat, componit alteram speciem cum altera, et unit eas quodammodo; et sic in seipso enuntiabilia format" (*De Ver.*, q. 2, a. 7). "Ad tertium dicendum, quod illa de quibus per signa docemur, cognoscimus quidem quantum ad aliquid, et quantum ad aliquid ignoramus; utpote si docemur quid est homo, oportet quod de eo praesciamus aliquid: scilicet rationem animalis, vel substantiae, aut saltem ipsius entis, quae nobis ignota esse non potest. Et similiter si doceamur aliquam conclusionem, oportet praescire de subjecto et passione quid sint, etiam principiis, per quae conclusio docetur, praecognitis; omnis enim disciplina fit ex praexistenti cognitione, ut dicitur in *I Posteriorum*" (*ibid.*, q. 11, a. 1, ad 3). "Hoc enim in materialibus generationibus accidere necesse est in quantum materia generati recipit formam generantis. In generatione autem intelligibili non sic est. Non enim sic verbum ab intellectu exoritur quod pars ejus praeintelligatur ut recipiens, et pars

ejus ab intellectu effluat, sed totaliter verbum ab intellectu originem habet: sicut et in nobis totaliter unum verbum ex aliis oritur, ut conclusio ex principiis" (*CG*, IV, cap. 14). "Quod quidem inconveniens ex quattuor potest considerari: primo quidem quia cum Filius in divinis procedat ut verbum, si Filius filium generaret, sequeretur quod in Deo verbum ex verbo procederet, quod quidem esse non potest nisi in intellectu inquisitivo et discursivo in quo verbum ex verbo procedit, dum ex consideratione unius veritatis in alterius veritatis considerationem procedit; quod nullo modo convenit perfectioni et simplicitati intellectus divini qui uno intuitu omnia simul videt" (*De Pot.*, q. 9, a. 9, ad 1). "Sicut si nos in hoc ipso quod intelligimus quid est homo, intelligeremus omnia quae de homine praedicari possunt. Quod quidem in intellectu nostro non contingit, qui de uno in aliud discurrit, propter hoc quod species intelligibilis sic repraesentat unum, quod non repraesentat aliud. Unde intelligendo quid est homo, non ex hoc ipso alia quae ei insunt, intelligimus; sed divisim, secundum quandam successionem. Et propter hoc, ea quae seorsum intelligimus, oportet nos in unum redigere per modum compositionis vel divisionis, enuntiationem formando" (*ST*, I, q. 14, a. 14).

express the actual existence of the subject.³³ It is clear in this purely existential type of judgment that this is the only possible connotation of the proposition. It is not clear that the attributive type of judgment, such as "Socrates is white," does not also leave itself open to existential significance. The proposition as it stands can mean either "If Socrates exists, then Socrates includes the intelligibility of whiteness," which makes it a purely attributive judgment; or it may mean "There exists a real subject, Socrates, which has the real attribute of being white." The latter meaning would make the judgment both attributive and existential. In both types of judgment, there is a composition of subject and predicate; but clearly the significance of the "is" in each case is different. St. Thomas clearly recognized that there was such a difference.³⁴

The existential "is" in these propositions is certainly not the *tertium adjacens*, and it does lend added significance to the proposition. But whence arises this added element? We cannot say that it arises in the same way as the content of subject and predicate—that is, there is no *verbum entis* produced in the intellect, which is then composed in the enuntiation with the subject and predicate. Existence is not a concept and cannot be reduced to the conceptual status of conceived essence.³⁵ It does not seem that St. Thomas

³³"Circa primum duo oportet intelligere: primo quidem quid est hoc quod dicit, est *tertium adjacens praedicatur*. Ad cujus evidentiam, considerandum est quod hoc verbum *est* quandoque in enuntiatione praedicatur secundum se; ut cum dicitur, *Socrates est*: per quod nihil intendimus significare, quam quod Socrates sit in rerum natura. Quandoque vero non praedicatur per se quasi principale praedicatum, sed quasi conjunctum principali praedicato ad connectendum ipsum subjecto; sicut cum dicitur, *Socrates est albus*, non est intentio loquentis ut asserat Socratem esse in rerum natura, sed ut attribuat ei albedinem mediante hoc verbo *est*; et ideo in talibus, *est* praedicatur ut adjacens principali praedicato. Et dicitur esse tertium non quia sit tertium praedicatum, sed quia est tertia dictio posita in enuntiatione, quae simul cum

nomine praedicato facit unum praedicatum, ut sic enuntiatio dividatur in duas partes et non in tres" (*In II Periherm.*, lect. 2).

³⁴"Ad secundum dicendum quod *esse* dupliciter dicitur: uno modo, significat actum essendi; alio modo, significat compositionem propositionis, quam anima adinvenit coniungens praedicatum subjecto" (*ST*, I, q. 3, a. 4, ad 2).

³⁵G. Rabeau is of the opinion that there is a separate *species intelligibilis* and a separate *verbum* for the act of existence. This would seem to constitute a gross misconception of the true character of the *actus existendi*. See G. Rabeau, *Species. Verbum*. ("Bibliothèque Thomiste," Vol. xxii. Paris: Vrin, 1938), pp. 156-159. Care must be taken to distinguish "existence" or "being" as a construct, which is capable of conceptualization, from that real

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intended the composition of propositions to be relegated to logical significance only. He seems to have intended that intellectual composition and division should correspond to the various levels of composition and division in real beings.³⁶ Such correspondence would be useless and meaningless if St. Thomas did not intend that logical composition in judgment be capable at least of existential reference.³⁷ It would seem, then, that the respective significance of "is" as either purely logical and attributive, or as existential and attributive, or as simply existential, is rather a function of the operation of the intellect judging than of any intelligible content of the propositions.³⁸

The mental word, as we have seen, is capable of functioning as an object of intellection without being referred to any extramental reality. It is also capable of functioning as directly referring to the real thing which is being understood. In the former instance, the affirmation of composition can be no more than an affirmation of logical composition without any existential reference. Taken in its latter function, however, the affirmation of composition in a mental word, which is immediately referred to a real thing, can indicate nothing else than the affirmation of the real composition of the really

existence which is grasped in an immediate judgment of existence. Obviously, the conception of being-as-construct is not in question here.

³⁶The relations between real composition and logical composition are indicated by St. Thomas in *ST*, I, q. 85, a. 5, ad 3. The important point for our consideration is that St. Thomas recognized a correspondence to real beings. See R. J. Henle, S.J., "Existentialism and the Judgment." *Proceedings of the ACPA*, xxi (1946), 40-53.

³⁷The issues in this discussion are highly complicated and deserving of more careful consideration and examination of St. Thomas's expressions than we have been able to afford here. A very helpful discussion is to be found in E. Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952), pp. 190-232. The relevance of the discussion to the development of an existential metaphysics is presented in Henle, "Existentialism and the Judgment."

³⁸In other words, it is not the quidditative content of the propositions

which determines the existential status of a given proposition. This issue was settled by Kant. But the difference between logical and existential assertion remains to be accounted for. The grasp and expression of existential intelligibility seems to be understandable in terms of the interpenetration and contact of the judging intellect and the sense powers. The immediately presented object is grasped in a single self-reflective act of judgment in which objective actuality is understood and expressed. No more than this is necessary, for the relation of acting intellect to the *esse rei* is that of act to act. The significance of "is" in an existential proposition is not a content but only the act of judgment immediately united to the actuality of being. This grasp of objectivity and existence, although it occurs in the composite—sensitive and intellective—act of perception, is nonetheless an act of the judging intellect.

³⁹In any case of composition involving *verba*, there is a parallel composition of phantasms in the imagination. The intellect of man cannot understand

existing object. In neither case is there any necessity or justification for a separate *verbum* for the existential element.³⁹

In all this discussion of the relation between the mental word and real being, an important point to remember is that in St. Thomas's conception of the mental word the mind forms the word not only about external reality but also about itself. In understanding itself, the intellect forms a likeness of itself in the mental word. It is precisely in this self-understanding and expressing character that the intellect provides St. Thomas with the finite analogy to the divine procession of the Trinity.⁴⁰

But what is the nature of the mental word as a relational medium, which somehow unites the understanding subject with the understood

except by the illumination of the phantasm by the agent intellect. This effects the production of the *species* in the possible intellect. We form *verba* and understand only insofar as this causal complex is operating. Thus St. Thomas will say, "Vis cognoscitiva non cognoscit aliquid actu nisi adsit intentio: unde et phantasmata in organo conservata interdum non actu imaginamur, quia intentio non fertur ad ea; appetitus enim alias potentias in actum movet in agentibus per voluntatem. Multa igitur ad quae simul intentio non fertur, non simul intuemur. Quae autem oportet sub una intentione cadere, oportet simul esse intellecta: qui enim comparisonem duorum considerat, intentionem ad utrumque dirigit et simul intuemur utrumque" (*CG*, I, cap. 55).

Further comment is added on the question of modification of phantasms for intellectual knowledge, when St. Thomas considers prophetic knowledge: "In imaginatione autem non solum sunt formae rerum sensibilium secundum quod accipiuntur a sensu, sed transmutatur diversimode: vel propter aliquam transmutationem corporalem, sicut accidit in dormientibus et furiosis; vel etiam secundum imperium rationis disponuntur phantasmata in ordine ad id quod est intelligendum. Sicut enim ex diversa ordinatione earundam litterarum accipiuntur diversi intellec-

tus, ita etiam secundum diversam dispositionem phantasmatum resultant in intellectu diversae species intelligibiles.—Judicium autem humanae mentis fit secundum vim intellectualis luminis" (*ST*, II-II, q. 173, a. 2).

⁴⁰"Sed in cognitione qua mens nostra cognoscit seipsam, est repraesentatio Trinitatis increatae secundum analogiam, in quantum hoc modo mens cognoscens seipsam verbum sui gignit, et ex utroque procedit amor. Sic Pater seipsum dicens, Verbum suum genuit ab aeterno, et ex utroque procedit Spiritus Sanctus" (*De Ver.*, q. 10, a. 7). "Omne autem intellectum, in quantum intellectum, oportet esse in intelligente: significat enim ipsum intelligere apprehensionem ejus quod intelligitur per intellectum; unde etiam intellectus noster, seipsum intelligens, est in seipso, non solum ut idem sibi per essentiam, sed etiam ut a se apprehensum intelligendo" (*CG*, IV, cap. 11). "Et si quidem eadem res sit intelligens et intellecta, tunc verbum est ratio et similitudo intellectus, a quo procedit; . . . Sed quando intellectus intelligit se, tunc hujusmodi verbum est similitudo et ratio intellectus. Et ideo Augustinus ponit similitudinem Trinitatis in anima, secundum quod mens intelligit seipsam, non autem secundum quod intelligit alia" (*In Joannem*, cap. 1, lect. 1). See also *De Ver.*, q. 10, aa. 8-9.

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reality? In the main, St. Thomas seems to consider the mental word in three distinguishable contexts: as a likeness of an immediately known reality, as a medium of knowledge, and as an object of knowledge in itself. Considering it as a likeness by which the subject knows a distinct object, St. Thomas speaks of the mental word as *that by which* the intellect knows.⁴¹ In this context, the function of the mental word is parallel to that of the *species*, to the extent that the latter is the *primum quo* and the former the *secundum quo* of the knowing process.⁴² The emphasis seems to be on the relation between the knowing subject and the known object. St. Thomas compares the impressed *species* and the mental word precisely in their function of uniting subject and object. On this level, his treatment of the mental word parallels that of the impressed *species* and in this regard is not distinguished from it.

In other contexts, St. Thomas focuses his attention on the nature of the mental word precisely as a means of knowing. In these places, he seems to prescind from the experientially immediate relation of knowing subject and known object in order to place the mental word properly in the causal complex of psychological acts which accounts for the knowing process. He will speak of the mental word as something like an intelligible instrument, which the intellect uses to

⁴¹"Ad quantum dicendum, quod intellectus divinus non intelligit essentiam suam per aliquam speciem differentem essentialiter aut realiter ab ipsa essentia; nihilominus tamen ipse intelligit essentiam suam per essentiam suam; unde essentia se habet ut intelligens, et ut intellecta, et ut quo intelligitur; et inquantum se habet ut intelligens, sic vere et proprie est ibi ratio intellectus, et inquantum se habet ut id quod intelligitur, est ibi vere ratio intellecti; sed inquantum se habet ut quo intelligitur, sic est ibi ratio verbi" (*In I Sent.*, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1, ad 4). "Ad tertium dicendum, quod conceptio intellectus est media inter intellectum et rem intellectam, quia ea mediante operatio intellectus pertingit ad rem. Et ideo conceptio intellectus non solum est id quod intellectum est, sed etiam id quo res intelligitur" (*De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 2, ad 3).

In this context, St. Thomas uses the

expression *similitudo rei intellectae* indiscriminately of both *species* and *verbum*. This usage emphasizes the parallelism between the two *species*. See note 6.

⁴²"Nihilominus tamen forma praedicta est secundum quod intelligitur: quia per formam excogitatum artifex intelligit quid operandum sit; sicut in intellectu speculativo videmus quod species, qua intellectus informatur ut intelligat actu, est primum quo intelligitur; ex hoc autem quod est effectus in actu, per talem formam operari iam potest formando quidditates rerum et componendo et dividendo; unde ipsa quidditas formata in intellectu, vel etiam compositio et divisio, est quoddam operatum ipsius, per quod tamen intellectus venit in cognitionem rei exterioris; et si est quasi secundum quo intelligitur" (*De Ver.*, q. 3, a. 2).

understand.⁴³ It is in this vein that he will refer to the mental word as *that in which* the intellect understands.⁴⁴ In these contexts, the mental word and the *species* are compared or contrasted as knowledge media. The emphasis seems to be on the produced and formed character of the mental word in comparison with the received character of the impressed *species*. The reception of the *species* is a passion, whereas the mental word is produced and fashioned in the immanent operation of the intellect. It is in this sense that St. Thomas wishes to distinguish *verbum* and *species*, for each is a different kind of medium. Thus, when St. Thomas applies the *in quo* terminology to the mental word, his meaning must be interpreted within this kind of causal context. To transfer this treatment into the radically different context of epistemological experience is a case of mistaken identity.⁴⁵

⁴³"Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod intellectus intelligit aliquid dupliciter: uno modo formaliter, et sic intelligit specie intelligibili qua fit in actu; alio modo sicut instrumento quo utitur ad aliquid intelligendum: et hoc modo intellectus verbo intelligit, quia format verbum ad hoc quod intelligat rem" (*Quodlibet.*, V, a. 9, ad 1).

⁴⁴"Istud ergo sic expressum, scilicet formatum in anima, dicitur verbum interius; et ideo comparatur ad intellectum non sicut quo intellectus intelligit, sed sicut in quo intelligit: quia in ipso expresso et formato videt naturam rei intellectae" (*In Joannem*, cap. 1, lect. 1).

⁴⁵In one place, St. Thomas considers the various *media* which can be had in intellectual knowledge. He is considering the possibility of immediate knowledge of the divine essence by created intellects. "Ad cujus evidentiam sciendum est, quod in visione intellectiva triplex medium contingit esse. *Unum*, sub quo intellectus videt, quod disponit eum ad videndum; et hoc est in nobis lumen intellectus agentis, quod se habet ad intellectum possibilem nostrum, sicut lumen solis ad oculum. *Aliud* medium est quo videt, et hoc est species intelligibilis, quae intellectum possibilem determinat, et habet se ad

intellectum possibilem, sicut species lapidis ad oculum. *Tertium* medium est in quo aliquid videtur; et hoc est res aliqua per quam in cognitionem alterius devenimus, sicut in effectu videmus causam, et in uno similium vel contrariorum videtur aliud; et hoc medium se habet ad intellectum, sicut speculum ad visum corporalem, in quo oculus aliquam rem videt. *Primum* ergo medium et *secundum* non faciunt mediatam visionem: immediate enim dicitur aliquid videre lapidem, quamvis eum per speciem ejus in oculo receptam et per lumen videat: quia visus non fertur in haec media tamquam in visibilia sed per haec media fertur in unum visibile, quod est extra oculum. Sed *tertium* medium facit visionem mediatam. Visus enim prius fertur in speculum sicut in visibile, quo mediante accipit speciem rei visae in specie vel speculo; similiter intellectus cognoscens causam in causato, fertur in ipsum causatum sicut in quoddam intelligibile, ex quo transit in cognitionem causae" (*Quodlibet.*, VII, a. 1). The *medium in quo* described in this passage is applied to the knowledge we have of the divine essence in this life—through its created effects. The only possible place in this categorization for the *verbum* is that of the *medium quo*. St. Thomas seems to

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Finally, when St. Thomas speaks of the mental word as an object of knowledge in itself, he is always careful to distinguish this knowing situation from that in which the mental word functions as a likeness by which the intellect knows the thing.⁴⁶ Thus, the distinction of these various conceptions of the mediating function of the mental

be referring to the impressed species in this passage under the same rubric. We might conclude from this and from what we have seen in regard to his general treatment of *species* and *verbum* as media, that the *verbum* was not a *medium in quo* for St. Thomas, at least in any meaning of that denomination which would imply experiential removal from the object of awareness. In a later text, where he is speaking of God's knowledge of things distinct from Him, St. Thomas says, "Ad sciendum autem qualiter alia a se cognoscat, considerandum est quod dupliciter aliquid cognoscitur: uno modo, in seipso; alio modo, in altero. In seipso quidem cognoscitur aliquid, quando cognoscitur per speciem propriam adaequatam ipsi cognoscibili: sicut cum oculus videt hominem per speciem hominis. In alio autem videtur id quod videtur per speciem continentis: sicut cum pars videtur in toto per speciem totius, vel cum homo videtur in speculo per speciem speculi, vel quocumque alio modo contingat aliquid in alio videri" (ST, I, q. 14, a. 5). This manner of knowing something in *alio* is then applied to God's knowledge of things distinct from Him, which things He knows in and through His own essence. God's knowledge of things is certainly in no sense mediate.

Both of these places are the only places that this survey could uncover in which St. Thomas speaks of knowledge of one thing in something else and uses the example of a mirror to explain his meaning. In neither of these texts does the example of the mirror apply to the *verbum*. I do not know how the application of the example of the mirror to the *verbum* ever arose, but it does not seem to fall in with the context or spirit of St. Thomas's analysis.

⁴⁶"Sed quamvis aliquid est species vel similitudo alterius, non tamen oportet quod semper quandocumque converti-

tur in speciem, convertatur in illud cuius est species vel similitudo; quia in speciem vel in imaginem contingit fieri conversionem dupliciter: vel secundum quod est species talis rei, et tunc est eadem conversio in rem et in speciem rei; vel in speciem secundum quod est res quaedam; et sic non oportet quod eadem conversione convertatur quis per intellectum in speciem rei et in rem; sicut quando aliquis considerat imaginem in quantum est corpus lapideum, et quantum est similitudo Socratis vel Platonis" (In I Sent., d. 27, a. 2, ad 3, sol.). "... unde et ipsa intentio *verbum interius* nominatur, quod est exteriori verbo significatum. Et quidem quod praedicta intentio non sit in nobis res intellecta, inde apparet quod aliud est intelligere rem, et aliud est intelligere ipsam intentionem intellectam, quod intellectus facit dum super suum opus reflectitur: unde et aliae scientiae sunt de rebus, et aliae de intentionibus intellectis" (CG, IV, cap. 11). "Sed quia intellectus supra seipsum reflectitur secundum eandem reflectionem intelligit et suum intelligere, et speciem qua intelligit. Et sic species intellectiva secundario est id quod intelligitur. Sed id quod intelligitur primo, est res cuius species intelligibilis est similitudo" (ST, I, q. 85, a. 2).

We might mention that this last text contains an instance of St. Thomas's use of *species intelligibilis* for the *verbum*. The expression more commonly denotes the impressed *species*. However, the expression *species intellectiva* clearly denotes the *verbum*; and further the *speciem qua intelligit*, which is itself understood, must be the *verbum* and not the impressed *species*. The continuity of the passage, then, demands that the *species intelligibilis* be a denotation of the *verbum* also. This instance is similar to, but not as clear cut as, that in *Quodlibet*, V, a. 9. See note 6.

word in knowledge seems to depend on the direction of the intention of the intellect, as attending either to the thing in reality or to the likeness of that thing. When the intellect's attention is directed to the extramental reality, the mental word itself is no longer in the focus of awareness.

The operations of our intellect are not restricted to the formal acts of forming definitions and of judgment. We have touched on some of the related aspects of the intellect's *per accidens* functions in the discussion of the existential type of judgments.⁴⁷ No treatment of the mental word in human cognition could afford to pass over the functions of the mental word in the intellectual knowledge of material singulars.⁴⁸

The contact of intellect with sense can be in two directions: from sense to intellect in the knowledge of singulars and from intellect to sense in the practical order. In the practical order there is a syllogistic-like movement from the universal major of the intellect, through the particular minor of sense, to the practical conclusion in a particular matter.⁴⁹ The intellect, then, properly and *per se*, knows

⁴⁷"... intellectus noster per se loquendo, singularia non cognoscat, sed universalia tantum. . . . Sed per accidens contingit quod intellectus noster singulare cognoscit" (*De Ver.*, q. 2, a. 6).

⁴⁸The character of the intellectual operation in knowledge of singulars and its relation to the sense powers has been thoroughly treated by G. P. Klubertanz, S.J., in "St. Thomas and the Knowledge of the Singular." *New Scholasticism*, xxvi (1952), 135-66, and also in his more extensive work, *The Discursive Power* (St. Louis, 1952). Our concern here is not so much with the teaching of St. Thomas on the *continuatio* of sense and intellect or the application of universal knowledge to the particular in the speculative and practical orders. We are rather concerned with showing how these general doctrines relate to St. Thomas's teaching on the *verbum*. Thus only a few texts will be cited to give the typical formulation of these doctrines.

⁴⁹"Quae quidem continuatio est dupli-

citer. . . . Alio modo secundum quod motus qui est ab anima ad res, incipit a mente, et procedit in partem sensitivam, prout mens regit inferiores vires. Et sic singularibus se immiscet mediante ratione particulari, quae est potentia quaedam individualis quae alio nomine dicitur cogitativa, et habet determinatum organum in corpore, scilicet mediam cellulam capitis. Universalis vero sententiam quam mens habet de operabilibus, non est possibile applicari ad particularem actum nisi per aliquam potentiam mediam apprehendentem singulare ut sic fiat quidam syllogismus, cuius maior sit universalis, quae est sententia mentis; minor autem singularis, quae est applicatio particularis rationis; conclusio vero electio singularis operis, ut patet per id quod habetur III *de Anima*" (*De Ver.*, q. 10, a. 5). "Ad secundum dicendum quod electio particularis operabilis est quasi conclusio syllogismi intellectus practici, ut dicitur in VII *Ethic*. Ex universali autem propositione directe non potest concludi singularis, nisi mediante aliqua

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only the universal;⁵⁰ however, indirectly and by a certain reflection to the phantasm, the intellect understands and grasps the singular also.⁵¹ There is a causal priority of sense over intellect in relation to the singular object; but as grasped in the knowing process, the singular object is both sensible and intelligible.⁵²

As regards the intellective abstraction of the universal, we must be careful not to confuse the direct universal, which is immediately abstracted from the sense phantasm and predicated materially of many things, with the reflex universal, which is constituted by the operation

singulari propositione assumpta. Unde universalis ratio intellectus practici non movet nisi mediante particulari apprehensione sensitivae partis, ut dicitur in *III de Anima*" (ST, I, q. 86, a. 1, ad 2).

⁵⁰"Ad primum ergo dicendum quod intellectus noster nunc cognoscit per species a rebus acceptas, quae sunt abstractae a materia et omnibus materiae conditionibus; et ideo non potest cognoscere singularia, quorum principium est materia, sed universalia tantum" (*De An.*, a. 20, ad 1).

⁵¹"Quae quidem continuatio est dupliciter. Uno modo inquantum motus sensitivae partis terminatur ad mentem, sicut accidit in motu qui est a rebus ad animam. Et sic mens singulare cognoscit per quandam reflexionem, prout scilicet mens cognoscendo obiectum suum, quod est aliqua natura universalis, redit in cognitionem sui actus, et ulterius in speciem quae est actus sui principium, et ulterius in phantasma a quo species est abstracta; et sic aliquam cognitionem de singulari accipit" (*De Ver.*, q. 10, a. 5). "Ad quintum dicendum quod intellectus noster et abstrahit species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus, inquantum considerat naturas rerum in universali; et tamen intelligit eas in phantasmatibus quia non potest intelligere etiam ea quorum species abstrahit, nisi convertendo se ad phantasma, ut supra dictum est" (ST, I, q. 85, a. 1, ad 5). "Indirecte autem, et quasi per quandam reflexionem, potest cognoscere singulare: quia, sicut supra dictum est, etiam postquam species intelligibiles abstraxit, non potest secundum eas actu intelligere nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, in quibus species intelligibiles intelligit, ut dicitur in *III de Anima*.

Sic igitur ipsum universale per speciem intelligibilem directe intelligit; indirecte autem singularia, quorum sunt phantasmata.—Et hoc modo format hanc propositionem, *Socrates est homo*" (*ibid.*, q. 86, a. 1).

⁵²"Et ideo dicendum quod primo cognitum homini potest accipi dupliciter: aut secundum ordinem diversarum potentiarum; aut secundum ordinem objectorum in una potentia. Primo quidem modo, cum cognitio intellectus nostri tota derivetur a sensu, illud, quod est cognoscibile a sensu, est prius notum nobis quam illud, quod est cognoscibile ab intellectu, scilicet singulare vel sensibile intelligibile" (*In de Trin.*, q. 1, a. 3). "Intelligible" is the reading of the older editions and has some good manuscript authority (see the critical edition of Bruno Decker [Leiden: Brill, 1955], p. 71). Decker prefers "intelligibili," which would simply mean "the singular or sensible [is known before] the intelligible."

The phrase "sensible intelligibile" presents difficulties. In the context it could mean that the object of the intellect, as intellect, was both sensible and intelligible; or, it could mean that the object of sense, was both sensible and intelligible. In either case, the singular as first known seems to be both sensible and intelligible. It is true that St. Thomas only rarely explicitly affirms the intellectual knowledge of the sensible singular (see the texts cited in note 51); he very often asserts the sensitive and/or imaginative knowledge of the intelligible. But in his doctrine of the unity of man's operations, one of these positions implies the other.

of the intellect in a reflex moment as formally universal and as such impossible of predication.⁵³ Thus, when the intellect, in its operation of composition or division, forms a mental word, it is not entirely adequate to describe the intelligibilities involved in the judgment as universal. Rather, they are neither universal nor singular, but abstract. And as such, they can be applied in predication to one or more subjects precisely because the intellect, acting in conjunction with sense, finds the *ratio intelligibilitatis* verified in the object of its knowledge; that is, in the sensible, material existent.

The interpenetration of sense and intellect permeates all of human cognition, even to the level of scientific knowledge. St. Thomas remarks that only when a man has reduced the universal knowledge of principles to the actual knowledge of particular principles, can he be said to have acquired scientific knowledge.⁵⁴ But the application of principles does not stop there; it extends even to the level of singular, material things. Such an application of universal principles to particular things can be effected only by the *reflexio* of intellect to the lower powers of sense.⁵⁵ So intimate and necessary is this connection of sense

⁵³"Ad primum ergo dicendum quod universale dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo, secundum quod natura universalis consideratur simul cum intentione universalitatis. Et cum intentio universalitatis, ut scilicet unum et idem habeat habitudinem ad multa, proveniat ex abstractione intellectus, oportet quod secundum hunc modum universale sit posterius. Unde in *I de Anima* dicitur quod *animal universale aut nihil est, aut posterius est . . .* Alio modo potest considerari quantum ad ipsam naturam, scilicet animalitatis vel humanitatis, prout invenitur in particularibus" (*ST*, I, q. 85, a. 3, ad 1).

⁵⁴"Similiter etiam dicendum de scientiae acquisitione; quod praexistunt in nobis quaedam scientiarum semina, scilicet primae conceptiones intellectus, quae statim lumine intellectus agentis cognoscuntur per species a sensibilibus abstractas, sive sint complexa, ut dignitates, sive incomplexa, sicut ratio entis, et unius, et huiusmodi, quae statim intellectus apprehendit. Ex istis autem principiis universalibus omnia principia

sequuntur, sicut ex quibusdam rationibus seminalibus. Quando ergo ex istis universalibus cognitionibus mens educitur ut actu cognoscat particularia, quae prius in potentia, et quasi in universali cognoscebantur, tunc aliquis dicitur scientiam acquirere" (*De Ver.*, q. 11, a. 1).

⁵⁵"Ad quartum dicendum quod scientia est de aliquo dupliciter: uno modo primo et principaliter, et sic scientia est de rationibus universalibus, super quas fundatur; alio modo est de aliquibus secundo et quasi per reflexionem quandam, et sic de illis rebus, quarum sunt illae rationes, inquantum illas rationes applicat ad res etiam particulares, quarum sunt, adminiculo inferiorum virium. Ratione enim universali utitur sciens et ut re scita et ut medio sciendi. Per universalem enim hominis rationem possum iudicare de hoc vel de illo. Rationes autem universales rerum omnes sunt immobiles, et ideo quantum ad hoc omnis scientia de necessariis est. Sed rerum, quarum sunt illae rationes, quaedam sunt necessariae

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and intellect, even in scientific knowledge, that the intellect cannot judge perfectly about anything without the perfect cooperation and application of the sense powers.⁵⁶ So that, for the human intellect, even its highest natural intellectual operations are somehow intimately connected to sense and sense knowledge.

This all too cursory examination of the texts of St Thomas dealing with the mental word in human cognition has revealed at least one point that has relevance for the epistemological evaluation of our experience. Remembering that the psychological account given by St. Thomas started from the experience of knowledge, we should expect that that account would, in a sense, terminate in experience. The causal-metaphysical analysis, in whatever terms it may be couched and however its method may differ from any attempt at the direct description of the knowing experience, ought still to be resolvable into the fundamental moments of that experience.

St. Thomas, speaking in broad terms, distinguishes two moments or functions of the mental word in cognition. The first is that in which the mental word functions as an object of knowledge in itself. This moment, as far as we can judge from this study, is reflective, purely intellectual, and related to the data of sense experience only as to the necessary conditions under which intellection can occur, as long as the soul is in the body. The epistemological relevance of this moment for our purposes is small, and it does not concern us here, except as a

et immobiles, quaedam contingentes et mobiles, et quantum ad hoc de rebus contingentibus et mobilibus dicuntur esse scientiae" (*In de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 2, ad 4).

⁵⁶"Judicium autem perfectum de re aliqua dari non potest, nisi ea omnia quae ad rem pertinent cognoscantur; et praecipue si ignoretur id quod est terminus et finis iudicii. . . . Manifestum est autem quod non potest esse perfectum iudicium fabri de cultello, si opus ignoraret: et similiter non potest esse perfectum iudicium scientiae naturalis de rebus naturalibus, si sensibilia ignorentur. Omnia autem quae in praesenti statu intelligimus, cognoscuntur a nobis per comparisonem ad res sensibiles naturales. Unde impossibile est quod sit in nobis iudicium intellectus perfectum, cum ligamento sensus, per quem res

sensibiles cognoscimus" (*ST*, I, q. 84, a. 8).

We might mention in passing that the same parallel sort of intellect-sense contact and causal penetration is found in the production of artifacts from the *idea*, or exemplar, in the intellect of the maker; the *idea* is none other than the *verbum*. "Alio modo ita quod sit terminus actus intelligendi, sicut artifex intelligendo excogitat formam domus; et cum illa forma sit excogitata per actum intelligendi et quasi per actum effecta, non potest esse principium actus intelligendi, ut sit primum quo intelligatur; sed magis se habet ut intellectum, quo intelligens aliquid operatur" (*De Ver.*, q. 3, a. 2). See also *ST*, I, q. 15, a. 1; *ibid.*, a. 2, ad 2; *ibid.*, q. 44, a. 3; *ibid.*, III, q. 3, a. 8.

demarcation of the second moment. The second function of the mental word is as a means of knowing something outside of itself. In this context, the mental word becomes only a means and in no sense a term of intellectual knowing. It is necessary as a metaphysical prerequisite for the operation, but it is not known in itself. Rather it is merely, or better, purely and simply, that by which the intellect knows the thing.

Thus, in the immediate knowledge of material singulars which characterizes our experience, the immediacy of that knowing is neither interfered with, nor contradicted by, the means, which make this very immediacy possible. In my awareness of things, I am not aware of any object other than the thing. Still, I find that I can understand and think about the intelligibilities which I originally discovered in the thing, when the thing itself is no longer in my awareness. I can also discover, by prolonged reflection and philosophical analysis, that the intellectual operation, which I performed in my immediate perceptual knowing of the thing, required an immanently produced object for that operation in the intelligible order. In both these cases, which are subsequent to, and thus related to, the knowledge of singular things, I can experience and recognize the necessity of the mental word; but in both cases, there is no longer question of my immediate knowledge of an existing thing.

One last point deserves to be mentioned in this matter. Which of the two general functions of the mental word is to take precedence will be determined largely by the direction of the intellect's awareness by attention. At any given moment in the perceptive contact of intellect and sense with a really existing object, the immediacy of my awareness of that object can be disrupted by the unstable focus of my attention.⁵⁷ The subtle shift in the focus of awareness away from the real being which is presenting itself and to the intelligible correlates which stand in intentional relation to that real being can dissipate the perceptual

⁵⁷The issues involved in attention, on both the psychological and the epistemological plane, are difficult and crucial. They remain relatively unexplored in regard to the problem of immediacy of perceptual knowledge. Attention can, in

general, be object-directed or subject-directed, and in each of these areas, we must recognize multiple degrees of awareness. It is sufficient for our purpose that the subject-object split be recognized.

contact and constitute a completely different noetic context. The more object-directed my attention is, the greater will the immediacy and objectivity of perceptual knowledge impress itself on me. The more subject-directed my attention is, the more will the epistemological immediacy become mitigated.⁵⁸

⁵⁸Knowing what we do about the correlations, on the psychological level, between perception and personality, and with some as yet unscientific suggestions as to the relations between the psychological structure of personality and the realist-idealist inclinations of philosophers, one cannot but wonder whether the ultimate resolution of the questions involving the realist immediacy of knowledge does not lie in the direction of perception-and-personality. Some suggestive work along these lines is reported in *Acta Psychologica*, xiv (1958), 12-23.

SECONDARY CAUSALITY IN THE *SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES*

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In the introduction to the excellent translation of the third book of the *Summa contra Gentiles*, the reader's attention is directed to three sections of the work which have aroused, or are arousing, controversy or are important in their unsurpassed treatment of certain questions.¹ These are: the famous discussion on the end of man which has led to a number of modern studies; the study of man's desire for the vision of God; and St. Thomas's treatment of moral problems under the precepts and counsels of divine law. Though the study we plan to make is connected with none of these three, our problem is nevertheless one which St. Thomas appears to be at special pains to present in all possible clarity and rigor. The problem is that of secondary causality.²

In order to see the Thomistic contribution in respect to secondary causality, the writer intends first to present briefly the thought of St. Augustine in regard to this problem. This is not for the purpose of comparing the two. Such an undertaking would involve more extensive research than is possible in the writer's present circumstances and would transcend the limitations of the *Contra Gentiles*. Since the purpose of this paper is to discuss a problem within a certain text, this additional task will not be undertaken here. Presenting St. Augustine first will serve simply to show the divergence between St. Thomas and other schools of thought under Augustinian influence in regard to this matter.

The mature thought of St. Augustine in reference to proximate causality is best found in the third book of his *De Trinitate*. Book III deals with the nature of the theophanies by which God has revealed Himself to man, whether they were by angels or by specially formed

creatures. Whatever the instrument, St. Augustine says, it is the power of the will of God which reaches to the sensible effects.

In all corporeal change God is the chief cause. St. Augustine adduces the example of the man who contracts an illness after spending himself in some work of mercy. Physicians might err in their discovery of a cause, one saying it was due to too much moisture in the body, the other to too little. Still, this is a pronouncement concerning only proximate causes. Further inquiry into the cause of the dryness reveals the self-imposed toil above which again is the soul of the individual which chose the work. St. Augustine continues:

Yet neither would this be the first cause, for that doubtless was a higher cause still, and lay in the unchangeable wisdom itself, by serving which in love, and by obeying its ineffable commands, the soul of the wise man had undertaken that self-imposed toil; and so nothing else but the will of God would be found most truly to be the cause of that illness.³

Following this, St. Augustine gives a slight foretaste of his theory of knowledge.⁴ To show more conclusively his position in regard to the

¹St. Thomas Aquinas, *On the Truth of the Catholic Faith*. Book Three, Providence, Part I, trans. Vernon J. Bourke (Garden City: Doubleday, 1956), pp. 18-19.

²The writer has chosen to use the *Summa contra Gentiles* for a number of reasons. She wrote her dissertation submitted as a partial requirement for a master of arts degree on the role of analogy in that work. Discovering that it was the analogy of efficient causality which provided St. Thomas a base from which to argue, she confined most of her study to the participation of creatures in being as effects of God. But in the first part of the third book, St. Thomas sees a further participation of creatures in God; namely, in respect to their being causes. The treatment of this had to be sketchy in the previous work, but the writer determined then to study this particular aspect of causality more thoroughly at a later time. This present paper is the realization of that aim.

The reader is undoubtedly aware of

the stress laid by some recent writers on the relation of causality to analogy. The *Contra Gentiles*, a work from the middle period of St. Thomas's life, was chosen because of the growing awareness of the importance of this text. Proof for this statement is the new five-volume translation published by Doubleday.

³St. Augustine, *On the Trinity*, Book III, chap. 3, trans. A. W. Haddan, Vol. VII of *The Works of Aurelius Augustinus*, ed. M. Dods (Edinburgh, 1873).

⁴*Ibid.*, chap. 8.

⁵Etienne Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de Saint Augustin* (Paris: Vrin, 1929), pp. 263-64.

⁶See Vernon J. Bourke, *Augustine's Quest of Wisdom* (Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1945), pp. 206-7. Dr. Bourke concludes: "This tendency to be unsatisfied with anything short of primary causality, as the explanation of events in this world, is a noteworthy feature of the metaphysical viewpoint of St. Augustine" (p. 207).

pre-eminence of primary causality, the Saint avers that some hidden seeds (*rationes seminales*) of all corporeal things that are born visibly are concealed in the material elements of the world. By means of these God's absolute power is imparted to creatures by which they work, applying some operation from without in proportion to the faculties assigned to each by the Creator.

When one looks at it more closely, this conception of the universe [as stable] appears in perfect agreement with the profound tendencies of Augustinianism. It eliminates effectively all suspicion of any creative efficacy whatsoever in man's activity and in that of other created beings . . . All that they [men] do is to use the intimate and secret forces of nature: *natura id agit interiore motu, nobisque occultissimo*. Whatever may be therefore the causal activity of man, it does no more than apply itself from without to these hidden forces, and it is God who creates from within: *creationem rerum visibilium Deus interius operatur*. From this results a universe, the characteristic aspect of which will be jealously safeguarded by Augustinian tradition. The created active principles scarcely do more than put into play and utilize the creative efficacy of God [*l'efficace créatrice de Dieu*] . . . It is He, in fact, who by His continuous operation up to the present day acts so that the *rationes seminales* deploy their forces and develop from their inmost recesses the visible forms which we contemplate. Instead of drawing the form [*de tirer la forme*] from the passive potency of matter, as do the secondary causes in Thomistic-Aristotelianism, created activities simply bring to light in Augustinianism the effects implanted by God in the *rationes seminales* from the very moment of creation.⁶

According to St. Augustine, any causal explanation which relies solely on secondary causes and which neglects the First Cause of all—namely, God's Will—is incomplete and not ultimate.⁶

Secondary Causality in the Contra Gentiles
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St. Thomas plunges into his study of secondary causality after showing that God, who governs all things by His providence⁷ and preserves all things in existence,⁸ has permitted a further participation of creatures in His being; namely, in respect to their being causes. This is not another application of the analogy of participation as it would be if we were examining the analogy in God's goodness or wisdom as found in the effect. Rather, this is a deeper penetration into the participation of creatures in the very being of God in respect to their being causes.⁹

... IN REGARD TO THE REALITY OF SECONDARY CAUSALITY

Because the effect imitates its cause, we can arrive at some knowledge of the cause through the study of the result of its efficiency. All knowledge of natural science is of an a-posteriori nature. If, then, effects are produced directly by God and not by the action of created things, a twofold result would ensue. First, we would be deprived of all this kind of knowledge. The power of a created cause cannot be seen unless the action proceeding from the power terminates in the effect. Since the power of a cause follows upon its nature, that nature cannot be known unless the effect shows forth the power of the agent. If all lower agents are impotent, their nature will remain unknowable. Second, the diversity of effects which we see would not necessarily follow. Heating, for example, is not caused except by the application of fire; and the generation of human beings is directly ordered to a univocal member of the species. The divine power, therefore, does not disregard the activity of the lower agent.¹⁰

⁷*CG*, III, cap. 64 (Leonine ed. man.; Rome, 1934). (Interchapter numbering corresponds to the translation by Dr. Bourke.)

⁸*Ibid.*, cap. 65.

⁹*Ibid.*, cap. 70 (no. 7).

¹⁰*Ibid.*, cap. 69 (no. 12).

¹¹*Ibid.* (no. 15).

¹²*Ibid.* (no. 16).

¹³Father Klubertanz says: "To limit creaturely causality to accidental change is to derogate from God's excellence instead of enhancing it. For God communicates to His creatures, not only being so that they exist, but also

goodness so that they can be the causes of other things. Were this not so, we would have difficulty in showing how God was supremely good" ("Causality in the Philosophy of Nature," *THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN*, XIX [1942], p. 29).

¹⁴"... ita nec forma proprie fit, sed incipit esse per hoc quod compositum sit reductum de potentia in actum, qui est forma" (*CG*, III, cap. 69 [no. 21]).

In connection with this see E. Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949), pp. 154-89 (especially p. 184).

Affirming the reality of secondary causality enhances, rather than detracts from, God's perfection and goodness. In reference to the former, St. Thomas says that an effect is more perfect in proportion to the perfection of the cause. But God is all perfect; therefore, to detract from His perfection is impossible. If we were to deny any active role in causation to creatures, this would involve a detraction both in the creature and in God. It is the manifestation of the fullness of perfection to be able to communicate to another being the perfection which one possesses.¹¹

In respect to goodness, since agents act insofar as they are in act, that which is good makes what is good; and, a fortiori, the highest good makes what is best. Now it is a sign of greater goodness and power to confer something on a number than exclusively on one. But the good of one thing becomes common to many if it can pass from one to the other, which communication can take place only through its own action. So God communicates His goodness so that the creature which receives it can transfer it to another by causing it in that other.¹²

. . . IN REGARD TO THE ACTIVITY OF SECONDARY CAUSES

The causality exercised by secondary agents is not restricted to accidental forms but reaches even to the giving of existence.¹³ Since to act is the result of a being in act, a more perfect act should not be deprived of action. Now, the substantial form is a more perfect form than the accidental form; and yet accidental forms in material things have their proper action. The disposition of matter in an accidental change is an example of this. Substantial forms should all the more have their proper actions; and since the substantial form of the agent is the source of action, it can be truly said that lower agents cause a thing *to be*. Forms, St. Thomas hastens to add, are not called *beings* in the sense that they possess being; but the composite exists by means of the form. This derogates the positions of form from *that which is to that by which the thing is*. Form "begins to be by the fact that the composite is reduced from potency to act, which is the form."¹⁴

When a lower body acts, it exerts its causality through accidents, those active and passive qualities by means of which its efficiency is

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realized. This does not limit, however, their causation simply to producing accidental modifications in others. It is the composite which acts; that is, the substantial form together with matter, and the likeness in the effect is especially to that by whose power the agent acts. As to spontaneous generation such as that observed in putrefaction, the cause there of the substantial form is one of the heavenly bodies which acts as an analogous cause, itself dependent on the Prime Cause. On this lower sphere, for the production of more perfect forms, St. Thomas says the celestial bodies, capable of such an act, must act through the dispositive character of a univocal agent.¹⁵

LIMITATION OF SECONDARY CAUSALITY

. . . PARTICIPATED NATURE OF THE AGENT IN REGARD TO BEING

Secondary causality is limited in that the agent is a participated being. St. Thomas makes this clear in a number of instances. In discussing motion, the Angelic Doctor points out that though all existing things are capable of moving and cannot cause anything except by motion, motion is not a part of the being of the thing. Since the being of anything is participated being, it cannot be the cause of the being of another but only of its being moved toward being. To exemplify the dependence involved in secondary causality, St. Thomas sets up the *a-pari* equation:

the divine operation	::	the motion of a corporeal mover
being of things		becoming and passive movement of the things made or moved ¹⁶

It is likewise evident that no particular univocal agent can be the unqualified cause of its species. Here the secondary cause can effect other members of the species¹⁷ but not itself. The individual man exists because human nature is present in his particular matter which serves as an individuating principle. When man causes man, he is, properly speaking, the cause of a human form coming to be in this matter. This limits univocal causality of this type to generation. To seek the proper agent of the species is to push the argument back to God, who stands as the first cause, an analogous one, in reference to

¹⁵CG, III, cap. 69 (no. 24).

¹⁶*Ibid.*, cap. 65 (no. 5).

¹⁷"Est autem causa hic homo huius hominis, per se loquendo" (*ibid.* [no. 4, init.]).

all of creation. The analogous nature of the divine causality obtains in the reflection of likeness which the effect mirrors. God then stands in regard to species as the secondary agent in reference to the individual, of which, St. Thomas affirms again, He is the direct cause. Now just as generative action ceases as soon as the generating agent ceases, so would the entire species cease if the first cause were to cease its operation.

. . . PARTICIPATED NATURE OF THE AGENT IN ITS POWER AS CAUSE

The common product of all agents is being. Now, several agents do not produce one result unless they act as one; and this, in turn, implies subordination to one leader. The example which St. Thomas gives is that of all the men in the army who work to bring about victory, and they do this by virtue of being subordinated to a leader whose proper end is victory. God alone can properly cause being, and therefore all other agents must participate in this divine power in order to effect the end.

Too, in all ordered series of causes, what is last in generation and first in intention is the proper product of the primary agent. For example, the form of the house which is properly said to be the product of the builder comes into effect only after the preparation of cement, stones, and timber, which, in turn, are the proper effects of the lesser workmen. In all action, being is intended. Therefore being is the proper product of the first cause, and all others give being by acting through the power of this principal agent, God.

The order of effects follows the order of causes where the more perfect effect must be attributed to a more perfect cause, and so on in progressively descending degrees. But the first effect is being, and all other effects are only determinations of being. Therefore, being is the proper effect of the principal agent. Whatever else produces being or particularizes or determines being does so only by acting through the power of the first cause.

Fire is the cause of all things that are on fire because whatever is a certain thing by essence is the cause of every participated likeness of that thing. But God alone is *His to be*, and other things are actual only by sharing in His total actuality or participating in His essential

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being. It follows that whatever brings something into being does so only by acting through God's power.

CONSEQUENCES FROM THE THOMISTIC DOCTRINE CONCERNING SECONDARY CAUSALITY

Two consequences result from St. Thomas's conclusions regarding secondary causality. First, since all things that act are dependent upon God, He must be everywhere;¹⁸ second, there must be some type of interaction between God and the natural agent to produce any effect.¹⁹

God's omnipresence follows in the first place since He must be present in all things which He has brought into being from nonbeing. This preservative action of God in reference to being follows from His nature as the fullness of Being.

Secondly, in the case of particular causes and their effects, there is a simultaneity of action such as fire heating through its essence and the soul conferring life on the body through its essence. Wherever being is, God must be since *esse* is proper only to Him. *Being* is predicated of things analogically, and the perfection must necessarily be brought back to the primary analogate.²⁰

The same effect can be from God and a natural agent, St. Thomas explains, if we distinguish between the thing itself that acts and the power by which it acts. Ultimately, all power comes from God; so that when a lower agent acts, it produces an effect not only by its own power but also by the power of higher agents. It is even possible to say that the same effect is produced by a lower agent and by God and by both immediately, though in different ways. For the power of the lower agent is not proportionate to the effect produced; and since there cannot be an infinite regress in regard to the powers of the next higher agents, the highest agent is discovered to be the immediate cause of the effect which is also proper to the lower agent. Nor is the effect due partly to the natural cause and partly to the divine action but wholly to both, though in a different way. As we have seen, nothing

¹⁸*Ibid.*, cap. 68.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, cap. 70.

²⁰See *ibid.*, II, cap. 15.

²¹Etienne Gilson, "Saint Thomas Aquinas," *The Wisdom of Catholicism*,

ed. Anton C. Pegis (New York: Random House, 1949), p. 935.

²²*CG*, III, cap. 69 (no. 15).

²³*Ibid.*, (no. 16).

acts except through God's power; yet through the immensity of His goodness He has communicated to His creatures His likeness as a cause so that they, too, can effect an end. There is an analogy here between the secondary cause in its dependence on God and that of an instrumental cause in its relation to the principal agent. The hewn tree is attributed both to the axe which served as the means of cutting and to the woodsman who wielded it and to both wholly.

CONCLUSION

Every operating agent is the cause of being in some way. Whenever agent causes are arranged in an orderly way, the subsequent cause works through the power of the antecedent causes as lower craftsmen work through the power of the chief artisan. Since God is the first cause, all other causes work through Him and effect being, acting as they do, through the divine power. Since the cause of an action is the one through whose power the action was effected, Holy Scripture attributes the cause of every action to God rather than to the secondary cause, saying through St. Paul: "It is God Who worketh in us both to will and to accomplish according to His good will" (*Phil.*, 2:13).

St. Thomas consistently insists that nature is responsible for its effects. ". . . it would be just as wrong to extol the rights of God at the expense of nature, since, in the long run, God's own glory would have to pay for it."²¹

God is not proved to be great by depreciating the natural order, an Augustinian tendency. There is a greater manifestation of power in creating an effect which in turn can act as a cause than in exercising His creative faculty in each particular instance. Besides the participation in being, the former creative act involves more generosity on the part of God, in that He imparts to creatures some of His perfection as cause, according to their potency to receive it.

Thus for St. Thomas, to withdraw from creatures their proper operations is to detract from the divine power²² and to disparage the divine goodness.²³

Chronicle

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY (Chicago) sponsored a symposium on "The University and the Future of America," on May 15, 1958. The role of theology in the future university was treated by the Reverend John Courtney Murray, S.J. Philosophy's task was discussed by the Reverend Martin C. D'Arcy, S.J. (Campion Hall, Oxford) and Professor Paul Weiss (Yale); Professor Eliseo Vivas (Northwestern) commented on the discussion. The role of science was considered by Doctor Paul Klopsteg.

ROSARY COLLEGE and the THOMAS MORE ASSOCIATION jointly sponsored a symposium on "The Catholic Contribution to American Intellectual Life," at River Forest, Illinois, June 14 and 15. The major speakers were: Doctor Karl Stern, the Reverend Joseph Fichter, S.J., Professor Peter Debye, Caroline Gordon Tate, the Reverend Benedict Ashley, O.P., Doctor George N. Shuster, and Professor Jerome Kerwin. Father Ashley spoke on philosophy.

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AND JNANA

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INTRODUCTION

Man's existential nature is brought out in the modern definition of him as an "incarnate spirit." For, on the one hand, he finds that the superior part of his nature has something of the infinite; he is capable of assimilating somehow all being without exception by knowledge and love. And on the other hand he realizes, too, his limitations and essential dependence on things and persons; even his body seems to stand in his way of living up to the higher status that is certainly meant for him. In this way, man is like an eagle that would fain soar to the highest heavens but cannot, as he is tied down to earth by a strong rope. We find him from the beginning of history ever seeking for solutions that will make him really "free"; he has thought out and put into practice doctrines varying from crude materialism to spiritual asceticism, from animal epicureanism to sublime mysticism—and this, both in the West and in the East alike.

Even long before Plato was born, the Upanishadic sages¹ were busy finding a way to escape from the bondage of cosmic illusion or ignorance, *maya-avidya*; from their time on, their thoughts and ideas have been guiding the lives of millions in India in one way or another. It is substantially these very ideas which Dr. Radhakrishnan, like the late swami Vivekananda, presents to the modern world as his *jnana* or wisdom. Unlike Samkara, our author likes to call scriptural knowledge *vidya* and to reserve the word *jnana* to designate its essential message, gnosis or spiritual wisdom.² He briefly describes it as "intuitive understanding",³ "realized experience";⁴ "cool, clear-sighted vision",⁵ "knowledge of Reality",⁶ "direct spiritual (integral)

apprehension of the Supreme";⁷ and he holds *that* to be the spiritual destiny of man.⁸ This "wisdom of the East," because of its strange yet spiritualistic note, seems to come as a solace to many a Westerner who is disgusted with, or unaware of, the traditions of his own past.

Now, just because this spiritual wisdom comes from a clime different from ours or is of a different past, we cannot brush it aside as worthless or erroneous. It is indeed possible that there lurks in it something useless or even harmful; but it is also possible that there is something valuable concealed in it. At any rate, human wisdom, whether of the East or of the West, needs careful and impartial analysis in order that the truth in it may be discerned.

Dr. Radhakrishnan proposes this ancient wisdom of India not only as the *sanatana dharma*, the perennial philosophy of the whole world, but also as a counter to all irreligion or "dogmatic religion"⁹ and as the essentials of genuine spiritual experience and interior life. Hence it is that he draws—or at least should draw—the attention not only of students of philosophy but also of all students of religion and the spiritual life.¹⁰

It is true that a critical study of gnosis in a classical author, in Samkara for example, might have been more fruitful than a critical study of a modern author. Yet the study of the moderns is not without profit, especially when these preserve almost all of the essentials of antiquity. Dr. Radhakrishnan is an author of no mean repute. During the last fifty years he has taught philosophy and religion in various universities; he has been invited to deliver important lectures at home and abroad; he is acknowledged by the English-reading public as one of the chief philosopher-spokesmen of India. While Gandhiji was a "saint," Tagore a poet, Aurobindo an ascetic, it is Dr. Radhakrishnan who is generally acclaimed as the

¹The earliest and the most important of these lived from the eighth to the fifth century B.C.

²S. Radhakrishnan, *Eastern Religions and Western Thought* (1939), p. 24; *The Bhagavadgita* (1948), p. 149; *The Principal Upanishads* (1953), p. 103.

³*The Idealist View of Life* (1932), p. 305.

⁴*The Hindu View of Life* (1927), p. 82.

⁵*Eastern Religions*, p. 78.

⁶*Bhagavadgita*, p. 53.

⁷*The Philosophy of S. Radhakrishnan*, ed. P. U. Schilpp ("Library of Living Philosophers Series" No. 8. New York: Tudor Pub. Co., 1952), p. 60.

⁸*Eastern Religions*, p. 94.

⁹*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 26.

¹⁰See the author's *East and West in Religion* (1933).

¹¹"Every theory of knowledge, every judgment of value refers and leads us to metaphysics" (*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 816).

¹² Cf. *Idealist View of Life*, p. 301.

philosopher of renascent Hinduism. It is, therefore, worthwhile to scrutinize and evaluate his philosophico-religious gnosis. There is already in existence the valuable work mentioned above, Professor Schilpp's *The Philosophy of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan*. But unfortunately not one of the twenty-three essays in it seems to consider critically the consistency of Dr. Radhakrishnan's principles and interpretations as a whole. To shed some light, then, on a few points and to offer some correctives to a few others in this otherwise useful inventory of our author's ideas is the aim of this initial study.

Aware of the momentous problems of the present-day world, Dr. Radhakrishnan prefers to discuss ethical principles rather than dwell on ontological truths; yet he himself is quite aware that ethics cannot stand firm unless it is based on sound metaphysics.¹¹ His interpretation of reality, therefore, is more fundamental and of greater moment than his rules of good conduct. That is why, leaving aside his ethical doctrines, I have concentrated for the most part on their metaphysical foundations.

If there is any originality in Dr. Radhakrishnan, however, it is not so much in his metaphysics itself as in his rhetorical framing of it. For his *jnana* or gnosis is in substance hardly different from the monistic theory of the Vedanta, even though some accidental changes are introduced to give it a semblance of a coherent whole. It is, rather, the impressive way he presents his favorite ideas—and that in terms familiar to readers of Plato and Plotinus, Kant and Hegel, Bradley and Bergson—that from the very start engages the attention of his audience.

I

A

RADHAKRISHNAN'S NOTION OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

Man, says Dr. Radhakrishnan, not only sees the fire that is burning in the hearth, not only infers its presence on the hill from the smoke that is visible there, but also experiences—at least on occasions—the fire of love when face to face with the true, the good, and the beautiful.¹² He has, therefore, not merely a perceptual and conceptual knowledge but

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also has, or can have, an "integral" or experiential knowledge of reality.

But what exactly does our author mean by "integral knowledge of reality"? It is not a subjective whim or the morbid views of a psychopathic mind.¹³ It is not a shadowy sentiment or pathological fancy fit for cranks and dancing dervishes.¹⁴ It is far from being occult visions, trance, and ecstasy.¹⁵ It is not a sensuous thrill or an emotional debauch.¹⁶ It is neither abstract thought and analysis nor formless darkness and primitive sentience.¹⁷ It is knowledge which is neither superficial nor symbolic nor secondhand.¹⁸ It is not mystical insight or heavenly vision or special revelation obtained through supernatural powers.¹⁹ Nor is it confused irrationalism or irresponsible mysticism. Do not the religious geniuses attest to the "objective" nature of this subject-object-less experience?²⁰ Is not the experience felt as of the nature of a discovery or a revelation, not a mere conjecture or a creation? The real is there actually confronting us; it is not conjured up out of the resources of our mind.²¹ The reality here is indeed of a different, supreme order; but it is not a private fancy or a subjective abstraction in the mind of the knower. It is a real object, *vastuvishayatvac ca.*²²

This integral knowledge of reality is nonsensuous, nonconceptual, immediate knowledge;²³ it is the most direct and penetrating examination of things possible to human mind, a simple, steady looking upon the real.²⁴ Different names are given to this higher apprehension, such

¹³*The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy* (1920), p. 439. See also p. 90.

¹⁴Author's article "The Spirit in Man," *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, ed. S. Radhakrishnan and J. H. Muirhead (1936), p. 487.

¹⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁶"My Search for Truth" (offprint, 1948), p. 30.

¹⁷*Idealist View of Life*, p. 153.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 145.

¹⁹*Principal Upanishads*, p. 103.

²⁰Cf. "Spirit in Man," p. 494.

²¹*Idealist View of Life*, p. 95.

²²*Indian Philosophy*, II, 512.

²³*Idealist View of Life*, pp. 138 and 143.

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 146.

²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 128, n. 1.

²⁶*The Heart of Hindustan* (1936), p. 8.

Cf. also *Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 794.

²⁷*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 792.

²⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 792 and 61; *Principal Upanishads*, p. 96. This "complete fusion," however, has its grades.

²⁹*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, pp. 61 and 792; *Idealist View of Life*, p. 146.

³⁰*Idealist View of Life*, p. 138.

³¹*Ibid.*, pp. 45 ff.

³²Cf. *Principal Upanishads*, pp. 130 f.

³³*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 793.

³⁴Cf. *Idealist View of Life*, p. 175.

³⁵*Indian Philosophy*, I, 238.

³⁶*Eastern Religions*, p. 51; "Spirit in Man," p. 492.

³⁷*Indian Philosophy*, II, 674.

³⁸"Spirit in Man," p. 492; *Idealist View of Life*, p. 199.

³⁹"Spirit in Man," p. 492.

as *prajna, pratibha, arshajnana, siddhadarsana, yogi-pratyaksha*.²⁵ It is wisdom which is sublimated knowledge, *jnanam vijñana sahitam*.²⁶ Here, the externality of the individual consciousness to the object is transcended.²⁷ There is a complete fusion of the subject and object, of the knower and the known.²⁸ It is knowledge by coincidence or identity;²⁹ we become one with the truth.³⁰

There are, of course, many who argue that they have no such experience of integral or intuitive knowledge. This, explains our author, is due to misapprehension. Have we not all some sense, for instance, of the organic wholeness of things, of the harmony of the world, the trustworthiness of nature, the meaningfulness of life? Have we not all some apprehension of our soul, some intuition of the self? We have all these through intuition.³¹ True, while we all have some intuitions of scientific or logical, aesthetic or ethical type, intuitions of philosophical or religious type seem to be beyond the reach of ordinary mortals. But that is simply because these are the perfect mode of integral insight possible here on earth during the cosmic manifestation.³² Intuition of God is not the only form of it,³³ though that may be the highest form of it.

If intuitive life is the highest range of the mental life of man, spiritual life or religious experience is surely intuition par excellence.³⁴ If already in the enjoyment of a melody, the contemplation of a work of art, the grasping of the argument as a whole, we have the mystical condition, the sight of God, the experience of reality,³⁵ we have in the spiritual insight a more vital realization of God, a living, immediate contact with reality.³⁶ When we contemplate a sunset over the sea or drink in the symphonies of a Mozart, we may be said to catch but the fringe of reality. It is only in a sublime religious experience that we really grasp the very essence of reality and become that reality.³⁷

Now, although the religious experience is analogous in some respects to the other higher spiritual activities, it cannot be identified with, or reduced to, any of these or the sum of them.³⁸ It is unique and autonomous.³⁹ The difference may be seen from the fact that while the cognitive and aesthetic and ethical sides of our life are only parts, however vital and significant, the religious side includes

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them all.⁴⁰ This is the transcendent vision of reality, the ineffable experience of a divine presence,⁴¹ "a turning the eye inward and seeing the self."⁴² It is not a consciousness of this or that being, but it is to know and to see in oneself the being of all beings, the Ground and the Abyss.⁴³ It is the state of pure apprehension in which the whole being is welded into one.⁴⁴ It is the intuition of all pervading unity of the self and the universe, the mystic realization of the oneness of all.⁴⁵

Spiritual experience engages our whole person. It is a state of ecstasy or complete absorption of our being. When the flash of absolute reality breaks through the normal barriers of the conscious mind, it leaves a trail of illumination in its wake. The excitement of illumination is distinct from the serene radiance of enlightenment. The human individual, in the contemplative insight, strips himself one after the other of the outer sheaths of consciousness, penetrates to the nerve and quick of his life until he is alone in the white radiance of a central and unique ecstasy. This is the fulfilment of man. This is to be with God. This is to be of God.⁴⁶

This religious consciousness of the sages, *arshajnana*, as distinct from the creative intuition of the genius, *pratibha*,⁴⁷ is the highest

⁴⁰*Idealist View of Life*, p. 200.

⁴¹Cf. *Indian Philosophy*, II, 511.

⁴²*Katha Upanishad*, II, 1, 1.

⁴³*Indian Philosophy*, II, 512.

⁴⁴*Eastern Religions*, p. 51.

⁴⁵*Idealist View of Life*, p. 125; *Indian Philosophy*, I, 258.

⁴⁶*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 63. Ecstasy, however, is not here ecstasy of rapture but of contemplation, as is clear from other sayings of our author.

⁴⁷*Idealist View of Life*, p. 200, n. 1.

⁴⁸*Eastern Religions*, p. 51.

⁴⁹*Idealist View of Life*, p. 128; *Indian Philosophy*, II, 510.

⁵⁰*Indian Philosophy*, II, 674.

⁵¹*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, pp. 60 and 69. According to Father Gardeil, we find in St. Thomas *cognitio Dei experimentalis* five times, *quandam experimentalis* twice, and *quasi experimentalis* once (*Revue thomiste*, 1929, p. 272). Anyhow, for St. Thomas real experience

of God is always a *donum gratuitum amoris Dei per lumen revelationis vel lumen gloriae* and so cannot be in fitness compared with the natural experience, even if it is mystical.

⁵²*Idealist View of Life*, p. 134.

⁵³"Spirit in Man," p. 492.

⁵⁴*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 61.

⁵⁵*Principal Upanishads*, p. 99. Cf.: "We may dispute about theologies, but cannot deny facts. The fire of life in its visible burning compels assent, though not the fumbling speculations of smokers sitting around the fire" (*Eastern Religions*, p. 23).

⁵⁶*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 793.

⁵⁷*Heart of Hindustan*, p. 13.

⁵⁸Cf. *Bhagavadgita*, p. 43; *Idealist View of Life*, p. 206.

⁵⁹*Idealist View of Life*, p. 206.

⁶⁰"Spirit in Man," p. 493.

⁶¹*Idealist View of Life*, p. 91.

kind of pure apprehension known to mankind.⁴⁸ This corresponds, says Radhakrishnan, to the enlightenment, *bodhi* of Buddha, the illumination, *anubhava* or *avabhoda* of Samkara,⁴⁹ the direct intuition, *sakshatkara* of Ramanuja,⁵⁰ or even to the *cognitio Dei experimentalis* of St. Thomas Aquinas.⁵¹

Now, if the necessity of integral knowledge in general for a harmonious life of man is hardly questioned by anyone, man's need for the spiritual mode of it, for the religious experience, is all the more urgent and pregnant with heavy consequences, since a denial of such direct knowledge of the spirit would finally lead to the denial of the fundamental Reality itself. For—but for the constraining authority of experience—it would be difficult for us to be certain of God.⁵² Speculative theology can conceive of God as a possibility; it is only religion—which is experience⁵³—that affirms God. The divine primordial reality, being a *spiritual fact*, cannot be apprehended either by sense perception or logical inference;⁵⁴ it is apprehended for certain only by a spiritual intuition;⁵⁵ it is revealed only through inner experience.⁵⁶

And man, continues Radhakrishnan, has not only a remote but an actual and even more or less proximate capacity for experiencing this spiritual intuition. For is there not, at the center of his being, something akin to the Supreme, “a ray of the eternal light emanating from the Central Sun”?⁵⁷ This inner, never-extinguishable divine spark can be fanned into a flame under favorable circumstances.⁵⁸ When the supreme light in us inspires the intellect, we have genius; when it stirs the will, we have heroism; when it flows through the heart, we have love; and when it transforms our being, the son of man becomes the son of God.⁵⁹

We may think that this is too tall a claim ever to be realized. No, says Radhakrishnan, spiritual experience is not merely possible but is also an undeniable fact. Only because there are persons to whom religious experience is unknown, we cannot say that it is either unreal or impossible; our limited experience is not the standard for all.⁶⁰ The experience of many a saint and mystic goes to prove conclusively the reality of the spiritual world. “The evidence is too massive to run away from.”⁶¹ For there is a tradition of direct apprehension of the

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Supreme in all lands, in all ages, and in all creeds.⁶² Buddha and Tao, Krishna and Christ, Moses and Mohammad, Plato and Plotinus, Augustine and Dante, Samkara and Ramanuja, Eckhart and Spinoza, Ruysbroeck and Boehme, Bunyan and Wesley, Ramakrishna and Rabindranath and numerous others⁶³ testify to the felt reality of God and hence to the fact of spiritual intuition.⁶⁴ The subtleties of the schools are all silenced by the protests of the souls who have seen reality.⁶⁵

And we cannot dismiss all these experiences as being due to mental unsoundness or pathological tricks, since some of the greatest mystics have been men of remarkable intellectual power, shrewd discrimination, and practical ability.⁶⁶ The fact, indeed, that religious experience has often been confused with emotional thrills and feelings may remind us of the need for careful scrutiny and examination of facts; but we cannot, on that score, throw away the whole body of religious experience as baseless. We are not willing to dismiss sense perception as illusory simply because we have dreams and hallucinations; we continue to rely on our judgments and interpretations of experience, even though they are not infallible. We need not be rude to the experience of God.⁶⁷ However much, therefore, we may quarrel about the implications of this kind of experience, we cannot question the actuality of the experience itself.⁶⁸ The religious experience may indeed be called exceptional, but only in the sense that all genius is exceptional.⁶⁹ For this experience or *anubhava* is open to all, though few attain to it; but the important point is that it is open to all. Reality is there, objective, ever present, waiting to be seen by the

⁶²*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 62. Cf. also Radhakrishnan's *Religion and Society* (1947), p. 47.

⁶³The list would be endless; so only the oft-quoted names are given.

⁶⁴Cf. *Idealist View of Life*, pp. 90 f., 95, and 98 f.; *Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 69; *Hindu View of Life*, p. 26; *Eastern Religions*, p. 64 and *passim*.

⁶⁵*Indian Philosophy*, II, 512.

⁶⁶"Spirit of Man," p. 493.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*

⁶⁸*Idealist View of Life*, p. 93.

⁶⁹"Spirit in Man," p. 493.

⁷⁰*Indian Philosophy*, II, 513.

⁷¹*Bhagavadgita*, p. 51.

⁷²Cf. *Idealist View of Life*, p. 91.

⁷³"*svatassiddha, svasamvedya, svayam-prakasa*" (*ibid.*, p. 92).

⁷⁴Cf. "My Search for Truth," p. 29; *Heart of Hindustan*, pp. 49 and 88; *Principal Upanishads*, p. 99; and *Idealist View of Life*, p. 173.

⁷⁵"My Search for Truth," p. 30; *Idealist View of Life*, p. 97; *Indian Philosophy*, I, 177; *Principal Upanishads*, p. 99; and *Heart of Hindustan*, p. 48.

⁷⁶*Idealist View of Life*, pp. 97 and 102.

⁷⁷*Ibid.*, p. 94.

⁷⁸*Eastern Religions*, pp. 28 f.

⁷⁹Cf. *Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 63.

⁸⁰*Idealist View of Life*, pp. 98 f.

⁸¹*Hindu View of Life*, p. 24.

⁸²Cf. *Eastern Religions*, p. 29.

individual minds that can seize it.⁷⁰ It can be verified by all of us, if only we are willing to pay the price for it.⁷¹

Now, if the need and fact of religious experience are evident to any unprejudiced mind, the determination, however, of the nature and characteristics of this sublime experience is rather a difficult matter, even according to Radhakrishnan.⁷² Self-established, self-evident, self-luminous as it is,⁷³ it is also quite mysterious and ineffable. Like most decisive experiences of personal life, it cannot be comprehended in exact formulas or expressed in clear concepts⁷⁴ but can at best be inadequately communicated to others through hints and images, symbols and suggestions, myths and metaphors.⁷⁵ That is why we often picture divine consciousness as a glowing fire, a lucid flash of consciousness revealing itself, and so on.⁷⁶ It is this striking feature of ineffability that casts a veil on all our intellectual probings into the intimate nature of the religious experience.

Again, as long as the spiritual experience lasts, the seer remains rapt in contemplation; he has neither the desire nor the power to analyse it. But once the vision ceases, as it must, he strives to recapture and retain it in memory. The process of reflection starts.⁷⁷ He represents the self as another with its transcendent majesty. He quakes and shivers, bleeds (*sic*) and moans with a longing gaze at it. He dares not even lift up his eyes. He represents the supreme as the sovereign personality encompassing the whole world, working through the cosmos and ourselves for the realization of the universal kingdom.⁷⁸ There is a perpetual disquiet, however, because ultimate Being is not an object and is hardly translatable in abstract ideas and intellectualizations. Reflective accounts, then, are always only approximations.⁷⁹

Besides, in all the accounts of these inspired sages, insists Radhakrishnan, we must distinguish "the given" from the interpreted elements, the simple facts of religion (experience) from the theological preconceptions.⁸⁰ And here, what is regarded as immediately given may be the product of inference. For something is directly experienced, but it is unconsciously interpreted in terms of the cultural and traditional ideas and prepossessions of the perceiving mind.⁸¹ While spiritual status is attained by our *ananda*, spirit, it is ever refracted in our *buddhi*, our logical universe.⁸² There is no such thing,

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then, as pure experience, raw and undigested.⁸³ For Dr. Radhakrishnan, strictly speaking, there are no experiences which we do not interpret; they are always mixed up with layers of interpretation.⁸⁴ It is only a question of degree.⁸⁵ Realization, therefore, is a fact; but the theory of reality is always an inference.⁸⁶ The intimate nature of reality remains impervious to our minds; all the descriptions we have of it are only "prejudiced" interpretations of the seers.

The philosophical question, then, of the real nature of any spiritual experience is thus ultimately reduced to a question of its interpretation. Now, Dr. Radhakrishnan does not claim to have himself any such experience; and so when he discourses on the nature of man and of ultimate reality, he is but commenting on, and trying to knit together, the various interpretations that have been put forward by others, especially by the Vedantists. Standing, therefore, no longer on the plane of nebulous and ineffable mysticism but on that of consistent and intelligible metaphysics, we are in a position now to examine carefully his interpreted doctrines of the self and of reality.

B

RADHAKRISHNAN'S INTERPRETATION OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

Sat: THE SUPREME

According to Radhakrishnan, then, there *is* a Being, *Sat*. The power of this Being, *aseitas*, means that it exists absolutely in virtue of itself,

⁸³*Idealist View of Life*, p. 99.

⁸⁴*Ibid.*

⁸⁵*Ibid.*, p. 100.

⁸⁶*Eastern Religions*, p. 23.

⁸⁷*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 38.

⁸⁸"In the beginning, my dear, this was just being, one only without a second" (*Chandogya Upanishad*, vi, 2, 2).

⁸⁹*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 38.

⁹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 39.

⁹¹*Ibid.*, p. 38.

⁹²*Ibid.*, p. 39.

⁹³*Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁹⁴*Principal Upanishads*, p. 63.

⁹⁵*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 40.

⁹⁶*Principal Upanishads*, p. 63.

⁹⁷*Ibid.*

⁹⁸*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 39.

⁹⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰*Principal Upanishads*, p. 63.

¹⁰¹*Ibid.*, p. 64; *Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 39.

¹⁰²*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 39.

¹⁰³*Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴*Brahman*, derived from the root *brh*, to grow, stands here for the absolute aspect of the Supreme. *Isvara*, from the root, *is*, to dominate, stands for its active aspect. The latter corresponds more to "Lord" than to "God." So *Sat* is *Atman*, *Brahman*, and *Isvara*.

¹⁰⁵*Principal Upanishads*, pp. 63 and 64.

¹⁰⁶*Bhagavadgita*, p. 38. Pluralistic universe, for Radhakrishnan, is a universe in which more than one self-sufficient, independent, ultimate reality is admitted, as in the *Samkhya* or *Vaisesika*. See, for example, *Indian Philosophy*, I, p. 37, n.

requiring no cause, no other justification for its existence except that its very nature is to be.⁸⁷ There can be only one such Being, "the Only One, without a second, *ekam evaditiyam*." ⁸⁸ That is the foundation or ultimate basis of all existence ⁸⁹ and the ground of all multiplicity; ⁹⁰ and that is the Divine Spirit.⁹¹ It is absolute or unconditioned as distinct from dependent or conditioned being.⁹² This is the Supreme, and it has necessary being; or, more accurately, it is its own being, *svayambhu*.⁹³ It is perfect and infinite,⁹⁴ and so it possesses infinite possibilities.⁹⁵

Atman: CREATIVE FREEDOM

Now, the power of manifestation is not alien to being; it does not enter it from outside. It is in being, inherent in it.⁹⁶ Yet it is not compelled to do so. It is free to move or not to move. It may be active or inactive.⁹⁷ Thus this ultimate Being is also pure Consciousness, *Atman*, and unconditioned Freedom.⁹⁸ Without any expression or variation,⁹⁹ needing nothing and desiring nothing as it is,¹⁰⁰ Pure Being mysteriously moves out of its primal poise so that worlds may spring into existence.¹⁰¹ Out of the infinite possibilities, it freely wills to actualize one possibility, to realize one world.¹⁰²

Brahman-Isvara: ABSOLUTE-GOD

These are, then, the two sides of the supreme, essential transcendental Being which we call *Brahman*, and Free Activity which we call *Isvara*, the timeless, spaceless reality and the conscious active delight creatively pouring out its powers and qualities; the timeless calm and peace and the brimful joy of activity freely, infinitely expressing itself without any lapse into unrest or bondage.¹⁰³ In this conception of *Brahman-Isvara*, or Absolute-God,¹⁰⁴ the first term indicates infinite being and possibility and the second suggests creative freedom and perfection.¹⁰⁵ It is not a question of either an Absolute with an apparent multiplicity or a living God working in a pluralistic universe. The supreme is both this and that.¹⁰⁶ Nay, strictly speaking, it is not even Absolute *and* God; it is just Absolute-God. They are not

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two realities, but just one supreme Reality. The distinction between them is only logical.¹⁰⁷

Trimurti: THREEFOLD ACTIVITY

The Spirit, then, Radhakrishnan says, enters into the world of non-spirit to realize one of the infinite possibilities that exist potentially in Spirit. And He creates, sustains, and ultimately resolves the universe. These three aspects of God's activity, these three functions of the Supreme, are brought out by the names *Brahma*, *Vishnu*, and *Siva*, which are not, except figuratively, to be regarded as different persons.¹⁰⁸ During these processes, all His qualities of wisdom, love, and patience find expression and help the fluent world to reach its end. God is spiritual Reality, unconditioned Freedom, and absolute Love.¹⁰⁹ His wisdom and power are sometimes personified as *Siva* and *Sakti*.¹¹⁰

Srishti: "MANIFESTATION"

As a consequence of this free choice, therefore, the derived reality of the world ensues from the primary reality of Absolute-God. The universe had certainly a beginning.¹¹¹ For, if this world were eternal,

¹⁰⁷*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 796

¹⁰⁸"... different names for the fact of God" (*Hindu View of Life*, p. 27). See *Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 40, and *Idealist View of Life*, p. 338.

¹⁰⁹*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 41.

¹¹⁰Cf. *Principal Upanishads*, p. 64. "This power or sakti is contained in the Supreme as oil in the oilseeds" (*ibid.*, p. 83, n. 1), and *Siva* and *Sakti* are regarded as the parents of the universe (*ibid.*, p. 734).

¹¹¹*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 44.

¹¹²*Ibid.*, p. 41; "Spirit in Man," p. 500. A single cosmic process is finite, though indefinite; but, for Radhakrishnan, there are series like this without end.

¹¹³"Spirit in Man," p. 500.

¹¹⁴*Bhagavadgita*, p. 38.

¹¹⁵*Principal Upanishads*, p. 63.

¹¹⁶*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 44.

¹¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 796.

¹¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 797.

¹¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 44; *Principal Upanishads*, p. 71.

¹²⁰*Principal Upanishads*, pp. 61 f.

¹²¹*Ibid.*, p. 72.

¹²²*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 44.

¹²³*Ibid.*, p. 41; *Principal Upanishads*, p. 65 and *passim*. Rig Veda speaks of *Hiranya-garbha* as the first seed resting on the navel of the Unborn (X, 82). It is the golden germ or egg of the world. Radhakrishnan tries to give it its original meaning. It is at times called "Prajapati" or even "Brahma."

¹²⁴*Principal Upanishads*, p. 61.

¹²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 60.

¹²⁶*Ibid.*, p. 62.

¹²⁷*Ibid.*, p. 72.

¹²⁸*Ibid.*, p. 65.

¹²⁹In the *Upanishads* themselves, the distinction between *Isvara* and *Hiranya-garbha* is not sharply drawn; often they are identified.

¹³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 62.

¹³¹*Ibid.*, pp. 62 and 72.

¹³²*Ibid.*

¹³³*Ibid.*, p. 72; *Indian Philosophy*, I, 171. Cf. "natura naturans" and "natura naturata."

a dualism of God and the world—where one of them will have a precarious, illusory existence—will result.¹¹² Creation, in fact, marks the beginning of this world with time, though not in time, since time has no existence apart from events;¹¹³ time derives from eternity and finds fulfilment in it.¹¹⁴

This free expression, *icchamatram*, of the Divine mind,¹¹⁵ this world, is a creaturely being. It exists and continues to exist because, and so long as, God wills it to be. Without the sustaining presence and activity of God, the world would collapse into nothingness. God is indeed distinct from the world, but He is not separate from it.¹¹⁶ So the Divine is working in the universe,¹¹⁷ guiding and controlling the concretization of one specific possibility¹¹⁸.

Hiranya-garbha: THE WORLD-SOUL IN SUBTLE FORM

Now, this freely chosen divine possibility, this particular manifestation of the Absolute-God¹¹⁹ that is to be realized, specifies the world—so to say “informs” it and indeed forms it as the soul fashions the embryo. In other words, the archetypal idea of God becomes incarnate,¹²⁰ becomes the innermost essence of the world,¹²¹ and is regarded as the soul or entelechy of the world.¹²² This is, according to our author, the World-Spirit in its subtle form, or the *Hiranya-garbha*.¹²³ The *Hiranya-garbha*, then, is the first product of the principle of nonbeing influenced by the Eternal Spirit,¹²⁴ the first-born of the divine Order, *prathama-ja*. He is the thread, *sutratman*, on which all beings and all worlds are strung like the beads of a necklace.¹²⁵ He is organically bound up with the world. Himself a creature, the first-born of creation, he shares the fate of all creation;¹²⁶ he is subject to all changes of the world.¹²⁷ Though he is sometimes spoken of as “God immanent in this world”¹²⁸ and his operations and changes attributed to God Himself,¹²⁹ yet, at other times, he is distinguished, by Radhakrishnan, not only from the Absolute but even from God or Isvara, who is prior to the World-Soul¹³⁰ and who is not subject to the changes.¹³¹ For Dr. Radhakrishnan, then, as for Samkara and Ramanuja, *Hiranya-garbha* has a subordinate place and is a created demiurge.¹³² He is *karya* or effect-Brahman, as distinct from Isvara, who is *karana* or causal Brahman.¹³³

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The World-Soul now expresses his spirit through the environment. He manifests the forms within himself. The world is fixed in him as are the spokes in the hub of a wheel.¹³⁴ The world is thus the manifestation of Hiranya-garbha and the creation of Isvara.¹³⁵ This manifest world is called *Viraj*, or the World-Spirit in its gross form.

Prakriti: "MATTER"¹

This derived reality is a mixture of being and nonbeing, *sat* and *asat*, divine principle and limiting principle, Hiranya-garbha and *prakriti*.¹³⁶ This new element, called the unmanifested *prakriti* or primal matter,¹³⁷ which is all but cast out from the sphere of being, by itself is more a demand of thought than a fact of existence, since even the lowest existence has received the impress of the Creative Spirit. To call it nonbeing is not strictly correct. This description indicates its distance from being. It is the ultimate possibility on the side of descent from the Divine, almost nonbeing but not utter nonbeing.¹³⁸ It is conceived as the objective principle which Isvara uses for creation,¹³⁹ or as the darkness of potency that resists and limits the light of actuality.¹⁴⁰

Jagat: THE COSMOS

Although the world and the World-Soul are both equally real, yet they are not eternal but temporal¹⁴¹ and organically bound up with each other.¹⁴² This dualism, however, of *purusha* and *prakriti*, spirit

¹³⁴*Principal Upanishads*, p. 60.

¹³⁵*Ibid.*, p. 63.

¹³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 90.

¹³⁷*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 801.

¹³⁸*Principal Upanishads*, pp. 86 f.

¹³⁹*Ibid.*, p. 86.

¹⁴⁰*Cf. Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 801.

¹⁴¹*Cf. Principal Upanishads*, p. 90.

¹⁴²*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 801.

¹⁴³*Ibid.*, p. 32. *Purusha* here is synonymous with the World-Spirit, and *prakriti* with chaos or prime matter.

¹⁴⁴*Principal Upanishads*, p. 81. *Cf. Taittiriya Upanishad*, III, 2: *annam brahmeti vyajanat*—even matter is Brahman.

¹⁴⁵*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 27.

¹⁴⁶*Ibid.*; *Principal Upanishads*, p. 84. *Cf. Tait. Upanishad*, II, 5.

¹⁴⁷*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 42. The classical notion of karma is thus given a new connotation.

¹⁴⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 42 f.

¹⁴⁹*Principal Upanishads*, p. 89.

¹⁵⁰*Ibid.*

¹⁵¹*Ibid.*, p. 80.

¹⁵²*Ibid.*, p. 89. Thomas Merton says something similar: "Everything you love for its own sake, outside of God alone, blinds your intellect and ruins your judgment of moral values and vitiates your choices . . ." (*Seeds of Contemplation*, p. 119).

and matter, cannot be ultimate. The World-Spirit confronted by chaos, or the waters over which the spirit broods, are both expressions of the Supreme Being,¹⁴³ since whatever exists owes its being to Brahman.¹⁴⁴

Samsara: WORLD-PROCESS

The world that is being realized, or *samsara*, is a process of events; and this process is not an incessant fluctuation comparable to a surging sea. It is rather a movement with a direction and goal.¹⁴⁵ During the cosmic process itself we have the successive emergence of the material, the organic, the animal, the human, and the spiritual orders of existence, corresponding to the five satges of *anna*, *prana*, *manas*, *vijnana*, and *ananda* of the *Taittiriya Upanishad*.¹⁴⁶

Karma: LAW OF NATURE

In the universe there are obviously laws of nature, physical, biological, and psychological. These laws, says Radhakrishnan, are comprehensively designated as *karma*. This karma, however, is not ultimate or absolute. It is but the expression of God's will and purpose. And God is not fate; nor is it an impersonal, abstract, determining power. We are not puppets moved hither and thither by the blind impersonal necessity of omnipotent matter or the sovereignty of divine providence.¹⁴⁷ Human freedom is thus in some sense guaranteed. This freedom of will possessed by self-conscious individuals makes sin and discord possible. These are not willed by the Divine though they fall within His purpose.¹⁴⁸

Avidya: IGNORANCE OR WORLDLINESS

Man, however, generally speaking, is led away by ignorance, *avidya*. While the world of multiplicity and the world-process reveal to him certain possibilities of the Real, they also conceal from him the full nature of the Real.¹⁴⁹ So he is deluded into thinking that the world is all, that it is self-sufficient, first and fundamental,¹⁵⁰ final and ultimate.¹⁵¹ And he becomes selfish and wordly.¹⁵² When he is self-willed, he surrenders to the restraint exercised by the play of mechanical forces. He is then victim of karma. But, even then, he

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is free to do differently. He can turn his eyes towards the Light in prayer and make an effort of genuine attention to empty his mind of selfish desires and let the thought of the Eternal fill it.¹⁵³

Moksha: FINAL REALIZATION

Now, man's ultimate aim is to live in the knowledge and enjoyment of absolute values.¹⁵⁴ His duty, therefore, is to dispel the shadows of ignorance, *avidya*, by the radiant light of wisdom, *jnana*. For this process of liberation, or *moksha*, divine providence gives him the means. The material world serves as the *kshetra*, the field or the environment where the individuals, *kshetrajna*,¹⁵⁵ struggle to escape from their alienation, from their slavery to the world, even till the awakening of the Spirit in them all.¹⁵⁶

There we have a brief conspectus of Dr. Radhakrishnan's metaphysics. Selective and concise as it is, I believe it is an accurate and objective exposition clothed in the very words of our author.

[To be continued]

¹⁵³Philosophy of Radhakrishnan, p. 43.

¹⁵⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁵⁵Cf. *Indian Philosophy*, II, 591.

¹⁵⁶Philosophy of Radhakrishnan, p. 45.

Rejoinder to Father Henle

VAN CLEVE MORRIS, *Rutgers University*

By way of a post mortem on "L'affaire Columbus" (see "An Experimentalist on Being" and "A Thomist on 'An Experimentalist on Being'" in the January 1958 issue),¹ I can candidly report that Fra Henle has, indeed, nailed me to the mast in a most inelegantly impressive way on a very important epistemological point. I refer to his criticism of my sentence "It is correct to say that the continent was there before he [Columbus] sailed," which appears on page 136, in footnote 6 on page 138, and elsewhere throughout his article. I have been "heisted on me own petard" in that my language was inexcusably inaccurate, a danger I pointed to in laying down the ground rules for intelligent discussion at the outset of my article.

I should have said that no statement can be made concerning the existence of the continent prior to the cognitive contact with it which Columbus and his companions are here dramatically reported to have had. One cannot say that the "continent was there" nor can one say obversely that it was *not* there. To an experimentalist, it is improper to make any ontological predication at this juncture. Some experimentalists, cornered in this way, are inclined to say that the continent had no existence prior to the onset of human (cognitive) relations with it, but this, to me, is no more warranted than what I said. An experimentalist can make no meaningful statement concerning the existence or nonexistence of any "thing" antecedent to his contact with that "thing's" operations, precisely because, as I have pointed out, the definition of that "thing" is "its" operations. So I retract, with not a little embarrassment, my phraseological lapse here.

Of perhaps greater moment is the apparent willingness of Fra Henle to make the lurch from cognitive awareness of the *operations* of the continent to a substantive predication of the essential existence—both present and past—of the continent itself. Exactly how this is done psychologically, or—more important—how it is defended logically, continues to mystify the experimentalist metaphysician. That is to say, when all there is to go on are the empirical reports we can generate concerning our contact with hitherto unexperienced relationships in the world—that

is, setting foot on an unknown beach—how can anything we say concerning the existential status of said beach be anything more than a refined and polarized digest of these reports? When we utter, “It is land,” we are simply sifting and cataloging the operations we experience into an arbitrary substantive—land. Our use of the word “land” is merely a handy, symbolic shorthand for the many experiences of operations we are now able to report.

It is because of this experimentalist reluctance to “go beyond the epistemological data” into the realm of “ontological existents” that I once again point to my error in language. If there were no experience of the operations of the continent prior to our sailing, then no ontological statement concerning the existential status of the continent can be made. And after these experiences are had, no existential retroactivity is permitted, since existentiality, in this metaphysic, is one with the experience of operations.

I am inclined to be more polemic at this point than my original essay suggested, because I am unable to comprehend how Thomistic ontologists can make existential statements concerning beings they have not yet experienced. If there be a goony-bird on the moon, we shall certainly have to await our experience of it before we make existential comments regarding it. And if, in 1970, we indeed find one there, I do not see what we can say about its existence in 1958. In this sense, Thomistic ontology is *ex post facto*, always contingent upon human awareness as to what is. And if antecedent reality must wait upon our experience of it to be defined and known, isn't it more prudent not to make such large claims concerning our knowing powers and confine our existential world to that which can be experienced, in the very largest meaning of that much-abused word?

If the nuclear physicists can, through their specialized type of experience, upset the celebrated “Parity Principle,” what are we to say concerning the existential cosmos for all those years when they devoutly believed in, and relied upon, said principle? As an experimentalist, I do not see what can be said if one were to stick to Thomistic ontology. To an experimentalist, the physicists simply had “Parity Principle” experiences which they reported and summarized in the principle. Now that they have had new and contradictory experiences, no overhaul of their ontological dicta is required simply because, in their modesty, they refused to make any in the first place.

But, now that all this has been said, I realize how futile the polemic

¹[Van Cleve Morris, “An Experimentalist on Being,” *THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN*, xxxv (1958), 125-33; Robert J. Henle, s.j., “A Thomist on ‘An Experimentalist on Being,’” *ibid.*, 133-41. Editor’s Note.]

really is, for I have indeed, as Fr. Henle has so vividly metaphorized, attempted "to throw a bridge across the widest section of the chasm." I had hoped in my earlier essay to do quite the opposite—to start "with some sort of crude fact and crude experience which are common to us all," as he has so perceptively said. I started with perception of a physical thing, certainly one of the most elemental grounds of knowing. I tried "to give a philosophical account of [this] common experience . . ." And now I can heartily agree with him that it is here that "we truly make the determining options."

To be more specific, I believe the parting of the epistemological ways occurs after all the perceptions of attributes (Thomistic) and the experiences of operations (experimentalist) have been had. At this point the Thomist digests his perceptions and funnels them into a "being" which accounts for the operations he perceives. We now have an existential being. The experimentalist simply refuses to do this, content with the aggregate of experiences he has had and the meaning he can derive from them.

If we both could, as he says, fix our gaze upon this primary divergence in thought, "hold our restive reflection at this point and attempt to develop a pre-systematic description of the crude facts," I concur with him that this strategy (his "third possibility," [p. 135]) is most likely of all to pay off. The fact that both Father Henle and I have tried our best to do precisely this and have not been notably successful at it certainly attests to his belief, which I share, that this strategy, while most promising, is perhaps the most difficult of all.

VERNON J. BOURKE, *Saint Louis University*

A Lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas. Based on the Summa Theologica and Selected Passages from his Other Works. By Roy J. Deferrari and Sister Mary Inviolata Barry, with the technical collaboration of Ignatius McGuinness, O.P. Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press. Five fascicles, 1948-1953. Pp. x + 1185. \$62.50, paper bound, folio.

There is no question of the need for a dictionary of the Latin of St. Thomas Aquinas. The present work is a good attempt to satisfy this need for English readers. The *Lexicon* lists the Latin words used in the *Summa Theologiae*, gives English meanings, and supplies texts from the *Summa* and occasionally from other works to illustrate these usages. It is not a doctrinal concordance. The main utility of the work is linguistic. No attempt is made to list all texts dealing with items of St. Thomas's teaching in theology or philosophy.

English equivalents of Thomistic Latin terms are often difficult to find, as anyone knows who has attempted a translation of St. Thomas. Sister Mary Inviolata, who appears to have done much of the actual work of compilation, was well aware that classical meanings often differ from St. Thomas's usage. In general she has succeeded in finding appropriate equivalents, though it would be easy to suggest improvements for certain technical words. (Those interested in definite suggestions might consult the review of the first two fascicles by A. C. Pegis in *Speculum*, xxv [1950], 261-68.) More use could have been made of technical articles on the vocabulary of St. Thomas, especially those by French scholars such as Blanche, Chenu, and Wébert. In my judgment, the *Lexicon* is more useful to beginners in Thomistic Latin than to experts who might wish help on a particular usage.

The Leonine edition was used for the *Summa Theologiae* and the Vivès printing for all the other works. Unfortunately, the technical assistance given Sister Mary Inviolata does not seem to have extended to information about authenticity. Many works used as additional sources of St. Thomas's usage were not written by Aquinas. More than ten works listed in the *Key to Abbreviations*, and quoted occasionally in the listings, are simply not authentic. (See, for instance, the lengthy text on *usura* from the notoriously spurious *De Usuris*.) Other writings are of such doubtful authenticity that no informed scholar would cite them without warning.

Still other works are commentaries begun by St. Thomas and finished by various other writers. The non-Thomistic portions should not be used in a lexicon such as this. A special problem is presented by the *Supplement* to the *Summa*, which is cited continually. Someone compiled this *Supplement*, after St. Thomas died, by selecting pertinent passages from his *Scriptum in IV Librum Sententiarum*. Citations from the *Supplementum* should be credited to the work in which St. Thomas wrote them; namely, the *Commentary on the Sentences*. This illustrates another deficiency of the *Lexicon*. It pays utterly no attention to chronological changes in Aquinas's vocabulary. There is, for example, the noted case of the use of *bonum* with a greater extension than *ens* (in the *Summa contra Gentiles*) and the subsequent correction of this usage (in the *Summa Theologiae*).

In one sense, the timing of this *Lexicon* was unfortunate. During the period after World War II, when Sister Mary Inviolata was working, many critical editions and new translations of separate works of Aquinas were published. In 1945, the decision to use the Vivès printing may have been partly justifiable, though even then there were better texts for many of the works. However, it is now clear (to give but one illustration) that an adequate treatment of the term *separatio* requires some attention to the critical editions of the *Commentary* on Boethius's *De Trinitate* (the incomplete edition by Father Wyser and the complete one by Bruno Decker). This is not a criticism of Sister Mary Inviolata; she did not have these editions when she started her work. Yet the comment shows that some revision will be necessary within a few years, because texts superior to, and correcting, the readings of the Vivès edition are coming out all the time. Indeed, it is well known that some of the early volumes of the Leonine *Summa Theologiae* will eventually require revision.

Another development is the work in progress under the direction of Father Busa. His project is to list all the usages, in all contexts, of all terms, in all the works of St. Thomas. This work is being carried on now in a way which Sister Mary Inviolata could not hope to match. She worked by much the same methods that glossators of the fourteenth century used. Father Busa's methods are those of a nuclear age. His material is clipped from printed texts, recorded on millions of punched cards, and manipulated by computing machines made available by the I.B.M. Company. What such mechanical techniques will produce is difficult to say, as yet. But surely Sister Mary Inviolata could not have realized at the beginning of her arduous task that she would end in competition with Frankenstein's monster!

The upshot of this review is this: A *Lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas* belongs in all libraries that have a budget sufficient to purchase it.

(Librarians may note that this *Lexicon* is *not* identical with the *Complete Index of the Summa Theologica*, by the same compilers, published in one volume in 1956.) There is no other dictionary like the *Lexicon*. If it is eventually revised, or replaced, that prospect is something for the distant future.

CELESTINE J. SULLIVAN, JR., *University of California*

***The Mind of Santayana.* By Richard Butler, O.P. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1955. Pp. xiv + 234. \$4.00.**

On September 26, 1952, George Santayana died in Rome. Thus came to an end the life of one of the most interesting and most enigmatic of modern philosophers. This man and his philosophy, I dare say, will prove of perennial interest to students of philosophy *per se* and of the mind of man, its creator.

Father Butler, the author of *The Mind of Santayana*, is quite cognisant of this dual appeal of Santayana to the student of philosophy, the dual appeal of the man and his work. Father Butler's book is primarily concerned with the work, not, however, without due recognition of the man and the influence of his subtle personality on the nature and structure of his philosophy. In fact, it is his picture of the man that is one of the most appealing things about this work; and I would recommend it in the first place for this, its secondary interest. Father Butler had the good fortune to have two years of close association with Santayana's person, and his evaluation of the influence of this person on his doctrines alone makes this book well worth the reading.

Concerning Santayana's philosophy as such, Father Butler's work is divided into two parts, exposition and criticism. The expository part deals primarily with the nature of essence, as this appears in the *Realms* books and *Scepticism and Animal Faith*. As Father Butler says,

I have concentrated upon the notion of essence, as described in these particular volumes, on the recommendation of Santayana himself. Here, he insisted, his mature philosophy is contained and best expressed. All that preceded was a preparation and development; what followed was a consequence and application (p. 59).

A chapter is devoted to a review of Santayana's favorite approach to essence through skepticism. The defining characteristics of essence, positive and negative, according to Santayana are then passed in review. In concluding this chapter Father Butler says: "... I would venture, in my

own terms, a definition of Santayana's notion of essence: *the quiddity of any being whatsoever*. We can elaborate that definition by adding: *without reference to any status: possible or actual, ontological or logical, physical or ideal, conceptual or eventual, simple or complex*" (p. 87). This, I think, is a good summary statement of Santayana's notion of essence.

The next chapter, on essence and existence, is given over principally to a presentation of Santayana's account of matter as substance. As Father Butler points out, Santayana's materialism is a basic presumption in his whole account of existence. No attempt is made on his part to substantiate his position. It is simply assumed as a basic article of his animal faith. Having thus been presumed, however, it is then consistently stated dogmatically as though it were matter of fact.

Santayana supposes that essence has a dual status with respect to existence, as the nature of the material world and as it appears in the mind. Concerning the latter, Father Butler is most interested in the role of essence in cognition. On this question he observes that

Santayana separates and does not merely distinguish *that which* is known and *that by which* something is known. This division cuts even deeper, as we shall see. The ideal and the real are utterly and irreparably disparate. . . . This marks a fundamental division and total separation between the realm of essence as the mind internally participates in it, and the realm of matter, which is encountered externally in action (pp. 104-5).

Hence the paradoxical conclusion on Santayana's part that knowledge is faith, a salutation, not an embrace. Further, essences intuited and essences exemplified in the material world are very likely essentially disparate and in any case existentially so; nor is it possible to know whether they are essentially the same or not (pp. 107-9). One might wonder, then, how we know that this is unlikely. Father Butler rightly observes that, for Santayana, "we must close our eyes to the chasm that lies between essence and existence and straddle the gap as we work our way through the world blindly—by 'animal faith'" (p. 118). It is not only that we are confined to ideas, not things; even the existential side of ideas escapes our grasp. Only essence remains immediate. And as Father Butler points out in the concluding chapter of the expository part of his book on "the primacy of essence," essence is primary for Santayana not only ontologically and epistemologically but morally and aesthetically as well.

The notion of essence, defined according to his own epistemological and materialistic prejudices, is the foundation stone of Santayana's

whole system of philosophy. And in the last of the realms of being which he treated, that of spirit, he developed a moral and aesthetic way of life that culminates in a naturalistic contemplation of essences for their own sake (p. 119).

Father Butler opens the critical part of his work with an attack on skepticism in general, a seemingly appropriate opening, since Santayana claims to establish his separation of essence from existence by a thorough-going skepticism—indeed, more thorough-going than that of Descartes or even Hume. However, it would have been well, I think, had Father Butler considered closely the steps of Santayana's reasoning in *Scepticism and Animal Faith* leading up to his conclusion that "nothing given exists." A criticism directed specifically against the course of this reasoning might at the same time have exposed the weaknesses of skepticism in general and Santayana's particular exemplification of it. That absolute skepticism is self-defeating and warrants no conclusions at all of itself does not specifically indicate why Santayana's conclusion from a skeptical line of reasoning that "nothing given exists" is unwarranted.

In what perhaps might be called ontological criticism as distinct from epistemological criticism, Father Butler comes more specifically to grips with the faults of Santayana's separation of essence from existence.

He [Santayana] has come to the "important conclusion" that the datum—a discovered essence—"does not exist." Santayana has jolted his critics with this proposition. But the conclusion need not be shocking at all. Although important, it is not remarkable; for, properly understood, the statement is true.

Essence does not, indeed cannot, really exist apart from the act of existence. For together they are entitative parts of every real being. Although these co-principles are really distinct in all creatures, they are not and cannot be separated but only distinguished. But, because they can be distinguished intellectually, an even bolder assertion can be made by saying that existence does not exist, an observation made nearly five hundred years ago by Cardinal Cajetan, St. Thomas's principal commentator. He pointed out that existence is exercised as a principle of real being and signified in the apprehension of a quiddity; and this signification can be considered logically as a distinguishable something.

Actually, although really distinct in contingent beings, essence and existence in real being are not separable since they unite to make being *be*. Even an abstracted essence merely takes on a new (intentional) mode of existence in the intellect, without losing its physical existence in the substance from which it is drawn and

always signifying it. Being is what comes first to the mind and always remains. The mind can focus on essence, obscuring its relation to existence, but cannot abstract existence from essence, since existence is not a form but the act of all forms (pp. 159-60).

The above is very cogent criticism of Santayana's separation of essence from existence, not, however, of how this separation is supposedly established by skeptical means. But I do think that it is well indicated here that such a separation cannot be established in any manner at all, for essence, as Santayana understands it, is not some being but *what* a being is. Santayana not only multiplies entities, considered here as separated beings, beyond necessity, but he multiplies them also beyond consistency, for what is first considered as the quiddity of something cannot also be considered as another thing itself in addition to that of which it is the quiddity.

The being first apprehended by the mind is real being, not a logical entity resulting from a review of the primitive datum. St. Thomas points out that existence precedes essence logically, in that the mind grasps the notion of essence by its apprehension of the essence of some existing thing. We cannot, strictly speaking, abstract existence from the essence grasped, for existence is not a form but the act of all forms, and is necessarily consigned even in the simple apprehension of essence.

In this apprehension the essence does not lose its existence; in fact it cannot; it merely takes on a new status of existence, intentional existence, in the mind, and real existence is thereby signified. We can refer back to this intentional existence by a second consideration of the mind; but to ignore existence altogether is, while possible, an altogether artificial, mental side-stepping, which achieves not the being of a second intention, proper to logic, but a being of third intention, a chimera, indeed "ghostly" and "inert" because it is dead—this is Santayana's notion of essence (p. 171).

It remains to point out that Father Butler claims—rightly, I believe—that Santayana's whole philosophy, while skeptical in intent, is dogmatic in fact, being based upon two inconsistent dogmas, essentialism in theory of knowledge and materialism in metaphysics; and never do the twain meet. Santayana is quite frank, to be sure, about his dogmatism in metaphysics. His materialism is confessedly only an object of his "animal faith," though at every turn he gives the reader the impression that to believe differently is foolish if not impossible. Yet he combines such a dogmatic materialism with the shadowy Platonism of his doctrine of essence, something as paradoxical, for example, as Democritus composing

the myth of the cave or Socrates confessing in the *Phaedo* that the body outlasts the soul. As Father Butler points out, there is no bridge for Santayana across this gap between Platonic idealism and Democritean materialism; but I would further observe that, in this strange combination, while nothing is gained something is indeed lost. The Platonism is emasculated, for the essences do not exist; and the materialism, confessedly irrational, has lost all appeal to rational men. How appropriate, then, is Father Butler's concluding quotation from Santayana's *The Idea of Christ in the Gospels*, from which I excerpt the last two sentences: "We are as innocent as the fig tree. Nevertheless it is quite possible that on the morrow we may be found withered" (quoted on p. 195).

WILLIAM W. MEISSNER, S.J., *Woodstock College*

***The Character of Man.* By Emmanuel Mounier. Trans. Cynthia Rowland. New York: Harper & Bros., 1956. Pp. x + 341. \$6.00.**

The Character of Man stands as a monument to the memory of one of the most vital and stimulating intellects of the contemporary rejuvenation of French Catholic thought. Up until the time of the publication of this work in its original edition, Mounier's efforts had been characterized by a certain chaotic determination. He was a prophet, whom one had to hold at once in terrible awe and feverish recognition. To this work, however, Mounier added a touch of science and of system, which, combined with the poetic and intuitional force of his thinking, provides us with a provocative manifesto. One regrets the unfulfillment of this departed giant.

The book is the more remarkable in that the French edition first appeared in about 1943—contemporaneous with Sartre's *L'Être et néant*. The Sartrean atmosphere, as in Mounier's other publications, is unmistakable, but it is no more than an atmosphere. The keynote here is revolt. The orientation and dynamism are personalism, the fierce crusading personalism that cried out with the cry of courage against despair in the pages of *Esprit*. It breathes the spirit of Bergson, Péguy, Kierkegaard the optimist, and Adler at his misunderstood best. Through the whole discussion, Mounier's basic concern is with commitment: commitment to self, commitment to truth, commitment to action. "In the confusion of all values, he must choose firmly all that it means to be a man, and a man of his time: then will it with daring, linking imagination with his fidelity. We have chosen. This study is not solely a study of man: it is a struggle for man."

As a scientific study (and it is fundamentally a treatise in psychology), *The Character of Man* never reaches the point of systematic theory. Even

so, it provides an intuitive and comprehensive (not to mention refreshing) account of modern French psychological thought. Using the characterology of Heymans and Wiersma, which is little known and less admired in American psychological circles, Mounier draws together a vast amount of empirical data and reinterprets several major theoretical orientations and subsumes the whole under the aegis of his dynamic personalism. The result is systematic but not a system. It is the probing of a pioneer spirit, and what is new deserves the commitment to confirmation and verification. Gripping and ringing with conviction though it may be, the psychologist is required to wade more slowly in his methodological hip-boots.

We must applaud the appearance of this English translation. Much of the radical development in phenomenological psychology and psychiatry on the European scene has remained closed to American thought. Mounier's work deserves to be better known on this side of the Atlantic, for it has been received with enthusiasm and devotion in his native country. The developing insistence from thinkers like Mounier on one side and the existential analytic theorists on the other on the positive and dynamic aspects of the person and the imperative of personal commitment and engagement might well provide a badly needed pick-up to a lagging behaviorism.

DESMOND J. FITZGERALD, *University of San Francisco*

***The Age of Adventure: The Renaissance Philosophers.* Selected with introd. and interpretive commentary by Giorgio de Santillana. New York: Mentor Brooks, 1956. 50¢**

***The Age of Ideology: The 19th Century Philosophers.* Selected with introd. and interpretive commentary by Henry D. Aiken. New York: Mentor Brooks, 1956. 50¢.**

The "Mentor" series has served teachers of philosophy by publishing selections from the classic thinkers from the Middle Ages to the present in inexpensive, readily obtainable paperbound editions. These volumes continue this service both in the passages chosen and in the thoughtful interpretations.

Santillana, professor of the history of science and the philosophy of science at M.I.T. and author of the dramatically written *The Crime of Galileo*, the reviser and annotator of the Salusbury translation of Galileo's *Dialogue on the Great World Systems*, leisurely expresses the many-sidedness and dynamic diversity of the Renaissance thinkers in his introductory essay. Rather impressed with variety for its own sake, Santillana

nevertheless presents the reader with aptly chosen passages which range from Nicholas of Cusa, da Vinci, More, Machiavelli, Erasmus, Luther, Durer, Michelangelo, Copernicus, Montaigne, Paracelsus, Kepler, Boehme, Galileo, and Hakluyt to Giordano Bruno. As the list implies, none of the readings is lengthy, varying from a few pages to over twenty pages for Montaigne and Bruno (in view of Santillana's expert knowledge, the Galileo selection, less than ten pages and of minor significance, was somewhat disappointing). However, it would seem that some effort was made not to duplicate the individuals presented in *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man* (Cassirer, Kristeller, and Randall); along with it, this Mentor book provides an excellent companion to Copleston's *Ockham to Suarez* or background reading for the opening chapters in Collins's *A History of Modern European Philosophy*.

Aiken's introductory essay on the background of the nineteenth-century philosophers and his remarks before each selection provide a succinct and excellent preparation for coming to grips with the essential elements of each philosopher's position. In an urbane, sympathetic, and clearly written fashion, Aiken leads the reader from a section out of Kant's *Prolegomena*, through Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Comte, J. S. Mill, Spencer, Marx, Engels, Nietzsche, and Kierkegaard to Ernst Mach, carefully tracing the reactions and developments which took place in that century. Aiken is very positive in his treatment of each man, attempting to point out some significant contribution each has made. Then in a "Concluding Unscientific Postscript," Aiken reveals something of his own hopes for philosophy.

Calling for a re-evaluation of the age of ideology and its contribution to contemporary thought, Aiken nevertheless is critical of those who would wish to return to some past thinkers' principles today. The past is past, he argues, and the critique of reason which must be undertaken today cannot involve the re-establishment of any past metaphysical synthesis. Instead, we receive from philosophy some satisfactory world-view which gives coherence and meaning to our life.

"The fundamental business of metaphysics . . . is not a description of the nature of things, but the formulation of a coherent world-view, adequate to the conduct of life," Aiken writes of the idealists, and it sums up fairly well his own theory of metaphysics. Whether a metaphysics is scientifically true or false is unimportant, Aiken says, speaking for himself. "What does matter is that the pictures of reality which they present to us may enable us to organize our energies more adequately for the satisfaction of our total needs as men."

Again this selection will serve as a handy undergraduate complement

to Collins's text or as an introductory guide to the further study of the nineteenth-century philosophers.

LEONARD A. WATERS, S.J., *Creighton University*

***The Contemplative Activity: A Study in Aesthetics.* By Pepita Haezrahi. New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1956. Pp. 139. \$3.00.**

The Contemplative Activity is a series of eight closely-reasoned lectures with the purpose of isolating the aesthetic act as distinct from, and underlying, all human activity in art. It is thus, in a neat paradox which the title catches, a simple, initial act of receptivity, of sensitivity upon which the total artistic activity is built. This total act will contain the judgments, knowledge of art history, refinements of taste—in short, all that can be taught about art by precepts—but nothing whatsoever will take the place of the primary act, “the contemplative activity,” upon which all is built.

Dr. Haezrahi here achieves, in admirable English, a synthesis in which such disparate aesthetic concepts as intuition, organic unity, disinterest, the hierarchy of sense and rational faculties, and aesthetic distance are marshaled and organized in accordance with a thorough grasp of her subject. Her work is frankly Kantian in origin and inspiration but with careful and necessary adjustment to today's psychological and anthropological knowledge. The refuge of subjectivism, in fact, seems a little strange in Dr. Haezrahi's synthesis, coming after a full and sensitive analysis of the “object” as in every sense real and existent previous to the act of the mind. This monist will-o'-the-wisp is felt particularly in her analysis of form and the work of the imagination, and yet her final summary is so wise and realistic that one can only admire the author's taste and training.

Unfortunately, she handles the relationship between the aesthetic and the moral in art with a taint of the old, old prejudice that the moral is, after all, irrational. A moral “faculty” is set up gratuitously—one that is in no deep way integrated with the aesthetic or even intellectual response to art. This is “faculty psychology” of the modern variety and not harmonious with the author's, and our deep and abiding admiration of the unified, organic, unique human response which initiates all aesthetic activity.

A Catholic Philosophy of Education. By John D. Redden and Francis A. Ryan. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1956. Pp. xiii + 601. \$4.75.

Education for Maturity. By Frederick Mayer and Frank E. Brower. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1956. Pp. vi + 155. \$3.25.

Toward a Reconstructed Philosophy of Education. By Theodore Brameld. New York: Dryden Press, 1956. Pp. xiv + 417. \$4.50.

These are three contributions to the philosophy of education, a flexible category which has historical antecedents but is, to a great extent, a twentieth-century hybrid. Books in this field are often designed as classroom texts; and they make a sustained effort to relate a generalized discussion of the aims, curricula, methods, and agencies of education to a complete philosophy of the real, of life, knowledge, and value. In a day when philosophy in the university world is generally highly specialized if not absorbed in linguistic problems, ventures of this sort are a survival of an older enthusiasm for the construction of synoptic world-views. It must be admitted, however, that the expansion and complexity of technical philosophical erudition inevitably make the more spacious enterprise appear somewhat shallow. Most philosophies of education, indeed, besides amalgamating material drawn from the behavioral sciences with their speculative reflections, rarely engage the strictly philosophical discussions at that level of profundity which the academic philosopher has come to expect. Still, they do try to provide an intellectualization of the crucial feelings and questionings actually preoccupying modern man; and perhaps to some extent they make up in range and relevancy for what they lack in subtlety and depth.

The works examined here fall neatly into a conventional sort of pattern, disposing themselves, so to speak, from north to south through center. One is projected from the base of Catholic Christianity and another from that of instrumentalistic naturalism. As respectively formulated, these two positions are made to seem, perhaps, even more totally antipodal than may be necessary. Certain value responses, at least, are common to both the Scholastic and pragmatic schools, even though the philosophical analyses are often in fundamental conflict.

A Catholic Philosophy of Education, by John D. Redden and the late Francis A. Ryan, is a revision of a well-known and widely used text which first appeared in 1942 and is still the most comprehensive statement available. The new edition is substantially unchanged. Some short passages have been interpolated; the order of the chapters has been slightly rearranged, and the bibliographies have been brought up to date. The

materials are divided into two parts for a full year's course, but they can be easily adapted to a one-semester program. The first twelve chapters outline the authors' philosophy under such familiar rubrics as those of child nature, aims and agencies, intellectual, religious, moral, aesthetic, and physical education. The second half is largely taken up with detailed—if highly critical—summaries and evaluations of such competing humanisms as those of socialism, nationalism, Communism, and experimentalism. The final pages discuss "Education for Democracy." The virtues of completeness, clarity, and sobriety which characterized the first edition remain here undiminished and will, no doubt, continue to recommend this text for use in Catholic institutions.

In 1950 Theodore Brameld published *Patterns of Educational Philosophy*, a rather unwieldy work of over eight hundred pages having the same sort of ground plan of critical and constructive sections as Redden and Ryan employ. In *Toward a Reconstructed Philosophy of Education*, Brameld has reworked and reissued the second half of that earlier book and has compressed the main points of his negative critique into a "prologue." The philosophy of reconstructionism which he expounds is, in its metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics, essentially the thought of Dewey but somewhat hardened. For the single-minded devotion to problem-solving by scientific method and to constant planning for goals always provisional is here supplemented by emphasis on the features of a "planned" society and by commitment to certain preferred solutions which have resulted from the problem-solving thus far. The inspiration, however, quickening what Brameld calls "the utopian proposals of reconstructionism" in the political order, owes a good deal to Marxian humanitarianism.

Besides a theoretical argument, this revision contains concrete proposals for school practice which are reminiscent of the "life adjustment" programs that flared up and out some years ago. These recommendations are often the index of a commendable zeal for the development of initiative and responsible freedom; but they are also quite vulnerable, since they are heavily laced with the more exotic kind of progressivism which, in the current climate of international scientific rivalries, is simply apt to arouse public indignation. In any event, students of philosophy will be more concerned with the speculative substructure on which these suggestions are made to rest. From this point of view, Brameld's book should prove interesting since it enunciates, without much nuance, naturalistic theses which are nowadays generally expressed more circumspectly. It is stated firmly, for example, that the entire universe contains no more than the world within reach of scientific experimentation, that the goals of history depend wholly upon human choices, that both truth and values are established by social consensus, and that a

philosophy like Thomism is not only profoundly regressive in character but also destructive of democratic life and thought.

Those who find reconstructionism unacceptable (a footnote suggests that their company includes Communists, Catholics, and Republicans) will be prompted to observe that theories of this sort absolutize their own ideals—Brameld's social self-realization, for instance—while denouncing other people's absolutes. Christian thinkers may, however, find two other lines of inquiry more instructive. One might at least ask whether the reconstructionist's hostility towards many values widely honored in Western tradition indicates some deficiency in exposition or communication on the part of those who would defend these values. It is also worth noting that instrumentalists do try to spell out an educational theory which will give form and direction to certain movements in the modern world which in themselves are quite admirable. The impulse toward political democracy or toward world community are cases in point, and one wonders if Christian philosophies of education have reflected on such matters as fruitfully as they might.

Messrs. Mayer and Brower, the authors of *Education for Maturity*, have excellent intentions. Like all philosophers of education, their basic orientation is ethical; and they would like in their book to distil the wisdom of the past and present, and relate it effectively to moral goals. In practice, however, no real synthesis emerges but only a succession of apothegms and high-level generalizations which exhaust the reader and leave him clamoring for more penetration and more distinctions. But if this eclectic project fails, it does at least point a salutary warning, for it demonstrates how difficult, indeed, is the plotting of any *via media*.

JAMES COLLINS, *Saint Louis University*

***Das Urteil und das Sein.* By Johannes B. Lotz, S.J. Pullach bei München: Verlag Berchmanskolleg, 1957. Pp. xxiii + 218.**

Father Lotz's book was first issued in 1938 under the title of *Being and Value*. In this new edition, some sections are rewritten and some explanatory notes added. These notes are useful for readers who may want guidance in the correlation between Thomistic problems and current terminology. The new edition also contains a long appendix, which replies to earlier critics and makes an analysis of Heidegger on truth and judgment. Since the book was not widely reviewed in America upon its original appearance, a brief account can be given of its argument.

During the nineteen-thirties, Lotz took several seminars with Heidegger and encountered the same problem confronting any theist, that Heidegger

confines being to the finite order and hence has no room in philosophy for God. With the aid of his studies in Aquinas and Maréchal, Lotz sought a rational way of making philosophical statements about God. He returned to the Thomistic doctrine on the transcendentals, which he viewed in the new perspective of their being expressed in judgments. Stress was placed on the relation between being and activity or operation. Since activity can consist in representing and in desiring or striving, this emphasis views being as the common root for the true and the good.

Transcendence concerns the relation between any particular thing-that-is and being itself. As a general relation, it is found in every such particular, since each thing-that-is is enlivened by being. But Lotz treats man as the special locus where transcendence occurs, since man can become aware of the bond between the things-that-are and being. Human knowledge, especially human judgment, is the proper home of transcendence. Judgment recognizes that being is not a genus and that neither the judging subject nor any finite object fully realizes the perfection of being itself. Hence the judgment posits that being itself is supercategorical and superfinite. Reflection on the kinds of beings leads us to make the distinction between the subsisting being and every finite participant in being. At the same time, this act makes a man fully aware of himself and of his relation of striving toward the subsisting being of God. This striving is achieved by way of knowing and loving, thus carrying out in the active order the ultimate significance of the judgments about the transcendentals and, indeed, every judgment as embodying an unconditional *is*.

In an appendix to this edition, the author defends his position against the charge of ontologism and clarifies its relation to Heidegger. Lotz subordinates pre-predicative openness to predicative truth, but in such a way as to open the route for the superpredicative truth of being. The undetermined dynamism of being is not only present factually in the judgment but is present there as manifesting the dynamism of the purely actual being. Hence Lotz departs from Heidegger in viewing human freedom not as an absolute but as a striving for union with the superhuman, subsisting being of God. Moreover, the history of philosophy is not just a wandering away from the meaning of being but keeps a positive reference to it. The chief problem raised by this book is the same as that raised by Maréchal's work: Can the human judgment validly affirm the being of God otherwise than through a causal inference, as far as philosophical method is concerned?

***Introduction to Logic.* By Andrew H. Bachhuber, S.J., New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1957. Pp. xiv + 332.**

Father Bachhuber points out in the preface that this subject matter is typical of manuals of Scholastic logic. The content of such a textbook is perfectly familiar: the three acts of the mind, the standard rules of inference, fallacies, division of terms, concepts, propositions, categories, predicables, and so on.

Unlike many Scholastic texts that have been hastily put together, this book has been carefully written from the point of view of the learning problems of undergraduates. Teachers who strive to develop the art as well as the science of logic will appreciate the order of presentation. The first half of the book covers the formal logic of immediate and mediate inference with a minimum of psychological and epistemological detail; the latter are covered in the second half, together with some of the intricacies of term, concept, and proposition. An appendix contains a chapter on symbolic logic and a sample multiple-choice test. This arrangement of subject matter enables the student to learn the rules early in the course so that ample time is available to apply them in exercises.

The first half of the book is a self-contained unit; this is an advantage in courses which combine logic with an introduction to philosophy. The book lends itself admirably to the requirements of a variety of courses.

The chapter on induction is an excellent introduction to the different kinds of induction employed in philosophy and the empirical sciences. Throughout the book, Father Bachhuber makes use of the type of induction which presents the necessary truth of the universal by affording insight into particular cases. Instances of the violation of rules are presented, and the student is encouraged to grasp by insight why the sequence is invalid. Then the rules are presented which capture and preserve this insight. The pedagogical and scientific value of this procedure is obvious.

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***A Christian Philosophy of Life.* By Bernard Wuellner, S.J., Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1957. Pp. ix + 278. \$4.25.**

Since philosophy springs from truths knowable without revelation it would seem to lose its identity by fusing with the latter. There are, however, many truths about human life that are well within the province of philosophy but which philosophy never suspected until revelation called

attention to them, as is attested by the pagan Stoics after the advent of Christianity. Father Wuellner does not "don the chiton of Aristotle or the toga of Cicero" but rather the modern academic gown that is worn becomingly in the halls of both philosophy and theology. The theme of his book is well compressed into one sentence quoted from Pope Pius XI: "The product of Christian education is the supernatural man who thinks, judges and acts constantly and consistently in accordance with the principles of right reason and the enlightening example and teaching of Christ" (p. 121). In other words, philosophy and theology each allows itself to be pervaded by the light of the other. To see whether this can be done, the skeptical reader would perhaps turn to the chapter on the problem of suffering and Christ's contribution to its solution. In this test case Father Wuellner's fusion comes off rather well.

Other matters in the book are not so crucial, and there is a feeling of gracious harmony in the mingling of reason and revelation. The chapters need not be read in sequence or in their entirety. One can let the book fall open at any page and find enlightening and heartening inspiration. The scholar back of it all shows through in the frequent references to select literature on the subject. For the sake of tidy pages the publisher relegated the "chapter and verse" notations to the back, where there is also an index for looking up special topics. The contents of the book would suffer from any attempt to summarize them. Instead, let the reader just sample them to whet his taste for the rest. But the achievements of the author it is possible to summarize, as he unconsciously does on page 238: "All the valuable principles, insights and conclusions of philosophy are absorbed into and are serviceable to a theological view of life."

AN APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF RESTITUTION

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Years ago, when I was an undergraduate student of philosophy, an interesting theory regarding the obligation of making restitution was commonly taught. Briefly it is this: Whenever, because of ignorance, the intention of the agent—that is, of the one committing the injustice—differs from the effect which results from his action, the agent is not bound in justice to repair the harm done. An example will clarify the matter. Should one, while intending to burn down the house of his enemy, destroy by mistake his neighbor's home, he is not bound in conscience to compensate for the damage done to his neighbor. Another example will bring this theory up to date. Not so long ago, in one of our more important cities, this ethical problem, or as it is commonly called by moralists, this "case of conscience," was discussed. A certain individual "borrows" an automobile without obtaining due consent of the owner, in order to take a "pleasure ride." Unintentionally he wrecks the car. Is he obliged to make restitution? The opinion expressed by the learned moralists present at this discussion was that he is not bound in conscience to do so.

Now, it is not for me to criticize a doctrine which is held in honor by a large number of excellent moralists. I confess, however, that I have always been disturbed by the thought that someone, who at this moment might be burning my house and wrecking my car, would be perfectly justified in declining to compensate me on the plea that he never intended to cause *me* any inconvenience.

Consequently, I was delighted when I ran across several texts in

St. Thomas's writings which not only demonstrate that, irrespective of intention, restitution is of obligation but also suggest by contrast a reason for the lenient view taken by the later moralists. For as we contrast these opposite doctrines, the somewhat subjectivist approach of these authors is seen to result from a failure to examine the nature of the object of the act of justice. As a consequence of this subjectivism, the mean of virtue as regards the act of justice is not a real mean but solely a mean of reason which determines the content of the just action in accordance with the intention of the agent.¹

This is not a controversial paper. I have no intention of trying to refute moralists of international repute. Rather, I would like to propose what I believe is St. Thomas's opinion and to paraphrase some of the reasons he offers to found his solution. These reasons are consequent upon a metaphysical analysis of the object of the just action.

The problem may be stated thus: Is the moral obligation to make restitution wholly dependent upon the intention of the agent to cause an injustice? Or more positively: What should be the content of the act of justice? We propose to offer a solution through an examination of *Aquinas's approach to the problem of justice*.

The philosophy of St. Thomas, a moderate realism, is founded upon the intelligibility of "being." The real, that is to say, the existent, is the initial source of man's knowledge. Now there is perhaps no place in the writings of the Angelic Doctor where an objective approach to a given problem is more manifest than in his treatise on justice. While

¹This problem will be examined later.

²"... all things which imply order to something are distinguished (and therefore become known to us) according to the distinction of the *things* to which they are ordered" (ST, I-II, q. 54, a. 2). We are presupposing the acceptance of the Thomistic position as regards the epistemological problem.

³The moral order is not caused by an extrinsic principle, as, for example, by the will of the lawmaker. Morality is intrinsic; it results from the finality of a rational nature.

⁴Cf. *ibid.*, II-II, q. 58, a. 8. The subject matter of a habit, *materia circa quam*, is not to be confused with the subject (*subiectum*) of a science (cf. *ibid.*, q. 59, a. 1, ad 3; also *ibid.*, q. 58,

a. 8). We may add that the object (*obiectum*) of an operation and radically of habit is comparable (in its relation to the habit) to the subject of a science. Cf.: "Sic, enim, se habet subiectum ad scientiam sicut obiectum ad potentiam vel habitum" (*ibid.*, I, q. 1, a. 7). Now the subject of a science is that under whose intelligibility (*ratio*) all things are studied in that science. In like manner, the object (formal) of a habit is that *ratio sub qua* all things are referred to that habit. Clearly, the object of a habit should not be identified with the subject matter, *materia circa quam*, of that habit. "Obiectum proprium virtutis est, bonum rationis consideratum in materia propria" (*ibid.*, I-II, q. 63, a. 4).

some philosophers, for example the Neo-Kantians, have proposed a justice based upon an irrational faith which flows from a categorical imperative, and others, following Rousseau, have sought in an analysis of the (subjective) rights of man a solution to the problem of justice. St. Thomas simply states and solves this problem in terms of the object of justice. What, he asks, is the object of the virtue of justice? The reason for his mode of procedure is that justice is not an imaginative fancy, not a personified abstraction, not a Kantian category; it is a reality, a habit, a disposition to certain good moral actions. Now, a habit is a potency, ordered to, and specified by, action which is the act of the potency, while the action is determined by its object.² Consequently, a study of the object will lead us to an objective understanding not only of the action which establishes "the just thing" (*ius* or *iustum*) but also of the intimate nature and workings of the virtue of justice.

First of all, we shall consider that the moral order is rooted in the finality of the rational nature to its last end; it consists in the relation of that nature to the absolute good.³ Hence the moral order embraces those actions that are placed by their rational supposit inasmuch as this supposit is rational. These are the human actions, enacted by the dual causality of intellect and will; they are the voluntary, the moral acts which dispose men toward or away from their true happiness. The moral goodness of these actions consists in their rectitude; that is to say, in their order to the last end. We infer, then, that reason and will, because they are the immediate principles of the moral act, must embrace in their joint operations the entire subject matter of the realm of morals.⁴

What is the subject matter of morals? Obviously it embraces those things with which the moral act is concerned. This subject matter comprises those things regarding which the human act must be rectified; that is to say, those things which are in themselves related to man's last end. These fall under two classes: on the one hand the internal passions of the soul and on the other the external operations which relate to another. Hence all good human actions, all actions which are placed by man insofar as he is rational, will be concerned either with the moderation and control of the passions—and these are the subject matter of fortitude and temperance—or with man's proper

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relations and dealings with other men—and these constitute the subject matter for justice.⁵

This distinction between the subject matter of the various moral virtues is the basis for the difference in the approach to the study of fortitude and temperance on the one hand and of justice on the other. The first (that is to say, the approach to fortitude and temperance) will consist largely in the study of the action. It will be psychological from the point of view of subject. The other (that is, the approach to justice) will be metaphysical, from the point of view of the object. Moreover, this distinction, as we shall observe, is the reason for the difference in gauging the morality of the act of the various moral virtues.⁶

How does this difference of approach in gauging the morality of the action work out in the concrete?

First of all, as regards the *interior* emotions or passions, the moral good or evil should be viewed in the light of the personal disposition of the agent toward such an operation. The morality of the act, therefore, will be gauged not merely objectively, not merely as to the term of operation, but according as the agent is well or ill affected by these operations. Only in this wise—that is to say, as related to the individual agent (person)—will the passions or emotions (that is, the internal affections of the soul) be rectified through the dispositions of the moral virtues of temperance and fortitude.⁷

⁵It is true that any act of the reason—for example, the study of a science—can, by a previous act of the will, be ordered *toward* or *away from* man's last end. For actions of the intellect are not of *themselves* related necessarily to the last end in one direction rather than another. These operations will be classified under the subject matter of morals only by reason of the direction of the will-act which governs them. On the other hand, a willed inordinate passion and any act of injustice lack in themselves the proper rectitude, while a voluntary rendering to another what is his due is in itself properly related to the end.

⁶The more recent moralists seem to have neglected this distinction. They failed to realize its importance and consequently gauged the act from a subjective point of view.

⁷Cf. *ibid.*, I-II, q. 60, a. 2. It will generally happen that the good of the virtue of justice is neglected because of an inordinate passion which affects the judgment of reason. The workings of the distinct moral virtues are intimately correlated. (Cf. *ibid.*, II-II, q. 123, a. 1.)

⁸"The [subject] matter of justice is the external operation according as this very operation, or the things used in that operation, has a *due* (*debitam*) relation (*proportionem*) to another person" (*ibid.*, II-II, q. 58, a. 10).

⁹"Medium rationis est medium rei." Cf. *ibid.*, I-II, q. 60, a. 2, and q. 64, a. 2; *ibid.*, II-II, q. 58, a. 10.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, I-II, q. 64, a. 2.

¹¹"... omne medium virtutis est medium rationis" (*ibid.*).

On the other hand, certain *external* operations, those which relate to another person, are found to be morally good or morally evil objectively, irrespective of the capacity, the conditions, and emotional state of the agent. These external operations are good or evil morally because of the relation to another, no matter how well or ill the subject may be disposed and affected by them. The moral goodness, the moral evil, in these external operations lies solely in the nature of the relation to the other (*secundum rationem commensurationis ad alterum*). The virtue and action which have for their subject matter external operations related to another, these we call justice. The function of justice, therefore, is to rectify those external operations which relate to another.⁸

THE MEAN OF JUSTICE

Since justice is limited to those operations which relate to another, since moreover the moral goodness of these external operations depends solely upon the order of relation to another, we are able to infer an important truth. This truth will be a directive in judging the moral value of an act of justice. It is this: "As regards justice, *the mean of reason is a real mean.*"⁹

This statement demands clarification. "A mean of virtue," declares St. Thomas, "signifies that which is put by reason in any subject matter."¹⁰ The measure and norm of an individual moral act is discovered and expressed by our reasoning power, which judges the objective morality of an action in accordance with knowledge of the law (right reason). Hence the moral goodness of a human action depends upon its conformity with *the measure of reason*. This measure is called a "mean," because, in accord with the limited perfection of human nature, a norm must avoid and reject excesses as well as defects. Consequently, the mean for any moral act, and therefore even for an act of justice, is always primarily a mean of reason.¹¹

The point we make is that, while the mean of virtue for the moral virtues of temperance and fortitude could only be a mean of reason, the mean of justice must also be real. For the judgment of reason as to the moral value of an act of justice—that is to say, as to the moral value of an operation which relates to another—in no way depends upon any subjective disposition of the agent. It is based entirely upon that which is due the other; it is therefore objectively real. Hence,

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"as regards justice, the mean of reason is a real mean." With regard to the moral virtues which are concerned with the passions, the mean of virtue is not a real mean. The reason is that an objective consideration of the subject matter will not suffice to determine the moral value of the operation. We must always refer the operation to the subject of the act and consider his personal dispositions in order to form a correct judgment of the moral value of the operation. For men are emotionally affected in a different manner by the same object because of condition, places, and inherited or acquired dispositions. Hence, the mean of those moral virtues (fortitude and temperance) which are concerned with the passions of the soul is solely a mean of reason.

In short, in our examination of the place of justice in the moral order we arrived at an understanding of two important truths. (a) The subject matter of justice embraces, and is limited to, those operations which relate to another. (b) In forming a true judgment of the moral value of an operation which relates to another, the mean of the virtue is not merely a mean of reason; it is a real mean.¹²

WHAT IS THE OBJECT OF JUSTICE?

We are now prepared to proceed to an examination of the object of justice.

¹²The mean of virtue can be interpreted as an immediate norm as regards the individual moral act. Hence the mean will differ for each individual action. The object (*ratio formalis*), however, is always the same for each virtue. It is, as St. Thomas puts it, the *bonum rationis in materia virtutis*, the good of reason in the subject matter of the virtue.

¹³Similar to the *subject* of a science (cf. *ibid.*, I, q. 1, a. 7), the *object* of a habit is that reality under whose intelligibility all things comprised in the subject matter of that habit must be referred to the habit. *Object* and *subject matter* of a habit are not identical. The subject matter of a habit embraces the things about which the habit is concerned. The subject matter of justice comprises external operations which are related to another. The object, on the other hand, is the *end* and *term* of an action. "Ad actum potentiae activae comparatur obiectum

ut terminus et finis" (*ibid.*, I, q. 77, a. 3.) An operation of justice has for its term and end to cause "the just thing." "The just thing" therefore, or as St. Thomas calls it, the *ius* or *iustum*, is the object of justice.

¹⁴The Latin word *ius* is sometimes rendered by *right* or *rights*, as in Rousseau's celebrated phrase, "the rights of man." In the language of St. Thomas *ius* and *iustum* have a totally different meaning and should not be rendered by *right* or *rights*. The reason is that *right* or *rights* ordinarily signifies (subjective) power (*potestas*) to do or to exact something, as in the phrase, "the right to vote." On the other hand, the term *ius* or *iustum* is not a power vested in an individual subject; rather it is the term and the end of an operation of justice. Hence, *ius* or *iustum* should be rendered "that which is just," or, better, "the just thing."

Habits are dispositions to actions; they imply order to something to be attained; they manifest finality to a term. This term is the object.¹³ Hence, to ask "What is the true nature of justice?" is to ask "What is the object of justice?" St. Thomas's answer is that the object of justice is "the just thing," the *ius* or *iustum*.¹⁴

What do we understand when we state that the object of justice is "the just thing"?

In general the object of any good habit, whether intellectual or moral, is a good (*bonum*) suitable to the nature of the agent. For virtue is the disposition of a faculty which inclines the subject to perfect itself by action. Hence, the object of any virtue is a good, a perfection suitable to the individual nature of the rational agent (person).

Not every virtue, however, necessarily rectifies the operation of the agent; not every good habit necessarily orders man's free action to his end. A good habit of the speculative intellect, for example, may be used to cause moral evil. Only the moral virtues, which necessarily rectify the voluntary act, order man to his last end. The reason is that the object of these virtues is not merely that which is good and suitable to nature; rather, this object properly relates to the end. In other words, because the object of the moral virtues is in accord with the finality of nature which founds the moral law, this object is not merely good but possesses rectitude. It is *the right thing*.

When, however, we examine the rectitude of the acts and objects of the moral virtues, we observe a further distinction. The rectitude of those virtues which are in the sense appetite is discovered by referring the term of the operation solely to the individual rational agent. On the other hand, in the operations which relate to another, and are attributed to justice, the rectitude is not constituted by a reference to the individual agent. This rectitude, his "right" order to the end, is founded upon a *relation of due equality to another*.

The object of justice, therefore, is not merely "the right thing" but "the just thing"; it implies a rectitude, an order to the end based upon a relation of *due equality* to another. To do "the just thing" we must establish a certain equality with another by giving him his due. The end and term of the virtue of justice, the establishing this due equality

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with another, is the object of justice, the *ius* or *iustum*, "the just thing."¹⁵

To sum up. The object of any virtue is that which is good or suitable to the nature (*bonum*). The object of any moral virtue is that which is ordered to the last end, that which has rectitude (*rectum*). The object of the virtue of justice is that which establishes a due equality with another. It is "the just thing" (*ius* or *iustum*). The object of justice is a reality, a "due equality" which results from

¹⁵It seems that the notion of *due* equality which is established by the *ius* or *iustum*, "the just thing," presupposes an understanding of right or rights which is a *potestas* (a moral power to have, to hold, to possess) to that which is *due*. For if an equality is *due* to another, this other has a right to that equality. Yet, at this point, Thomas has nothing to say about rights; it is only much later, in the question on the right of property, that he brings up a discussion of what *right* means. Obviously, St. Thomas, unlike more recent moralists, does not seem to have been bothered much by the general problem of rights. Why? Perhaps there is no real problem here. The reason is that definite rights are always presupposed and indicated, at least implicitly, by the precept of law. Indeed, we say that the basis for the validity as well as for our knowledge of any right is simply the law. A true law expresses moral obligation. Now, if one has an obligation to fulfill, he must have a right, a moral power (*potestas*), to whatever is necessary for the normal observance of this obligation. The absoluteness or the relativity of a right will necessarily depend upon the absoluteness and relativity of the precept of law. If the law flows immediately from the finality of nature, the obligation to the observance of the precepts is absolute. This, of course, is the case with the precepts of the natural law. Hence the rights to those things which are required for the observance of the natural law are absolute rights. The precept of the natural law, for example, which forbids self-destruction implies a natural right (subjective) to the necessities of life. This type of moral power flows from the nature; it is a property

of nature and can never be destroyed. Now, all that we have just stated regarding the nature and origin of rights seems fairly obvious, and this may well be the reason why Thomas has nothing to say about rights when he approaches the problem of the object of justice, which establishes a due equality and supposes the right of another to that equality. To him the proposition that man has natural rights is self-evident.

¹⁶The juridical field embraces those external operations which relate to another. "*... proprium est iustitiae inter alias virtutes ut ordinet hominem in his quae sunt ad alterum*" (*ibid.*, II-II, q. 57, a. 1).

¹⁷The equality required by justice (*quaedam aequalitas*) is a *due equality*.

¹⁸"*... etiam non considerato qualiter ab agente fiat*" (*ibid.*). It would seem from the expression *qualiter* that in Aquina's doctrine involuntariness does not excuse one from making restitution. This problem will be examined later.

¹⁹"*Iustum dicitur aliquid quasi habens rectitudinem iustitiae ad quod terminatur actio iustitiae*" (*ibid.*).

²⁰"*Ius est res iusta, est res debita . . . Opus adaequatum alteri*" (*ibid.*, a. 2). The end of an act of justice is not precisely that the one who has more—or even too much—may have less but rather that he who has *less than his due* may receive what is his *due*. The notion therefore that in justice all men should receive equal goods is in no way founded upon a true notion of justice. The equality established by justice consists in rendering to another that which is due, not in giving everyone the same equal amount.

an external operation. This operation implies "otherness" because of something due to the other.¹⁶ This equality is obtained by giving to the other his due.¹⁷ Consequently this equality is measured without any consideration of how it is caused by the agent¹⁸ and only in accord with what is due the other (*secundum rationem commensurationis ad alterum*). Hence the mode of justice is *strictly objective*, so that in judging of "that which is just," the mean of reason is a real mean. Consequently, the primary reference regards that which is due to the other, that which re-establishes equality. "The just thing," therefore, is that which in a manner possesses the very rectitude of justice.¹⁹ It is the term of the just action.

From this study of the *object* of justice we infer (in a general manner) the moral rectitude of the act and of the nature of the inclination of justice. For this object is the term and end of the just action and of the virtuous inclination. Consequently there can be no inclination and no action of the virtue of justice when the object of the act is not "the just thing."

The object of justice is "that which is just," the thing due to the other which establishes equality.²⁰

INJUSTICE

We stated that our problem is to determine the true content of the act of justice; to discover whether the action, which by causing "the just thing" establishes the due equality, must necessarily include restitution. Now, the re-establishing of due equality by the agent generally presupposes an actual or a potential injustice, an undue inequality in the other (in the patient). In order to determine the true content of the just act which repairs adequately an actual or futural injustice, it will be helpful to understand and to probe the structure of injustice.

Paralleling justice, injustice implies two distinct persons. One, the agent, by its action (*actio*), causes the inequality; the other, the patient or victim, suffers (*passio*) this inequality. Two factors, therefore, are necessary to establish the (formal) inequality of injustice; two elements must enter into its constitution—an action and a sufferance.

Consequently, in order to judge whether the inequality caused by

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the *agent* and suffered by the *patient* is a real (formal) injustice and in order to determine what is necessary to re-establish the equality of justice, we should ascertain whether the *action* on the part of the agent and the *sufferance* (*passio*) of the patient are truly (formally) unjust.

The action of the agent will be an unjust action only if it be voluntary, so that the guilt of the evil act be imputable to the author of the act. For the injustice which is about to be caused could not be imputed to the agent unless (a) "the unjust thing" is intended and therefore known and unless (b) the inequality of injustice results from a will-act of free choice. These two elements of the will-act, intention and free choice, are required in order that the action be truly an unjust act. For there can be no moral guilt and consequently no punishment can be inflicted (a) when the agent does not *intend* an injustice because of invincible ignorance as regards the objective morality of the action and (b) when the inequality is not caused by a will-act of choice, as when a spontaneous passion has impeded reason and made it impossible for the will to act.

In either occurrence—that is to say, whenever the agent does not intend the injustice or whenever the injustice is not caused by the will-act—the inequality is not a "formal" injustice as regards the agent.²¹

On the part of the patient or victim, the sufferance (*passio*) or harm resulting from the action of the agent is unjust only when the effect produced is, at least implicitly, opposed to the will of the patient. The reason is that a man can give up what is his only through an act of his will.²²

Hence if there has been no such will-act, the object matter is his, and for the agent to take it is to destroy the equality of justice. On the other hand, should the patient *willingly* give up his ownership, the object matter is no longer *his*, no longer *his due*. In this case, the apparent harm done is not a formal injustice on the part of the

²¹Moralists call this type of inequality material, not formal.

²²Cf. *ibid.*, II-II, q. 59, a. 3, ad 1.

²³"Dicendum est quod iniustum, per se et formaliter loquendo, nullus potest facere nisi *volens*, nec pati nisi *nolens*" (*ibid.*, a. 3).

²⁴Only those who have the due

authority can apply such retribution. Indeed, God alone, *qui scrutatur corda hominum*, is able to exact absolute retribution. We know from revelation that, in the present order of grace, man can atone for his sins through penance and good works.

patient. The reason is that since the object has been willingly surrendered to the other, it does not cause the inequality of injustice.

In short, a complete (*per se* and formal) inequality of injustice as regards both agent and patient depends upon two necessary factors. (a) The agent must intend and choose the inequality which he causes. (b) The patient, at least implicitly, is unwilling to suffer the inequality caused by the agent.²³

From these reflections we are able to infer some general principles which should govern any act of justice in order to re-establish the due equality done away with by an injustice. The act of justice must fully repair the injustice. Hence it is necessary to repair the disorder caused by the two formal elements which constitute a real, a formal inequality of injustice. Likewise, it is imperative to know what must be done to repair an inequality when one element of injustice is lacking and *only one* is present.

Now, in a formal injustice, these two elements are an unjust action (*actio*) on the part of the agent and an unjust sufferance (*passio*) in the victimized patient. Consequently, in a formal act of justice which is to do away with the inequality, the contraries of these two elements must in some manner be realized. What are these two contraries? First, the agent must suffer (*passio*) some retribution, some punishment, in order to atone for the guilt incurred through a voluntary unjust action.²⁴ And, second, in order to repair the harm done to the victimized patient, full restitution (*actio*) must be made, not only as regards the object taken but also, when such is the case, for any damage suffered.

Briefly, whenever a "formal" injustice has been committed, two factors must enter in order to re-establish fully the equality of justice. *Restitution* must be made to the victim, restitution that should include adequate compensation for any harm suffered. Then there must be *retribution*; that is to say, punishment of the culprit proportioned to his guilt. This punishment, according to human law, may be exacted in the form of a fine or penal servitude and the like. Obviously, only those having the proper authority can inflict punishment.

(The term or object of this complete restoration of the equality of justice, which includes both restitution and punishment [retribution] is called by St. Thomas *contrapassum*. *Contrapassum* [literally, "that

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which is suffered in return"] we shall render imperfectly by the word *reciprocity*. Reciprocity, therefore, implies full compensation for the harm done to the patient and for the guilt of the agent.²⁵)

We may now easily infer how the inequality of injustice is removed and the equality of justice re-established by act or acts of commutative justice. Three possible cases and three solutions are offered.

The injustice is formal only as regards the patient. In this case a real injury has been caused to the unwilling patient but without guilt on the part of the agent. This may be due to one of two possibilities. Either the agent is invincibly ignorant (no intention) of the injury he is about to cause to another, or the action results not from the free act of choice but from a spontaneous passion.

The solution of this case is that the act of justice which re-establishes equality should, in either supposition, be limited to making full restitution for injury caused. Obviously no punishment, no retribution is required to atone for the malice of the act. The agent either did not intend, or did not choose to cause, an inequality of injustice. Consequently, there is no malice and no guilt.

A difficult problem arises at this point. Is one bound to make restitution when the action which causes injury to another is placed in accordance with the principle of the double effect so that there is no intention to cause the injury? We answer that the principles proposed by St. Thomas seem to demand restitution whenever possible. The reason is that although no evil moral act is placed and no guilt is incurred, since the injury is not intended, nevertheless harm to an unwilling patient has been caused. The inequality of injustice on the part of the patient must be done away with, and equality of justice re-established through restitution.

²⁵*Contrapassum* will not be had by a mere restitution of the object taken and compensation for the harm done. The culprit should receive a "sufferance" to atone for the malice of the evil act. "Hoc quod dicitur contrapassum importat aequalem recompensationem passionis ad actionem precedentem" (*ibid.*, II-II, q. 61, a. 4). Hence *contrapassum* will include two elements, restitution and punishment.

St. Thomas adds that "reciprocity (*contrapassum*) has no place in distributive justice" (*ibid.*). The reason is that restitution to the injured party, as

well as the punishment inflicted on the guilty, is demanded in justice, not because of what the agent is *as a person* but simply because of *his action* which caused inequality of injustice. Distributive justice, however, is not concerned with things and actions, exchanges, rewards, and punishment for actions. It looks solely to proportional equality according to person. *Contrapassum*, therefore, *belongs solely to commutative justice*. (Cf. Marie Louise Martinez, R.S.C.J.; "Distributive Justice according to St. Thomas," *THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN*, May, 1947.)

The inequality of injustice is formal as regards the agent only. In this case, although the agent intends and freely chooses to cause an injustice to another, no harm is really done to the other. The reason may be that the intended victim had already willed to give this object to the agent and consequently had relinquished his ownership.

The solution of this case is that since no sufferance (*passio*) had been endured by the patient, no restitution is required. Some punishment (*passio*), however, or atonement on the part of the agent is necessary to make retribution for the evil act of injustice.

Finally, whenever the two formal factors constitute "the unjust thing," the equality of "the just thing" is fully re-established through reciprocity (*contrapassum*), which includes restitution and retribution.

CONCLUSION

In concluding this paper I should like once more to recall the fundamental fact in St. Thomas's theory of justice. This theory through and through presents an objective approach; that is to say, the object rather than the subject is the source of inquiry. Because of this objective point of view, the inferences drawn avoid the pitfalls of idealism and the dead-ends of skepticism.

An understanding of the object of justice indicates that this object relates to another and is constituted by a *due equality*. From this analysis two factors, agent and patient, which are causally necessary for the equality of justice, are proposed to our reflection.

Because the causing of the equality of justice presupposes at least a potential injustice and in order to evaluate the influx produced by these two causal factors (agent and patient) upon the due equality of justice, we proposed an examination of the nature of injustice. Two inferences were drawn. The patient must be duly compensated in order that the equality of justice be restored (restitution). And the agent must atone for his evil deed (retribution).

An understanding of the nature of these two causal elements will manifest a clear distinction between restitution and retribution. Only through such understanding can we hope to solve the practical problems which arise daily in our social and professional dealings with our fellowmen.

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Henri J. Renard, S.J.

Chronicle

AT LOYOLA UNIVERSITY'S LEWIS TOWERS, in downtown Chicago, a symposium was held on November 6, 1958, on the topic "The Emergence of Personality in Ancient Society." Four papers were given: "The Relation of the Individual to His Family," by Dr. E. A. Speiser of the University of Pennsylvania; "The Relation of the Individual to Political Society," by Dr. George B. Mendenhall of the University of Michigan; "The Relation of the Individual to His Cult," by the Reverend Louis Zabkar of Loyola University in Chicago; and "The Person as a Self-conscious Individual," by the Reverend John L. McKenzie, S.J., of West Baden College of Loyola University.

THE THIRD EAST-WEST PHILOSOPHERS' CONFERENCE, sponsored by the University of Hawaii, will be held June 22 to July 31, 1959, in Honolulu. The theme will be "East-West Philosophy in Practical Perspective." The work of the conference will be divided into six one-week sections, each dealing with one aspect of the subject, as follows: the relation of philosophical theories to practical affairs; natural science and technology in relation to cultural institutions and social practice; religion and spiritual values; ethics and social practice; political, legal, and economic philosophy; and conspectus of practical implications for world understanding and co-operation. The program will include regular conference meetings (three evenings each week), special seminars for associate members, a series of public lectures by representatives of East and West, and special courses in the summer school of the University of Hawaii. Some forty scholars from East and West will prepare papers and lead discussions. Members will be specialists who are invited or come on their own initiative. Associate members will be invited from among younger teachers of philosophy, humanities, and social sciences. There is no fee for attending the conference, but seminars and courses have a tuition fee. Further information can be obtained from Professor Charles A. Moore, Director, East-West Philosophers' Conference, University of Hawaii, Honolulu 14, Hawaii.

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A PROPOSITIONS

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The present paper is a follow-up on the article entitled "Existential Import and 'Latin Averroism,'" ¹ and both of them are developments upon the article "Is the Square Back in Opposition?" ² Now, while in the latter we had suggested that only some *A* propositions might be nonexistent, when we came afterwards to discuss Averroism we put forward the hypothesis that *all* universal affirmatives of *necessary* predication were nonexistent. This hypothesis, we said, was a logical consequence of the doctrine of creation. Our point could be put in the following way. The proposition "Every creature is such that its essence does not include its existence" is a logical consequence of the doctrine of creation. But all the categories of being with all their subordinate genera and species come under the heading of "creature." Therefore any essential predication about any category of being or its subspecies is nonexistent. For example, the proposition "Every man is rational" is true even though no men ever existed. It tells us only about the nature of man; it gives us no information at all about whether there *are* any men.

The Averroists, however, held a position contrary to the above. In the person of their leader, Siger of Brabant, they held that propositions of the type "Every man is rational" are true only if there exist instances of the subject term.³ Propositions, therefore, of this type require an *eternal* world with *eternally membered* species to serve as underpinning for the evidently eternal truth of such propositions. As can be imagined, neither Albertus Magnus nor St. Thomas Aquinas admitted such a theory. In this paper we try to show how, in a

Thomist system, universal propositions of essential predication can only be nonexistential.

One point is worth noting at the outset. The controversy over existential import generally takes place between mathematical logicians and Aristotelians. Our purpose is to take it out of this context since it does not belong there. Admittedly the mathematical logicians can take the credit for fixing attention today upon the problem itself. Nevertheless, it has no exclusive connection with either mathematical logic in general or with material implication in particular. Those logicians, therefore, who equated this question with the "errors," as they termed them, of mathematical logicians quite missed the point.

And the facts of history justify our procedure. Joyce, we grant, places the origins of the problem in the modern period. He says that the question of the existential import in categorical propositions "seems to have first been raised explicitly by the German philosopher Herbart (1776-1841)"⁴—and no doubt Herbart did revive it. But it was known five hundred years before his time. The title itself of Siger of Brabant's *Questio utrum Hec Sit Vera: Homo Est Animal Nullo Homine Existente* shows this. And Siger was not the first to have raised the question. As Pierre Mandonnet says: "The latter [namely, Siger] seems to allude to the antiquity of the problem. In any case, it had already been put formally and in the same terms by

¹T. Gierymski and M. P. Slattey, "Existential Import and 'Latin Averroism,'" *Franciscan Studies*, xviii (June, 1958).

²T. Gierymski and M. P. Slattey, "Is the Square Back in Opposition?" *Philosophical Studies* (Maynooth), vii (December 1957), 123-30. Cf. n. 20 of this article for the source of the article mentioned above; and cf. *ibid.*, n. 17, as being a partial source for the present paper.

³Cf. article mentioned in n. 1. Cf. also Lottie H. Kendzierski, "Eternal Matter and Form in Siger of Brabant," *THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN*, xxxiii (March 1955), 223-41 (especially 237-41).

⁴G. H. Joyce, s.j., *Principles of Logic* (3d ed. "Stonyhurst Philosophical Series." Longman's, 1926). p. 111.

⁵"La question . . . était en circulation avant d'être reprise par Siger. Celui-ci semble faire allusion à l'ancienneté du problème. En tout cas, il avait

déjà été posé formellement et dans les mêmes termes par Albert le Grand" (*Siger de Brabant et l'averroïsme latin au XIII^{me} siècle* [Fribourg, Suisse, 1899], p. cxxxviii). For the allusion made by Siger, see *ibid.*, Append., p. 54, 1.14, where Siger says ". . . et apparet ex praedictis manifeste causa contradictionis antiqua de veritate huius propositionis, homo est animal nullo homine existente."

⁶"Pour Siger, la position est tout autre. En strict aristotélécien, il n'accepte pas l'universel antérieurement à l'existence des singuliers" (*ibid.*, p. cxxxviii).

⁷*Ibid.*, p. cxxxix. See also Etienne Gilson, *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, trans. A. H. C. Downes (New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1932), chap. 4.

⁸Arthur Little, s.j., *The Platonic Heritage of Thomism* (Dublin: Standard House, 1949), p. xv.

Albert the Great.”⁵ Mandonnet goes on to say that Siger, “as a strict Aristotelian . . . does not accept the universal before the existence of the singulars,”⁶ and to point out the logical connection between Siger’s doctrine here and the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of the world to which he also subscribed.⁷

Accordingly we intend to treat the question in the context in which, evidently, it arose and to treat it as connected with the fundamental philosophical questions of the time, which thinkers like Siger evidently thought it was. Speaking of this period Father Little justifiably says, “The details of the historical situation . . . comprise an episode more dramatic and more crucial than any other in the history of philosophy except perhaps the death of Socrates.”⁸ For this was the time when the new philosophy of Aristotle, with various Neoplatonic and Arabian accretions, was fast becoming a dangerous rival to the Christian religion; and the burning question of the day was, How much, if any, of Aristotle’s philosophy was compatible with Christian belief?

The Averroists, or “integral Aristotelians” of the time, led by Siger of Brabant, were maintaining that all natural truth was to be found in Aristotle and that to be a philosopher consisted in studying and commenting upon Aristotle’s text. They were accused of arguing that when Aristotle’s doctrine conflicted with Christian belief, then both doctrines were true, the unstated qualification being that of course only Aristotle’s doctrine was really true. If is not surprising, then, that St. Thomas, who found so much that was true in Aristotle, should be looked upon with suspicion by the conservative “Augustinians” as being no different from the Averroists. So much was this the case that in the condemnation of various Averroist theses at Paris and Oxford in 1277, some of St. Thomas’s theses were also included.

Now, one basic point at issue in this whole Christian-Averroist conflict was that concerning the essential eternity of the world. Aristotle taught it; so, naturally Siger held it. But one could hardly expect the Christian theologians to embrace it with joy. There is little doubt, however, that another doctrine logically connected with this Aristotelian cosmological theory has been received, or at least, not explicitly rejected by Scholastics; namely, the theory of existential import in *A* propositions. As we shall see later on, there is

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general agreement that the Aristotelian logic of categorical propositions presupposes the *actual existence* of instances of the subject term. So whatever answer you give to the question of existential import will place you in one of the two opposing camps—Averroist or creationist. If, like Siger, you assert it, then you put yourself among the Averroists; if, on the other hand, you deny it, then your position is compatible with creationist metaphysics. This discussion, then, is not an artificial one.

I

Two distinctions are basic to the whole discussion. One is that between the strict *A* proposition (commonly known as the necessary universal proposition or the essential predication) and the merely enumerative *A* proposition (commonly known as a contingent proposition or an accidental predication). The other distinction is between *what* a proposition asserts and *how you find out* about its meaning and truth. If these distinctions are granted, we hope to show how necessary propositions are nonexistential, while those which are existential are merely enumerative—that is, contingent.

Now, these distinctions are not novel. The first is just a restatement of the Aristotelian distinction between the scientific proposition and a purely accidental one. The second is illustrated by St. Thomas in his description of the mode of knowledge peculiar to men and angels. Both a man and an angel can know that, for example, the physical universe is contingent. But they know it through diverse media, since a man has to make use of induction and deduction, which, according to St. Thomas, are not necessary for an angel. So although they have different ways of knowing it, the proposition is not dependent for its truth either on their knowing it or on their method of knowing it. Its truth is dependent rather on whether it correctly describes the nature of the physical universe.

Now, although discussions of existential import often seem to end in searches for palm trees in Alaska or for polygamous bachelors, we

⁹Frederick Copleston, S.J., *A History of Philosophy* ("The Bellarmine Series." Burns, Oates, & Washbourne, 1953), III, 418.

¹⁰Cf. H. W. B. Joseph, *An Introduction to Logic* (2nd ed., rev. Oxford, 1950), p. 177, and Jacques Maritain,

An Introduction to Logic (Sheed & Ward, 1946), p. 227. This topic, we very much regret, did not allow us an opportunity to acknowledge our admiration for, and the debt we owe to, Maritain as a philosopher—as *the* Thomist philosopher of today.

will be concerned here only with the natural species of things. Our inquiry could in fact be regarded as a working out of the consequences in formal logic of the doctrine of creation. On this point Father Copleston says:

Aristotle himself was concerned to explain the *how* of the world, that is to say, certain features of the world, especially change or becoming or 'movement'. With a philosopher like St. Thomas, however, there was a shift of emphasis: the problem of the *that* of the world, the problem, that is, of the existence of finite things, became primary. . . . It is possible, therefore, to call the philosophy of St. Thomas an 'existential' philosophy in a sense in which one can hardly call Aristotle's philosophy 'existential'.

We think that this distinction between Aristotle and St. Thomas also holds good for logic, and for the same reasons. The problem of existential import never seems to present a difficulty to an Aristotelian logician. We suggest that it is important for Thomists.

II

First we will discuss the distinction between the true universal and the enumerative one, since this distinction is basic. Fortunately, however, there is general agreement on the point. Joseph uses the above terms "true" and "enumerative" for making the distinction, while Maritain uses "in necessary matter" and "in contingent matter."¹⁰ As we said, this is the Aristotelian distinction between the scientific and the merely contingent proposition. For our purposes, we will speak of the essential proposition and the contingent one.

It is generally agreed that contingent propositions are existential, since they are merely statements of fact about groups of individuals. Joseph gives the example "All the French ministries are short-lived" and evidently means it to be only a description of the actual durability of the individual ministries up to the moment of writing. It was not meant to give a description of anything essential to a French ministry. So no question arises over the existential import of these contingent propositions, or enumerative universals. But since they

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differ in logical type from essential propositions, there is a very serious question about the justifiability of treating them in logic under the same symbol *A*, as one treats essential propositions.

But when we come to the essential proposition, the question of existential import appears in full light; and the Aristotelians show themselves to be very indefinite on the subject. For example, Joseph says, "For a judgement is really universal, when the subject is conceptual, and the predicate attaches to the subject (or is excluded from it) necessarily";¹¹ then he goes on to mention the important point that "an universal judgement has nothing, as such, to do with *numbers* of instances; if the connexion affirmed in it be necessary, the judgement is still universal, whether there be a million instances of its truth or only one."¹²

The obvious question to put here is, Why stop at one? Why not say it is true even when there are *no* instances? He has told us that the subject is conceptual and that the proposition is not about "*numbers* of instances" (with his own underlining of "*numbers*"), in which case he should logically conclude it to be true for zero instances. And he does, in a footnote, mention that some logicians allow its truth in such circumstances. He seems to find difficulties in such a position, nevertheless, for he says that "such a view makes the universal judgement, however, purely hypothetical: cf. Leibniz . . . Bradley . . . Bosanquet . . ."¹³ Although Joseph seems to have qualms about allowing a categorical proposition with zero instances to be equivalent to a hypothetical proposition, Coffey, the Thomist logician, has no such fears. He says, "It is precisely those universals which, though expressed assertorically (All *S*'s are *P*, No *S*'s are *P*), would be more appropriately expressed as modals, that do not imply the existence of their subjects";¹⁴ and he later says that the two forms are interchangeable.¹⁵

We see on the part of Maritain the same lack of definiteness that we saw on the part of Joseph. Maritain says that a proposition in necessary matter "does not require the actual existence of the subject in order

¹¹*Introduction to Logic*, p. 177.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 179.

¹³*Ibid.*, n. 1.

¹⁴P. Coffey, *The Science of Logic* (New York, 1938), I, 261.

¹⁵"If, however, we interpret the universal as not implying the existence of its subject, then the universal forms 'If an *S* is *M* it is *P*', and 'All *SM* is *P*'

would be mutually interchangeable" (*ibid.*, p. 269).

¹⁶*Introduction to Logic*, p. 227.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 228.

¹⁸*Ibid.*

¹⁹*Ibid.*

²⁰The conjunction would be of the form "Every *S* is *P*," and "There are some instances of *S*."

to be true . . . and has not necessarily and of itself an 'existential' sense."¹⁶ He says furthermore that ". . . it is not necessarily and of itself concerned with anything except the relation of the Pr. to the S., that is, with the simply ideal existence of this S. with this Pr."¹⁷ But then he goes on to say the opposite, or nearly the opposite:

. . . there is nothing to prevent the mind from adding an existential sense to it (the truth in this case ceasing to be an eternal truth) as it does in all universals obtained by *induction* in the experimental sciences.

Every acid makes litmus paper turn red.

Every mammal is viviparous.

Taken in themselves these propositions would, no doubt, remain true even were there neither acids nor mammals, but actually we never think of them without understanding that there are acids and that there are mammals . . .¹⁸

Then he roundly concludes, "A proposition, whose Pr. is *essential* to the S. may also be understood as having existential import."¹⁹

So Maritain first tells us that the propositions are nonexistent; then he says the mind can add an existential sense to them, as happens in experimental science. Consequently they lose their eternal truth. Yet they would "no doubt" remain true even if nonexistent; and finally they can be understood as being existential. The clarity appropriate to logic could well be employed here.

We do not deny that minds can add many things to the interpretation of a proposition. But here we are concerned with the limits imposed by logic. If these propositions are true in the absence of instances, then they are nonexistent. If, on the other hand, you interpret them as existential, then you have a different type of proposition on your hands and one which is contingent. The former was a necessary proposition; the latter is a *conjunction* whose elements are a necessary proposition and a purely contingent existential one concerning the subject species.²⁰ So it is quite false to say that necessary propositions may also have existential import. They do not. And those which do are either conjunctions, and thus contingent, or else enumerative universals and thus equally contingent.

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We will agree with Maritain that *in order to find out* their truth, we have to inspect actual instances of the types referred to by the propositions—like the acids and mammals in Maritain's examples. But, to use our second basic distinction, this concerns only our knowledge and has nothing to do with *what* the proposition asserts. So, as St. Thomas says, we have to make use of sense experience, to look at actual instances, in order to know anything at all. Take the proposition in physics that $d = 16t^2$. If its truth depended upon bodies actually falling, then it would be false before creation—which consequence raises questions about God's knowledge of physical laws, apart from anything else—or alternatively it would be false unless bodies kept on falling, which is absurd.

It is when Maritain says that necessary propositions lose their eternal truth on being taken existentially that he shows, in its fullest light, the weakness inherent in the traditional logic of the *A* proposition with its ambiguous symbolism and interpretation. Can the same proposition be both essential and contingent? Can it be both existential and nonexistential? Evidently not. But the failure of most Aristotelian logicians to come to a clear decision over the two types of so-called *A* propositions leaves them in constant danger of falling into those contradictions. The fact is that contingent *A* propositions are, strictly speaking, not universal at all. For they do not preclude the possibility of a negative instance, as can be seen from the illustrative propositions about the French ministries. Essential propositions are, on the other hand, universal. They allow of no possible exception. But they do not affirm the existence of members of the subject class.

²¹"Soit le jugement universel: 'Tout homme est mortel'. Si par ce jugement on veut signifier que 'Tout supposé qui serait homme serait aussi mortel, et de plus il y a au moins quelque supposé qui est homme', on dira que le jugement est 'existentiel'. Si on veut simplement signifier: 'Tout supposé qui serait homme serait aussi mortel', sans dire qu'il existe au moins un homme, on dira que le jugement est 'non-existential' " (J. Dopp, *Leçons de logique formelle* [Louvain, 1950], 1^{re} partie, p. 91).

²²To quote van Steenberghen: "His [Siger's] philosophical system is dominated by a theory of knowledge that is strictly Aristotelian. . . . He bases the absolute value of judgements of the abstract order on the eternity of the world and all the species" (F. van Steenberghen, *Aristotle in the West* [Louvain, 1955], p. 222). See also Little, *The Platonic Heritage of Thomism*, pp. 72-73.

²³"Il serait fort souhaitable que ces différences fussent toujours marquées dans le langage" (*Leçons de logique formelle*, p. 91).

The following is another example of the ambiguity just mentioned. Dopp says:

Take the universal judgement: "Every man is mortal". If by this judgement one wishes to signify that "Every supposit which was man would also be mortal, and in addition there is at least one supposit which is a man", one will say that the judgement is "existential". If one simply wishes to signify: "Every supposit which was man would also be mortal", without saying that at least one man exists, one will say that the judgement is non-existential.²¹

But just as we saw with Maritain, there are two different propositions mentioned here with two different conditions of truth. One is true even though no men should exist, granted that it is a necessary proposition. The other, however, is not an *A* proposition at all. It is an implicit conjunction whose elements are a necessary and a contingent proposition; namely, "Every man is mortal" and "There are men." And the whole conjunction is contingent. There are two ways of contradicting a conjunction, since it has two elements; but there is only one accepted way of contradicting a proposition in the Square. An old objection—but a valid one.

The way to get rid of these difficulties is to remove the ambiguity. One way is to adopt the axiom which Coffey says is implicit in Aristotelian logic—namely, that there are always instances of *S* and *P* in the Square; and with this axiom the objections made against Joseph, Dopp, and Maritain will not hold. Their logic will be quite consistent—and it will be Averroist. They will have denied, implicitly, the possibility of free creation. Aristotle's logic is quite consistent, since it presupposes the natural eternity of the world and eternally membered species.²² But Scholastic thinkers can hardly entertain the latter presuppositions. We agree with Dopp when he says that "it would be very desirable if these differences were always marked out in language."²³ For logic, it is imperative. Possibly the strangest thing in the whole controversy is the fact that the Scholastic logicians had merely to interpret essential propositions as modal and therefore non-existential in order to avoid these difficulties. A clue to this is given in Aristotle's theory that science is of the universal and the *necessary*.

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Coffey says that the assumption of existing instances of the classes *S* and *P* "appears to have underlain the traditional treatment of immediate inferences in Aristotelian logic";²⁴ he says furthermore that "the traditional doctrine on opposition will also hold good if the existence of *S* be assumed independently of the import of the propositions themselves altogether. And this appears to have been the assumption really, if only implicitly made in scholastic logic."²⁵ If this is the case, then an anticreationist assumption is present "really, if only implicitly," in Scholastic logic. But let us leave the cloudy air of the implicit and the ambiguous for the clear atmosphere of the explicitly defined question and the open deliberate answer to it. Take Siger. In the *Quaestio* that we mentioned above, he makes this statement:

Furthermore, given no particular man in existence, if man is an animal, then some man is an animal—for instance, Socrates, or Plato, or Cicero. If therefore by hypothesis none of the singulars is animal, *since there are none*, then it seems that man is not an animal.²⁶

²⁴*Science of Logic*, I, p. 252; and cf. p. 254.

²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 254.

²⁶"Preterea, nullo homine particulari existente, si homo est animal, aliquis homo est animal, ut socrates, vel plato, vel cicero. Si igitur per ypothesim nulus singularium sit animal cum nullus sit, videtur etiam quod homo non sit animal" (*Questio utrum Hec Sit Vera: Homo est Animal Nullo Homine Existente*, in Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant*, p. 49, ll. 4-7). Italics mine.

²⁷Cf. for example, "Si igitur ablatis individuīs auferantur ea sine quibus non potest esse natura humana, auferretur, et ipsa natura humana. Quia eis ablatis non manet homo aliquid in rerum natura, nec animal nec aliud" (*ibid.*, p. 51, ll. 34-35).

²⁸"... patet quod nullo existente homine particulari, adhuc est vera, homo est animal, et huiusmodi aliae locutiones" (*Lib. I De Intellectu et Intelligibili*, tract. II. c. 3 [Paris: Vives, 1890], IX, 494b).

²⁹*Platonic Heritage of Thomism*, p. 159.

³⁰"Socrates est rationalis quia homo est rationalis, et non e converso: unde dato quod Socrates et Plato non essent, adhuc humanae naturae rationalitas competeret" (*Quodlibet.*, VIII, a. 1). Cf. also *ST*, I, q. 55, a. 3, ad 1.

³¹"Si omnes creaturae ab esse deficerent . . . natura humana manebit talis quod ei competeret rationalitas" (*Quodlibet.*, VIII, a. 1, ad 3).

³²*Platonic Heritage of Thomism*, p. 159, n. 3.

³³For the general problem of the relations between Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Thomism, the reader is referred to Father Little, *Platonic Heritage of Thomism*.

³⁴"Contingit tamen quandoque ratione significati eas habere contrarietatem, puta cum attribuitur aliquid universali ratione naturae universalis, quamvis non apponatur signum universale; ut cum dicitur, *homo est animal*, *homo non est animal*: quia hae enunciationes eandem habent vim ratione significati; ac si diceretur, *omnis homo est animal*, *nullus homo est animal*" (*In Lib. I Perihermeneias*, cap. 3, lect. 5, n. 22; ed. Leonine, I, 50-51).

We can deal with a statement like this. It is quite clear, and quite false. And Siger leaves us in no doubt about what he means, since he keeps on repeating the same conclusion, after looking at other arguments, all the way through his reply.²⁷ Albertus Magnus is, if anything, clearer, for he lets us know that the proposition he mentions is only an example of a certain *type* of proposition, evidently the necessary proposition. He says: “. . . it is evident that, there being no particular man in existence, this is nevertheless true, *Man is an Animal*; and so are other statements of this form.”²⁸ Once more, what he says is quite clear—and equally true. We will quote a statement by Father Little for the illustration of St. Thomas’s position in the matter: “. . . he says that if neither Socrates nor Plato (nor anyone else) existed, it would still be true that man is rational.”²⁹ The following passage from St. Thomas is given by Father Little as a reference for this assertion: “Socrates is rational because man is rational, and not conversely. Wherefore given that Socrates and Plato did not exist, rationality would still belong to humanity.”³⁰ And this, St. Thomas goes on to say, is true even “if all creatures ceased to exist.”³¹ And it is very significant for this whole question that Father Little maintains that St. Thomas was replying here to Siger: “St. Thomas’s attention must have been directed to this truth by its denial by Siger de Brabant denying all existence to the universal previous to the singular.”³² The two opposing views, then, are quite clearly stated. The one holds the existential interpretation of necessary propositions, with its logical partner, the natural eternity of the world. The other holds their nonexistential interpretation, a logical consequence of the doctrine of free creation. The only ambiguity which might remain now rests with the Aristotelians. After they have said, following Plato, that science is of the *universal*, why should their scientific propositions imply the *existence of individuals*? Why not merely the possibility of the latter?³³

At this point it may be helpful to mention propositions of the form “S is P,” since there has been a certain divergency of opinion about them. St. Thomas says quite clearly that such propositions have the same meaning as do universal propositions, the quantifier being understood. So they should read, “All S is P.”³⁴ But Joyce denies this. On the contrary he says:

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In propositions such as "Man is mortal" "The oak is deciduous", the employment of the singular number shows that the immediate object of our consideration is the universal nature as abstracted. But the nature viewed in abstraction from individuals is also viewed in abstraction from existence. . . . It is otherwise with propositions expressed in the plural, e.g. "All oaks are deciduous". Propositions of this class . . . most certainly suppose the existence of both subject and predicate *in rerum natura*.³⁵

One thing can be said about this interpretation of necessary *A* propositions: it is clear—and Averroist.

Maritain disagrees with Joyce on the interpretation of the form "*S* is *P*," for Maritain evidently takes it as existential. He says:

When I say: "Man is social", the word "man" not only represents (renders present to my mind) human *nature* (considered in an abstract universal), but it also takes the place for me of the extra-mental thing of the individuals to which sociability is attributed by the copula *is*.³⁶

So presumably "Man is social" is existential. When Joyce disagrees with St. Thomas over the identification of the two forms, and with Maritain over their existential import, we agree with St. Thomas against Joyce and with Joyce against Maritain.

There have been three sorts of existential import known to philosophy, and St. Thomas rejects all of them. The first is the Platonic, the second is the Aristotelian, and the third is St. Anselm's. The first posited a reality which was itself an Idea represented by the abstract idea in my mind. The second posited the eternal existence of membered species as the objects represented by our ideas of each species. The

³⁵*Principles of Logic*, pp. 112-13.

³⁶*Introduction to Logic*, p. 62.

³⁷"Sic igitur patet quod essentia divina, in quantum est absolute perfecta, potest accipi ut propria ratio singulorum. . . . Augustinus dicit, quod Deus alia ratione fecit hominem et alia equum; et rationes rerum pluraliter in mente divina esse dicit. In quo etiam aliquantulum salvatur Platonis opinio ponentis ideas, secundum quas formarentur omnia quae in rebus materialibus existunt" (*CG* I, cap. 54).

³⁸"Deus est prima causa exemplaris omnium rerum . . . Deus est primum exemplar omnium" (*ST* I, q. 44, a. 3). See also: "A primo igitur per suam essentiam ente et bono, unumquodque potest dici bonum et ens, in quantum participat ipsum per modum cuiusdam assimilationis; licet remote et deficienter" (*ibid.*, q. 6, a. 4). See also n. 39.

³⁹"Propria enim natura uniuscujusque consistit secundum quod per aliquem modum divinam perfectionem participat" (*ST* I, q. 14, a. 6).

third posited the existence of God as the object properly represented by the idea we could form of God. Now, while St. Thomas rejected each as they stood, he did agree with them in part. In the case of Plato and St. Anselm, he rejected their methods and agreed with the conclusions—in a modified way for Plato. For Aristotle, he agreed with his methods, but, in this case, rejected his conclusion as regards an eternal world. So St. Thomas says that the Platonic doctrine of Ideas is saved to some extent, as these Ideas are in the mind of God.³⁷ God is the universal exemplar which all beings copy imperfectly and in whose perfections all beings participate.³⁸ St. Thomas denies that we have any adequate idea of God, and this is what would be necessary for an argument a priori of God's existence. We have to prove God's existence from creatures, a posteriori, which method will show that God exists necessarily. St. Thomas will agree with Aristotle that *in order that we discover* the truth about the natures of things we must look at instances of them; we must have some sense experience of them. But the natures of things do not depend upon our discovery of them, and likewise the truth about their natures does not depend upon there being any individuals with those natures. Their existence depends upon God's freely creating them. Their possibility depends upon their being possible participations or copies of God's nature,³⁹ and God knows these diverse natures quite apart from whether He creates them or not. So as regards our means of knowing, St. Thomas is Aristotelian; as regards the ontological status of what we know, he tends in this particular case toward Platonism—or better still, he improves and corrects Platonism in his own Thomism.

III

It will no doubt have been remarked that we have been using our second basic distinction—between what is asserted and how we find it out—in our discussion of the first distinction. The fact is that the one involves the other, especially for human knowledge, where it is not possible to know the natures or properties of things without first seeing examples or instances of those things. Evidently, then, we are proposing the direct opposite to the Berkeleian thesis that *esse est percipi*, a thesis which has merely to be stated in order to be seen to

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be false. Berkeley missed the distinction between a thing's existence and our knowledge of its existence, or he put it so clumsily that it has been confused by his followers.

IV

It is instructive to notice the differences of opinion among Scholastic logicians about the existential import of *I* propositions. The general opinion, voiced by Coffey and Dopp, is that they are existential. So Coffey says, "Particular propositions, whether affirmative or negative, almost invariably carry with them, in ordinary usage, if no implication, at least an assumption, of the existence of their subjects."⁴⁰ Dopp says, "Particular judgements are generally interpreted as being existential. 'Some man is vain' signifies in effect: 'There is at least one supposit which is at the same time man and vain.'"⁴¹ The quotation from Siger given above leaves no doubt that he would agree with this assertion. Yet Maritain thinks otherwise. He offers some examples of propositions which he says are *I* propositions and yet nonexistent. They are "Some man is creable" and "Some animal (viz. man) is rational."⁴²

The first proposition looks strange from the outset. If it means "There exist men who are creable," it certainly is existential; but if it means "It is possible for there to be a man who is creable," then it is no longer categorical. It is modal. As we suggested before, a mere transference of necessary propositions over to modal logic would solve this whole problem. The second proposition means either "There exists at least one individual animal" (and then it is existential) or "The class *animal* contains the class *rational*" (and then it is not an *I* proposition). *I* propositions concern individuals which are members of both *S* and *P*. So our second interpretation, if true, prevents it from being an *I* proposition.

We might further note that the same objection as we have raised

⁴⁰*Science of Logic*, p. 260.

⁴¹"Les jugements particuliers sont généralement interprétés comme étant existentiels. 'Quelque homme est vaniteux' signifie en effet: 'Il y a au moins un supposé qui est à la fois homme et vaniteux'" (*Leçons de logique formelle*, p. 91).

⁴²*Introduction to Logic*, p. 227.

⁴³*Ibid.*, p. 229.

⁴⁴Cf. n. 17 of the article mentioned in n. 2 above.

⁴⁵Cf. S. Thomas, *ST* I, q. 13, aa. 5 & 12.

against Maritain's interpretation of the second proposition above applies also to this third proposition, which he takes as being both *I* and nonexistential; namely, "Some man (for instance, a saint) has imperfections." ⁴³

The question of the status of propositions in natural science does not affect the question here. They are generally interpreted as being probability-statements; so they are half way, as it were, between contingent and necessary statements—contingent insofar as they make assertions about past instances, tending towards necessity insofar as they tend toward assertions about all possible instances. One could say that they start from the contingent and progress towards the necessary, the necessary proposition being the *limit* of a progression which is infinite. So, since they never reach their limit, presumably they remain existential.

As we have said before,⁴⁴ there is one type of necessary proposition which has existential import; namely, any statement about the nature of God. Such propositions, however, cannot strictly be called *A* propositions because God is neither a category of being nor subsumed under a category. Nor can they strictly be called *I* propositions, because God is not a member of a species, or even singular propositions, if the subject of a singular proposition is taken to be a member of a species. By abstracting from the limitations of being involved in the use of these types of proposition, though, we can use them in a wider sense to refer to the Being who possesses *eminentiori modo* whatever perfections of being exist within the categories.⁴⁵ Evidently we are not called upon here to go into such a vast subject.

V

There are two unstated axioms for the Aristotelian Square. One is that no self-contradictory term can function as value for the variables *S* and *P*. The other, the one we have been concerned with throughout this paper, is that there are *actual instances* of *S* and *P*, whatever species or genus *S* and *P* might stand for. It is this second axiom which involves the essential eternity of the world, thereby rendering it incompatible with any creationist metaphysics and therefore with Thomist thought.

Nevertheless, a very small change suffices to get us out of the

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impasse. If this second axiom were to demand only the *possibility* of instances of *S* and *P*, the Square would then be satisfactory. In fact, since self-contradictions are not allowed as terms in the Square, it could be said that this axiom of possible instances is already present in the first axiom.

On this interpretation, the essential proposition would figure in a *modal* Square, as an *A* or an *E*. *A* would read, "Every *S* is necessarily *P*"; and *E*, "Every *S* is necessarily non-*P*." *I* would mean, "It is possible for an individual to exist which was *S* and *P*"; and *O*, "It is possible for an individual to exist which was *S* and non-*P*." This, then, is the Square for the necessary or scientific proposition; and it is nonexistential. The ordinary existential categorical Square can then be kept for the enumerative *A*'s and *E*'s, these propositions being only magnified *I*'s and *O*'s.

VI

In conclusion we would like to quote, from the Polish logician Czezowski, a passage on Aristotelian logic which is a model of clarity and succinctness:

In order to make it precise we place in front of the classical logic the axiom:

422.1 (S) (Ex)Sx.

that is, for every predicator *S* there exists an *x* such that *x* is *S*.

This axiom expresses in logical language the metaphysical principle fundamental to the Aristotelian theory of science

⁴⁶T. Czezowski, *Logika* (Warsaw: PZWS, 1949), pp. 106-7. (Our translation).

Explanation: A predicator, designated by letters such as *P*, *Q*, *R*, *S*, could be defined as:

(f):(EP).fx = Px Df.

Czezowski defines *Z* and *U* as:

'Zx' = 'KPxNPx' Df.

'Ux' = 'APxNPx' Df.

(*ibid.*, p. 99).

⁴⁷Czezowski is not the only one to propose such an exclusion. Cf. T. Kotarbinski, *Elementy teorii poznania, logiki formalnej i metodologii nauk* [Elements of the theory of knowledge, formal logic, and methodology of the sciences] (Lwow, 1929), pp. 222-25. Cf. also,

J. Salamucha, *Pojecie Dedukcji u Arystotelesa i sw. Tomasza z Akwinu* [The notion of deduction in Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas] (Warszawa, 1930), p. 122. Here we find the following: "Mathematical logic is a logic of deduction, formally quite different from the logic of Aristotle. The entire formal logic of Aristotle could become a small part of mathematical logic if it were supplemented by certain additional assumptions. Thus, for instance, a rule should be introduced forbidding the substitution of the so-called 'null or empty names' and such universal names which comprise the designata of all names, e. g., the name 'object' for name-variables." (Our translation.)

according to which forms, genera and species (S) exist only in individual object (x). It excludes Z as a term in any proposition whatsoever: it excludes also U since the range of the variable S extends to the negation of predicators. Thus if we were to introduce U we would have to introduce the zero predicator NU contrary to the axiom. Axiom 422.1 performs an essential function. For if we remove the restriction imposed by that axiom, universal propositions become ambiguous, and some theorems in classical logic—false.⁴⁶

For the reasons already given, we propose the replacement of the axiom of the *existence* of *x*'s by that of their *possibility*. Czezowski's exclusion of the null and universal classes from Aristotelian logic prevents the occurrence of all those types of paradoxical inference mentioned in "Is the Square Back in Opposition?"⁴⁷

A NEW JOURNAL "of sacred and profane studies" has been begun by Editorial Herder of Barcelona. Entitled *Orbis Catholicus*, its more proximate function is indicated by its subtitle, "Revista Iberoamericana Internacional." Its intention is to provide for the Spanish-speaking peoples a continuing contact with the contemporary intellectual and cultural movements, especially of Europe. Listed as collaborators are about a hundred of the better-known Catholic scholars in Europe and South America. In the first issue, there are articles by Hans Urs von Balthasar ("La palabra en la historia"), E. Beitia ("Raíz modernista de la religión en Unamuno"), Jacques Leclercq ("El cristiano ante el orden internacional"), and M.-F. Sciacca ("Humanismo y palabra revelada"). A section is devoted to analyses of various movements, and there are a few book reviews. Subscriptions can be obtained through Herder and Herder, Inc. (7 West 46th St., New York 36) at 75¢ a copy, \$4.80 a year.

Research Difficulties in the *Liber De Causis*

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In a recent article on Gabriel Marcel, James Collins suggests that acquiring an exact understanding of this French existentialist is difficult because of the nature of his writings. Some, it is true, are cast as technical lectures (for example, his "Gifford Lectures," *The Mystery of Being*), but many others are either plays or journals. "As a practical footnote," Dr. Collins concludes, "it may be added that Marcel's writings are somewhat diffuse. Hence a real service would be performed by a concise selection of his leading doctrines in a single volume."¹

In the present study we are concerned with an early medieval Semitic author, who obviously is widely separated from Marcel in time, nationality, background, and the like, and yet who is similar to the French author on this one point: he too is hard to follow precisely because of the nature of his treatise. No matter what doctrine one seeks to investigate in his *Liber de Causis*, one encounters several textual obstacles which impede that investigation and which we intend here to isolate so as to make future research in the *Liber* easier.

But before engineering the isolation, can we identify that medieval author more closely? Not with any certainty, for although its Latin translation is commonly attributed to Gerard of Cremona (d. 1187), the authorship itself of the *Liber* is still an open question. According to G. Anawati's recent and detailed survey, most modern scholars have attributed it either to Alfarabi, who died at Baghdad in 950 A.D., or to David the Jew, who worked together with Gundissalinus in Toledo, Spain, on translating Arabic and Greek treatises into Latin during the second half of the twelfth century and whose name variously appears as Ibn David, Abraham Ibn Daoud, Avendauth, Avendehut, Avendehat, and so on.² According to Anawati himself, its authorship cannot yet be definitively decided; but he would seem to favor a ninth-century Arab as its author, and he certainly counsels attentive study of Arabian Neoplatonists and, among the Greeks, of Plotinus as well as of Proclus before one decides the question.³

Incidentally, Father Anawati's suggestion that Plotinus may have directly influenced the author of the *Liber* is corroborated by a recently discovered similarity between their accounts of how the universe was caused. The

Greek author divides the genesis of the universe into two atemporal moments—the overflowing of the cause and, secondly, the self-completion of that which has overflowed by turning back to *contemplate* its cause. The author of the *Liber* has retained Plotinus's second moment in all important essentials and has simply substituted creation for the first moment. The First Cause no longer produces by overflowing: He creates, He gives being to the Intelligence (or whatever the item in question may be). That Intelligence then proceeds to develop itself by receiving *through contemplation* the additional perfections God pours upon it. In stressing the function which *contemplation* performs in that moment of self-completion, our author seems much closer to Plotinus than to Proclus.⁴

Now back to our aim in the present paper. What main textual difficulties await the student of the *Liber de Causis*?⁵

¹"Marcel: Christian Socratic," *Commonweal*, LXVIII, No. 22 (Aug. 29, 1958), 542.

²G. C. Anawati, o.p., "Prolégomènes à une nouvelle édition du *De Causis* arabe," *Mélanges L. Massignon* (Paris: A. Maisonneuve, 1957), pp. 73-110.

³*Ibid.*, pp. 83-5, 109-110.

⁴See L. Sweeney, s.j., "The Doctrine of Creation in the *Liber de Causis*," Etienne Gilson testimonial volume (Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1959).

⁵The text used is R. Steele, *Liber de Causis*, Vol. XII of *Opera Hactenus Inedita Rogeri Baconi* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1935), pp. 161-87. References in large Roman numerals will be to Propositions, in arabic numbers to pages and lines. For instance, "IV, 164, 11" means Steele's edition, Proposition Four, page 164, line 11.

Otto Bardenhewer's German translation of the Arabic text (*Die pseudo-aristotelische Schrift Ueber das reine Gute bekannt unter dem Namen Liber de Causis* [Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1882], pp. 58-118) will also be constantly consulted and will complement Steele's edition wherever necessary or helpful. References to that German translation will be made in the same manner as to this latter, except for the addition of "B (G)." For example, "B (G), IV, 65, 9" should be read as Bardenhewer's German translation, Proposition Four, page 65, line 9.

⁶St. Thomas seems first to have recognized our author's dependency

upon Proclus's treatise, after reading William of Moerbeke's translation (see H. D. Saffrey, *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Super Librum de Causis Expositio* [Fribourg: Société Philosophique; Louvain: Éditions E. Nauwelaerts, 1954], p. xxiv and p. 3, l. 7 sq.). An edition of William's translation has recently been published by C. Vansteenkiste, o.p., "Procli Elementatio Theologica Translata a Guilelmo de Moerbeke (Textus Ineditus)," *Tijdschrift voor Phil.*, xiii (1951), 263-302 and 490-531.

⁷E. R. Dodds (ed.), *Proclus: Elements of Theology* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933 [hereafter referred to as Dodds]), Prop. 88, p. 80, l. 25 sq.

⁸II, 162, 23 sq.

⁹This indication is located in the fact that, whereas the Being which is prior to Eternity is *being*, the One is not *being* at all. Why? Because the One is prior to Being as well as to all else (e.g., Dodds, Prop. 2, p. 4, l. 19 sq.; Prop. 115, p. 100, l. 28 sq.; etc.)

¹⁰II, 162, lines 26 sq., 32 sq. and 35 sq.

¹¹Dodds, p. 246.

¹²II, 162, 27 sq. For Proclus's conception of time in the *Elements*, see Dodds, Props. 53-55, p. 50 sq. and pp. 228-230.

¹³For a discussion of its relationship with the *Elements of Theology*, as well as a list of the propositions from Proclus which each proposition in the *Liber* is based upon, see Bardenhewer, pp. 11-37.

The first such obstacle is easily recognized—the disconcerting way in which its author uses Proclus's *Elements of Theology*.⁶ If he merely repeated or even wholly rejected the pagan Greek, one might easily conclude that his attitude toward problems is or is not essentially Procline. What he actually does, however, is much more complex and subtle. He paraphrases or, at times, even literally quotes Proclus; but then he inserts his own qualifying phrases and clauses within those very paraphrases and quotations, or even replaces portions with his own statements.

Let us take as a representative case his comparatively short and simple Proposition II, where he locates the First Cause, Intelligence, and Soul with reference to eternity. In Proposition 88 of his *Elements*, Proclus states that "every true Being is either prior to Eternity or in Eternity or is a participant of Eternity."⁷ In Proposition II of the *Liber de Causis*, however, that statement becomes: *Omne esse superius aut est superius eternitate et ante ipsam aut est cum eternitate aut est post eternitatem et supra tempus*.⁸ In his explanation of Proposition 88, Proclus indicates with sufficient clarity that the Being prior to Eternity is not the One seu First Cause but is the First Being.⁹ According to the *Liber*, though, the Being prior to Eternity is the First Cause, which holds that rank, as our author emphatically repeats, precisely because it has caused eternity, which therefore has acquired its being.

Esse vero quod est ante eternitatem est causa prima, quoniam est causa ei. . . . Et significatio quod causa prima est ante eternitatem ipsam, est quod esse in ipsa est acquisitum . . . Et causa prima est supra eternitatem, quoniam eternitas est causatum ipsius.¹⁰

In Proclus's Proposition 88, the Being which is in eternity is the First Life, whereas the Being which is a participant of Eternity is the Intelligence.¹¹ In Proposition II of the *Liber*, nonetheless, the Being which is with, and in, eternity has become the Intelligence, while the Being which is after Eternity and above Time is the Soul, a position which this latter holds precisely because it is the cause of time (*et anima . . . est supra tempus quoniam est causa temporis*).¹²

Almost every proposition in the *Liber* exemplifies that disconcerting use its author makes of the pagan Greek philosopher.¹³ But our brief analysis of Proposition II is sufficient to indicate that certainly one obstacle standing in the way of an easy and accurate evaluation of his position on any problem is the fact that our author is both so near and yet so far from Proclus.

The next obstacle is perhaps less obvious but equally formidable—our anonymous author attempts too much in too little space. In R. Steele's edition, the *Liber* runs to only twenty-six pages,¹⁴ yet within that relatively small area an entire and complex universe is unfolded. At its summit is the First Cause; at its base is the sensible universe; and on the two intervening levels are souls and intelligences.¹⁵ Each stratum of creatures is again subdivided hierarchically. The lowest is headed by heavenly bodies and Time, with material things filling in the lower ranks.¹⁶ On the next stratum the higher division is made up of intellectual souls, with the First Intellectual Soul occupying the lead position, and the lower division is constituted by mere souls (*ex animabus est que est anima intelligibilis . . . et ex eis est que est anima tantum*).¹⁷ On the third stratum divine intelligences make up the more perfect rank, which is headed by the First Divine Intelligence, and mere intelligences form the less perfect (*ex intelligentiis est que est intelligentia divina . . . et de eis est que est intelligentia tantum*).¹⁸

Moreover, within those same few pages our author is not content merely to sketch the general structure of that hierarchy but also aims at disclosing

¹⁴Pp.161-87.

¹⁵The four levels of the universe are implied in almost every Proposition. As examples of more explicit passages, see IV, 164, 3 sq.; IX, 169, 2 sq.

¹⁶Propositions XXX to XXXII, pp. 183-87, *passim*. What we here call "material things" are variously described in the *Liber*: bodies involved in magnitude, motion, and division (VII, 167, 2 sq.); *generata* (IX, 169, 22); *res destructibiles* (XI, 171, 19); *res sensibiles que moventur* (XIV, 172, 29); *corpora naturalia*, which can be either inanimate or rational (XIX, 176, 16 sq. and 31 sq.) *substantie . . . composite cadentes sub generatione . . . res temporales* (XXIX, 183, 14 sq.).

¹⁷XIX, 176, 14 sq.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, line 12 sq.

¹⁹XXX, 183, 25 sq.

²⁰VIII, 168, 1 sq.; XIV, 172, 25 sq.

²¹XII, 171, 23 sq.

²²I, 161, 1 sq.

²³XXII, 178, 24 sq.

²⁴"Et virtus quidem divina est supra omnem virtutem . . . quoniam est causa omni virtuti" (X, 170, 21 sq.; IX, 170, 2 sq.). "Causa prima est fixa, stans cum unitate sua pura semper"

(XX, 177, 6 sq.). Also see IV, 164, 5 sq.

²⁵"Immo est unitas ejus [First Cause] pura, quoniam est simplex in fine simplicitatis" (IV, 164, 5 sq.; XXI, 178, 8 sq.).

²⁶"Natura continet generationem, et anima continet naturam, et intelligentia continet animam. . . Et causa quidem prima . . . est supra intelligentiam et animam et naturam" (IX, 169, 24 sq.). Because of its transcendence, the First Cause is also above knowledge and description (VI, 166, 1 sq; XXII, 178, 21 sq.).

²⁷IV, 164, 3 and 21. Our author repeatedly affirms that the first creature is the Intelligence *seu* Being. For instance, "Et intelligentia . . . est primum creatum quod creatum est a causa prima" (VII, 167, 25 sq.); "ens autem creatum primum, scilicet intelligentia" (XVI, 174, 19 sq.); *ibid.*, l. 33 sq.; XXIII, 179, 12.

Hence, in IV, 164, 3, what our author meant to say is, most likely, that the First Created Being is above every *lower* intelligence ("supra [inferiorem] intelligentiam").

Perhaps, though, the problem cannot

the mutual relationships between its various levels and, even, between various items within one and the same level. A whole list of such disclosures can easily be drawn up. For instance, the higher is joined to the lower through a middle item, which is similar to each extreme.¹⁹ The higher knows the lower as its effect, while the lower knows the higher as its cause.²⁰ The higher is in the lower, and the lower in the higher, each in its own way.²¹ In the case of an effect produced by both a higher and a lower cause, the higher has more influence than the lower because the higher causes the very causality of the lower, with the result that the efficacy of the Supreme Cause is prior to, present within, and remains after, the efficacy of all other causes.²² No matter what the basis of comparison may be, the higher is always better than the lower, with the highest completely transcending the order in question. Especially this last point in its many applications reveals the deep layer of Neoplatonism underlying the *Liber*. For example, the higher is more perfect than the lower, while the First Cause is more-than-perfect (*est supra completum*).²³ Again, higher entities are also more powerful and are fewer in number, whereas the First Being is above power and is absolutely unique.²⁴ What is higher in the scale of reality is also more simple and has more unity, but God is absolute simplicity and unity.²⁵ Again, the higher contains the lower, and what is highest is totally uncontained, for does not Nature contain individual material things, the Soul contain Nature, and the Intelligence contain the Soul, whereas the First Cause is above all?²⁶

Such, then, is the hierarchic universe which the author of the *Liber* endeavors to describe within the brief space of its thirty-two propositions—a complex structure whose four tiers are tightly fitted one upon another through mutual resemblance, knowledge, in-existence, and causal influence. Although the testimony he there gives to the existence and nature of an early mediaeval Neoplatonism is extremely valuable and interesting, still one can hardly avoid suspecting that by attempting so much within such narrow textual confines our author may have omitted much relevant and even necessary information on other facets of his doctrine.

INCONSISTENCIES

Although the previous obstacle arises from what the author fails to say, the final set of difficulties is the apparent inconsistencies in what he actually does say. Some of these seem due merely to a defective condition in the text or to a momentary slip of the author's or translator's pen. Such might be the explanation for the contradictory affirmations in IV that the First created Being is above intelligence and yet is intelligence (*esse est . . .*

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supra intelligentiam . . . et esse quidem creatum primum est intelligentia).²⁷ Or, again, in XVI that the First Cause is subsistent Infinity and yet is above it (*Ens autem primum creans est infinitum primum purum . . . proculdubio est supra infinitum*).²⁸

be so easily solved since Proclus, too, is caught in a similar inconsistency. At times the Being is above intelligence because Being is an intelligible (*νοητόν*) and prior to *Nous* (Dodds, Prop. 161, p. 140, 14 sq.). More commonly, however, Being and Intelligence are identical (e.g., Dodds, Prop. 20, p. 22 l. 1 sq.; Prop. 129, p. 114, l. 16 sq.; etc.).²⁹ XVI, 174, 14 sq. and 19.

Subsistent Infinity is the hub of another puzzle. Infinity comes between the First Cause and the First created Being *seu* Intelligence (XVI, 174, 27 sq.) and, hence, is not to be identified with either. Yet Intelligence is the first creature. What, then, is Infinity? Our author implies that it is caused—"infinitum est a causa prima" (XVI, 174, 31) or "die Unendlichkeit stammt aus der ersten Ursache" (B [G], XV, 90, 4). Yet if caused and prior to Intelligence, why is not Infinity the first creature? If uncaused, why is it not identical with God?

²⁹XI, 171, 19 sq. The German version is even clearer—"Die vergänglichsten, unter das Entstehen und Vergehen fallenden Dinge sind aus einer Körperlichkeit, ich meine aus einer körperlichen, zeitlichen Ursache" (B [G], X, 82, 2 sq.).

³⁰XVI, 174, 32 sq. Also VIII, 168, 1 sq.: Intelligence knows lower items (which include *res corporee*) precisely because it is their cause.

³¹XIX, 176, 14 sq.

³²III, 163, 7 sq.

³³*Ibid.*, line 17 sq. Even more clearly: II, 162, 26 sq.; IV, 164, 3 sq.

³⁴XII, 171, 24 sq.; XVIII, 175, 20 sq. This latter triad can rather easily be reconciled with the former (see preceding note) if *Vita* is equivalent to *Anima* (as the author himself implies in, for example, XII, 172, 2 sq.) and moved to the third and lowest place.

³⁵XV, 173, 33 sq. Also see Props. XXV to XXIX, where various properties are ascribed to such self-sufficient substances. For example, they are above generation (XXV, 181, 1 sq.) and above

corruption (XXVI, 181, 19 sq.). They are simple, eternal, and indivisible (XXVII, 182, 9 sq.; XXVIII, 182, 18 sq.). They are more perfect than temporal things (XXIX, 183, 9 sq.).

³⁶XXI, 178, 18 sq.

³⁷"Individuum suum est bonitas pura" (IX, 170, 9 sq.). "Ihr eigenthümliches Wesen ist das reine Gute" (B [G], VIII, 79, 4 sq.).

"Non est bonitas nisi per suum esse et suum ens et suam virtutem, ita quod est bonitas, et bonitas et virtus et ens sunt res una" (XX, 177, 14 sq.). "Propinque uni puro vero" (X, 170, 29 sq.). "Illud ergo in quo est unitas fixa . . . unum primum verum" (XXX, 186, 32 sq.). See also XVII, 175, 4.

³⁸See XVI, 174, 14 sq., where *ens primum creans* occurs three times and *ens primum*, twice. In XVIII, 175, 20, *ens primum* occurs three times; in XXX, 186, 19, we find *ens purum*. See IV, 164, 7 sq.; "Propter suam propinquitatem esse puro et uni vero."

³⁹XX, 177, 24 sq. and 30 sq. See B (G), XIX, 96, 12 sq.: "Gibt es kein Verhältniss (*σχέσις*) und nichts anderes Vermittelndes." Then: "So wirkt das Wirkende in Wahrheit und lenkt und leitet in Wahrheit" (*ibid.*, 97, 6 sq.). Also see *ibid.*, p. 198.

⁴⁰"Causa prima creavit esse anime mediante intelligentia" (III, 163, 18 sq.). "Creans animam et naturam et reliquas res mediante intelligentia" (IX, 169, 32).

⁴¹IX, 169, 1 sq. and 31 sq. That the first creature is, in fact, Intelligence, see the texts gathered *supra*, n. 27, first paragraph.

⁴²"Si invenitur res non indigens in generatione sui, id est in sua forma et sua formatione, re alia nisi se, et est ipsa causa formationis sue et sui complementi . . ." (XXV, 181, 11 sq.). Also see XXVI, 181, 31 sq.

⁴³Such reconciliation has been attempted in L. Sweeney, S.J., "Doctrine of Creation in the *Liber de Causis*," *passim*.

Others, however, are less easily handled, as the following instances show. According to XI, material things are not caused by intelligences but by a corporeal and temporal item (*res destructibiles sunt ex corporeitate, scilicet ex causa corporea temporali, non ex causa intellectuali eterna*),²⁹ yet according to XVI the First Intelligence is the very medium through which even corporeal things receive life, light, and other perfections (*relique bonitates . . . descendunt super reliqua causata intelligibilia et corporea mediante intelligentia*).³⁰ Again, in XIX our author classifies the highest type of souls not as divine but as intellectual,³¹ and yet in III he attributes to them divine activity.³² In this latter proposition, also, he lists Being, Intelligence, and Soul as the three top items of his hierarchy;³³ and yet elsewhere he lists Being, Life, and Intelligence.³⁴ In XV self-sufficiency and independence (*stans fixa per se, non indigens in sui fixione et sui essentia re alia exigente ipsam, quoniam est substantia simplex sufficiens per seipsam*) are somehow predicated of every existent capable of self-knowledge and self-introversion (a description which certainly fits all intelligences);³⁵ yet in XXI such properties seem restricted entirely to the First Cause because of His absolute simplicity and excluded from all else as absolutely needing the enriching out-pouring of God (*relique autem res intelligibiles aut corporee sunt non divites per seipsas, immo indigent uno vero influente super eas bonitates et omnes gratias*).³⁶ Frequently he designates his First Principle by such typically Neoplatonic descriptions as "Pure Goodness" or "the Primal One-True,"³⁷ but occasionally names it simply "First Being," "Pure Being," and the like.³⁸ Although XX affirms that between a true agent and his effects no mediator exists (*non est continuator neque res alia media . . . agens vero inter quod et inter factum ejus non est continuator penitus, est agens verum et regens verum*),³⁹ the First Cause is frequently described as creating the Soul and all else through the Intelligence.⁴⁰ Finally, God causes all intelligences,⁴¹ which, however, somehow cause themselves through knowledge and, actually, are called "self-constituting" and the like.⁴²

According to such instances, our author has made puzzling statements concerning items on every level of his Neoplatonic universe. And although most are reconcilable,⁴³ still their mere presence is enough to make one's journey through the *Liber* slow and painstaking.

SUMMARY

Such, then, are some reasons why the *Liber de Causis* is by nature difficult to interpret—its author is so near and yet so far from Proclus; he attempts so much in such a few pages; and, finally, he appears to speak

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inconsistently. In this brief study our aim has been to render research in this important document easier and less disconcerting by pinpointing in advance these three major obstacles which anyone wishing to successfully locate its author's position on a major topic must conquer. To be forewarned is, so the saying goes, to be forearmed.

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***Painting and Reality.* By Etienne Gilson. The "A. W. Mellon Lectures in the Fine Arts," 1955. Pantheon Books, 1957. Pp. xxiv + 367.**

This is a very positive as well as a very humble book and one that reflects great credit upon modern Scholasticism. M. Gilson surely deserves our warmest congratulations.

"What has the philosopher to learn from painting?" (p. ix) is the basic attitude of these lectures, and there is nothing at all hypocritical in Professor Gilson's discipleship throughout the book. There is, likewise, nothing apologetic in Gilson's subjection of painting as "reality" to the metaphysics of Aristotle and St. Thomas. Very correctly, then, the book may be described as "the meeting point of two entirely different disciplines: metaphysics and the concrete reality of the painted works of art" (p. x).

Allowing the painters (especially the moderns) to speak of their art, Gilson interprets their doctrine in the light of the classical metaphysics of being and with such sympathy as, equivalently, to bring that philosophy powerfully to the support of painting during the last hundred years, the years of "the boldest creative experiment ever attempted during the whole evolution of the art of painting" (p. x). The result is quite exhilarating. No one could put Aristotle and St. Thomas quite so rigidly to the test of modernity as modern painters; and, conversely, modern painting has received new depth and stature from its association here with the wisdom of the ages.

The first half of the book is devoted to separate chapters (lectures) on the existence, individuality, duration, ontology, and causality of paintings as Aristotle understood those concepts. The arrangement is a bit untidy but the conclusions are uniformly clear and fresh. A painting is—has physical as well as aesthetic existence—in genuine independence of the beings existing in nature. This solid basis of realism, rigidly distinct from Kantian idealism or any abstractive "mentalism," gives worth and dignity to the whole artistic activity. "Still-life" painting, for example, is taken as a kind of archetype in that it can rightly be said to have no "subject" if by subject we mean the description of some scene or some action:

. . . the things that a still life represents exercise only one single

act, but it is the simplest and most primitive of all acts, namely, TO BE. . . . Always present to that which is, this act of being usually lies hidden, and unrevealed, behind what the thing signifies, says, does, or makes (p. 28).

With this sharp distinction between "subject" and "painting" the author allows the painters to insist upon the aesthetic activity as the very substance of their art. Realist, again, matter and form are defended by Gilson as principles truly constitutive of any art piece and not merely metaphorically. A strictly Aristotelian concept of form is vindicated for a painting. It is "the essential nature of a thing" (p. 110). It "isolates within matter a whole that because it is endowed with determinate size, shape, and position in space is capable of separate existence" (p. 111). Thus art is "the ability to create a new being that nobody would ever see, either in nature or otherwise, unless the art of the painter caused it to exist" (p. 116). "The artist creates a form; and by the same token, a being" (p. 123).

This establishes in Scholastic realism the fact of the artist as creator. From here on, the dialogue of the book is pretty much concerned with this concept of creation as opposed to "imitation" and with its realistic meaning and implications. Since a painter creates a form, all his obligations are to the very form he creates and not to any external object, being, or landscape that he might try to imitate. So,

. . . a true painter does not borrow his subject from reality; he does not even content himself with arranging the material provided by reality so as to make it acceptable to the eye. His starting point is fantasy, imagination, fiction, and all the elements of reality that do not agree with the creature imagined by the painter have to be ruthlessly eliminated (p. 130).

At the heart of the creative process, then, we find not natural "subjects" to be copied, but "motifs," "incentives to create"; that is, "the response of the imagination of an artist to the stimuli of sense perceptions" (p. 138). In this way the foundation for nonrepresentational art is laid. Idealism fails to provide a solid basis for art, which is really a distinct order of being neither absolutely severed from nature nor identified with nature but one created by beings of nature—artists.

Is the precise origin of the creative process, then, to be called "intuition"? Gilson doubts if this is the best word (p. 150), since he is afraid intuition may connote a "vision," the perfect precognition of a work to be done. Nevertheless, "the starting point of the painter—that is, what he first has in mind—is a more or less fluid image, or rather a sort of moving scheme that is much less a model properly so-called than the germ of the work to be" (p. 149). This is an intellectual activity, of course, but not a

vision, and, as knowledge, little resembles the determinate knowledge we have of already existing objects.

The germinal form in the mind of the painter is not such a [mathematical] law, but it operates in accordance with a secret feeling for intelligibility. A sort of instinct rather than a knowledge, the germinal form gropes its way toward its final embodiment in a certain matter according to an inner tendency similar to that which orientates the form toward its end in the production of a natural being (p. 187).

These reflections on intuition inevitably recall Professor Jacques Maritain and the volume which is companion to this in the "Mellon Lectures," *Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry*. Maritain is mentioned only very sparingly in this book; and from the objections Gilson makes to his key ideas of "poetry" and "intuition," it might seem as if the present work is designed as a correction of Maritain. Such would, however, be a totally superficial view. The two books come out of precisely the same metaphysical roots in St. Thomas and Aristotle, and show the same kind of radical application of philosophy to art. It is rather, I believe, that Gilson's approach is more soberly ontological and Maritain's frankly exploratory in the psychological wastes of the unconscious and preconscious. It is true that "mentalism" (if Maritain ever held it) here receives very positive correction. But "intuition," while Gilson does not explore its psychological roots, and even "poetry" (though the term itself is not accepted in Maritain's sense) are certainly assumed in the "germinal form," the "motif," the "instinct," by which hand and mind co-operate in painting and without which there would be in painting no "poetry," "music," "painting"—but only subjects to be represented (p. 252).

The last four chapters are more immediately concerned with the evolution of modern painting in the light of the principles here discussed. The evolution is splendidly defended as the pursuit of pleasure, and pleasure as founded in real beauty. This involves us in the problem of creation as against imitation. Gilson doesn't like either Plato's or Aristotle's doctrine of imitation because the idea of representation, logically leading ultimately to deception, always introduces an antinomy into the doctrine of artistic creation (p. 250-52). "Is not the pleasure given by art independent of the subject?" The whole evolution of painting from 1857 to 1957 is here defended; it is the progressive attempt "to eliminate from painting all the merely representational elements and exclusively to preserve the poetic elements" (p. 252). If, logically, this leads to the elimination of all representation in painting, even representation of geometric forms and purely plastic elements, until finally nothing is left but "prime matter"

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itself as "subject" of paintings, Gilson is willing to go the whole way, commenting only, in a dry way, "The only objection to prime matter is that it is rather monotonous" (p. 257).

A distinction very important in religious art is thus introduced: the distinction between painting and "picturing." The ultimate object of a painting is "to achieve a fitting object of contemplation" which may or may not be representational (p. 266). But picturing is the art of representing or imitating. Thus, for religious worship or historical commemoration, a *picture* may be required which will, by representing or imitating some object not present, fulfil the need of piety or education. A *painting* in the same situation, because it may be nonrepresentational, may totally fail to give satisfaction. Nevertheless, "the art of doing Christian pictures does not exclude the possibility of doing Christian paintings; by itself, however, it necessarily is representational art" (p. 295). Would that church artists accepted this distinction.

In defense of nonrepresentational art, Gilson is much more tolerant than was Maritain. He seems not to be afraid of the "animal frenzy" and cynical abandonment of beauty for ugliness which can be the motive for suppression of natural appearances. He approaches a "qualitative universe" (pp. 269-80) distinct from the visible universe in the inexhaustible realm of possible reality. To disclose this world "either real for us to discover or possible for art to actualize" (p. 280) is the proper function of creative art. It is his metaphysics which keeps Professor Gilson here free both from idealism and from a surrealist craving to violate reality in a mad attempt to discover truth beyond human reason. It may not always keep the artists themselves free from such madness. The greatest gift within the power of realism to offer the painter, if he will only accept it, is this contact with being which makes him truly a "creator," and at a still higher level, assures him that

. . . he will know the exhilarating feeling of finding himself in contact with the closest analogue there is, in human experience, to the creative power from which all the beauties of art as well as those of nature ultimately proceed. Its name is Being (p. 299).

With these profound words Professor Gilson brings to a close a truly magnificent book.

Literary Criticism: A Short History. By William K. Wimsatt, Jr., and Cleanth Brooks. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1957. Pp. xv + 755. \$6.75 (text), \$8.95 (trade).

Joyce and Aquinas. By William T. Noon, S.J. "Yale Studies in English," Vol. 133. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. xii + 167. \$3.75.

Problems of Art: Ten Philosophical Lectures. By Susanne K. Langer. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1957. Pp. 184. \$3.50.

In reviewing Mr. Wimsatt's book, *The Verbal Icon*, we emphasized the author's growing importance among American critics as a spokesman for the Christian-Aristotelian tradition in literature. The present *Short History* is another noteworthy step in Mr. Wimsatt's emergence. In collaboration with Mr. Cleanth Brooks, one of the brilliant "names" in the new criticism and now his associate at Yale, Wimsatt here presents a full-scale review in one volume of the whole of Western literary critical writing from Plato to Maritain and Mrs. Langer. The book is not an anthology, though there is considerable direct quotation, nor is it strictly a history of criticism. It is a series of well-documented but rather chatty essays on the significance for our day of the famous systems of literary criticism of the past; an "argumentative history of literary argument in the West" (vii), if we take the authors' own view. No really new material is uncovered; but the emphasis upon the medieval theorists and the respect shown for Coleridge and the nineteenth-century apologists for romanticism (Coleridge, Wordsworth, Shelley, and Croce are quoted with unusual fullness) are both so uncommon as to be almost "discoveries."

What is worthy of highest praise here is that the authors do argue for a single point of view (broadly Aristotelian) and vigorously maintain that there are absolute objective values and norms in literature. Thus, the theme for the whole work is found in the original Platonic-Aristotelian dilemma, idealism *vs.* realism. Mingling modern opinions freely with the historical ones under discussion, the authors keep this theme meaningfully alive throughout the book. It may turn into the question of imitation *vs.* intuition in the classical period or the supremacy of didacticism over inspiration in the Middle Ages, but always the choice seems to be Plato or Aristotle. A rather bewildering set of antinomies are all deftly brought back to the court of Aristotle's realism: morality *vs.* license (Sidney), skepticism *vs.* "probabilism" (Dryden), decoration preferred to originality

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(eighteenth century), and imagination and individuality revolting against imitation and decorum in the turmoil of the nineteenth century.

Finally, the last two hundred pages survey the warring critical schools of modern times. This is, naturally, the most interesting section of the book; but it is also somewhat disappointing. Brooks is not the Aristotelian that Wimsatt is, and it is Brooks who takes responsibility for this section. Perhaps he is too close to the men and movements in which he has taken a considerable part personally. At any rate, the difficulty seems to be that after five hundred pages of discussion of the realist-idealist dilemmas, the dilemma itself comes to be the reality; one comes subtly to believe that it has no solution. This is basically an abandonment of the authors' original "argument" for Aristotle and absolute values. Thus the Aristotelian criterion is not rigorously applied to Hegel, Jung, the symbolists, I.A. Richards, semanticists, and the rest. Mr. Brooks, for example, cites I.A. Richards's statement that words "lead to the creation of bogus entities, the universals, properties, and so forth" (p. 636) without argument, even though Richards's system thus leads (as is pointed out) to rank exploitation of the emotions. The criterion here applied to the moderns seems to me to be not Aristotle but Brooks's own irony, paradox, and ambiguity—valuable in themselves but not incisive enough in a book of this architecture.

In a discussion involving Aristotle, finally, it is a fault that the true nature of the hylomorphic principles of being and action is not driven home with emphasis. Matter and form are not clearly expounded as *principia entis* (for example, "The *to ti ēn einai*—the "being what a thing was"—is a relative of *ousia* so close as to be nearly indistinguishable from it" [p. 23]). No vigorous application of Aristotelian "form" is possible unless the analogy of being is "stressed, instressed." These critics are in the forefront of a new humanistic interpretation of literature, and this book is to be praised highly even while a stronger metaphysical base is recommended.

Father William T. Noon, S.J., one of M. Wimsatt's graduate students at Yale, here presents his doctoral dissertation, a splendid example of the kind of scholarship Mr. Wimsatt represents and is fostering.

It should be said at once that *Joyce and Aquinas* is primarily a study and interpretation of James Joyce's work and only secondarily an analysis of what can and cannot be drawn from St. Thomas Aquinas in the way of an aesthetic theory. Nevertheless, Father Noon is an excellent metaphysician, and it may be that this exposition of St. Thomas will be the most effective feature of the book.

The argument of the book is, I think, that Joyce's work, as satire and comedy, cannot be correctly appreciated unless one knows the criterion or

milieu or abstract ideal in terms of which everything that Joyce touched is satirized. That criterion, to an astonishing degree, is Joyce's grasp of St. Thomas and the Catholic world-outlook. Obviously, this is an analytic approach which no Joyce scholar can overlook, and Father Noon's command of metaphysics gives his interpretation depth and authority. It is possible that Joyce's irony is overpraised, however. Through irony, any comment, however blasphemous or scandalous, coming from the mouth of Joyce-Bloom-Daedalus-Stephen as a kind of composite hero, can be interpreted as ironic. And when through "ironic incognito" (p. 103) the artist is hidden, how is a reader to judge "that Joyce succeeds in presenting a searching and exhaustive critique of contemporary society" (p. 101)? It is precisely the norm that becomes obscure. The devil himself is a theologian. "Nihilism" would, indeed, be an absurd attitude for St. Thomas, but is Joyce St. Thomas even when he uses Thomas's sublime theology?

Despite this query, the theme of the book is solid and its scholarship outstanding. In successive chapters, Father Noon explores Joyce's knowledge of St. Thomas, his aesthetic theory, his famous "epiphanies" as related to Thomistic metaphor and *claritas*, his development of the genre of comedy with the aid of St. Thomas's view of individual and class, and finally, in very careful dogmatic chapters, the Blessed Trinity and God as Creator, beautifully handled as analogues of the artist-creator and his works as creations of his mind and heart—giving real vitality to Joyce's concern with the gestation of language in his later work. No indication can be given here of the competence with which Father Noon handles St. Thomas's texts which bear on aesthetics. There is not an unscholarly conclusion in the book, and there are many that deal with highly controverted questions in aesthetics.

It is a distinct pleasure to read Mrs. Langer's classically beautiful English prose writing. Full of insights, yet patiently methodical, her pages reveal her intense personality in language that is itself a product of art.

Problems of Art—really a gathering of lectures given since Mrs. Langer's last book, *Feeling and Form* (1953)—does not materially change the author's aesthetic theory. The lecture form is evident throughout, and the book's greatest merit is its clarification and illustration of her position.

The concept of "significant form" or "living form" is still the key to Mrs. Langer's work and is the best thing in it, but it is still plagued with the problem of the relationship of form to "feeling" as the subjective source of art. It does not seem to me that the "significant form" as she presents it must be read as necessarily the product of idealistic philosophy. In fact, it seems to me to call out for a dualism and is more meaningful when explained in terms of analogy (which the author uses) than in any

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other context. Thus, the lecture "Living Form" (and those preceding it), which uses the language of analogy, is more effective as an explanation of creation in poetry than the strictly idealistic final lecture, "Poetic Creation." Even in that lecture (p. 150) Mrs. Langer sees that a philosophy of idealism is not essential to her theory of form. Moreover, in idealism the problem is precisely how this artistic form (if it really exists) is related to subjective feeling. Her really splendid analysis of form demands some relationship in being which will explain how a poem is a projection, in any sense, of one's self.

It is interesting that Jacques Maritain (*Creative Intuition*, Chapter 4) also speaks of emotion as the *form* of the poem in much the same context as Mrs. Langer. The meaning, if interpreted in terms of the analogy of being, would seem to be very much the same, and it would give emotion or feeling in Mrs. Langer's theory a solid objective relationship to the form of the poem.

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***The Tragic Philosopher: A Study of Friedrich Nietzsche.* By F. A. Lea.
New York: Philosophical Lib., 1957. Pp. 354. \$6.00.**

In his foreword, Lea explains that he means his book to be neither a biography of Nietzsche nor a systematic study of his philosophy; "its principal aim is to trace the *development* of Nietzsche's thought from 1865, the year of his 'conversion' by Schopenhauer, to 1888." It is mildly vexing to the reader that a work which comes so close to being a biography, by the very nature of its subject, has abstained from the relatively minor additions that would constitute the final step. However, within its self-imposed limitations, this is a very fine study indeed. It presents the Odyssey of Nietzsche's thought from its initial dependency on Schopenhauer and Wagner to final bold autonomy and self-sufficiency. This is done well, providing a full sympathetic portraiture of Nietzsche's ideas, supported by ample quotations from his works.

Among the merits of Lea's presentation are his appreciation and sympathy for Nietzsche, which never decline to mere adulation. Lea maintains throughout an attitude of independent evaluation and critical assessment, making an earnest effort to separate the wheat from the chaff. For example, he quite rightly finds in the late Nietzsche a misanthropy that is a travesty on his own earlier clear vision of Apollonian standards of human potentiality.

The reader will, I think, find of particular interest Lea's penetrating critique of Nietzsche's fervently hostile conception of Christianity and of

Jesus. "[Nietzsche's] interpretation of history, and therefore of his own role in history, stands or falls with his representation of Jesus. If he was mistaken in this, he was mistaken in much else as well: and I, for one, believe he was radically mistaken" (p. 335). Nietzsche's invidious identification of Christianity with the stultifying and self-righteous syrup served up by a host of pietistic female relatives who plagued his boyhood in Naumburg precluded his achieving anything approaching a balanced grasp of the meaning of Christianity.

To the reviewer's mind, the most serious outright defect of Lea's book is its oblique treatment of the process of fraud and forgery by which Nietzsche's sister Elizabeth attempted, all too successfully, to modify and distort the image of Nietzsche for posterity. This distortion is only hinted at in a few passing references. It should surely have been accorded fuller, explicit discussion in a book of this sort, which aims to right our view of Nietzsche's personality and work in order to create a more favorable climate for a study of his writings.

Lea's book is a constructive step in providing English-speaking readers with materials for an understanding and just interpretation of Nietzsche's work. As such, the general reader will be appreciative of its merits, since there are far too few sympathetic Nietzsche studies available in English. But in view of present tendencies in English-speaking philosophy, the current professional indifference to Nietzsche is likely to continue for some years. And this indifference is now wholly unmerited and without foundation. While Lea defends Nietzsche (I think successfully) against the charge of being anti-intellectual and *opposed* to reason, it does seem that Nietzsche has little use for reasoning and logical supporting argumentation as an instrument of philosophic method. Apparently his own practicing concept of philosophical discourse is that it must be a perpetual manifesto. Unfortunately it is this impatience with rational methods of inquiry, rather than his high humanism, that earns for Nietzsche his self-awarded title of "firstling of the twentieth century." Nietzsche suffered from a chronic inability to decide whether to be a philosopher or a prophet. (He once even thought of finding somewhere a large building or perhaps an old castle to house himself and the disciples and followers of whose coming he felt certain.) Despite his consistent affirmation of an uncompromisingly high ideal of human excellence, this undermines Nietzsche's claims to be taken seriously by philosophers of the present day, who turn to the literature in order to learn rather than to be edified.

***On Selfhood and Godhood.* By C. A. Campbell. New York: Macmillan Co., 1957. Pp. xxxvi + 436. \$6.00.**

Now that J. O. Urmson and others are beginning to take a historical, even a nostalgic, view of the past thirty years in British philosophy, a few features of that period are becoming clear. These years did not bring forth a new and permanent general standpoint as successor to traditional empiricism. Furthermore, the labors of this period did not succeed in laying the ghost of idealism, some stubbornly resistant elements of which continued to operate on minds. And in retrospect, the Gifford Lectureship has afforded the public an opportunity, during the years of "the revolution in philosophy," for continuous development of some pre- and apparently post-revolutionary currents in philosophy.

As Gifford lecturer during 1953-54 and 1954-55, Professor Campbell of Glasgow University confesses his "inability to do obeisance to the twin gods of so much recent British philosophy—empiricism and linguisticism." In earlier contributions to *Mind*, he had set forth reasons for holding that language analysis does not bring us to the heart of the matter. In the present lectures he sets out for the heartland itself, the sphere of religious affirmations. His first bold step is to regard his inquiry as a natural theology rather than the more fashionable philosophy of religion and to admit that natural theology is a metaphysical discipline. He asks those who have grown accustomed to using "metaphysics" as a swear-word to make a temperate review of their emotive attitude and, despite its by now venerable status, to consider the consequence of the disappearance of its general theoretical basis. The verifiability principle has changed even more radically in its status than in its content, since it now stands only as one useful methodological postulate and criterion of meaning, not as the unique definition and norm of meaning.

To prepare the way for a theory of God, Campbell first seeks to determine the nature of man. He appropriates from the idealism of Bradley and Bosanquet two cardinal tenets, the theory of judgment and that of self, but introduces his own modifications. Against Price and other analysts, he argues for the presence of a judgmental factor in every cognition. Although remaining vague on the nature of pure sensation as a noncognitive experience indispensable for cognition, he does show that the ultimate subject of judgment is a mind-independent reality, to which various traits are ascribed. The judging activity enables us to recover what William James liked to call the vanishing self. "An apprehending cannot be *that* which apprehends. What is 'known' cannot be known to the operation of knowing. It can be known only to a subject which, while engaged in the

knowing, is not itself *identical with* the knowing." The judging subject is an active and substantival self, since it has experiences which are not identical simply with its own being. Campbell notes that the substantial self can only vanish in a theory of sense data, where the data are isolated from their judgmental context and given independent status.

In the moral order, also, Campbell appeals to the function of judging as support for the irreducible consciousness of obligation, against the reductionist efforts of the linguists. Here, the canon is proposed that "the meaning of the moral ought is its meaning in moral *experience*, which need not, and frequently does not, find overt expression in speech or writing." The moral sentence adds the factor of communication and usually the aim of influencing the future actions of others. This purpose is stressed by the hortatory theory of ethical statements, but the author observes that the hortatory element is an addition to the silent judgment itself of moral obligation. Similarly, the emotive-expressive theory fixes upon the emotional aspect normally involved in stating a moral position, but does not notice that the moral experience itself is composite; it includes both a feeling and a determinate judgment as its components. On the crucial question of whether there is a single moral order for all men, the author reinterprets social anthropology to show that variations are compatible with the presence of a common moral principle, say, the promotion of the well-being of the community. This duty still allows great leeway among different human conceptions of what the community is in basic unity, how the agent belongs to it, and what constitutes its proper well-being.

Campbell finds a turning point to religious problems in the implication of basic moral judgment that there is a real moral order somehow present in the nature of things. The precise manner is explored by various religious and metaphysical views of the supreme being. He distinguishes at once between a rational and a suprarational theism, correlated with a literal and a symbolic use of the divine names. Rational theology is depicted as holding that there is a literal identity of meaning between perfections attributed to God and those we experience, saving only the removal of defects from the latter. A test case is found in the attributes of thought and will. They cannot be given a literal significance without importing imperfection into God, since judgment concerns objects not perfectly known, and willing concerns the acquisition of new perfection or the maintenance of being against possible loss of perfection.

In defence of suprarational theism, Campbell adopts the theory of the numinous proposed originally by Rudolf Otto. There is a felt, but not a conceived, identity between certain symbols and the concept of God. These

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representations are imperfect but can be applied with objective validity, since they do not depend on personal caprice but express the internal, necessary structure of the human mind. Metaphysical arguments can then be used to show that the affinity of the symbols holds good not only for the idea of God but also for the divine reality. Campbell revises Bradley on the need to suppose the unity of an infinite reality as the ultimate basis for predicating different factors. Together with the moral argument for a personal spiritual presence, this metaphysical approach shows the relevance of the suprarational concept of God to a divine reality whose nature transcends us.

The lectures on God do not fulfill the promise of those on man. Too many complicated issues are treated too hurriedly, starting with the initial contrast between literal and symbolic meaning. The literal position is variously described as holding for identity of meaning, for precision, and for conceivability of the divine nature, without sorting out these different senses. Scant attention is paid to theories of knowing and willing which do not necessarily involve an imperfection and yet which do not make any claim to know the divine nature in itself. The doctrine of objective symbolic predication rests on a Kantian theory of the a-priori structure of the mind, without fully considering the problems and alternatives.

Yet Campbell is proposing a symbolical theology of a unique sort. He agrees with Sertillanges in rejecting an arbitrary subjective kind of symbolism. The symbols are analogical, in virtue of an intrinsic suggestion leading to the thing symbolized. To overcome the objection that we would have to know the divine nature in order to have a symbolic knowledge expressive of both difference and likeness, Campbell replies that the perfection of value, for instance, even as we conceive it in human experience, points beyond itself.

Our human aspirations after value cannot find absolute fulfilment so long as any imperfection remains in our state. Now this entails that absolute fulfilment is achievable not in any finite mode of being, but only in an infinitude or self-completeness of being that transcends our human condition. In other words, the ideal consummation of "human value" *itself* lies in a state qualitatively different from any conceivable human value.

This theory of pointing and suggesting on the part of finite things is on the trail of a view of causal participation. It is prevented from reaching the latter position, however, by two circumstances connected with Campbell's sources. His reliance upon Bradley's approach to the infinite reality through an analysis of judgment remains within the a-priorist conception of knowledge and leaves out causal considerations. And his

only cited reference for what he calls the Scholastic theory of analogy is Mascall, who tries to work it out solely in terms of Cajetan's doctrine on analogy of attribution and proportionality. Again, the role of causal inference is neglected in such a notion of analogy, so that the only alternatives before the author are a claim to reach the divine nature somehow in itself and a basing of objective validity upon the necessary structures of the mind. The role of causal inference would be precisely to furnish a primary sort of analogy which would avoid these extremes.

JOHN J. FITZGERALD, *University of Notre Dame*

***Philosophy of Science. The Link between Science and Philosophy.* By Philipp Frank. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1957. Pp. xxii + 394.**

In *Philosophy of Science*, Philipp Frank brings his long experience and remarkably agile analytical powers to bear upon the problem of finding or reconstructing some verifiable link between philosophy and science. In a deeper sense, he appears in quest of a world view that respects the originalities and powers of modern scientific thought since the Renaissance without ignoring their connections with Greek, Roman, and medieval philosophical thought. One finds in this effort the scattered fruits of a productive career expressed in a language and form calculated to engage every earnest inquirer into the highly involved problematics of the many relations connecting and dividing the humanistic and scientific learnings of the West.

On the assumption that at any given period man's conception of himself in the world is a function of his prevailing view of the physical universe, the author formulates and evaluates the successive decisive concepts of the physical universe accumulated in the historical course of Western thought. Diverse and even incompatible as are these great conceptual schemes in other respects, they are all found to involve the same primitive elements—sense experience and general principles—the linkage between which constitutes for Professor Frank the basic problem of the philosophy of science.

Ancient philosophical and modern scientific thought are represented as differing primarily in their concepts of the general principles with which they describe and interpret the irreducible data of sense experience. For the ancients—in particular for Plato, Aristotle, and their medieval

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continuator, Aquinas—general principles are, in the final analysis, either scientific because they are the self-evident ground of logically necessary consequences verified in a vague general way in common-sense experience or hypothetical because productive of useful consequences without being evident in themselves. The rise of scientific technology in the seventeenth century doomed the traditional pre-Renaissance identification of science with philosophy. Thereafter, a radical rift arose between the types of ancient and modern science. Ancient science was unchangeably committed to the belief in self-evident first principles intuited with “the eyes of the mind”; modern science was no less firmly committed to first principles, but first principles invented rather than intuited and accepted rather for the verifiability of their consequences than for the self-evidence of their truth. In modern scientific thought the hypothetical-deductive procedure, known but not cherished by the ancients, has displaced their traditionally preferred categorical-deductive procedure, particularly in the realm of natural science. As responding to a persisting set of individual and social needs, to which the new natural science was, if not indifferent, at least neutral, the displaced classical procedure continued to assert itself in the more complex and less controllable realms of psychological and sociological phenomena, particularly in the deeply disturbed realm of knowledge theory. Originating with Descartes and mightily advanced by Kant, post-Renaissance metaphysical thought has sought in vain to recover or reconstruct some link between the traditional metaphysical wisdom of the West and modern technological science. All such efforts stemmed, according to Professor Frank, from a common traditional concept of mathematics as a deductive science from self-evident principles.

If the discovery of non-Euclidean geometry in the nineteenth century established unambiguously the hypothetical as opposed to the categorical character of ancient as well as modern mathematics, thus robbing metaphysics of the last unchallenged ground for its belief in self-evident principles, the same discovery has quite unexpectedly provided a new insight with which to close the gap opened between philosophy and science in the Renaissance and widened with the discovery and development of Newtonian mechanics. It is his detailed, perceptive manifestation and interpretation of this insight which, for this reviewer, provide the most illuminating section of Professor Frank's work. A condensed analysis of the textbook proof of the similarity of triangles, premised on the Euclidean axioms of the straight line and parallels, shows that, far from expressing self-evident truths, these axioms are such stipulated relations between terms as yield the same results whatever meaning one assigns to the related terms. Using appropriate Lobatchevskian axioms, it can be shown that the theorem of similar triangles vanishes and with it the traditional inter-

pretation of the physical universe as essentially homogeneous. Such purely formal mathematical systems are shown to acquire a physical meaning through operational definitions which are extrinsic to the physically meaningless terms of the formal system. In their formal structure (axioms and theorems) the enriched or interpreted systems are certain but tell us nothing about the real world; in their physical interpretation, they become vague and uncertain but tell us something verifiable about the physical world.

Professor Frank holds that both ancient and modern science can be shown to exhibit such purely formal structures whose terms are interpreted or defined operationally. To sustain this thesis, he traces in detail the development of the theory of motion (essential, he says, to all human science) from the "organismic mechanics" of Aristotle and the medievals through Newtonian to modern relativistic and quantum mechanics. In accepting the concept of the void as empty or absolute space, known to Plato but rejected by Aristotle, Newton was able to formulate the basic principles of his mechanics: (1) that a body at rest or in motion, upon which no unbalanced force is acting, maintains its state of rest or performs a rectilinear motion with a constant speed and (2) that an unbalanced force acting upon a body will equal the product of the mass of the body times the acceleration that the force produces. Without, however, the specification of an inertial system and the formulation of operational definitions for the concepts of force and mass, these laws turn out to be nothing more than arbitrary linguistic conventions without physical meaning. In eliminating the inelegant dichotomy of the terrestrial and celestial physics of Aristotle's organismic mechanics, the mechanics of Newton constituted a decisive advance in man's science of the physical universe. Yet its foundations are not without "organismic" or "theological" vestiges in their identification of absolute space with the divine sensorium and their assumption of a directive intelligence for such observed regularities in planetary motions which cannot be derived from the assumption of arbitrary initial positions and speeds. Twentieth-century mechanics has eliminated these "remnants of organismic physics" by dropping the concept of absolute space and taking the system of the fixed stars as a sufficient inertial system for the validity and verification of Newtonian mechanics for all masses with speeds which are small compared to the speed of light. For high-speed particles, the Newtonian mechanics, without losing any of its formal validity, is operationally unsuitable. Professor Frank sharpens further this key distinction between the formal and operational elements of human science in a complex technical analysis of the scientific meaning of relativistic and quantum physics as opposed

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to the irrelevant and often enough contradictory metaphysical interpretations of them. The result is a view of philosophy contracted to the philosophy of science, which, in turn, is construed as a continuing "research in the 'pragmatics of science' which envisages a coherent system containing the physical and biological as well as the sciences of human behavior" (p. 360). At the level of his analysis and presentation of the "pragmatics" of physical science and such of the other natural and behavioral sciences as employ, more or less successfully, the formal and operational procedures of the physical sciences, Professor Frank's work strikes one as cogent and convincing in its insights. This reviewer cannot say as much for his analysis and interpretation of classical philosophical thought as exemplified in the Aristotelian-Thomist theory of motion. It is the case that Aristotelian and Newtonian mechanics can be compared in their common bearing on the realm of observable locomotion. In such a comparison, the Aristotelian mechanics would appear to be a primitive and highly "speculative" scientific theory. Yet to be truly and significantly fertile in insights into the complex laws of the development and differentiation of scientific types, it would seem necessary that such comparisons should not ignore the historical, linguistic, and doctrinal contexts of their terms. In the view of this reviewer, it is not the case that the Aristotelian mechanics is, in the historical, linguistic, and doctrinal contexts of its formulation, a sufficient exemplification of the much more general and deeper Aristotelian theory of motion. It would seem no less a distortion of the Aristotelian doctrine of motion to represent it in terms of its mechanics than to represent the mechanics of Newton in terms of its organismic or theological elements. A more fruitful level of comparison would have been one suggested but not generally applied by Professor Frank himself, the intention of the theory's or doctrine's author. But with this criterion, much of the cogency of the author's insistence upon the organismic or finalistic character of the Aristotelian doctrine as a sign of its philosophical nature would vanish. Thus, Greek and Roman atomism, though externally and apparently more congenial to modern scientific thought by virtue of their nonfinalism, are in intention no less philosophical or scientific in the ancient sense than the finalism of Plato or Aristotle. In short, beyond the narrow range of the special epistemology of modern physical science, the authentically philosophical content of this work is not apparent.

Throughout, Professor Frank employs the ancient dialectic of discovery in accumulating and contrasting a vast company of philosophical spokesmen both ancient and modern. Unless correctly interpreted, such disparate opinions tend rather to confuse than clarify the argument. Thus, it is simply not clear that the Aristotelian-Thomist principle of efficient caus-

ality—whatever is in motion is moved by another—is derived, except disputatiously, from the argument attributed to St. Thomas (p. 94). In the context of Aristotelian-Thomist thought, the meaning and import of this “principle” follows from an inductive analysis of motion-in-general rather than the special case of locomotion. Accordingly, the disastrous consequences for traditional religious and ethical beliefs of its disproof by the Newtonian principle of inertia, no less than that disproof itself, are not established.

Of the two primitive elements of Professor Frank's general view of human knowledge—namely, common-sense experience and general principles—the former particularly recurs ambiguously in his argument. Sometimes it signifies both the contents of the observer's immediate external sensation and their assertion, as, for example, in the observation and statement of the presence of moving bodies or “spots” in the observer's field of external vision. Again, it often designates the experimental data collected in a laboratory report. Still again, it signifies the set of statements about reality which all averagely educated men, in a given historical period, readily accept and agree upon. This spread of diverse meanings in the loose usage of a primitive term is not without significant bearing on the interpretation of the general principles which are derived, whether by intuition or invention, from them. It provides, among other dialectical advantages (?), a useful device for describing, if not understanding, the process by which new “truths,” which are initially rejected as conflicting with accepted “truths,” in time become themselves assimilated in the public mind as self-evident; for example, the nineteenth-century belief in the self-evidence of the Newtonian laws. Self-evidence in this context becomes little more than consensus, whether true or false, a criterion useful perhaps in the dialectical order of discovery but simply irrelevant in the scientific order of demonstration.

In his closing chapters, Professor Frank formulates inconclusive views on causality and validation in scientific thought, views consonant with, yet not simply iterative of, the views of Mach and Reichenbach. Here again the clarity of the argument is diminished by the intrusion of numerous disparate quoted opinions. The author's practice of not identifying his ancient sources in the footnotes with the same precision with which he identifies his modern sources makes intolerably difficult their checking (p. 368, nn. 7 and 8). Finally, such relatively trivial but no less irritating typographical errors as the omission of key words (p. 62), occasional misprints (“externally” for “eternally” [p. 97]), and footnote references to nonexistent sections of the printed text (p. 376, n. 17) diminish the pedagogical effectiveness of the book.

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***Causality and Chance in Modern Physics.* By David Bohm. Foreword by Louis de Broglie. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand; London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957. Pp. xi + 170. \$5.00.**

The two most revolutionary concepts introduced into physical theory by quantum mechanics in the 1920's were the description of mechanical processes in terms of probabilities (Born) and the uncertainty principle (Heisenberg). While the latter is a direct algebraic consequence of the fundamental commutation relations of quantum mechanics, the former is an interpretation essentially extrinsic to the theory, justified mainly by the ease and directness which it lends to the comparison between theory and experiment.

Though the probability interpretation of quantum mechanics had its early foes, such as Louis de Broglie, it soon gained the day and is now the conventional and almost unanimously accepted view. The book under review is the work of one of de Broglie's successors in dissent, a former professor of physics at Princeton University. Bohm's program, as outlined here, is a two-pronged attack on the conventional analysis. On the one hand, he is concerned with showing that quantum mechanics itself cannot be justifiably regarded as the ultimate description of physical processes and that its concomitant uncertainty principle is thus not universally applicable. In his own words,

. . . there is good reason to assume the existence of a sub quantum-mechanical level that is more fundamental than that at which the present quantum theory holds. Within this new level could be operating qualitatively new kinds of laws, leading to those of the current theory as approximations and limiting cases in much the same way that the laws of the atomic domain lead to those of the macroscopic domain. The indeterminacy principle would then apply only in the quantum level, and would have no relevance at all at lower levels (p. 69).

On the other hand, Bohm questions the probability interpretation of quantum mechanics even when applied on the level of atomic processes where it has achieved such success. Basing his argument on the postulate of levels of physical activity existing below the atomic domain of quantum mechanics, Bohm proposes to interpret the wave function of Schroedinger as representing an actual force field which tends to concentrate the atomic particles (for example, electrons) in the regions of its maximum intensity, but whose effect is partially nullified by the random fluctuations of these

particles due to processes on the lower levels. The presentation of this new interpretation is nontechnical and nonmathematical, but references are given to the scientific journals where Bohm and his coworkers have offered detailed arguments.

Considered simply as a postulate, Bohm's assumption of levels below the quantum mechanical is no more justified than the contradictory one which assumes quantum mechanics to be the final theory. But from experimental evidence (mostly at very high energies) it seems clear that quantum mechanics is *not* the final theory, and Bohm's hypothesis offers one possibility for progress and the development of more adequate and comprehensive constructions. Whether or not that possibility will in fact be realized remains to be seen.

Bohm has much more to say of a directly philosophical character, but for the most part it is questionable and immaterial to the main argument.

RICHARD J. BLACKWELL, *John Carroll University*

***An Introduction to Philosophy.* By Daniel J. Sullivan. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1957. Pp. xiii + 288. \$3.75.**

How can the beginning student be brought to an understanding of the peculiar nature of philosophical problems and of philosophical thinking toward the solutions of such problems? Books which are entitled "Introduction to Philosophy" are attempts to answer this question. Two approaches are frequently used. The first is a survey of the history of philosophy, or at least of the history of Greek philosophy. The assumption is that the actual development of Western philosophy is a natural and congenial development for the beginning student. The danger to be avoided here is historical relativism. The second approach is a survey of systematic philosophy. The assumption is that the student can appreciate the nature of philosophy in general by means of a summary of its parts. The danger here is unsupported dogmatism.

Mr. Sullivan uses both of these approaches with effect. The text itself is well-organized and understandably written with constant attention to the limitations of the beginning student.

Approximately the first quarter of the text is devoted to a survey of philosophical thought from Thales to Aristotle. The author's point is to show that Aristotle represents the culmination of Greek philosophy and in turn supplies the foundations for perennial philosophy. However, in defense of this position, Mr. Sullivan interprets the Aristotelian forms as

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reincarnated Platonic Ideas. Hence Aristotle does not really oppose the Platonic position but rather brings its truth to fulfillment (p. 46). This interpretation is certainly open to question.

The remaining three quarters of the text is a survey of systematic philosophy which uses man as the focal point. From a discussion of the cognitive and appetitive functions in man the text proceeds to an examination of man's individual and social moral character, of the material world, and finally of the universe of being and God. This body of systematic philosophy, based on Aristotelian-Thomistic realism, is said to be perennial in the sense that its truth is everlasting. However, it is not the work of any one individual philosopher or school and is in need of constant renewal in each succeeding generation.

Although this survey of systematic philosophy occupies the larger part of the book, the author does not have enough time in one volume to develop his points fully. Hence it is really a survey of the main conclusions of systematic philosophy, a kind of skeleton outline in which the flesh and blood of living argumentation to these conclusions has receded into the background. And it is precisely this intellectual labor of personally giving birth to these conclusions that constitutes the life of philosophy. However, if this book prods its readers to think and read further toward such an experience, then it has adequately served its purpose as an "Introduction to Philosophy."

NICHOLAS RESCHER, *Lehigh University*

John Locke: A Biography. By Maurice Cranston. New York: Macmillan Co., 1957. Pp. xvi + 496. \$8.00.

On Locke's death, an *escritoire* filled with his personal papers passed to his heir and remained in his family until sold by them to the Bodleian Library in 1948. Previously only the unsatisfactory biography of Locke by Lord King, at one time a possessor of these papers, was able to draw upon this resource. By use of it, and with thoroughgoing exploitation of other manuscript Locke materials scattered through libraries and private collections in England, the Continent, and America, Maurice Cranston has produced a superb biography, whose every chapter bears witness to his diligent and painstaking workmanship.

While previous biographies of Locke—especially Fox Bourne's standard two-volume work—have made the philosopher out as a paragon, Cranston's work is refreshingly honest. Over against his many and signal virtues, Locke had various human shortcomings whose frank presentation in this biography is one of its sources of fascination.

Locke was decidedly materialistic. He was an anxious landlord. In a letter of condolence to the son of a long-standing friend who had just died, Locke included a record of money owed and books borrowed. "Even in this time of genuine grief, the philosophers's first thought seems to have been for his material possessions." Nor did Locke scruple to invest in the slave trade and other colonial ventures in which—from his vantage-point as colonial administrator—he could see sure profit. "Locke might therefore be considered a member of the investing class whose interests his economic writings signally upheld," Cranston writes; and again, "Unlike Milton, who called for liberty in the name of liberty, Locke was content to ask for liberty in the name of trade; and unlike Milton, he achieved his end."

Locke was a vain man. He was loath to acknowledge indebtedness—especially to the unpopular Hobbes. He was in all things circumspect and in many things furtive, devious, and secretive. In a list of the five "most lasting pleasures of life," drawn up by him in his mid-thirties, "reputation" ranks second, outdistancing even "knowledge" (third), and leaving behind to the very end "the expectation of eternal and incomprehensible happiness in another world"; surely an odd ranking for a Christian theorist.

All of the less admirable traits of Locke's character come to a focus in his act of posthumous ingratitude to Shaftesbury. Shaftesbury had launched Locke into the great world; and to him Locke owed, direct benefits aside, his influential and remunerative status as a power in Whig councils. Yet in a letter to Lord Pembroke after dismissal (on the grounds of his intimate association with Shaftesbury and his politics) from a studentship at Christ Church, Locke wrote, "I cannot but complain of it as a hard case: that having reaped so little advantage from my service to him whilst living I should suffer so much on that account now he is dead." Cranston remarks that "Locke's comment on Shaftesbury is significantly at odds with what he said at other and better times about his former patron. Here, and here, so far as I can ascertain, alone, did Locke even hint that Shaftesbury had treated him parsimoniously."

But such deficiencies are not exhaustive of Locke's personality or of the life as portrayed in Cranston's biography. I have dwelt on them solely to indicate that here is a fresh and honest perspective. Cranston's enthusiasm for his work, his genuine devotion to the person that was Locke, and his deft flair for historical portraiture combine to make his *John Locke* a first-rate biography and a thoroughly readable, indeed an absorbing, book.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CURRENT PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS PUBLISHED IN NORTH AMERICA

For the purposes of this bibliography, "philosophy" will be understood in a very broad sense. It will include works in other fields—such as sociology, aesthetics, and politics—that involve philosophical principles and problems.

"Current" books will be understood to include new books, revised editions, and reprints if the previous printing had been out of stock for a notable period of time, or if there is a notable difference in price, format, and the like.

"Publication in North America" will be understood to refer not only to works originally published in that area, but also to works originally published in some other country and simultaneously or subsequently issued by some North American publisher under his own imprint. In the latter case (if it is known), the book will be marked by the symbol ‡ in the left-hand margin.

The procedure is as follows:

1. Books announced for publication will be listed in the issue which next appears after the announcement is received.
2. Books actually published will be listed in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 above.
3. Books received by THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN will be listed with full bibliographical information and a descriptive and/or critical note in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 and/or No. 2. This will be done even if a full review is to appear later.

ADAM, AUGUST. *The Primacy of Love*. Trans. from the German by Elisabeth Corathiel Noonan. Westminster: Newman Press, 1958. Pp. 225. \$3.25.

ADLER, MORTIMER JEROME. *A Dialectic of Morals*. New York, Frederick Ungar Co. Pp. 127. \$3.50.

———. *The Idea of Freedom*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1958. Pp. xxvii + 689. \$7.50.

This is the first major publication of the Institute for Philosophical Research and is the product of five years of work by a group of scholars. It is natural, therefore, that the volume should contain a rather extensive explanation of the method and aims of the present inquiry.

The immediate aim of this book is a comprehensive and intelligibly ordered view of what men have held about freedom. Accepting the fact of philosophical diversity, the author and his colleagues believe that differences are not always simply irrelevant to each other, and that, when differences can be sharply joined, an "issue" exists, concerning which truth can be reached by philosophical methods. They likewise hold that differences have most commonly never developed into true controversies, because principles, definitions, method, aims, and the like, have too often remained implicit. They view their task as the construction of the issues as such.

The method, then, is an *analysis* of what thinkers have said about freedom, in order to lay bare the basic issues at stake. As they maintain, fruitful discussion is possible only when the participants

agree on precisely the points concerning which they have different views. This analysis and confrontation they call "dialectic."

In carrying out this program, the subject of "freedom" is identified at two levels. At the first level, freedom is discussed in relation to circumstances. At the second level, freedom is related to the self (self-realization, self-perfection, self-determination). The conclusion is a classification of theories about freedom and a statement of what is called "a general understanding of freedom."

There are bibliographies of works referred to (pp. 623-40) and of other works examined (pp. 641-63), and separate indices to Book I (presentation of aims and method) and Book II.

ALBERTUS MAGNUS, ST. *'Libellus de Alchimia' Ascribed to Albertus Magnus*. Trans. from the Borgnet Latin. Ed. Sister Virginia Heines. Foreword by Pearl Kibre. Berkeley, Univ. of California Press. Pp. 101. \$3.50.

American Classics Reconsidered. Ed. Harold C. Gardiner, s.j. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1958. Pp. x + 307. \$4.95.

This group of essays on some of the greater nineteenth-century American writers is not only a book of literary criticism but expands into broader areas of cultural history and the history of ideas. Father Gardiner also contributes an introductory essay, pointing out the unity of theme of the book and the kind of work done in it. Successive chapters then deal with Emerson (by Robert C. Pollock), James Fenimore Cooper (by Charles A. Brady), Brownson (by Alvan S. Ryan), Hawthorne (by Joseph Schwartz), Longfellow (by Joseph E. O'Neill, s.j.), Poe (by Jeremiah K. Durick), Thoreau (by Michael F. Moloney), Melville (by Geoffrey Stone), Whitman (by Ernest Sandeen), and the literary historians: Prescott, Bancroft, Motley, and Parkman (by Mason Wade).

ANGELL, ROBERT COOLEY. *Free Society and Moral Crisis*. Foreword by Reinhold Niebuhr. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1958. Pp. 260. \$6.00.

[ARISTOTLE.] *Aristotle's Selections*. Trans. from the Greek by F. H. Peters. Introd. by Thomas Yoseloff. New York, Fine Editions Press. Pp. 247. \$3.95.

[—]. *Aristotle's Poetics: The Argument*. Trans. and ed. Gerald F. Else. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 686. \$11.00.

[—]. *The Pocket Aristotle*. Ed. Justin Kaplan. New York, Pocket Books. 50¢

———. *On Poetry and Style*. Trans. G. M. A. Grube. New York: Liberal Arts Press; Aug., 1958. Paper, 75¢

———. *Topica et Sophistici Elenchi*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 272. \$4.00.

ARTZ, FREDERICK BINKERD. *The Mind of the Middle Ages*. New York, Alfred A. Knopf. Pp. 590. \$6.50.

[AUGUSTINE, ST.] *An Augustine Synthesis*. Ed. Erich Przywara, s.j. New York: Harper & Bros.; Apr., 1958. Paper, \$1.95.

———. *On Christian Doctrine*. Trans. with introd. by D. W. Robertson, Jr. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958. Pp. xxxii + 169. Paper, 95¢

This work of St. Augustine's could almost be called a treatise on Christian education; it deals directly with the formation of a Christian student and shows him how to read and live the Bible.

The introduction is an excellent presentation of St. Augustine's method. Particularly useful is the brief but very accurate account of the allegorical (or spiritual) method of interpretation, which is distinguished from a "scientific" analysis on the one hand and from

the use of metaphor; this latter distinction is one which is not often made (pp. xiv-xvi).

This edition is excellently printed and well bound.

AURELIUS, MARCUS. *Meditations of Marcus Aurelius*. Trans. from the Latin by Meric Casaubon. Introd. by Matthew Arnold. New York, Dial Press. Pp. 245. \$5.00.

Authority. Ed. Carl Joachim Friedrich. Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press. Pp. 242. \$5.00.

BACH, GEORGE LELAND. *Inflation*. Providence, Brown Univ. Press. Pp. 110 \$2.50.

BAIER, KURT. *The Moral Point of View*. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 338. \$4.00.

BALDWIN, ARMAND JEAN, *Christian Principles of Political Science*. Latrobe: Archabbey Press, 1957. Pp. 160. \$3.00.

BANFIELD, EDWARD C., and BANFIELD, LAURA FASANO. *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*. Glencoe: Free Press, 1958. Pp. 204. \$4.00.

BARRETT, WILLIAM. *Irrational Man: A Study in Existentialist Philosophy*. Garden City: Doubleday & Co.; Aug., 1958. \$4.00.

BARTLETT, SIR FREDERIC CHARLES. *Thinking*. New York: Basic Books, 1958. Pp. 203. \$4.00.

BAYLIS, CHARLES A. *Ethics: Principles of Wise Choice*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1958. Pp. 383. \$4.00.

BEACH, WALDO. *Conscience on Campus*. New York: Association Press, 1958. Pp. 124. \$2.50.

BEARDSLEY, MONROE C. *Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.; Sept., 1958.

BERNARD, CLAUDE. *An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine*. Trans. Henry Copley Greene. Introd. by Lawrence J. Henderson; foreword by I. Bernard Cohen. New York: Dover Pubns., 1958. Pp. [7] + xix + 226. Paper, \$1.50.

This classic had been reprinted by the same publishers in 1957; this edition adds the new foreword by Professor Cohen. Professor Cohen points out some of the significant ideas advanced by Bernard and notes that present-day students will not accept his criticisms of statistics.

The edition, as was the earlier one, is beautifully printed and attractively bound, and is offered at a remarkably low price for the high quality.

Bertrand Russell's Best. Ed. R. E. Egner. New York: New American Lib.; Sept., 1958. 50¢

BIELER, LUDWIG. *The Grammarian's Craft*. Brooklyn, Folia. \$1.00.

BOHR, NIELS HENRIK DAVID. *Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958. Pp. 109. \$3.95.

BOND, EARL DANFORD. *One Mind, Common to All*. Foreword by Francis J. Braceland. New York, Macmillan Co. Pp. 207. \$4.50.

† BOSS, MEDARD. *The Analysis of Dreams*. Trans. from the German by Arnold J. Pomerans. Foreword by E. B. Strauss. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1958. Pp. 223. \$6.00.

† BOUYER, LOUIS. *Newman: His Life and Spirituality*. Trans. J. Lewis May. Introd. by H. Francis Davis. New York: P. J. Kennedy & Sons, 1958. Pp. xiii + 391. \$7.50.

This is an excellent translation of what has in a short time come to be considered the authoritative life of Cardinal Newman. The philosophical ideas of Newman, which are only slowly being interpreted by recent studies, are referred to in this life only indirectly and not by way of major interest. But the life itself and the theological ideas are presented in a way that is both illuminating and sympathetic. The

book belongs with every collection of works by or about Cardinal Newman.

BOWMAN, ARCHIBALD ALLAN. *The Absurdity of Christianity and Other Essays*. Ed. with introd. by Charles W. Hendel. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958. Pp. xxxiii + 62. Paper, 75¢

The essays contained here are more theological than philosophical, though it may be pointed out that the author's intent is to explain the very nature of religion, faith, and God to an audience that is obsessed with the secular view of life. In some sense, therefore, these essays can also be considered to pertain to the philosophy of religion.

The lengthy introduction locates the general work of Bowman and points out the special argument of each of the essays. In particular, the editor shows that the "absurdity" of which Bowman speaks is not an existentialist blind leap or a Tertullianist irrationalism but precisely an absurdity from a limited point of view: that of the secular mind. The view in which the spiritual or supernatural enters the ambit of human life is the dimension of the "subjective mode of existence," which is not completely explained either by these essays or by the editor.

BOWMAN, SYLVIA E. *The Year 2000*. New York: Bookman Associates, 1958. Pp. 404. \$6.00.

BRÉHIER, ÉMILE. *The Philosophy of Plotinus*. Trans. Joseph Thomas. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1958. Pp. vii + 205. \$4.50.

This is an excellent translation of one of the best-known works on Plotinus. It has long been considered—and justly—the most useful introduction to the subtle and intricate Plotinian philosophy. M. Bréhier himself reviewed this translation, wrote a special chapter, "The Sensible World and Matter," for it, and revised the notes and selective bibliography.

Bréhier's presentation is in the main faithful to Plotinus. He appreciates the force and importance of the various Plotinian themes and knows where to place the crucial issues. If there is a defect of sympathy, it is due to a kind of Neo-Kantian rationalism which prevents him from taking seriously any affirmation of a completely transcendent reality. If this defect is allowed for, the book can be most useful to all, whether they wish merely a general understanding of one of the great thinkers or are preparing for an intensive study of ancient philosophy.

BROADBENT, D. E. *Perception and Communication*. New York: Pergamon Press; June, 1958. \$8.50.

BRONOWSKI, JACOB. *Science and Human Values*. New York, Messner. Pp. 94. \$3.00.

BROWN ROGER. *Words and Things*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press; July, 1958. \$7.50.

BRUEHL, CHARLES P., and CAMPBELL, WILLIAM E. *Psychology. The Study of Man's Normal Mental Life*. Villanova, Pa., Villanova Press. Pp. 400. \$5.50.

BRUEHL, LAWRENCE. *The Death Blow to Communism*. New York: Vantage Press, 1958. Pp. 426. \$5.00.

This is an attempt to construct a comprehensive philosophy of things, life, and society; the author is an engineer and works in the psychological department of a computer laboratory. The author presents his own version of natural law, whose key components are position, operation, and duration. In terms of it he tries to give new definitions of all key terms of philosophy and social science. The author states his basic principles thus: "1. Every being is characterized by the total of its structural elements (position).

2. Every being has an assembly of interior elements. 3. Every being has exterior relations to other being" (p. 104). On the same page, he claims that "equality . . . is a transcendental. In ordinary language, equality is expressed by the auxiliary verb 'to be' . . ."

The author has over 500 references to St. Thomas, and most of his other references are to Scholastic authors. It is doubtful whether he has correctly interpreted more than a small fraction of them. Most of the snippets he quotes he denies or criticizes. The application of the basic principles to politics and economics seems to be really relatively common-sense views asserted baldly, on the alleged ground of their derivation from the basic principles.

BUBER, MARTIN. *I and Thou*. Trans. Ronald Gregor Smith. 2d. ed. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958. Pp. xii + 137. \$1.75.

The translation of this classic was first published in 1937. The second edition contains a few minor revisions. The translator has written a new introduction, in which he stresses the attitude which a reader must take in order to profit deeply.

The major difference in this new edition is a "Postscript" written by Buber himself, in which he tries to answer some of the questions readers of this work have asked him and to clarify some of his positions. The first clarification concerns the sense in which we can stand in the *I-Thou* relationship to the world around us. The second is our relationship to spirit as we find it in the world, in history, art, and "inspiration." The third discusses the situations between men in which full mutuality cannot be attained, not by reason of any imperfection in the participants, but because of the very situation itself (for example, the teacher-student relation). The fourth is a clarification of what Buber means by speaking of God as a "Person." This explanation is well done; yet a Thomist misses the added clarity that would result from an adequate notion of analogy and an intellectualist (but *non-rationalistic*) approach to the problem of the proof for the existence of God.

BUGBEE, HENRY G., JR. *The Inward Morning*. Introd. by Gabriel Marcel. State College, Penn.: Bald Eagle Press, 1958. Pp. 232. \$5.00.

Metaphysics is in a way the subject of this book, a metaphysics which stands to science and action as the dawn to the day. It is a reflective metaphysics written in journal form, and essentially so, for the author considers that our contacts with essential truth are never permanent or systematizable but must be seized when they occur. Moreover, the book can be said to have themes, though it can hardly be said to be about any objects. The themes (very tentatively indicated) are such as these: the nature of reflection, understanding, experience, realism, the human condition, certainty, well-being, commitment versus utilitarianism, the nature of existence and of truth. In this mode of thinking, the evil counterparts which one might expect are to be found: faithlessness, objectivity, science, object, thing, heteronomy. There is no index to this book—one would most likely be incompatible with the type of reflection engaged in.

The introduction by Gabriel Marcel is enthusiastic and helpful in that it shows the significance of some themes.

BURKE, EDMUND. *Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful*. Ed. J. T. Boulton. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Aug., 1958. \$4.50.

BURROW, TRIGANT. *A Search for Man's Sanity*. New York, Oxford Univ. Press. Pp. 639. \$8.75.

BUTTERFIELD, HERBERT. *The History of Science*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958. \$3.00.

- CARNAP, RUDOLF. *Introduction to Symbolic Logic and Its Applications*. New York: Dover Pubns.; Aug., 1958. \$1.85.
- . *Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1958. Pp. 268. \$1.65.
- CARPENTER, WILLIAM SEAL. *Foundations of Modern Jurisprudence*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1958. Pp. 236. \$3.25.
- CARUS, PAUL. *History of the Devil and the Idea of Evil*. New York: University Books; Aug., 1958. \$10.00.
- CARY, JOYCE. *Art and Reality*. New York: Harper & Bros.; Aug., 1958. \$3.00.
- CAUCHY, VENANT. *Désir naturel et béatitude chez saint Thomas*. Montréal: Fides, 1958. Pp. 126. Paper, \$2.50.

The meaning of these terms has acquired a special significance in recent years, when the gratuity of the supernatural order was brought into the same context. The author proposes to show that the text of St. Thomas does not conflict with this gratuity. He begins by considering the relation between the efficaciousness of the Divine Will in relation to the contingency of the world. He then examines St. Thomas's formal texts on "natural," "supernatural" (and the history of these terms), the supernatural end, natural desire, and obediential potency. He then takes up the historical context of St. Thomas's texts and in the light of them tries to answer textual difficulties. Finally he takes up the question of natural end and natural happiness.

It is good to have a careful historical examination of some of these texts. The author shows clearly that some texts of St. Thomas do not bear on the "natural" as in the relationship "natural-supernatural" but as in the relationship "natural-elicited (free)". But the problem cannot be eliminated entirely. The author criticizes, often effectively, many recent solutions, holding that the traditional solutions of men like Cajetan and Cathrein are both Thomistic and correct. However, the necessary logical relations between nature and end are not so simply disposed of; and there is some confusion between the "necessary willing" of merely formal objects and the real elicited acts directed to real concrete ends.

- CHISHOLM, RODERICK M. *Perceiving: A Philosophical Study*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. xi + 203.

The author wishes to investigate some of the puzzles that arise when we think or talk about perceiving. His program thus sounds like the project of an analysis. True, he does analyze a number of propositions, especially those which express doctrines that seem to him inadequate or wrong. But by and large his program is not reductionist at all. In fact, a very important part of the book is an examination of what the author calls the empiricist interpretation of perception; namely, that the *only* criterion of evidence is the way things appear.

After laying the ground by defining his terms, the author turns to a discussion of evidence in the second part. Here he is most concerned with stating marks of evidence which will enable us to identify at least some evidences. In the third part, the author looks at the problem of the object of sensation, devoting considerable attention to the question of sense data and appearances.

- CHROUST, ANTON-HERMANN. *Socrates, Man and Myth*. Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1958. Pp. xiv + 336. \$6.75.

What do we know about the historical Socrates? By means of a most painstaking analysis of ancient texts and a consideration of all the theories that have been propounded, the author concludes that we know almost nothing. He argues that the literary accounts of

Socrates deliberately intended to create a myth, and that they therefore show rather the ideas and activities of the Socratics than the facts about Socrates. He proposes the hypothesis that Plato's *Gorgias* was a counterattack, occasioned by the *Kategoriae Socraticae* of Polycrates. Finally, he suggests that Socrates was a "politician" working to reform the state behind the scenes. As is evident, the author relies heavily on Xenophon, but with a great deal of critical interpretation.

CHU, T. *Law and Society in Traditional China*. New York: Lounz, 1958. \$10.50.

[CICERO.] *Tullius Ciceronis, de Natura Deorum*. Ed. Arthur S. M. Pease. Vol. 2, Books 2 and 3. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Aug., 1958. \$20.00.

COHEN OF BIRKENHEAD, LORD. *Sherrington: Physiologist, Philosopher and Poet*. Springfield: C. C Thomas Co., 1958. Pp. 122. \$3.50.

COMPTON, CHARLES H. *William James, Philosopher and Man*. Foreword by Lucien Price. New York, Scarecrow Press. Pp. 229. \$4.50.

Concepts, Theories, and the Mind-Body Problem. Ed. Herbert Feigl and others. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1958. Pp. 563. \$7.00.

COONEY, TIMOTHY. *Ultimate Desires*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1958. Pp. 100. \$2.75.

This book is written to provide some kind of basis for ethics. The author believes that most men are concerned with ethical questions but that philosophy has hitherto failed to provide any basis for answering such questions. He feels that the Humean position—"we can be certain only that some ideas exist"—is the only real certitude; all else is doubtful. But from such a position nothing at all follows. Hence, to ground an ethics, he makes ontological assumptions and takes the position that the best ontology is the one that makes the fewest assumptions. His assumptions are that people exist and have desires. He next argues that there are three levels of desire: physical, social, and "cosmological" (in the Kantian sense of questions about the universe as a whole). He is agnostic about any transcendent reality but thinks that this is unimportant, since we can strive for perfection in ourselves.

The author is evidently well intentioned. He has picked up from various philosophical systems their doubts and limitations, yet retains his common-sense feeling that we ought to have ideals and ought to work for them. The over-all outcome is naturally disappointing.

COULTON, G. G. *Medieval Faith and Symbolism*. New York, Harper & Bros. Pp. 464. Paper, \$1.85.

CULBERTSON, JAMES THOMAS. *Mathematics and Logic for Digital Devices*. Princeton: Van Nostrand Co., 1958. Pp. 234. \$4.85.

CUSHMAN, ROBERT E. *Therapeia*. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1958. Pp. 344. \$6.00.

DAVIES, ROBERT M. *The Humanism of Paul Elmer More*. New York: Bookman Associates, 1958. Pp. 222. \$5.00.

DAWSON, CHRISTOPHER HENRY. *Religion and Culture*. New York: Meridian Books. Pp. 230. Paper, \$1.25.

DÉSCARTES, RENÉ. *Philosophical Writings*. Trans. with introd. and notes by Norman Kemp Smith. New York: Modern Lib., 1958. Pp. 319. Paper, \$1.65.

Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science. Ed. Sidney Hook. New York, New York Univ. Press. Pp. 252. \$5.00.

DICKINSON, G. L. *Greek View of Life*. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press; Sept., 1958. Paper, \$1.75.

DIJKSTERHUIS, E. J. *Archimedes*. New York, Humanities Press. \$12.50.
The Doctrine of Saint-Simon: An Exposition, First Year, 1828-1829.
 Trans. with notes and introd. by Georg G. Iggers. Preface by
 G. D. H. Cole. Boston: Beacon Press; Aug., 1958. Pp. xlvii + 286.
 \$4.95.

DRAKE, HENRY L. *The People's Plato*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1958.
 Pp. xxiii + 633. \$7.50.

This is a presentation of Plato's thought. Section One of Book One contains biographies of Plato and Socrates; well documented, these assume the more traditional view that Socrates was really such as Plato pictures him. The rest of the book contains sections of Platonic writing, with editorial introductions. The introductions are usually good. The "Platonic writing" is sometimes direct quotation (based, with changes, on the Jowett translation), sometimes abridgment, using the actual sentences of the original with omissions, sometimes rewriting after the manner of a digest. These Platonic writings have been arranged in a topical order in four books. The first book begins with the mission of Socrates, especially his trial and the conversations in jail. Then come chapters on theology, the nature of marriage, of bravery, moral education, reminiscence, and the nature of virtue. The second book has chapters on justice, the state and education, the place of women, the role of philosophy, perversions of the state, and the rewards of justice. The third book deals with the creation of the universe and of man, the golden age, the love of beauty, the history of Atlantis, the judgment after death, the meaning of love, the nature of knowledge, the theory of ideas, and pleasure and wisdom. The fourth book has two chapters of miscellaneous sayings; then come chapters on sophistry, rhetoric and wealth, aspects of virtue and friendship, some principles, and finally some views of Plato's on Socrates's mission. The author then concludes with a summary of some of these ideas. There are also a selective bibliography, the notes (including the identification of the sources quoted), and an index.

For those who are not specializing in philosophy, this abridged edition of Plato may well be serviceable. If people cannot, or will not, read the full-length originals, they can reap much of the same advantage from a condensation. And serious reflection on the nature of man and his destiny would be good for many.

DUNS Scotus Philosophical Association Convention Report, 1958. Cleveland: Our Lady of Angels Seminary, 1958. Pp. x + 249. Paper.

This report contains a number of papers and some summary reports. The following papers were read: "Peter Olivi and the Doctrine of Free Will," by Turibius Niebrugge, o.f.m.; "Human Motivation," by Conall Dolan, o.f.m.; "William of Ockham and Papal Authority," by Aaron Pembleton, o.f.m.; "St. Bonaventure and the Eternal Creature," by Victorian Haladus, o.f.m.; "Music and the Mind," by Pierre Amen, o.f.m.; "Existential Import in Logic," by Clyde Ebenreck, o.f.m.; "Censorship," by Harry Speckman, o.f.m., and Merton Classen, o.f.m.; and "Christian Humanism," by Cormac Knoll, o.f.m.

There are six summary reports on a variety of topics, mostly practical: juvenile delinquency, humor, energy, study habits, comic books, and a debate on the formal distinction. This volume also contains a cumulative index.

‡ DURKHEIM, EMILE. *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*. Trans. from the French by Cornelia Brookfield. Glencoe: Free Press, 1958. Pp. 272. \$5.00.

- ECKARDT, URSULA M. VON. *Pursuit of Happiness in the Democratic Creed*. New York: Praeger, Inc.; Sept., 1958. \$4.50.
- EDDINGTON, ARTHUR. *The Philosophy of Physical Science*. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press; Sept., 1958. \$1.75.
- EISELY, LOREN. *Darwin's Century: Evolution and the Men Who Discovered It*. Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1958. \$5.00.
- ELIADE, MIRCEA. *Birth and Rebirth: Religious Meanings of Initiation in Human Culture*. New York: Harper & Bros.; Sept., 1958. \$3.00.
- . *Yoga: Immortality and Freedom*. New York: Pantheon Books; Sept., 1958. \$5.00.
- Emergence of the Modern Mind, The*. Ed. Frederick Charles Gruber. Philadelphia: Univ. of Penn. Press, 1958. Pp. 93. \$2.50.
- ‡ EMMET, DOROTHY MARY. *Function, Purpose and Powers*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1958. Pp. 307. \$6.50.
- ERASMUS. *Praise of Folly*. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press; Sept., 1958. Paper, \$1.35.
- Essays in Moral Philosophy*. Ed. A. I. Melden. Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press; Aug., 1958. \$4.50.
- Ethics*. Ed. Oliver A. Johnson. New York: Dryden Press, 1958. Pp. 555. \$5.75.
- Existence*. Ed. Rollo May and others. New York: Basic Books, 1958. Pp. 455. \$7.50.
- FAUST, CLARENCE H. *Toward Understanding American Education*. Yellow Springs, Ohio: Antioch Press, 1958. Pp. 30. Paper, 50¢
- This brief lecture is intended to provide a scheme for understanding American schools. To some extent it does this by declaring that the school of today been shaped by four forces: inertia (the self-perpetuating curriculum), the development of new knowledge and the emergence of new key concepts, social need, and the ability of individuals. With regard to the second point, the author maintains that any school "system" or any theory of education must rest on some basic consensus. He asserts further that there is no longer any theological consensus, that philosophical consensus is absent except that 'for us, the results of experience and experimentation are wholly valid, while abstract reasoning reflects mere opinion or even prejudice' (p. 22). He finally suggests that the new basis for consensus will be social and proposes the concept of "responsibility." An interesting and provocative analysis; and a tendentious one.
- FEUER, LEWIS SAMUEL. *Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1958. Pp. 333. \$7.50.
- FISHER, SEYMOUR, and CLEVELAND, SIDNEY E. *Body Image and Personality*. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1958. Pp. 431. \$9.25.
- Four Existentialist Theologians*. Ed. Will Herberg. Garden City, Doubleday & Co. Pp. 320. Paper, \$1.25.
- FREUD, SIGMUND. *On Creativity and the Unconscious*. New York: Harper & Bros.; Oct., 1958. \$1.85.
- FRIEDLANDER, PAUL. *Plato*. Vol. I, *An Introduction*. Trans. from the German by Hans Meyerhoff. New York: Pantheon Books, 1958. Pp. 444. \$5.00.
- FRIEDRICH, CARL JOACHIM. *The Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1958. Pp. 262. \$4.75.
- GARDEIL, H. D., O.P. *Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*. Vol. I, *Logic*. Trans. John A. Otto. St. Louis, B. Herder Book Co.
- . *Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*. Vol. II, *Cosmology*. Trans. John A. Otto. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1958. Pp. xii + 218. \$3.75.

Previously published was Volume III, *Psychology*. Father Gardeil's series is well-known and is justly considered one of the standard

Thomistic textbooks. In the present volume, he concentrates on the purely philosophical parts of Aristotle's physical doctrine and does not attempt to reconcile it with modern science (though the translator tries to do this by means of footnotes; for example, his footnote on "natural place" and gravitation, p. 101). The topics taken up in successive chapters are: the principles of mobile being, quantity and quality, nature, causes of mobile being, motion, the concomitants of motion, proof of the Prime Mover, the Aristotelian astronomy, and concluding evaluation.

In addition, the translator has given as appendices a number of translated readings from St. Thomas (pp. 164-208), mostly from the *Commentary on the Physics*, and also the *Principles of Nature*. These readings make the volume much more useful.

———. *Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*. Vol. IV, *Metaphysics*. Trans. John A. Otto. St. Louis, B. Herder Book Co. GARDNER. *Logic Machines and Diagrams*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.; July, 1958.

GARVIN, JOSEPH N. *Summa contra Haereticos*. Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press; June, 1958.

GEOGHEGAN, WILLIAM D. *Platonism in Recent Religious Thought*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 206. \$4.00.

GIERKE, OTTO. *Political Theories of the Middle Age*. Trans. with introd. by Frederic William Maitland. Boston: Beacon Press, 1958. Pp. 288. Paper, \$1.95.

† GILBY, THOMAS, O.P. *The Political Thought of Thomas Aquinas*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1958. Pp. xxvi + 357. \$5.00.

After a brief introduction, in which the historical background is sketched and a glimpse of St. Thomas's background and principles is given, the author gives a detailed account of the influences at work (pp. 1-90). These influences are of four kinds: the theologians (including the Bible as containing also secular wisdom), the jurists, the social structure (including the influence of the new orders), and the philosophers.

The major part of the book is devoted to an exposition of what St. Thomas added to this background. First, the author analyzes St. Thomas's notion of law, showing how his philosophical approach enabled him to weld together disparate elements into a new and more comprehensive view of law as reason at work. Next, there is a discussion of human law, its nature, limits, and its relation to political society. This is followed by an extensive analysis of the notions of community, justice, common good, legal justice and moral virtue, the corporate group, and the state as a "person." The influence of Aristotle is treated separately, with an emphasis on the contribution of Aristotle to the whole theory of the nature and kinds of political society.

In a conclusion, the author assesses the influence of St. Thomas (not very great in his own time, a growing importance since the Spanish revival and Pope Leo XIII), then summarizes in a rather sweeping fashion the development of human groups from the primitive community-group, through the political group to a society of fellowship.

GLANVILL, JOSEPH. *Plus Ultra or the Progress and Advancement of Knowledge since the Days of Aristotle (1668)*. Gainesville: Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints; May, 1958. \$7.50.

GOTSHALK, D. W. *The Promise of Modern Life*. Yellow Springs: Antioch Press, 1958. Pp. 128. \$2.50.

GRANT, ROBERT M. *Miracle and Natural Law in Graeco-Roman and Early Christian Thought*. New York, Humanities Press. \$6.00.

- GRAY, HENRY DAVID. *Emerson*. New York: Frederick Ungar; June, 1958. \$3.50.
- Great Legal Philosophers*. Ed. Clarence Morris. Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press; Aug., 1958. \$10.00.
- GREENE, THEODORE MEYER. *Moral, Aesthetic, and Religious Insight*. New Brunswick, N.J.; Rutgers Univ. Press. Pp. 141. \$2.75.
- GRUBE, GEORGES MAXIMILLEN ANTOINE. *Plato's Thought*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1958. Pp. 337. Paper, \$1.60.
- HADAS, MOSES. *The Stoic Philosophy of Seneca*. Garden City: Doubleday & Co.; Sept., 1958. 95¢
- HADFIELD, J. A. *Psychology and Morals*. 15th ed. New York: McBride Co.; Aug., 1958. \$3.50.
- HALL, CALVIN S., and LINDZEY, GARDNER. *Theories of Personality*. New York: John Wiley & Sons. Pp. 572. \$6.50.
- ‡ HALLETT, H. F. *Benedict de Spinoza*. Fair Lawn, N.J.; Essential Books. Pp. 184. \$4.00.
- HANNA, THOMAS. *The Thought and Art of Albert Camus*. Chicago, Henry Regnery Co. Pp. 223. \$4.50.
- HARRISON, R. J. *Man the Peculiar Animal*. Baltimore: Penguin Books; June, 1958. 95¢
- HART, CHARLES A. *Thomistic Metaphysics: An Inquiry into the Act of Existing*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1958. \$5.50.
- HEIDEGGER, MARTIN. *What Is Philosophy?* Trans. from the German with introd. by William Kuback and Jean T. Wilde. New York: Twayne Pubs., 1958. Pp. 97. \$3.00.
- HEISENBERG, WERNER. *Physicist's Conception of Nature*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.; Sept., 1958.
- . *Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1958. Pp. 221. \$4.00.
- HERDAN, G. *Language as Choice and Chance*. New York: Philosophical Lib.; Aug., 1958. \$15.00.
- HESBURGH, THEODORE M., C.S.C. *Patterns for Educational Growth*. Notre Dame, Ind.: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1958. Pp. xv + 71. \$2.25.
- The six addresses here offered were given on the occasion of the annual Mass of the Holy Spirit at the beginning of the school year by the distinguished president of the University of Notre Dame. Philosophical and theological ideas are touched on, as is to be expected, and yet presented more in an inspirational than in a didactic manner. The topics of the individual addresses are: wisdom and education; a theology of history and education; the mission of a Catholic university; education in a world of social challenge; the divine element in education; and education in a world of science.
- HIGGINS, THOMAS J., S.J. *Man as Man: The Science and Art of Ethics*. 2d ed. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1958. Pp. xiii + 585. \$4.50.
- The first edition of this popular textbook was published in 1949 and noted in THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, xxvi [November 1949], 67). The revision has been extensive: a great part of the book has been rewritten for clarity and for more contemporary examples. The lists of readings at the end of each chapter have been entirely revised, and there are excellent references to the most recent studies. In addition, the movements of current thought, like positivism, emotivism, and communism, have been given considerably more attention. The section on natural law gives the current objections to natural law and provides brief answers. There is a section on situational ethics. In other respects, the book remains unchanged: the basic structure (general principles, individual ethics, social ethics) is the same; the combination of problem method and thesis method is kept; the judgments on moral issues remain the same.

The typography is in some respects better because of a more generous use of bold-face type.

[HOBBS, THOMAS.] *Leviathan*. Parts I and II. Ed. with an introd. by Herbert W. Schneider. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958. Pp. xvii + 298. Paper, \$1.00.

This edition reproduces the standard text, carefully compared with the first edition, together with the marginal headings; spelling and so on have been modernized. The editor and publisher have added explanatory footnotes and have tried to identify Hobbes's references. As a kind of prologue, the present edition begins with Chapter 46 of the third part (which, as the editor notes, is a kind of Hobbesian "discourse on method") and ends with the final chapter of Part Four, which is a conclusion.

The brief introduction gives a summary life of Hobbes and locates him in reference to religious and philosophical movements of his time. The editor notes that Hobbes wished to write a natural science of justice, which was to serve as ground for the laws of the absolute sovereign. He indicates that the Galilean method of natural science was to be used in this endeavor; he does not point out the typical nominalist clichés used by Hobbes. Hobbes, it is noted, was Puritan in tendency, with a Calvinist psychology; he was also a materialist (like Tertullian and other early sects, he thought God had some kind of "ethereal body").

The edition is excellently printed and sturdily bound, and, in the face of rising costs, still offered at prices comparable with those of the first works issued by this remarkable publisher.

HUGHES, H. STUART. *Consciousness and Society*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf; Sept., 1958. \$6.00.

† *Humanism and Education in East and West*. An international round table discussion organized by UNESCO. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 224. \$2.75.

† HUMPHRIES, CHRISTMAS, *Zen Buddhism*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1958. Pp. 254. \$3.75.

HUNGERLAND, ISABEL C. *Poetic Discourse*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1958. Pp. 181. Paper, \$3.00.

HUSIK, ISAAC. *A History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy*. New York, Meridian Books and Jewish Pubn. Soc. of America. Pp. 516. Paper, \$1.95.

INHOLDER, BARBEL, and PIAGET, JEAN. *The Growth of Logical Thinking from Childhood to Adolescence*. Trans. Anne Parsons and Stanley Milgram. New York: Basic Books, 1958. Pp. 382. \$6.75.

Islam: Muhammad and his Religion. Ed. with introd. by Arthur Jeffery. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958. Pp. xviii + 252. Paper, \$1.75.

The editor gives a brief general introduction to the selections, as well as introductions to the longer passages and explanatory notes. The selections are from the Koran and from various traditional sources, as well as from a few modern interpreters. The organization of matter makes the volume very useful for a student who wishes direct knowledge of the sources of this great religious movement but does not have the time to read the very extensive, repetitious, and loosely organized original works.

The edition is neatly presented and sturdily bound.

JAMES, WILLIAM. *Talks to Teachers on Psychology; and to Students on Some of Life's Ideals*. New York: W. W. Norton & Co.; Sept., 1958. \$3.95; paper, 95¢

JASPERS, KARL. *Man in the Modern Age*. Trans. Eden and Cedar Paul. New York: Humanities Press, 1958. \$3.00.

——— and BULTMANN, RUDOLF. *Myth and Christianity*. Trans. from the

German. New York: Noonday Press, 1958. Pp. 116. \$3.00; paper, \$1.25.

JEANS, JAMES. *Physics and Philosophy*. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press; Sept., 1958. \$1.75.

JENKINS, IREDELL. *Art and the Human Enterprise*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. ix + 318. \$5.50.

This work has as its major intention to show the relation of art to man and to his other activities. The author begins by maintaining that human experience has three dimensions: the affective, theoretical, and the aesthetic; and that these three dimensions correspond to the three dimensions of an object: import ("value"), connectedness, and particularity. Moreover, the aesthetic experience is not merely receptive; it contains an impulse which leads to creative expression and ultimately to some external object. There is also a detailed analysis of the nature of the aesthetic object, where the author shows a similar patient inclusiveness; he argues that during the aesthetic moment of appreciation the aesthetic object is self-contained but that in its secondary status it appeals to both the affective and cognitive sides of experience.

This serious and balanced reflection upon the nature and place of art deserves wide attention.

JEVONS, W. STANLEY. *The Principles of Science. A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method*. Introd. by Ernest Nagel. 3d ed. New York: Dover Pubns., 1958. Pp. liii + 786. Paper, \$2.98.

As Professor Nagel points out in his introduction the work of Jevons was one of the great formative influences on modern logic and the methodology of science. Though it has been far surpassed by modern logics, the formal analysis of Jevons was one of the first efforts made in English to use the Boolean notation and analysis. In addition, Jevons argued strongly against the theories of induction stemming from Bacon and Mill, and proposed instead the hypothetico-deductive process as the method of science. His work is still valuable, and the great number of illustrations he uses does a lot to make his analyses clear.

The edition is well printed and strongly bound, and is offered at a remarkably low price.

JOHNSON, ALLISON HEARTZ. *Whitehead's Philosophy of Civilization*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1958. Pp. 222. \$5.00.

JONAS, HANS. *The Gnostic Religion*. Boston: Beacon Press; Oct., 1958. Pp. 320. \$6.00.

JONES, ADAM LEROY. *Early American Philosophers*. New York: Frederick Ungar, 1958. Pp. 86. \$2.50.

† KANTOROWICZ, HERMANN. *The Definition of Law*. Ed. A. H. Campbell. Introd. by A. L. Goodhart. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 135. \$3.00.

KAUFMANN, WALTER. *Critique of Religion and Philosophy*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1958. Pp. xvii + 325. \$5.00.

This book is almost a formal attack on theology of all kinds and on the Christian religion as a whole. The author makes a point of explaining that his procedure is a negative one but that he does have a positive position of his own (there are, in fact, some very religious passages in the book). There are also, and somewhat incidentally, some purely philosophical discussions.

The most philosophical chapters are the early ones on the nature of philosophy (which have some relations to Platonism and some to Pepper); the criticism of positivism (and/or analysis) and existentialism as two half-currents of the full stream of philosophy, and the chapter on the nature of truth and its relation to expe-

rience. After these chapters follow chapters on the nature of religion and faith, proofs for God, the nature of dogma and theology, the basic nature of religion, scripture and poetry. There are many quotations, and the author is a master at the apt selection of texts; he skillfully employs the art of controversy and tries to insulate himself against criticism by claiming that critics and reviewers will be unfair to him by quoting him (see especially p. 158). The polemic is often brilliant, often unfair, and sometimes resentful and bitter; it probably will sell well.

KIERKEGAARD, SØREN AABYE. *Edifying Discourses*. Ed. Paul L. Holmer. Trans. from the Swedish by David F. and Lillian Marvin Swenson. New York: Harper & Bros., 1958. Pp. 284. Paper, \$1.45.

† ——. *Johannes Climacus or De Omnibus Dubitandum Est and A Sermon*. Trans. from the Swedish with assessment by T. H. Croxall. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 196. \$3.00.

† KITTO, H. D. F. *Sophocles, Dramatist and Philosopher*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 72. \$1.20.

KLEIN, CAROL. *The Credo of Maimonides*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1958. Pp. 143. \$3.75.

This is a study of the thought of Maimonides, intended for readers that are not specialists in philosophy. The author first gives a brief account of the life of Maimonides and his writings. Then he takes up briefly the following topics: the nature of philosophy, the existence and nature of God, the theory of truth, free will, the purpose of the world, eternity and creation in time, miracles, immortality, revelation, the resurrection, and the meaning of the Messiah. The last chapter is a commentary on the "Thirteen Articles" of faith as proposed by Maimonides.

This book is useful in that Rabbi Klein can work directly with the Hebrew terms and relates the ideas of Maimonides to the Talmud. But his understanding of the philosophical theories to which he refers (for example, he gives definitions of the term "philosophy") is apparently quite deficient and certainly awkwardly expressed (as in his summaries of philosophical positions about the proofs for the existence of God as given by modern philosophers). And it often is evident that English is not the author's native tongue. Moreover, the publisher has made it hard to tell notes from text.

† KNIGHT, EVERETT WARREN. *Literature Considered as Philosophy*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1958. Pp. 256. \$5.00.

KOLESNIK, WALTER B. *Mental Discipline in Modern Education*. Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1958. Pp. 242. \$3.50.

KONOPKA, GISELA. *Eduard C. Lindeman and Social Work Philosophy*. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1958. Pp. 228. \$4.50.

KOYRE, ALEXANDER. *From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1958. Pp. 320. Paper, \$1.60.

Language, Thought and Culture. Ed. Paul Henle. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1958. Pp. 279. \$4.95.

[LAO Tzu.] *Tao Teh King*. Ed. Archie J. Bahm. New York: Frederick Ungar, 1958. Pp. 126. \$2.75; paper, 95¢

LATHAM, EARL. *Philosophy and Policies of Woodrow Wilson*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; June, 1958. \$5.00.

LAUER, J. QUENTIN, S.J. *Triumph of Subjectivity*. New York: Fordham Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. ix + 185. \$3.50.

LAWSON, CHESTER ALVIN. *Language, Thought, and the Human Mind*. East Lansing: Michigan State Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 123. \$4.50.

† LECLERC, IVOR. *Whitehead's Metaphysics. An Introductory Exposition*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1958. Pp. xiii + 234. \$3.75.

As the author remarks, "Whitehead's writings are often rather

difficult because of his distinctive style, combining great complexity with extraordinary brevity and precision of statement. . . . all his ideas are presupposed in the discussion of each of them" (pp. x, ix).

The study begins by showing that Whitehead's metaphysics arises from the very same problem that is at the source of all the great systems of metaphysics. Its major point is the discovery and analysis of the nature of the primary instance of being—the actual entity, or *ousia*. Then the author takes up the procedure of metaphysics, showing how, for Whitehead, it is rational, speculative, and hypothetical. This introductory section of the book is Part One. Part Two deals with the doctrine of process. Here it is shown how, in terms of his requirement for the nature of metaphysics as systematic and coherent, Whitehead drives the choice between elimination of change from metaphysics on the one hand or inclusion of it in the notion of actual entity itself. In connection with process, the author explains successively the categories of creativity, eternal object, and relativity. Part Three analyzes the doctrine of experience, the rejection of the concept of vacuous actuality, prehension, feeling, and objectification. Part Four analyzes the nature of actuality; it develops the genetic analysis, the nature of God, and the universe.

Throughout, the author presents these ideas in Whitehead's own words, with copious quotations. It is an admirable piece of exposition.

‡ LEFF, GORDON. *Medieval Thought from Saint Augustine to Ockham*. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1958. Pp. 317. Paper, 85¢

This history of medieval thought is eminently readable and is not cluttered up with digressions on economics, technology, and social structures. Urbane and well-informed, the author has produced what in many ways is a sympathetic and useful history of the period. Yet, well-informed as it is, the book has many phrases that betray a lack of understanding. For example—this is one of many—"In the same way, it was a purely Christian interpretation to endow the first mover with the attributes of God as creator; from the point of view of pure reason, there is no more *evidence* for seeing Him as God than as first cause" (p. 212). If this is supposed to be a presentation of St. Thomas, the Leff-St. Thomas has been newly created; if it is a criticism—and Mr. Leff certainly has the right to criticize or disagree—it should not appear as harmlessly as it does. The whole notion that unless a philosophy somewhere contradicts faith it is not a completely distinct rational discipline would surprise most of the people with whom the author deals, except the late fourteenth-century fideists.

LEONARD, HENRY S. *The Principles of Right Reason: An Introduction to Applied Logic*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1957. Pp. 640. \$5.50.

LEWIS, C. S. *The Allegory of Love*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press; Sept., 1958. \$2.25.

Literature and Belief: English Institute Essays, 1957. Ed. M. H. Abrams. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Sept., 1958. \$3.75.

‡ [LOCKE, JOHN.] *The Reasonableness of Christianity with: A Discourse of Miracles and Part of: A Third Letter concerning Toleration*. Ed. and abridged by I. T. Ramsey. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 102. \$2.50.

Logical Positivism. Ed. A. J. Ayer. Glencoe: Free Press, 1958. \$6.00.

LYND, HELEN MERRELL. *On Shame and the Search for Identity*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1958. Pp. 318. \$5.75.

‡ MACINTYRE, ALASDAIR CHALMERS. *The Unconscious*. New York: Humanities Press, 1958. Pp. 109. \$2.50.

† MACKINNON, D. M. *A Study in Ethical Theory*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1958. Pp. vii + 280. \$3.25.

The author is acquainted, indeed familiar, with the trends in philosophical writing that tend to look on philosophy "as talk about talk"; witness his apologetic embarrassment in talking about awareness of freedom (pp. 124-31). Yet, as he says, a crucial question in ethical theory is that of the "possibility of metaphysics."

The arrangement of the book seems strange at first glance. Chapters on utilitarianism and Kant are followed by a chapter on the notion of moral freedom; then comes a chapter on Butler, followed by chapters on the relation of ethics to politics, and between ethics, metaphysics, and religion. Yet there is a unity, and it lies more or less in the contrast between an "intuitive ethics" and an "ethics of consequences," on the one hand, and between goodness viewed as self-perfection as against goodness as obedience to God on the other.

In his command of a complex argument and his realization of the profound bearing of the issues he takes up, the author is very impressive. He does not produce an ethical theory; he is content, at least on the surface, with discussing the nature of ethical theories produced by others. Yet at the same time he vividly conveys the impression that an ethical theory we must have, will it or not.

MACMURRAY, JOHN. *The Self as Agent*. New York, Harper & Bros. \$3.75.

MARCUSE, HERBERT. *Soviet Marxism*. New York, Columbia Univ. Press. Pp. 271. \$4.50.

MARGENAU, HENRY. *Thomas and the Physics of 1958: A Confrontation*. "The Aquinas Lecture," 1958. Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. [iv] + 61. \$2.50.

In this lecture, the author tries to compare some points of Thomistic epistemology with the situation of modern physics. He begins with the distinction between intellect and sense as proposed by St. Thomas and compares it to the distinction between lawful experience and theory on the one hand and historical-individual experience on the other. Next, he suggests that this difference is to be referred to the distinction between the agent and the possible intellects: the latter is merely abstractive and collative of sensory material; the former constructs theories which are not identical or even isomorphic to sense perception but merely are correlated with it. He finally suggests that the ontological dimension of reality is permitted to science, and even suggested by it, but is properly discussed only by philosophy. Finally, he argues strongly that facts and information are by no means the major part of science—that understanding is much more important and that this importance should be reflected in our teaching of science.

MARITAIN, JACQUES. *The Degrees of Knowledge*. Trans. from the 4th French edition under the supervision of Gerald B. Phelan. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; Nov., 1958. \$7.50.

MARTIN, HAROLD CLIFFORD. *The Logic and Rhetoric of Exposition*. New York: Rinehart & Co., 1958. Pp. 214. \$2.00.

MASCALI, E. L. *The Importance of Being Human*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; Dec., 1958. Pp. 124. \$2.75.

† MAYO, BERNARD. *Ethics and the Moral Life*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1958. Pp. 246. \$5.00.

MCGOVERN, WILLIAM MONTGOMERY, and COLLIER, DAVID S. *Radicals and Conservatives*. Chicago: Henry Regnery & Co., 1958. Pp. 174. \$4.00.

† MCKELLAR, PETER. *Imagination and Thinking*. New York: Basic Books, 1958. Pp. 230. \$4.25.

† MEHLBERG, HENRYK, *The Reach of Science*. Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1958. Pp. 368. \$5.50.

MILL, JOHN STUART. *Autobiography*. Introd. by Currin V. Shields. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958. Pp. xviii + 201. Paper, 90¢

This is a revealing document, not only for the development of Mill's own philosophical ideas but also for the educational ideas of his father and for the psychology of character. The brief introduction is helpful in orienting the reader; there are a chronology and a selected bibliography.

The book is carefully edited, beautifully printed, and well bound, and yet its price remains within the reach of any student or scholar who wishes to possess his own copy.

———. *Utilitarianism*. [Rev. ed.] New York: Liberal Arts Press. Pp. 88. Paper, 50¢

MILLER, JAMES WILKINSON. *Logic Workbook*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. vii + 88. Paper.

These exercises, twenty-seven in number, are so arranged that they can be worked directly in the book and then turned in, or answered on blank paper. They are based on modern symbolic logic; as the author points out, there are so many different notations that it is better to write a book in English and let each instructor teach, and each class employ, their favorite system.

A *Modern Introduction to Ethics*. Ed. Milton K. Munitz. Glencoe: Free Press, 1958. \$6.50.

Moral and Ethical Standards in Labor and Management. New York: National Assoc. of Manufacturers, 1958. Pp. 7. Paper.

NAGEL, ERNEST, and NEWMAN, JAMES R. *Godel's Proof*. New York: New York Univ. Press; Aug., 1958. \$2.75.; paper, \$1.75.

NANDA, B. R. *Mahatma Gandhi*. Boston: Beacon Press; Dec., 1958. Pp. 530. \$6.50.

† NEF, JOHN U. *Cultural Foundations of Industrial Civilization*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 177. \$4.00.

NEFF, MARY. *Your Uncommon Sense*. Chicago: Science Research Associates; Sept., 1958. 50¢

NEILL, THOMAS PATRICK. *Makers of the Modern Mind*. 2d enlarged ed. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1958. Pp. 433. \$4.00.

NEWMAN, JOHN HENRY. *Scope and Nature of University Education*. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co.; Sept., 1958. Paper, \$1.25.

NOBLE, DAVID W. *The Paradox of Progressive Thought*. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1958. Pp. 280. \$6.00.

† NOWELL-SMITH, PATRICK HORACE. *Ethics*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1958. Pp. 283. \$7.50.

O'BRIEN, KEVIN J., C.S.S.R. *The Proximate Aim of Education*. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1958. Pp. x + 267. \$5.00.

This is a dissertation presented to the Catholic University of America. The author intends to examine the true nature of Christian education and to describe and define its real end. After a brief introduction, in which he indicates his dependence on revelation and gives a eulogy of Scholastic philosophy, he analyzes the notion of finality, doing this in a relatively traditional and verbal form. Next he gives a number of opinions about the end of education offered by some modern theorists (the principle of selection is not stated or discoverable). Next come chapters on the Catholic view: the nature of Christian perfection, man's co-operation, and then the formal statement that the proper and immediate end of education is "the congruity of Christian perfection." A final chapter draws out some particular implications.

Dissertations must necessarily use technical terminology and must

compress their presentation so that only specialists can easily read what is presented. But what even professional Catholic educators will make of this philosophical reconditeness is a question.

- Observation and Interpretation*. Ed. Stephan Korner. New York: Academic Press, 1958. Pp. 232. \$8.00.
- OTTO, RUDOLF. *The Idea of the Holy*. Trans. from the German by John W. Harvey. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 251. Paper, \$1.75.
- PAP, ARTHUR. *Semantics and Necessary Truth*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press. Pp. 468. \$6.75
- [PASCAL, BLAISE.] *Pascal's Pensées*. Trans. from the French by W. F. Trotter. Intro. by T. S. Eliot. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1958. Pp. 316. Paper, \$1.15.
- PASCH, ALAN. *The Method of Empiricism*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; Dec., 1958. Pp. 304. \$6.50.
- PATTERSON, ROBERT LEET. *Philosophy of Religion*. New York: Henry Holt & Co.; Mar., 1958. Pp. 360.
- PEPPER, STEPHEN C. *The Sources of Value*. Berkeley, Univ. of California Press. Pp. 746. \$8.50.
- † PETERS, RICHARD STANLEY. *The Concept of Motivation*. New York: Humanities Press, 1958. Pp. 166. \$2.50.
- PHENIX, PHILIP HENRY. *Philosophy of Education*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1958. Pp. 635. \$5.75.
- † PIAGET, JEAN. *The Psychology of Intelligence*. New York: Humanities Press, 1958. Pp. 190. \$3.75.
- PIEPER, JOSEF. *Happiness and Contemplation*. Trans. from the German by Richard and Clara Winston. New York: Pantheon Books, 1958. Pp. 124. \$2.75.
- POINCARÉ, HENRI. *The Value of Science*. New York: Dover Pubns.; Aug., 1958.
- † POLANYI, MICHAEL. *Personal Knowledge. Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1958. Pp. xiv + 428. \$6.75.

The scope of this book is human knowledge, examined in almost all of its possible manifestations in some detail; it is therefore incapable of summary. But some of its aims can be pointed out. The title itself, as the author says, is intended to show that knowledge, properly speaking, is a personal act. Claims of complete impersonality and objectivity are self-defeating, as the author makes clear. He insists strongly and with many examples on the tacit components, on the subsidiary and instrumentally known elements that surround any explicit statement. He tries to show that all knowledge, even the most abstract and formal, is rooted in non-articulated experience. He rejects also the claims of neo-behaviorism and of positivism. He shows that the notion of complete conventionality (mere usefulness) is false to the very science it is alleged to explain.

On the other hand, in his insistence on the experiential and lived grounding of all knowledge he risks blurring the difference between intellect and sense; in showing the heuristic character of science he reduces all knowledge (including a knowledge of God) to a heuristic program which belies his belief that science reaches truth and not merely efficient manipulation. This difficulty will perhaps lead many to reject the very real and profound insights of the author.

- POLLARD, WILLIAM G. *Chance and Providence*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; Sept., 1958. Pp. 180. \$3.50.
- RADER, MELVIN. *The Enduring Questions: Main Problems in Philosophy*. New York: Henry Holt & Co. Pp. 564. \$5.75.

- RANDALL, JOHN HERMAN, JR. *Nature and Historical Experience*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. Pp. 334. \$5.50.
- . *The Role of Knowledge in Western Religion*. Boston: Beacon Press; Nov., 1958. Pp. 160. \$3.50.
- ‡ REEVES, JOAN WYNN. *Body and Mind in Western Thought*. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1958. Pp. 403. Paper, 95¢
- ‡ ROSENTHAL, ERWIN I. J. *Political Thought in Medieval Islam*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 334. \$6.50.
- ROTHSTEIN, JEROME. *Communication, Organization, and Science*. Foreword by C. A. Muses. Indian Hills, Colo.: Falcon's Wing Press, 1958. Pp. xcvi + 110. \$ 3.50.

This extremely interesting book must be read in the spirit of the author, who professes himself a "theorist probing as deeply as he can. . . . The information-organization view is therefore pushed in many directions" (p. lxxxviii). This viewpoint is "espoused with a vigor that may seem to exclude any other approach, [but] I do not subscribe to a monistic philosophy" (p. lxxxvii).

The author begins by relating the more specialized, newer concepts of information-theory to those of entropy, and by juxtaposing the notions of measurement and communication. From this, he progresses into theories about the nature of language, logic, theory, skill. On a slightly expanded basis he considers an organism as an information-system, as well as a political society, and even a world-state. Obviously he is working with a univocal notion of *system* and consequently applies it symbolically (metaphorically).

In a lengthy foreword, Mr. Muses (pp. vii-lxxxv) gives some logical and mathematical backgrounds for the theory, expands it in some places, and in the last fourteen pages points out some reductivist statements the author makes (for example, the notion that life is a process of adjustment; that computers can write poetry or be creative).

Even with this critical view, there still are some tendencies toward monism and reductionism in the book; but a critically alerted reader will find the imaginative generalizations highly interesting.

- RUSSELL, BERTRAND ARTHUR WILLIAM. *Understanding History, and Other Essays*. New York: Philosophical Lib. Pp. 122. Paper, 95¢
- ‡ SAMUEL, HERBERT LOUIS. *In Search of Reality*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1958. Pp. 237. \$7.50.
- SCHAPIRO, JACOB SALWYN. *Liberalism*. Princeton: D. van Nostrand Co., 1958. Pp. 191. Paper, \$1.25.
- SCHLEIERMACHER, FRIEDRICH ERNST DANIEL. *On Religion*. Trans. from the 3d German ed. with introd. by Rudolph Otto. New York: Harper Bros., 1958. Pp. 309. Paper, \$1.60.
- SCHNEIDER, HERBERT W. *The Puritan Mind*. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press; Sept., 1958. \$1.85.
- SCHRÖDINGER, ERWIN C. *Science, Theory and Man*. Trans. James Murphy and W. H. Johnston. Preface by Lord Rutherford. Biographical introd. by James Murphy. New York: Dover Pubns., 1958. Pp. xxiv + 223. Paper, \$1.35.

Schrödinger's views on the nature and meaning of science are those of a great scientist who reflected often and deeply on these philosophical problems; they are not ill-considered and disconnected utterances. Hence, even though the epistemology is inadequate, the work remains an important source. The edition is beautifully printed and well bound.

- Science and the Creative Spirit*. Ed. Harcourt Brown. Toronto, Univ. of Toronto Press. Pp. xxviii + 165. \$4.60.

- Science and the Modern Mind: A Symposium.* Ed. Gerald Holton. Boston: Beacon Press; Nov., 1958. Pp. 128. \$3.95.
- Selected Readings in the Philosophy of Education.* Ed. Joe Park. New York: Macmillan Co., 1958. Pp. 450. \$5.00.
- SHEEN, FULTON J. *God and Intelligence in Modern Philosophy.* Garden City: Doubleday & Co.; Sept., 1958. 95¢
- SMITH, J. MAYNARD. *The Theory of Evolution.* Baltimore: Penguin Books; Sept., 1958. 85¢
- SONDEL, BESS SELTZER. *The Humanity of Words.* Cleveland: World Pub. Co. Pp. 245. \$4.00.
- SPARSHOTT, F. E. *An Enquiry into Goodness.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1958. Pp. xiv + 304. \$5.50.

This is an investigation of the meaning of "good" from the point of view of the analysis of ordinary language. The author is urbanely critical of most classical philosophers but also of the Cambridge school of analysis. Individual analyses are at times brilliant and at other times almost irritatingly short-sighted. The formula which the author arrives at is put thus: "To say that x is good is to say that it is such as to satisfy the wants of the person or persons concerned" (p. 122). The earlier sections of the book investigate such questions as the nature of a philosophical question; the later ones the primary and secondary instances of the usage of "good" and considerations of divergent philosophical interpretations of this word.

- SPINOZA, BARUCH. *The Book of God.* Ed. Dagobert D. Runes. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1958. Pp. 121. \$3.00.

This text is a revision of the translation of A. Wolf, published under the title *Spinoza's Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well-Being*.

Revisions were made from the Dutch versions, but there are no major changes in the text. The introduction is very brief (five pages) and is as much a polemic against Christianity as it is an introduction to the thought of the Jewish author.

It is good to have an easily available edition of this philosophical classic.

- . *On the Improvement of the Understanding.* Trans. with introd. by Joseph Katz. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958. Pp. xx + 40. Paper, 50¢

In his general introduction, the editor claims that Spinoza was a seminal mind, foreshadowing some contemporary positions. In particular, he maintains that Spinoza's philosophy is an attempt to take science seriously. He claims that Spinoza is not a rationalist, and one of his reasons is that his views "have clear experiential reference" (p. xiii). He does show the rigid systematization of the philosophy of Spinoza, and he points out some basic general traits of the treatise. There is a very brief bibliography. The translation aims at producing a text that can be understood by a reader ignorant of Latin and traditional meanings of terms; this attempt leads to a text that is sometimes as much an interpretation as a translation.

- † [———.] *The Political Works.* Ed. and trans. A. G. Wernham. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 473. \$10.10.

- STALLKNECHT, NEWTON P. *Strange Seas of Thought.* Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press; Sept., 1958. \$5.00.

- STANLIS, PETER J. *Edmund Burke and the Natural Law.* Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1958. Pp. 324. \$5.75.

- STARK, WERNER. *The Sociology of Knowledge.* Glencoe: Free Press, 1958. \$6.00.

- STCHERBATSKY, T. *Buddhist Logic.* 2 vols. New York, Lounz Co. \$18.50.

STRAUSS, LEO. *Thoughts on Machiavelli*. Glencoe: Free press, 1958. \$6.00.
Studies in Ethical Theory. "University of Colorado Studies: Series in Philosophy," No. 1. Ed. Karl K. Hulley. Boulder, Colo.: Univ. of Colorado Press, 1958. Pp. 111. Paper, \$2.50.

This issue contains eight papers, only one of which deals with particular considerations. Bertram Morris, in "Ethics and Human Nature," argues that good is predicated in relation to human nature, because the real essence of man is his moral nature. Edward J. Machle, in "'Human Nature' and Ethics," maintains that "human nature" can be taken in a factual descriptive sense and in a value-charged mode. In the first sense, it is not good by definition, but in the second it is; and this is because it involves the acceptance of one's self as a moral being. John O. Nelson, in "Philosophical Ethics and Morality," argues that philosophical ethics entirely dispenses with morality; for he holds that morality is the emotive good, whereas philosophy is a purely cognitive process. Robert Rogers, in "On the Justification of Ought-Statements," holds that value-statements are not descriptive and that therefore no facts ever justify a moral statement. David Hawkins, in "Ethics and Ethical Experience," argues for what he calls an "empirical realism," "empirical" in the sense that experience is relevant to the evaluation of moral judgments; "realism" in the sense that the things, objects, actions which one is judging have independent reality and value. Doris Webster Havice, in "The Need for Sound Type-Theory in Ethical Inquiry," shows the advantages of improved theories of personality types for making ethical choices. William Sacksteder, in "Human Nature, Science, and Philosophy," argues that the several sciences have each their contribution to make; that philosophy functions to some extent as a dialectic between the sciences and as a source of principles which set the very conditions under which communication is possible; and finally that philosophy has a practical function. Forrest Williams, in "What Is Truth About Man," argues that man as a whole is too complex for science and maintains that only literary creations can express the truth concerning human beings.

SULLIVAN, CELESTINE J., JR. *Critical and Historical Reflections on Spinoza's 'Ethics.'* "University of California Publications in Philosophy," Vol. 32. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1958. Pp. 45. Paper, \$1.00.

This short study of Spinoza sees in him an ambiguous as well as great thinker. As regards being and knowing, the author points out the ambiguity of the relation between substance and attribute (they are and are not identical), between two different attributes, between the attributes of thought and extension. The source of this ambiguity the author finds in the conflict between the new science and the old religion, which Descartes translated into the dualism of mind and matter, and which Spinoza tried to overcome. But the solution of the dualism by an identification of thought and extension, of idea and body, admits of two alternative readings—as idealism and as materialism—and the correctness of either one can never be established.

The rest of the first part of this paper then takes up a number of difficulties which the author sees as flowing from the basic difficulties: the notion of idea; consciousness in man and in God; cause and effect, essence; the relation of these three; the modes and the causal relation.

The second part of the paper takes up the notion of eternal life: immortality, inertia, conatus, the essence of man and his action and passion; the mind, and the ambiguity of the notion of eternal life.

- The study is interesting and valuable, but there is neither a table of contents nor an index.
- † TA TUNG SHU. *The One-World Philosophy of K'ang Yu-Wei*. Trans. from the Chinese with introd. and notes by Laurence G. Thompson. New York: Macmillan Co., 1958. Pp. 300. \$6.00.
- TATON, R. *Reason and Chance in Scientific Discovery*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1958. \$10.00.
- Theories of History*. Ed. Patrick Gardiner. Glencoe: Free Press. 1958. \$7.50.
- ‡ THODY, PHILIP. *Albert Camus: A Study of His Work*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1958. Pp. 155. \$3 75.
- THORNDIKE, LYNN. *A History of Magic and Experimental Science*. Vols. 7 and 8. New York: Columbia Univ. Press. Pp. 816, 707. \$10.00 ea.
- THURSTONE, L. L. *The Measurement of Values*. Preface by Thelma Gwinn Thurstone. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; Nov., 1958. Pp. 384. \$7.50.
- † TOULMIN, STEPHEN EDELSTON. *The Uses of Argument*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press. 1958. Pp. 270. \$4.50.
- TSUNODA, RYUSAKU; DE BARY, WILLIAM THEODORE; KEENE, DONALD. *Sources of the Japanese Tradition*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press; May, 1958. Pp. xxi + 928. \$7.50.
- ULLMANN, STEPHEN. *The Principles of Semantics*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1957. Pp. 346. \$10.00.
- The first edition of this work was published in 1951; the present second edition is a corrected photo-reprinting of the first edition, with an added chapter on recent developments, a new bibliography, and a new index (pp. 300-46). The "semantics" of this book is a division of linguistics, not the positivistic philosophical movement sometimes called "general semantics."
- The author points out that some knowledge of the facts of linguistic usage are significant for philosophy and that philosophical theories of "meaning"—if any theories should become established—would be very important for linguistics. Frequent discussions of philosophical theories occur in various chapters.
- USHENKO, ANDREW PAUL. *The Field Theory of Meaning*. Preface by Stephen C. Pepper. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1958. Pp. 204. \$4.75.
- VOEGELIN, ERIC. *Order and History*. Vol. 2, *The World of the Polis*; Vol. 3, *Plato and Aristotle*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press. Pp. 407, 400. \$6.00 ea.
- VON BUDDENBROCK, WOLFGANG. *The Senses*. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press; May, 1958. \$4.00.
- VON MISES, RICHARD. *Probability, Statistics and Truth*. 2d rev. English ed. New York, Macmillan Co. \$5.00.
- VON NEUMAN, JOHN. *The Computer and the Brain*. New Haven, Yale Univ. Press. Pp. 96. \$3.00.
- VON URBAN, RUDOLF. *Beyond Human Knowledge*. New York: Pageant Press, 1958. Pp. 254. \$5.00.
- VON WRIGHT, GEORGE. *Treatise on Induction and Probability*. New York: Humanities Press; June, 1958.
- WARD, BARBARA. *Faith and Freedom*. Garden City: Doubleday & Co.; Sept., 1958. 95¢
- WARNER, REX. *The Greek Philosophers*. New York, New American Lib. Pp. 238. Paper, 50¢
- ‡ WARNOCK, G. J. *English Philosophy since 1900*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 192. \$1.20.
- WESTFALL, RICHARD S. *Science and Religion in Seventeenth-Century England*. New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, Pp. 244. \$4.50.

- What Is Science?* Ed. James Roy Newman. New York, Simon & Schuster. Pp. 510. Paper, \$1.95.
- WHEELER, M. C. *Logic: The Way We Think*. Philadelphia, Peter Reilly Co. Pp. 129. \$2.50.
- WHEELIS, ALLEN. *The Quest for Identity*. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1958. Pp. 250. \$3.95.
- WHITEHEAD, ALFRED NORTH. *The Function of Reason*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1958. Pp. 96. Paper, \$1.25.
- . *Symbolism*. New York, Macmillan Co. Pp. 96. \$2.50.
- WIEMAN, HENRY NELSON. *Man's Ultimate Commitment*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 328. \$5.95.
- WILHITE, VIRGLE GLENN. *Founders of American Economic Thought and Policy*. New York: Bookman Associates, 1958. Pp. 442. \$6.00.
- WILLIAMSON, ADOLPH ANCRUM. *The Cosmic Function of Life*. New York: Vantage Press, 1958. Pp. 78. \$2.50.
- WIMSATT, WILLIAM KURTZ, JR. *The Verbal Icon*. New York, Noonday Press. Pp. 317. Paper, \$1.65.
- WINDELBAND, WILHELM. *History of Ancient Philosophy*. Trans. Herbert Ernest Cushman. New York: Dover Pubns., 1958. Pp. xv + 393. Paper, \$1.85.

This is one of the classical histories of philosophy; it was one of the first to relate general history to the history of thought, and it takes a rather broad view. Yet it is in general faithful to the sources and still contains many useful analyses. The edition is well bound and economical; the original printing seems not to have been even and clean.

- WOLTER, ALLAN BERNARD, O.F.M. *Summula Metaphysicae*. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1958. Pp. xii + 189. \$3.50.

This Latin text of metaphysics was written for use in Franciscan seminaries, according to the announcement of the publishers. The author, by distinguishing the common patrimony of the Scholastics from particular and controverted opinions, would seem to have had in mind at the same time the establishing of a common understanding among many schools of thought. And it is to be hoped that this book will be available to a much wider circle of students, even where it is not adopted as a textbook.

The book is divided into four parts: (I) transcendental being and its general attributes; (II) the "disjunctive attributes" which make up the basic divisions of being; (III) the existence and nature of God, in a rather brief treatment; (IV) ontological truth and goodness. The Latin text is clear, simple, and direct, and a set of review questions at the end should help the student to prepare for the final examination. There is a useful introductory bibliography which emphasizes English-language books and articles, and a good index.

- WRIGHT, CHAUNCEY. *Philosophical Essays*. Ed. Edward H. Madden. New York: Liberal Arts Press; July, 1958. \$2.75; paper, 80¢
- WYLIE, C. R., JR. *101 Puzzles in Thought and Logic*. New York: Dover Pubns., 1957. Pp. 128. Paper, \$1.00.

This group of puzzles belongs to that class which need no special information but only a good imagination and careful logical analysis. The author shows how such puzzles are solved in a twelve-page introduction. The book can provide a very interesting pastime, or a source for games; it could also be used to great advantage for an occasional assignment in a logic course.

- ZILBOORG, GREGORY. *Freud and Religion*. Westminster, Newman Press. Pp. 70. Paper, 95¢

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- ADLER, MORTIMER J. *The Idea of Freedom*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1958. Pp. xxvii + 689. \$7.50.
- ALPER, NOAH D. *The Manufacturer vs. the College Professor on Taxation*. St. Louis: Public Revenue Education Council, 1958. Pp. 11. 15¢
- American Classics Reconsidered*. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1958. Pp. x + 307. \$4.95.
- AUGUSTINE, ST. *On Christine Doctrine*. Tr. with introd. by D. W. Robertson, Jr. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958. Pp. xxii + 169. Paper, 95¢
- BAGOT, JEAN-PIERRE. *Connaissance et amour*. Paris: Beauchesne, 1958. Pp. 248. Paper, fr. 1450.
- BERNARD, CLAUDE. *An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine*. Trans. Henry Copley Green. Introd. by Lawrence J. Henderson. Foreword by I. Bernard Cohen. New York: Dover Pubns., 1957. Pp. xix + 226. Paper, \$1.50.
- BOUYER, LOUIS. *Newman: His Life and Spirituality*. Trans. J. Lewis May. Introd. by H. Francis Davis. New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons, 1958. Pp. xiii + 391. \$7.50.
- BOWMAN, ARCHIBALD ALLAN. *The Absurdity of Christianity and Other Essays*. Ed. with introd. by Charles W. Hendel. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958. Pp. xxxiii + 62. Paper, 75¢
- BRÉHIER, EMILE. *The Philosophy of Plotinus*. Trans. Joseph Thomas. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1958. Pp. vii + 205. \$4.50.
- BRUEHL, LAWRENCE. *The Death Blow to Communism*. New York: Vantage Press, 1958. Pp. 426. \$5.00.
- BUBER, MARTIN. *I and Thou*. Trans. Ronald Gregor Smith. 2d. ed. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958. Pp. xii + 137. \$1.75.
- BUGBEE, HENRY G., JR. *The Inward Morning*. Introd. by Gabriel Marcel. State College, Pa.: Bald Eagle Press, 1958. Pp. 232. \$5.00.
- CAFFARENA, JOSÉ GÓMEZ, S.J. *Ser Participado y ser Subsistente en la Metafísica de Enrique de Gante*. Rome: Gregorian Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. xi + 283. Paper, \$3.50.
- CARTY, CHARLES. *Confessions without a Hearing Aid*. St. Paul: Radio Replies Press, 1958. Pp. 32. Paper, 15¢
- CAUCHY, VENANT. *Désir naturel et béatitude chez saint Thomas*. Montréal: Fides, 1958. Pp. 126. Paper, \$2.50.
- CHANNING, WILLIAM ELLERY. *Unitarian Christianity and Other Essays*. Ed. with introd. by Irving H. Bartlett. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957. Pp. 121. 80¢
- CHISHOLM, RODERICK M. *Perceiving: A Philosophical Study*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. xi + 203.
- CHROUST, ANTON-HERMANN. *Socrates, Man and Myth*. Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1958. Pp. xiv + 336. \$6.75.
- CLAUDEL, PAUL. *The Essence of the Bible*. Trans. Wade Baskin. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1957. Pp. 120. \$3.00.
- College Counseling and Testing*. Ed. James P. O'Connor. Washington: Catholic Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. ix + 244. Paper, \$3.75.

ARTISTIC AND PRUDENTIAL JUDGMENT

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Artists and moralists have seldom been on the best of terms. The rift between them first began when Plato ousted the poets from his ideal republic; and, if one can judge from the present row over censorship, the rift today is as wide as ever.

Significantly enough, contemporary Neo-Scholastic teaching has tended to affirm this rift rather than to attempt to heal it. One need not read very long in the writings of Maritain and Adler, for instance, before one discovers that art and the moral virtue of prudence are by nature in separate realms entirely, prudence in the realm of the moral good, art in the realm of amoral and transcendental beauty; that the prudential judgment never affects the art object as such; and that within his own sphere of activity the artist is free from the *do's* and *don't's* of moral censure.¹ Though apparently we have been unable to mend the breach between art and morality, it is, perhaps, a credit to the tolerance of our age that we have at least learned to live with it.

On the other hand, Walter Kerr, in a very stimulating lecture,² has recently called for a revision of Christian aesthetics to cope with the problem of the relationship of art and morality. In commenting upon the tensions that exist between the art critic and the censor, Kerr remarks that "there is no resolving our present dilemma, no escaping the increasing tensions of a tug-of-war in which both parties are committed to unalterable positions, except by the rational development of a demonstrative, defensible aesthetic."³

The present article will, perhaps, be a step toward such an aesthetic. In it I shall attempt to restate and in part to resolve the whole complex problem of the relationship of art and prudence.

The traditional Neo-Scholastic doctrine on the relation of art and prudence has for the most part been developed from a series of texts in the *Summa Theologiae* in which St. Thomas discusses the relationship

of the two virtues of *ars* and *prudentia*. According to this reading of the Thomistic texts art (*ars*) is to be defined as *recta ratio factibilium*. Although this habit is a virtue of the practical intellect, it also has a speculative side inasmuch as it is expressible in a determined body of rules. As an imperfect virtue, art is ordered not to the good of man as such but to the good of the object which it produces. Hence, the nature of art, though not its exercise, lies outside the pale of morality; for, since art is not a moral virtue, it can be governed by prudential judgment only extrinsically—that is, as to its acquisition, use, or social consequences. Hence, every art object must be subjected to two separate and *unrelated* judgments, one as to its aesthetic value, the other as to its moral consequences.

The basic fallacy of this position lies in the assumption that the Thomistic definition of *ars* as *recta ratio factibilium* is an adequate description of the habit of poetry, painting, sculpture, and so on. This assumption, I suggest, is a false one.

Recta ratio factibilium is an adequate description of the habit which enables a man to engage in such activity as the making of pots, pans, and other *useful instruments*. However, before one can apply the definition *recta ratio factibilium* without qualification to the production of a poem, sculpture, painting, and so forth, one must determine whether or not there is an essential difference between a pot and a painting. For clearly, if the products of habits are essentially irreducible, the habits which produce them will likewise be essentially irreducible.

Hence, the question which confronts us at this point is this: Is a pot the same thing as a painting? We shall in the future designate the pot and like articles of human productivity as “artifacts,” whereas we shall reserve the term “works of art” or “art objects” for music, sculpture, painting, and the like. Is then every work of art an artifact, and is every artifact a work of art?

¹The reader might find it interesting to compare the following contemporary Neo-Scholastic treatments of the relationship of art and prudence: M. Adler, *Art and Prudence* (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1937), pp. 418-54; J. Maritain, *Art and Scholasticism* (London: Sheed & Ward, 1930), chaps. 4 and 9, and *Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry*

(New York: Pantheon Books, 1955), pp. 48-52, 58-61; Ralph McInerney, “Apropos of Art and Connatural-ity,” *THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN*, XXXV (March 1958), 173-89.

²*Criticism and Censorship* (Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1956).

³*Ibid.*, p. 82.

One of the clearest characteristics of the artifact is that it is an object which has a particular use. Pots, pans, tables, chairs, and the like, are all functional objects which partake of the nature of tools. They are instruments which extend and support the various practical external activities of man.

Works of art may also serve practical purposes. They may be used to serve as gifts, to cover a wall, to fill an empty corner, and so on. Nevertheless, to use a painting as a gift is not to use it as a painting. In the last analysis, any material thing, be it a button or a ten-dollar bill, can serve as a gift. Hence, its giveableness does not qualify to constitute a painting as a work of art. What does constitute a painting formally as a work of art is the peculiar sort of *knowableness* proper to a work of art. We must explain why this is so.

Art objects are not useless objects, but their use is speculative rather than practical. Considered as a work of art, a painting has *no other function* than to be known. An artifact too is knowable, but its knowability is always in function of some further practical end. One does not contemplate a hammer, but one recognizes its use and employs it. Once you have seen a Rembrandt there is nothing else you can do with it precisely as a work of art.

Hence we may conclude that an artifact is an instrument to be used, whereas an art object is an expression to be known.

This is an important distinction, for it shows that the artifact achieves the perfection of its being only by *being used*, whereas the art object achieves the perfection of its being only by *being known*. Indeed, the art object achieves its formal existence as art (expression) only in knowledge.

That this is so is clearest in the case of poetry and music. The being of a poem does not consist formally in the ink blots on the pages of a closed book or in the disturbances in the air set up by a person who recites the poem. These are the material conditions, no more; for the poem's formal existence is in the mind of the person who understands it. The same can be said of music, which is formally neither the notation on the page nor the air vibrations set up by the instruments.

That the art object achieves formal existence as art only in the mind is less clear in the case of painting and sculpture than it is in the case of poetry and music. Pigment, canvas, stone, and clay all have

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physical existence more substantial than the physical prerequisites for poetic or musical communication. But the printed poem and the pigment-covered canvas are nevertheless identical with the air vibrations of a musical note in this; namely, that insofar as each enters into the constitution of an art object, each is *nothing more* than the material conditions necessary for artistic communication. The fact that a painting lasts longer than the vibrations of a note does not, for all that, make it art any more formally.⁴

Architecture is in many ways the most difficult of the arts to handle. Its functional nature makes it most like a pure artifact. Indeed, insofar as a building is functional it is an artifact, and a purely functional building is only an artifact. Architecture attains to the stature of art only when it is not simply functional but also expressive. (Think, for instance, of the cathedral of Notre Dame in Paris.)

I have been attempting here to arrive at a notion of the nature of the habit of art through an analysis of the nature of objects of art. By now it should be clear, I think, that art is essentially the ability to communicate knowledge by way of a material medium. The object of art is that material medium itself molded to fit the needs of artistic communication. But the habit of art always and of its nature looks beyond the art object to the mind of the person who will view the object, and the art object itself has as its *sole function* as art object (*finis operis*) to communicate artistic knowledge. Indeed, the work of art exists only materially in the art object itself; it exists formally only in the mind of the person who knows the object.

Let us explore briefly some of the implications of this analysis. Communication has a double aspect. It can be viewed from the point of view of the communicator (actively) or from the point of view of the communicand (passively). Taken formally and in its fullest sense, communication includes both active and passive elements.

Actively considered, communication does not take place formally unless the communicator deliberately intends to communicate, although communication passively considered could take place formally without the intention of the communicator to communicate. If com-

⁴Gilson has written intelligently on this particular point; but he tends to overemphasize, I believe, the artistic existence of the physical painting. Cf. *Painting and Reality* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1957), pp. 4-28.

⁵The word "total" must be insisted upon; otherwise there is no point in even discussing the case.

munication is simply passive, however, it is not communication properly so called. For example, I may happen to overhear someone saying something which he has no intention of communicating to me.

Consider now the case of a man who sits down at a piano apparently to compose a song but with the *total*^s *absence* of any intention to communicate. As far as he is concerned, the whole of his activity terminates at himself and himself alone. It is not that he definitely excludes others; he simply does not consider them. They are nonentities to him. For him, therefore, his musical notations and the playing of the notes are simply and solely a crutch to his own thoughts; and the working out of the song is identical with the doodling a person might indulge in to help himself clarify his own ideas.

Note well, however, that the man at the piano is not communicating to himself. "To communicate to oneself" is strictly a metaphor. He is simply thinking, with the sounds he makes on the piano to aid his thought. If he proceeds through the entire process of song writing without ever adverting to another self to whom he is directing what he is doing (however implicitly he may advert to it), then from the point of view of the pianist what is produced is not art. That is to say, actively considered it is not art; and hence the object (song) which results from this activity is not formally an art object. Only when the pianist recognizes the fact that his musical doodling (a fact to which he has been so far totally oblivious) is something intelligible to others and only when this fact appears to him as a desirable good does he convert the musical doodling, which till now has been only materially an art object, into an art object formally so called.

Let us suppose, however, that the pianist never gets past the stage of musical doodling. A person in the next room hears him at the piano. *Per accidens* what he hears becomes for him an artistic expression, although in itself the musical doodling is nothing of the sort. Nevertheless, what is an art object only passively considered is not an art object strictly and simply.

I have said that the art object is simply the material conditions of artistic communication. The word "communication" is to be understood in this context in its fullest and most formal sense; that is, both actively and passively. In itself a song is intelligible sound. A

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song does not become an art object until it is put forth *as an expression (to another)* of the inner state of the artist.

I would be happy if I could terminate this analysis of art here. But to say that the art object is a material medium of communication in no way distinguishes the art object from the most prosaic conversation on the price of eggs. What formally distinguishes the art object from other communication media is the kind of knowledge it communicates.

I have defined art as a kind of formal expression. Expression always involves a grasp of things in a knowledge relationship. Now, every knowledge relationship involves a subject (knower) and an object (thing known) of knowledge. Since man is not only a knower but a reflective knower, he is aware not only of things but of *himself* as being aware of things.

Hence, knowledge may be either subject-centered or object-centered. Knowledge is object-centered when it seeks to be strictly objective; that is, when it seeks to get at the nature of a thing as it is in itself and independently of the knower. Object-centered knowledge need not be merely knowledge of things outside the self. Indeed, I can treat myself as an object of knowledge by seeking to know myself in my objective nature and apart from any preconstructed self-concepts I may possess. This treatment of the self constitutes the burden of rational psychology. What makes rational psychology object-centered knowledge is that from first to last the rational psychologist regards himself impersonally, in the same way as he might regard a stone or a dead frog which he wished to subject to mathematical or biological analysis. The sole concern of object-centered knowledge is to achieve objective certitude, and it is most perfect in the sciences of philosophy and theology.

⁶*Creative Intuition*, pp. 9-34.

⁷This personalized knowledge turns up even in narrative poetry. The story of Achilles, for example, is not simply a tall tale like the legends of Pecos Bill. Achilles, like the words which tell of him, is himself an expression of something else. He is a symbolic expression of *humanity* in the concrete. The community of nature existing between Homer and Achilles grounds the possibility of an *artistic* narration. Because Achilles is not simply Achilles but a

concretization of tragic humanity, he is in some sense identical with the poet Homer himself. In grasping Achilles as tragic man the poet grasps himself as tragic man. What distinguishes narrative from lyric poetry is the fact that the narrative poet grasps himself as a concrete human universal indirectly—that is, by reflection on the experiences of another—whereas the lyric poet grasps himself directly, by reflection on his own inner experience.

Subject-centered knowledge, on the other hand, is essentially a personalized form of knowledge. Here Maritain's remarks in his opening chapters of *Creative Intuition* are extremely suggestive.⁶ In subject-centered knowledge, the knower's main concern is with himself as experiencing an object. The drive of subject-centered knowledge is toward the uncovering of my personalized reactions to the world about me, which has been imported into me through my knowing faculties. Subject-centered knowledge is capable of degrees, but it finds its most perfect expression in artistic knowledge. We shall discuss later to what extent this artistic knowledge is concerned with objective certitude.

In artistic knowledge, subject-centered knowledge becomes formally universalized. That is to say, in artistic knowledge a man is not only reflectively concerned with his reaction to things about him, but he recognizes his reaction as being a *typically human* one and hence communicable. He looks upon himself as a concretized universal, as undergoing an experience which is irreducibly and irrevocably his own, while at the same time being an experience of a sort common to the race of men. This realization is throughout a personalized one and inspires the artist with the desire to communicate his experience in its irreducibly personalized form.⁷

Thus to be an artist a man must not only have trained himself to think artistically; he must be able to communicate his artistic thought to others in its personalized form. Such a communication requires an apt medium as well as the mastery of that medium by the artist.

Command of the medium has a double aspect. It implies the mechanical skills necessary to mold the medium, like the ability to wield brush or hammer; and it also involves the ability to detect the possibilities of communication latent in any given medium and capable of serving the needs of personalized expression. El Greco is said to have remarked once of Michelangelo that, as a painter, the Italian was a good man but simply did not know how to paint. Indeed, most of Michelangelo's paintings remind one of the outlines of projected statues colored with pigment rather than genuine paintings. Magnificent as the frescoes of the Sistine Chapel are in what they express, one feels that on a technical level the artist has failed to exploit the full potentialities of his medium.

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The arts, then, possess a loose unity of noetic content. This content consists in the personalized and reflective grasp of oneself as a concretized human universal in one's experience of things as they are or as they are thought to be. Particular objects of art differ in the manner in which they particularize and specify this generic content of artistic knowledge. The different artistic genres on the other hand are diversified solely by reason of the material medium of expression. A painter expresses his insight in pigment; a musician, in plastic sound; a poet, in significant language. Yet poet, painter, and musician all express an insight which is generically the same in content.

Since, however, artistic thought is expressed in and through a medium, the medium will of necessity affect the thought expressed both in the content and in the mode of expression.

As to the mode of expression, the medium will determine to a large extent the clarity with which the artist can express himself. Certainly, conceptual language, the medium of poetry, is a clearer medium of expression than colored pigments, the medium of painting, or than plastic sound, the medium of music. If, however, the artist is a man of any sort of capability, there will always be present in his work a minimum core of artistic knowledge; and this knowledge will be a more particularized version of the generic content of artistic knowledge as we have described it.

As to the content of expression, the medium will limit the possibilities for particularizing the generic content of artistic knowledge. There are some experiences which can be expressed by music which cannot be expressed by poetry, painting, and so on. And the same is true of any one of the arts with reference to any of the others.

A few words concerning music as a medium of expression may serve as a clarification. One may listen to music in various ways; for instance, as a progression of sounds. The man engrossed in a book and only vaguely conscious of music being played in the background would exemplify this type of listener. Again, one may listen to music as suggestive of various past experiences and associations, like the man who hears a song which sets him dreaming about a childhood sweetheart. Again, one may listen to music as a formal structure and determine the number and order of the themes and the place of their insertion into the score as the piece progresses.

In none of these cases is the listener listening to music as a work of

art. This occurs only when one formally attends to the music as being *expressive* of the inner state of the artist. To hear music as sound, as suggestive of images, or as a formal structure is to hear it as divorced from the artist who wrote it. No work of art can be appreciated as art if it is so divorced from its maker, for to know a work of art as divorced from its maker is not to know it as the expression of subject-centered knowledge. Rather, it is to know the art object simply as an object; that is, to know it with object-centered knowledge as a thing of such-and-such a determined nature.

A few words are necessary here concerning the relationship of subject-centered and object-centered knowledge found in artistic expression as the personalized and reflective grasp of one's reaction to things as they are or as they are known. This last phrase, "as they are known," is an important one and deserves closer consideration.

Object-centered knowledge seeks to get at the nature of things as they are in themselves, as divorced from the knowing subject. While subject-centered knowledge concentrates upon the reactions of the knowing subject, subject-centered knowledge can never dispense with, or divorce itself from, the natures of things outside the mind. A subject always grasps himself as reacting to an object of a determined nature. Subject-centered knowledge is not interested primarily in the critical examination of the nature of things. In subject-centered knowledge the knower tends to accept uncritically his impressions of the nature of the world about him and then to concentrate upon his personalized reactions to things as they impress him.

As a result, the expression of subject-centered knowledge will display *two levels of truth*. The first level of truth consists in the accurate description of the personalized reaction of the subject to his conception of things. For example, a poet might express in a sonnet his grief that (as he is convinced) the soul of man must perish with the body. He will attain to the first level of truth if he accurately conveys the sentiment of grief he feels. For lack of a better term we will call this first level of truth subject-centered truth.

The second level of truth within subject-centered knowledge concerns the accurate expression of the natures of those things in themselves to which the subject is reacting in a personalized manner. At this level of truth we find the importation of object-centered knowledge (and

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hence of objective truth and falsity) into a subject-centered experience. This object-centered knowledge is no mere adjunct to subject-centered knowledge; it is an integral part of subject-centered knowledge and essential to the perfection of subject-centered knowledge. The poet mentioned in the preceding paragraph failed precisely at this second level of truth. Similarly, Walt Whitman spends a great deal of time in *Song of Myself* giving voice to his personalized realization of his pantheistic oneness with all things. We may presume that Mr. Whitman has told accurately the way he felt in this matter; but we may question (better, deny and censure) the objective truth of the world view upon which his subjective reaction is based.

We are at last in a position to draw some conclusions concerning the relation of art to morality and prudence. In the course of these conclusions, I shall refer to the habit of producing artifacts as *craft* and the habit of producing art objects as *art*.

Craft is a habit of the practical intellect which is correctly defined as *recta ratio factibilium*. It is an imperfect virtue inhering in the intellect, expressible in an organized body of rules and independent of the moral virtues. The nature of craft considered in itself lies outside the pale of morality.

Art is correctly described as an acquired ability to communicate artistic knowledge to another through the use of an apt material medium. Hence, at least two things are required in art: (1) the ability to think artistically—that is, the ability to think along the subject-centered lines which we have described; (2) the ability to communicate this knowledge to another via some apt material medium.

Because of the material medium of communication, art necessarily implies craft; but art is not simply craft. The art object is no more than the necessary condition of artistic communication. However, the activity of an artist as a craftsman is only materially artistic activity. As a craftsman the artist seeks in his activity the good of the art object considered in itself. But as an artist formally considered, he seeks

⁸*Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 109, a. 3, ad 1.

⁹Maritain defines the beautiful as an amalgam of the three transcendentals: one, good, and true. The simultaneous and formal grasp of "the radiance of all the transcendentals united" is a feat of mental gymnastic which I for one am

quite unable to perform. The beautiful, I believe, is more aptly defined as being insofar as it is capable of exciting the sort of subject-centered knowledge we have described above as artistic knowledge. Cf. Maritain, *Creative Intuition*, p. 162.

in his activity not the good of the object itself but the good of that other person or persons with whom he is trying to communicate. Similarly, a person needs some command of language in order to speak the truth, but when he tells the truth a person is not formally engaging in the craft of the grammarian. Just so, the artist as artist is not formally engaged in the craft of painting.

One may have acquired, for instance, the craft of making model ships. Art and craft are similar in this that the consistency which obtains between the artifact and its blueprint is similar to the consistency that obtains between the completed work of art and the visual-audile pattern in the imagination of the artist. The significant difference between the model ship and the art object is that the model ship simply copies; it does not express, whereas the sole function of the art object as such is to be an expression.

The ability to communicate knowledge of an artistic nature involves, therefore, habits both of the practical and of the speculative intellect. For insofar as art involves materially some craft, it is a virtue of the practical intellect; while insofar as it involves the habit of thinking artistically, it is a habit of the speculative intellect.

However, the communication of knowledge to another is also essentially a moral act. The very production of an object whose sole function is the communication of knowledge involves the setting up of a communication situation on the part of the artist. Hence, no artist can be in a state of indifference as to the truth content of the knowledge he expresses. Moreover, since man is by nature social, he is morally bound to perform those actions which are necessary for the preservation of human society. Now, human society is impossible unless men can believe one another. Hence, the man who freely sets out to express his mind on any subject is morally bound to express his mind truthfully.⁸

Thus, to reduce art to the amoral seeking of a transcendental beauty is to betray its essentially moral character.⁹ Indeed, if we regard the end of the artistic creation itself (*finis operis*), the creative action of the artist has no other end than the production of an object whose *sole purpose* as art object is to convey knowledge to some viewer. Because it is the attempt to communicate and not mere craft, art belongs properly to the moral order.

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At this point we might recall the two levels of truth to be found in any artistic expression. At the level of subject-centered truth, the artist is truthful if he communicates to the best of his ability that personalized reaction which he desires to communicate. At this level of truth successful communication is the only adequate criterion of the truth of the work; for at this level of truth the evidence is irreducibly personal to the artist.

At the level of object-centered truth, however, where an objective view of the world is imported into the art object as the cause of the artist's personalized reaction, the natures of things in themselves become the norm of the truthfulness of the art object; and at this level of truth any intellect capable of grasping the natures of things is qualified to judge the truthfulness of the art object.

At the level of subject-centered truth there is no real moral problem, since it is highly improbable that an artist would freely set out to deceive his audience concerning his reactions to the world as he sees it. The question of morality does become acute, however, at the level of object-centered truth. For no artist can set out to deceive the public concerning the nature of the world. Moreover, any art object propounding a false view of the world is *ipso facto* in itself censurable, even if the intentions of the artist are of the best.

However, a moral failure at either level of truth is *also an artistic failure*. Since art is essentially the ability to communicate a particular form of knowledge, any defect either in the matter or in the manner of communication is also an artistic failure. Hence, to the extent that the artist fails to communicate true knowledge, he fails precisely as an artist. Truth is a perfection of knowledge. To the extent that knowledge is not true it is not even knowledge. To fail to communicate true knowledge is to fail precisely in one's function as a communicator (artist).

Hence, the perfect artist is the one who communicates perfectly his personalized reactions to the world as it actually exists; and no art object can assert that to be true which is false or that to be good which is evil.

We may conclude from all of this that art is a part of the virtue of truthfulness. Truthfulness is the habit of speaking the truth.¹⁰ The

¹⁰*Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 109, a. 1.

¹¹*Ibid.*, a. 2, ad 3.

¹²*Criticism and Censorship*, p. 86.

virtue of truthfulness involves two things: (1) the representation of things as they are without distortion; (2) the communication of truth when it is fitting and in the manner in which it is fitting.¹¹ The artist as the perfect communicator of artistic knowledge will not only impart his vision truthfully; he will also speak when he is called upon to speak and be silent when his silence is required. With regard to the fitting communication of artistic knowledge, however, one should note that the personalized nature of artistic knowledge endows art with a greater freedom with regard to what precisely is fitting in time and manner of expression than one would find in other forms of expression of a more prosaic nature. (Take, for instance, ordinary conversation.) To be too strict in this regard would be to threaten (imprudently) the existence of art itself, since often a work of art must be struck off while the intuition is still at white heat. Often, too, the very personalized nature of the experience to be expressed will require the most unconventional idiosyncrasies in the manner of expression, if the experience is to be expressed at all.

Since artistic expression is limited to a particular kind of knowledge, it is not simply identical with the moral virtue of veracity; but it is a part of that moral virtue. From this fact important conclusions follow. (1) Truth alone does not qualify to constitute a particular expression as artistic. In addition to being true the art object must also express genuine artistic knowledge. (2) There is no real conflict between art and prudence. Prudence is directive of all the moral virtues, including the moral virtue of truthfulness. Nevertheless, the perfectly prudent artist is communicative with a prudence which of necessity takes into account the peculiar nature of artistic knowledge and the needs of artistic communication.

The conflict between art and prudence really arises only in the mind of one who attempts to reduce art to the level of mere craft. Indeed, Walter Kerr was very near the truth when he remarked, "The defender of art and the defender of prudence are actually interested in the same objectives, in slightly different proportions. Each really wants good art, though neither has as yet been careful to make explicit the idea of good art."¹² To judge a work of art as a piece of craftsmanship is not to judge it formally as a work of art. Good craftsmanship is necessary

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to good art; but good art is judged formally on the basis of the knowledge content of the work of art, although the content of any given work will be conditioned by the employment of the medium to express that knowledge content.

This identification of art with a part of the moral virtue of truthfulness in no way reduces art to the level of didacticism. Didacticism in art is the substitution within an art form of object-centered for subject-centered knowledge. Didacticism is simply sermonizing, and sermonizing always leaves the sermon-giver out of the picture. Artistic didacticism is merely sermonizing in an artistic medium. It is not art because it is not the expression of artistic knowledge. Hence, as long as artistic knowledge remains personalized knowledge, art as the expression of that knowledge remains free from the trammels of didacticism. Even so, there is still no reason in the world why personalized knowledge should not be true knowledge.

Nevertheless, the artist who is hired to produce a work of art which expresses at the level of object-centered knowledge something which the artist himself does not personally believe to be true is faced with a special problem. If such an artist is to produce a genuine and integral work of art, he must at the very least find something about the object he portrays which is true and which is apt to yield him a genuine artistic insight; and he must make this truth the thing which the art object expresses. If I may be allowed an extreme example, the atheist who attempts to build a church in honor of the Ascension might, for instance, portray the Ascension as being a symbol of a deep-seated human desire for happiness and ultimate success. This is a truth about the Ascension, although it is hardly the whole truth. The chances are that a congregation of believers would read a good deal more into the church than the church actually expresses. Nevertheless, in this way the artist could build his church while still preserving his artistic integrity.

If this whole analysis of the nature of art and its relation to the moral order be correct, then there are two negative judgments that can be leveled against a work of art, one by the artist alone and one by both the artist and his public. The artist alone must judge whether or not the art object correctly expresses his personalized reaction to the world as he conceives it; but both the artist and his public must judge whether or not the world (both physical and moral) as the

artist conceives it is the real world as it actually exists. Provided, however, the personalized nature of artistic knowledge and expression be always kept in mind and safeguarded, at this level of aesthetic judgment, as I hope I have shown, the norms of morality and of aesthetics are identical.

Chronicle

THE ASSOCIATION FOR REALISTIC PHILOSOPHY held its fall meeting on October 24 and 25 at Harvard University. Professor Herman Dooyeweerd (visiting professor at Harvard [Free University, Amsterdam]) gave a paper, "Can Reason be Autonomous?"; the commentator was Professor David Freeman (University of Rhode Island). Professor Geoffrey Clive (Clark University) read a paper, "Existentialist and Phenomenological Elements in the Thought of William James."

THE BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY CLUB OF NEW YORK has announced a lecture series to be held at the Hunter Playhouse. Among the lectures scheduled are "The Crisis in Higher Education," October 14, with George N. Shuster (president, Hunter College), William C. Fels (president, Bennington College), and Stringfellow Barr; Clarence Q. Berger (Brandeis University) will be chairman; and "The Impact of Science on Our Culture," December 16, with Norman Cousins, William L. Laurence, Leonard K. Nash (Harvard University); John P. Roche (Brandeis University) will be chairman.

VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY will inaugurate an annual lecture series in honor of St. Augustine to begin this spring. St. Augustine and the Augustinian tradition is the general theme for the series, which will feature eminent American and European scholars. It is planned to publish the lectures annually. The inaugural lecture will be given by the Reverend Paul Henry, S.J., of the Catholic Institute of Paris, currently visiting professor at Duke University.

CULTURAL RELATIVISM AND PRIMITIVE ETHICS

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I

Contact with nearly every preliterate as well as civilized culture in the world has unveiled to anthropologists the vast disparity in mores and general world picture of men around the globe. The Australian aborigine eking out his existence in the most primitive fashion thinks differently, has a different moral code, sanctions different practices and taboos than does the Euroamerican found on Fifth Avenue, New York, or assembling cars in a Detroit automobile factory. Man is man wherever you go, but somehow so many things depend on his environment and cultural milieu that his outlook is more varied than his morphological makeup.

This diversity has given birth to the now widely disseminated theory known as cultural relativity. Melville J. Herskovits, one of its most ardent propounders, gives us its definition in a neat sentence when he says, "This principle, briefly stated, is as follows: *Judgments are based on experience, and experience is interpreted by each individual in terms of his own enculturation.*"¹

Once he has posited this principle, Herskovits goes on to erect his structure of cultural relativism by stipulating that the morals and ethos of one age are replaced by a new set in another. The normal and the abnormal can be defined only with reference to the specific culture we are viewing. And the greatest enemy of both a proper appreciation and a truly objective judgment of cultures not our own is ethnocentrism.²

Another anthropologist pushes the principle to some of its logical conclusions.

In looking at a polygamous society and a monogamous society, we have no valid way to assert that the one is better than the other. Both systems provide for human needs; each has values discoverable only when we look at marriage from the point of view of the man who lives under the one system or the other. This is, necessarily then, also to be said in comparing cultures which practice torture, infanticide, in-group sorcery, and homosexuality with those that do not.³

Simultaneously, however, this rigid extreme of cultural relativism is a cause of concern to the cultural anthropologist. The question arose sharply when he asked himself if he was to tolerate the brutalities of Dachau and the terrors of Communist Russia. He could say that it is not wrong for the Eskimo to sanction infanticide and for the Dahomean to practice polygamy, but he could not bring himself to nod in approval at the inhuman butcheries of Nazi Germany. Perhaps there is some way of judging after all. Could it be that Euroamerican culture has some validity applicable to all mankind?

The drafting of the Bill of Human Rights, a task assigned to a board of anthropologists, helped to delineate this discrepancy in cold relief. If we merely let every clan, every culture, go its way in its present practices precisely because no one has a right to say that there is such a thing as permanency in values or to state what these might be, then we are at a stalemate and human rights have no significance.

The ethnologist, nevertheless, is a serious seeker after truth. And his present dilemma is as embarrassing to him as it is satisfying to his

¹*Man and His Works* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), p. 63.

²Herskovits also stresses the need of complete detachment, which follows, of course, from a purgation of ethnocentrism: "A basic necessity of ethnographic research is the exercise of scientific detachment, which in turn calls for a rigid exclusion of value-judgments" (*ibid.*, p. 80). And A. L. Kroeber is even more insistent on the need of eradicating ethnocentrism and all value judgments: "There is no room in anthropology for a shred of ethnocentricity, of homini-centricity; for prevaluations in favor of our civilization, our religion, our philosophy, our stand-

ards; nor room either for reservations of this product or that belief as being too noble or too fine to be studied by ordinary methods of natural science" (*Anthropology* [rev. ed. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1948], p. 841).

³Robert Redfield, *The Primitive World and Its Transformations* (Ithaca, Cornell Univ. Press [reissued as a World Seal Book, 1957]), p. 144.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 163.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 157.

⁶"Universal Categories of Culture," *Anthropology Today*, ed. Kroeber and others (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 521.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 520.

triumphant adversary. Robert Redfield feels that there is a maturity and growth in the universal value system.

The standards as to the good have changed with history. The moral canon tends to mature. The change is far from steady, and the future course of the ethical judgment is not, it seems to me, assured to us. But in this sense—that on the whole the human race has come to develop a more decent and humane measure of goodness—there has been a transformation of ethical judgment which makes us look at noncivilized peoples, not as equals, but as people on a different level of human experience.⁴

Redfield calls this an extension of the doctrine of cultural relativism and he states this in the following formula: The true and the good “are relative to a great historic cultural difference, that between uncivilized people and civilized people.”⁵ And so we are again faced with the problem of the one and the many.

The difficulty arises, of course, in deciding precisely what is relative and what permanent. For although Redfield has not employed the term “permanent,” he has implied it when he speaks of development and maturity. If all is relative, then how can we judge what is “more decent and humane”? Whether he realizes it or not, Redfield is doing far more than merely extending the theory of cultural relativism; he is transforming it.

Many anthropologists are now aware that the similarities in man far outweigh the variations. Clyde Kluckhohn has pointed out that man’s social life postulates a certain amount of reciprocal behavior, a standard system of communication, and mutually accepted morals.⁶ But with a cultural relativism as a *point de départ*, anthropologists find it difficult to establish what these invariants are. They somehow realize, nevertheless, that they underly this relativism. “In principle, however,” Kluckhohn unabashedly acclaims, “there is a generalized framework that underlies the more apparent and striking facts of cultural relativity.”⁷

Kroeber, in 1953, had also reached the conclusion that a rigid cultural relativism leaves many a *lacuna* in the ethical outlook. But he too is in a quandary as to the degree of variation and permanence which obtains in the value system. “It is a fundamentally scientific

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question which will not be answered soon and will not be answered in terms of zero or a hundred per cent.”⁸ The question demands reformulation and will take much time and painstaking effort.

II

The problem is before us. Where lies its solution? Has anthropology with its truly global experience of man solved a problem of which philosophy has for centuries not even been cognizant? The contemporary ethnologist has rejected the concept of “human nature” as one of his greatest and most long-standing hindrances to a really open view of man.⁹ It was only the obliteration of such a preconceived notion from his mind that purged the cultural anthropologist, which in turn rendered him tolerant and understanding of all cultures, no matter how primitive or how apparently aberrant. Philosophy, with its stress on natures, is obviously aprioristic and therefore wrong.

Yet the relativistic pragmatism of the anthropologist, as we have seen, causes him concern in certain realms and has stood in need of revision and recasting in a new light. Redfield states that there must be some universals of morality “because universal conditions of human living give rise to them.”¹⁰ Here we have arrived at a need, an exigency. And this need is seen as something so basic that it becomes universalized not merely in atomized cultures but in all parts of our inhabited planet.

David Bidney, a philosopher-anthropologist, seeks a way between the two horns by attempting to demonstrate that we are actually not faced with a dilemma.

*A. L. Kroeber, “Concluding Review,” *An Appraisal of Anthropology Today*, ed. Sol Tax and others (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 376.

⁹“It has been this use of cross-cultural materials, more than anything else, that has sounded the death-knell of theories about ‘human nature.’ ‘Human nature’ was that chameleon-like force in man that was variously held to cause him to seek profits, or to be a monogamist or to have polygamist tendencies, or to strive to better his standard of living or to do any of those things that seemed obviously basic to

students of Euroamerican society. . . . It can, indeed, be said that the philosophy of cultural relativism, that has come to dominate most anthropological thought and, indeed, social science in general, has its beginnings in the refutations of ‘human nature’ that mark the literature of cultural anthropology” (Herskovits, *Man and His Works*, pp. 617-18).

¹⁰*The Primitive World*, p. 142.

¹¹“The Concept of Value in Modern Anthropology,” *Anthropology Today*, p. 692.

¹²*Ibid.*

The issue as interpreted by the cultural relativists apparently turns on two alternatives: either one accepts a doctrine of fixed absolute values, or else one denies objective norms in favor of historic relativity and relative validity of values. I do not think, however, that we are necessarily limited to these two alternatives.¹¹

He then goes on to say that because there are growth and development in the field of their disciplines, natural scientists do not thereby deny the existence of an objective criterion of truth with regard to their matter. Growth and development do not imply substantial change; this mutation is on the accidental level. Therefore with regard to moral values the same thing holds good.

Similarly, in the sphere of moral truth values, it is not logical to reject objective moral norms simply because some alleged objective moral norms are seen to have a purely subjective validity within a given cultural context. . . . There is no reason why there may not be a cumulative increment in our knowledge and achievement of moral ideals comparable to our advance in the attainment of truth values in the natural sciences. Murder and theft are examples of negative moral values which are, even now, concrete ethnological universals, even though there is considerable disparity as regards the areas of their application in different cultures.¹²

Here we feel that Bidney is coming to grips with the problem, not running away from it. He has made a comparison, showing the absurdity of the extreme cultural relativistic position by pointing up a like position with reference to the natural sciences. No one will deny that these sciences have advanced so far in the past three or four hundred years as to make our forefathers look absolutely naive in some of their most basic tenets. Yet the natural scientists do not throw up their hands in despair and deny the objectivity of their several sciences. Change, growth, development, mean advance in the same materials, just as a person in his lifetime grows and develops from a tiny, non-reasoning creature to a rational, intellectual man. Basically, Bidney is facing the problem of the one and the many.

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If we view man from the evolutionary point of view—not now from the standpoint of physical but rather intellectual evolution—we realize that reflective consciousness of moral values must dawn on him after the trial and error of aeons of generations. *Homo paleojavanicus* and *homo neanderthalensis* could not be expected to know what modern man knows. The ethical dawn is necessarily long in coming; and even in our own day, as Redfield has pointed out, there are varying degrees of ethical consciousness throughout the world.

History must develop man's capacity for reason. But because this development takes so long, it cannot be hoped to be attained within the lifetime of the individual. Complete rationality, then, is reached by man only after hundreds of thousands of years. But, "mankind has the potentiality for developing rationality to its fullest extent, and rationality is therefore a universally valid idea."¹³

"Rationality" is the one ideal of the many millions of men who "have trod, have trod, have trod." And its dynamic force carries man to its development within him. Even though each individual man has not reached it and many more will not, it is nevertheless for man, for each individual man; and the day will dawn when all enjoy its fruits—fruits which have been fought for by so many millions through so many ages.

Rationality brings with it, of course, the ethical dawn, the growth and development of moral consciousness. For rationality bespeaks intellect, and intellect precedes will in pointing out its own object, which is *verum*. The will, following upon intellect, grasps the *verum* as *bonum*, something to be sought after. And as St. Thomas points out, "the good is the first thing that dawns on the apprehension of practical reason, which is ordained to action; for every agent acts for an end, which has the intelligibility of good."¹⁴

¹³*Ibid.*

¹⁴Sicut ens est quod cadit in apprehensione simpliciter, ita bonum est primum quod cadit in apprehensione practicae rationis, quae ordinatur ad opus; omne enim agens agit propter finem, qui habet rationem boni" (ST, I-II, q. 94, a. 2).

¹⁵"Et ideo primum principium in ratione practica est quod fundatur supra

rationem boni, quae est: Bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Hoc est ergo primum praeceptum legis, quod bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum. Et super hoc fundantur omnia alia praecepta legis naturae, ut scilicet omnia illa facienda vel vitanda pertineant ad praecepta legis naturae, quae ratio practica naturaliter apprehendit esse bona humana" (*ibid.*).

In this same article St. Thomas solves for us, basically, the problem of cultural relativity. And it is surprising how much latitude he allows with regard to the many value systems throughout the world. The title of the article is *Utrum Lex Naturalis Contineat Plura Praecepta vel Unum Tantum*. And the Angelic Doctor responds by stating that just as there are many primary indemonstrable principles, so there are many precepts of the natural law.

. . . the first principle in practical reason is that founded on the concept of good, which is that the good is what all things seek after. This is, therefore, the first precept of law, that good is to be done and sought after, and evil to be avoided. And upon this are based all the other precepts of the natural law; that is, all those things to be done or to be avoided, which practical reason naturally apprehends as human goods, pertain to the precepts of the law of nature.¹⁵

So far the disseminators of cultural relativism would be in whole-hearted agreement with us. The good is to be done and the evil avoided. But the *crux* of the problem arises when we ask—for *all* men—what is the good and what the evil? For some men infanticide is good, for others, polyandry, for still others both these are bad and something else is good. Thus we are brought back to our starting point and the original problem still exists. As a consequence, the only rational solution is cultural relativity.

St. Thomas, however, does not stop here. Admittedly, he has so far left himself open, for he has been very general; but he must lay these foundation stones to demonstrate that *de facto* all men are seeking what is good and avoiding what is bad. Obviously, if we are to proceed farther, we must start with a norm of morality, which according to St. Thomas is *recta ratio*. Men always seek to justify their actions, seeking *reasons* for what they do; they will often *rationalize* to the point of justifying the most heinous crimes. If, then, we rectify our reason, that on which we base our moral judgments will be in accord with nature and consequently will be good and proper.

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Accordingly, Aquinas continues by pointing out that *bonum* has an aura of an end about it and *malum* the opposite. Therefore reason grasps as good whatever man inclines toward by nature, and vice versa for evil.¹⁶ If reason is not distorted but *recta*, in accordance with its very nature, then what it gets as end (and consequently as good) is that towards which natural appetite tends. This harmony between nature and reason will secure for man the proper *bona* and the proper *mala*. And since all men have the same nature (they are all rational animals, or as anthropologists like to say, they are all culture builders, which reflects their rationality), if they follow this nature, their normative judgments should be substantially in universal agreement with each other.

There is, however, still a large tract of no-man's-land wherein differences abound; but these differences will not be substantial, only accidental. Furthermore, as we have already pointed out, we must leave room in this no-man's-land for rational development, growth in moral consciousness.

St. Thomas continues:

Therefore according to the order of natural inclinations there is an order of the precepts of the natural law. For first of all there is in man an inclination to good according to nature in which he communicates with all substances; namely, that every substance seeks after the conservation of its *esse* according to its nature. And in accordance with this inclination those things pertain to the natural law through which man's life is preserved and the contrary is hindered.¹⁷

¹⁶"Quia vero bonum habet rationem finis, malum autem rationem contrarii, inde est quod omnia illa ad quae homo habet naturalem inclinationem, ratio naturaliter apprehendit ut bona, et per consequens ut opere prosequenda, et contraria eorum ut mala et vitanda" (*ibid.*).

¹⁷Secundum igitur ordinem inclinationum naturalium est ordo praeceptorum legis naturae. Inest enim primo inclinatio homini ad bonum secundum naturam in qua communicat cum omnibus substantiis, prout scilicet quaelibet

substantia appetit conservationem sui esse secundum suam naturam. Et secundum hanc inclinationem pertinent ad legem naturalem ea per quae vita hominis conservatur, et contrarium impeditur" (*ibid.*).

¹⁸"Secundo inest homini inclinatio ad aliqua magis specialia, secundum naturam in qua communicat cum ceteris animalibus. Et secundum hoc dicuntur ea esse de lege naturali quae natura omnia animalia docuit, ut est commixtio maris et feminae, et educatio liberorum, et similia" (*ibid.*).

The first precept has been laid down. All things—no matter what their nature—have a radical desire to preserve their existence. Once created, once joined with a substantial form, they violently resist decomposition and corruption of their *esse*. In the case of living things, this desire to preserve existence is manifested in the desire to preserve life. Man's first concern is his *esse*; and since he knows that his life means his *esse*, he is by nature constantly on the alert against all forces opposing his life.

The second primary principle of the natural law is equally universal to man.

Secondly, there is in man an inclination to something more special, according to that nature in which he communicates with the rest of animals. And in accordance with this, those things are said to be of the natural law which nature has taught all animals, as is the sexual intercourse between male and female, and the education of children, and so forth.¹⁸

The conservation of the species is naturally and intuitively known and desired by all man. This is so basic that no reasoning, no education or even civilization, is needed to point it out. The most primitive of all men in history did not have anyone to inform them that their species had to be preserved by sexual union; yet they obviously had the desire and the knowledge, or their species would have become extinct.

Education of children is the second basic *notum* which St. Thomas enumerates under this class of first principles. And, of course, this education must be *humano modo*. It does not mean formal schooling, as is obvious; but it does imply a bringing up, an orientation in accordance with each culture's patterns, value system, religious beliefs, juridical law, customs, and world view. In short, it implies complete enculturation. This, too, is immediately given in every man's experience. There is a natural tendency to make real men out of the offspring. And for each tribe, whether civilized or not, real men, real human beings, are themselves.

Interesting to note at this juncture is the fact that education is considered by ethnologists as one of the universals of culture. Here,

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then, we have an identity between this pattern and that of the value system.

Finally, we arrive at that precept which is *homini proprium*. It pertains solely to intellect, to reason.

Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to the good according to the nature of reason, which is proper to him; namely, man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God and to live in society. And in accordance with this, those things belong to the natural law which pertain to an inclination of this kind, such as that man avoids ignorance, does not offend others with whom he must transact business, and other like things which pertain to this.¹⁹

There are really two principles contained in this last one. Man avoids ignorance, and he lives in peace with his fellow man. These are specifically human; they are nonexistent among the animals, for only man can know and thus learn to live at peace with others.

All men, from the preliterate Eskimo and Australian to the most highly educated Euroamerican, are industrious avoiders of ignorance. They wish to know everything, if possible, about their own culture and many things of other cultures besides. This curiosity begins in early childhood and carries through till death. We shun ignorance; it is a plague. And the desire for knowledge, as St. Thomas tells us, does not cease with human things. Even the earliest men, as is evidenced by the elaborate burial rites Neanderthal man performed for his dead, strove to pierce through the here and now of the contingent world to eternity and the absolute.

The avoidance of ignorance, as listed under this third precept of the natural law, should not be confused with the education of children, which was found under the second precept. The latter, strictly

¹⁹"Tertio modo inest homini inclinatio ad bonum secundum naturam rationis, quae est sibi propria; sicut homo habet naturalem inclinationem ad hoc quod veritatem cognoscat de Deo, et ad hoc quod in societate vivat. Et secundum hoc, ad legem naturalem pertinent ea quae ad huiusmodi inclinationem spectant, utpote quod homo ignorantiam vitet, quod alios non offendant cum quibus debet conversari, et cetera huiusmodi quae ad hoc spectant" (*ibid.*).

²⁰Clifford G. Kossel, S.J., in a paper entitled "Some Problems of Truth in Ethics" (unpublished) has brought out the all-inclusiveness of these three basic moral principles of practical reason: "There is no moral precept which is not a determination of one of these essential goods; they contain in principle the totality of the human good."

speaking, is bringing up and is, therefore, common to men and animals alike; the former is that aspect which so amazes anthropologists about man that they use it as the specific difference between him and his simian cousins. Unlike the ape or any other animal, man builds upon the past; he learns and discovers *new things*; he is a culture builder and an *animal symbolicum*.

To live in society is not only natural to man but an exigency. Man abhors solitude; further, he is dependent on his parents till about his eighteenth year. Finally, speech itself, whose very *raison d'être* is communication, seems to point up, as Aristotle says, the need of a social life. In order to live in society, man had to learn to live peaceably with his neighbor, first with the members of his own sib and then, as societies expanded, with other tribes and clans until whole states were eventually formed.

What makes all these first precepts pertain to the natural law is the fact that they are all seen as the good to be followed and to be done. And, as we saw St. Thomas point out earlier in this article, this is the very first general principle of practical reason. After the will tends towards these precepts, the intellect, in its turn, then sees them as man's good, consequently that they are a law, a law of nature itself—for him.²⁰

IV

The cultural relativists will interpose at this juncture by stating that they are still in general agreement with us, but that we have not said a word about homosexuality, polygyny, theft, infanticide, murder, or suicide. And then there are a host of smaller values which are as varied as the cultures that sanction them. What of all these?

Again, however, St. Thomas proceeds further. In the final three articles of this same question he asks first whether the natural law is one among all men; second, whether it can be changed; and finally whether its imprint can be eradicated from the heart of man.

In the first (the fourth article) he says that since practical reason deals with contingencies and the operations of men, the more we get down to particularities, the wider the divergence in beliefs and practices.

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In matters of action, however, there is not the same truth or practical rectitude among all men with reference to the more particular, but only with reference to the common things; and among those for whom there is the same rectitude in particulars, it is not equally known to all. Thus, therefore, it is clear that concerning the common principles of reason whether speculative or practical, there is the same truth or rectitude among all men, and it is equally known. . . . But concerning the particular conclusions of practical reason there is neither the same truth nor rectitude among all; and even among those for whom it is the same it is not equally known.²¹

Here we see Aquinas's latitude—a latitude which embraces all value systems the world over. Those common principles which he enumerated in the second article are the same among all men both as regards their rectitude and their knowledge. As he will point out in the sixth article, man cannot erase them from his heart, no matter how obfuscated his mind becomes by vice and perverted moral habits. The rectitude, therefore, is always and everywhere the same. Likewise all men know these precepts intuitively. But as we descend to particulars, problems begin to arise. Concerning those precepts "which are, as it were, conclusions of the common principles, [the natural law] is the same among all in most cases both according to rectitude and according to knowledge . . ." ²² But, St. Thomas adds, in some cases these secondary precepts can vary as regards rectitude, on account of certain impediments, and as regards knowledge, on account of passion, bad mores, or evil habits of nature.

²¹"In operativis autem non est eadem veritas vel rectitudo practica apud omnes quantum ad propria, sed solum quantum ad communia; et apud illos apud quos est eadem rectitudo in propriis, non est aequaliter omnibus nota. Sic igitur patet quod quantum ad communia principia rationis sive speculativae sive practicae, est eadem veritas seu rectitudo apud omnes, et aequaliter nota. . . . Sed quantum ad proprias conclusiones rationis practicae, nec est eadem veritas seu rectitudo apud omnes; nec etiam apud quos est eadem, est aequaliter nota" (ST, I-II, q. 94, a. 4).

²²"Sed quantum ad quaedam propria, quae sunt quasi conclusiones principiorum communium, est eadem apud omnes ut in pluribus et secundum rectitudinem et secundum notitiam . . ." (*ibid.*).

²³Latrocinia nullam habent infamiam quae extra fines cuiusque civitatis fiunt, alque ea iuventutis exercendae ac desidia minuentiae causa fieri praedicant" (vi, 23).

²⁴ST, I-II, q. 94, a. 4.

²⁵*Ibid.*, q. 100, aa. 1, 3, and 11.

²⁶*Ibid.*, a. 11.

Really, then, cultural relativism contains more than just a modicum of validity. Aquinas's explanation allows such a wide margin of difference as to be truly amazing. Basically, it arises out of his keen knowledge of human nature and his consequent lack of all ethnocentrism. For his principles, set down centuries before many of the tribes anthropology is studying today were even known, are as applicable to today's scientific and advanced world as they were in his own society. In the fifth article of this question he even says that the natural law can be changed through addition, which is precisely what Bidney is stating today. Things can be added *ad humanam vitam utilia* as man becomes morally conscious in history.

An example of ignorance of the more particular aspects of these precepts is the sanction on theft of the ancient Germans, which Caesar recounts in his *De Bello Gallico*.²³ The reason for this ignorance, Aquinas says,²⁴ is that the Germans had bad customs and moral habits. Or again, certain primitive tribes may see the common precept to live in peace with their fellow men as something which applies to their own clan exclusively. They may be waging a chronic war with their neighbors across the river or over the hills and will kill these latter at every opportunity. But the dawn of moral consciousness is just beginning in them; they are still immature children as regards ethical judgment. The fact that they live at peace among themselves is already a demonstration of this precept's validity, and the time will come when their peaceful relations will expand to embrace the traditional enemy across the river too.

Later in the *Prima Secundae*²⁵ St. Thomas goes into detail about the secondary and tertiary precepts, which, he says, are offshoots of the primary principles. The *communissima* (or primary precepts) need no promulgation or explication, since they are immediately clear to all; the secondary, or *magis determinata*, which are the precepts of the Decalogue, do require to be pointed out, "because in a few cases human judgment happens to be perverted concerning these."²⁶ Finally, there are those precepts which are manifest to the wise alone; and these are the more refined laws revealed to Moses and Aaron, which we find in Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy.

The natural law, then, in its first principles is one and immutable among all men both as regards rectitude and cognition.²⁷ But in particular conclusions there is a latitude among some in both rectitude and cognition. These *particularia* are arrived at after a certain amount of consideration, reasoning, ethical maturity. We now know that any practices in certain cultures which are against the *communissima* or primary precepts of the natural law are definitely a perversion of nature; all men should know them. This perversion, however, is had in varying degrees. Also, the knowledge may not be entirely universalized among some very primitive peoples.

What must be borne constantly in mind is the fact of man's growth in moral consciousness. Ethnologists are beginning to recognize this fact as well as the existence of certain ethical universals. If there is such a thing as development, perfecting of the human species in the moral sphere, then we need not fear, as Herskovits does, to treat some peoples as ethically lower than others. By this we do not mean to condone everything our own Euroamerican code sanctions. We take as our *point de départ* what St. Thomas lays down as primary

²⁷"Since it [the natural law] is a part of his [man's] nature, it comes from the Author of his nature, namely from God. It is not the result of a process of reasoning; rather it is an initiative awareness of moral obligation. It is something written upon the tablet of his conscience by his Creator. Because it is a principle of human nature, it governs all men at all places and at all times and is essentially immutable. It applies to man both in his private and his social conduct. In respect of his social conduct, its first principle is, *seek the common good*, or, the same thing analytically expressed, *do good to others, harm no one and render to each his own*" (Harold R. McKinnon, "The Higher Law: Prevailing Teaching Denies Moral Law" [unpublished address delivered before the Conference of Federal Judges of the Ninth Circuit, San Francisco, Sept. 3, 1946, p. 5]).

²⁸Paul Radin, *Primitive Man as Philosopher* (New York: D. Appleton & Co.,

1927), p. 96. Take special note of the last sentence.

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 65.

³⁰Wilhelm Koppers, *Primitive Man and His World Picture*, trans. Edith Raybould (London: Sheed & Ward, 1952), p. 55. (Italics added.) Koppers claims that this is the common opinion among specialists on this question. Herskovits, on the contrary (*Man and His Works*, p. 116), says that we do not know, nor have we any means of finding out, whether early man lived promiscuously or not.

³¹It is the spirits who, long ago, established the social and moral regulations which govern Yap life, who originally forbade incest, and who take action against it when it occurs. The spirits are therefore seen as the source of morality and the locus of ultimate authority" (David M. Schneider, "Political Organization, Supernatural Sanction and Punishment for Incest on Yap," *American Anthropologist*, LIX [1957], 797).

in the natural law, and we erect our ethical edifice upon that. These precepts, together with *recta ratio*, our norm of morality, are the immutable fundament according to which we can judge all cases around the globe.

VI

Despite the allowances made for precivilized tribes, however, ethnologists inform us that the most primitive peoples have a very high code of morals.

The ethics of primitives shows us a very high code—one that inculcates man's right to happiness and freedom of expression, a limitation on this freedom because of human relationships, and the individual's full responsibility for his actions. And though this code is not always lived up to, the primitive is aware of this as something wrong.²⁸

Among the moral beliefs of the Winnebago Indians, this same author informs us, are the uselessness of killing and the fitness of marrying only one person at a time.²⁹ And another ethnologist goes so far as to state that "primitive promiscuity or group marriage must be rejected and a normal *monogamous* family life substituted for the earliest stage of man's history."³⁰ This is supported by the mythology of the primitives, who claim that they received their laws on sex taboos from their high god. The natives on the island of Yap believe that they received their moral code from the spirits, who are regarded as the source of morality.³¹

These facts, if not actually pointing to a divine institution of the moral code, at least indicate its sacrosanct and sublime character in the minds of the most primitive peoples. They recognize morality as their most precious possession and therefore guard it with this intangible aura of sacredness.

Among pre-Stone Age primitives—the Bushmen, Pygmies, Australians, and Eskimos—morality for the most part is surprisingly high. And it is thought by some that it is only contact with civilizations which are higher technologically that has broken down this high state

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in some places.³² Often, there exists premarital chastity, freedom of choice of a marriage partner, fidelity in *monogamous* marriage, equality of sexes, marital chastity, and great love and care of children.³³

These are far more than the most basic precepts of the natural law. Monogamous marriage was not even the rule in the Mosaic code. Since all men are endowed with an intellect and reasoning power, they can arrive at the more particular principles of the natural law after moral development and mature reflection. Their will, a *rational* appetite, seeks after the good which intellect has laid bare to it.

VII

Cultural relativism in its extreme form, then, is untenable. For, as many cultural anthropologists are beginning to admit today, there do exist certain ethical universals. St. Thomas tells us what they are and how far they apply. He leaves us a large tract of no-man's-land where rectitude and knowledge are not sufficient to point out to certain peoples what is right and what wrong. In the same breath he is leaving the field open for the development of moral consciousness.

Is homosexuality wrong? Is infanticide wrong? Are the practice of torture and in-group sorcery wrong? Some cultures sanction these practices. If we say they are wrong, are we ethnocentric? Are we classifying them as inferior? Should we take steps to correct them?

What does right reason tell us in the light of the primary precepts of the natural law? Does homosexuality conserve the species? Does infanticide? The answer to these is definitely no. They are perversions of nature, and it is only because they are not seen as part of the imperative to preserve the species that their practice continues; or else their evil is known and recognized, and they bring with them unhappiness and frustration.

What about torture and sorcery? It is immediately evident that these involve further refinements of the *principia communissima*. If there is a lack of cognition here, it is not blameworthy. But in each of these groups of practices we recognize a distortion of the natural

³²Anthony Zimmerman, S.V.D., "Sexual Morality among Primitives," *Christian Family*, LII (Nov., 1957), 6-9, 31-32.

³³*Ibid.*, p. 31.

law—if not in its primary, at least in its secondary and tertiary precepts. And since we are further developed, we are not being ethnocentric if we admit the moral inferiority of those who practice them, any more than an Einstein would be if he pointed out to a Toda of India how to use a milking machine for his buffaloes, or to a Ponapean of Micronesia how to put commercial fertilizer on his yams.

And so we see the one and the many and how they can exist side by side. There is great latitude (multitude) within an immutability (one). All men of all times know in the immediacy of human experience an unchangeable, irreducible natural law. But men are as varied as the places they inhabit. As they develop, however, and as their reasons become more rectified and their knowledge grows, the *particularia* of the natural law dawn on their consciences, and the many approach ever near to the one.

"Being" in *The Sophist*

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I. DR. ESLICK'S THESIS

Dr. Leonard J. Eslick has expounded, in two articles,¹ a profound theory of Plato's later metaphysics. Though this theory draws on Cornford's reading of the *Parmenides* and on statements in the other late dialogues, its crucial test is *The Sophist*; and both articles center attention on the meaning of "being" and "other" in this dialogue. Though the arguments are telescoped in such brief articles, they are complete on this central issue and can be summarized as follows.

Being is, for Plato, a univocal term. To escape the Parmenidean difficulties inherent in this stand, he postulates a dialectic between being and nonbeing. Thus nonbeing *is*. Plato escapes the obvious difficulties of this position by contending that the root of the real is Unity, the One, not existence as a separate principle. To be is to be *this*. Essence not only determines, but is the source of, all truth and reality. Inseity, identity, and unity are the notes of the most Real. For the Forms to exist in time, however, is to become combined with predicates, to have unity mixed, diffused, and diminished by otherness, which makes a thing less real.

Dr. Eslick, therefore, opposes "otherness" to being, and finds here his "existent nonbeing." "The other *exists*, for Plato, and this is precisely the existence of non-being."² But it is obvious, in his discussion and in Plato's, that what this otherness dilutes is not *being* as it is used in *The Sophist* but unity. After demonstrating that Plato's supreme principle is *unity* and not being, Dr. Eslick seems nevertheless to work on the Thomistic assumption that whatever opposes the supreme principle of reality must also be the opposite of being. He does not see the audacity of Plato's conception in this work—which places being among the forces that oppose reality, its turmoil and dynamism warring with the stable simplicity of the Forms.

Thus Plato must be, in Dr. Eslick's theory, a skeptic who, in believing that predication means combination with the subject's "other" (and so with *nonbeing*)—thus destroying Form, whose essential note is unity—must believe that we disguise and deny a thing's true essence by trying to know it in the predicate.

The ultimate subject of Platonic predication is non-being, rather than substance or *ousia*.³

In discourse, we only know the masks worn by non-being. It is other than any masks which it wears, and in itself it is not like the mask at all, and not more like any mask than another. . . . I believe that the sophist Plato thought he had caught was discourse itself, which, if Plato's theory is correct, is the great dissembler.⁴

II. AN ALTERNATE THESIS

To understand *The Sophist*, we must first grasp its teaching that "other" is not opposed to being but to the One and thus to unity, the root of reality (of the noble and the good) but not of existence. If we may put it so, it is comparatively unimportant to Plato whether a thing *exists* in time and space and in combination with other forms. What matters more is that existence must draw its sustenance from pure sources, the same springs from which we draw our knowledge and statements draw their meaning. These are the Forms. As he puts it in the *Timaeus*,

we must conceive of three things—the becoming actual, that wherein it becomes actual, and *the source wherefrom* the becoming thing is copied and produced. Moreover, the recipient should be likened to the Mother, the source to the Father, and what is engendered between these to the Offspring.⁵

Being is, as Plato says in *The Sophist*, the sum of things. But he is interested in the source of things—of their selfhood and intelligibility, their oneness and identity. He did not, therefore, think in the metaphysical framework of Aquinas, testing diverse real things before him, basing his method on perceptual contact with existent things. He tested reality,

¹"The Dyadic Character of Being in Plato," *THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN*, xxxi (Nov., 1953), 11-18. "Plato's Dialectic of Non-Being," *New Scholasticism*, xxix (Jan., 1955), 33-49.

²"Dyadic Character of Being in Plato," p. 17.

³*Ibid.* The logical positivists reach Dr. Eslick's conclusions about Plato by a different path, as R. C. Cross demonstrates in "Logos and Forms in Plato" (*Mind*, lxxiii [Oct., 1954]). Here predication is seen as a shuffling of different masks over the unknown because the Form is merely *the account given of a word in the predicate*. As in Dr. Eslick's thesis, the real Simplicity

which Plato sought is unattainable. Predication is complication and therefore self-defeating as a knowledge-process. The very form of our typical means of knowing shows that we cannot look on Beauty bare. It is an exercise in logic, combining and contrasting (by knowing the "other") meaningless counters.

⁴"Plato's Dialectic of Non-Being," p. 49.

⁵*Timaeus* 50C-D.

⁶*Sophist* 248-249A.

⁷*Ibid.*, 249B.

⁸*Ibid.*, 249C.

⁹*Ibid.*, 250C.

rather, by its essential purity, its ability to be named and treated as intelligible. This dialogue, for instance, begins with the problem of error in *discourse* and is an attempt to save the logical structure of predication. Thus aim and method differ from the existentialist approach that Dr. Eslick takes; the aim is to discover the roots of oneness and truth, and the method is logical. He sought not "first act" but final rest in the stability and permanency of the Real.

This is not, of course, to say that Plato was a naive idealist unaware of the problems involved in the concept of separate and stable Forms. In fact, his late dialogues all treat the conflict between his early theory of the Forms and the actual mixture and combination of Forms which is discourse and the world. Thus, in this dialogue, he refutes the "friends of the Forms" by saying that action and passion are no less a part of knowledge than of generation and that if knowledge is of the Forms, then they must act on the mind and be acted upon by it. There must be change even in the pure world of the intellect⁶—but it is a change made possible not by virtue of the Forms themselves, which are by nature stable.⁷ This is to say that though the Forms are in themselves the sources of all reality, intelligibility, and excellence, they are not of themselves active or dynamic. Change, action, and passion *exist*, though their nature is repugnant to that of the Forms.

Then it is apparent that the philosopher, who is especially compelled to credit these things [reason and intelligibility], must reject the view of those who claim that the universe—whether it is One or composed of Many Forms—is entirely stable; yet neither can he heed those who say that being is nothing but ceaseless change.⁸

Plato has disclaimed, then, not only Heraclitus but—finally and clearly—Parmenides. Nor has he been forced to surrender the Forms. He has merely said that *of themselves* they do not have actual existence. To exist they must undergo a kind of degradation. Existence is, then, a less noble and real thing than essence and Form. It is neither rest nor motion, but a "third thing";⁹ and the ability of Forms, by virtue of this third and lowlier thing, to combine with each other brings about their entrance into the world of existent things.

I contend that whatever has the power either to change other things, whatever their nature, or to be affected in any way by another, however base that other agent, and though this be the only time it

suffers change—that thing, I say, exists. For I set up as a true definition (τιθεμαι γὰρ ὅρον ὀρίζειν) that being is nothing but a certain power.¹⁰

Now, being is not, and cannot be, a Form, since it is the power to *change*, and the essential note of the Forms—as Dr. Eslick demonstrates beyond doubt—is stability. This shows how far Plato is from considering “being” an unmixed excellence. He has repudiated the metaphysics of *The Republic*, in which he claimed that material things had no true existence but were the fantasies of blinded men. To renounce that view, he inserted in the passage just quoted the phrase “however base that other agent” (φαυλοτάτου). Now he admits that material things—though they remain base in his consideration—must be said to exist. Faced with the same problem which Thomists answer with the doctrine of the analogy of being, Plato felt no necessity for keeping existence among the nobler things in his hierarchy of values. He continued to use it as a univocal term; but he could do so only by calling it a protean and extra-Formal reality—a “power” or function of the Forms in their combined state and that by which and in which they are able to combine.

If we are to understand what kind of nature this “third thing” has for Plato, we must follow him further in his logical method. The proof that Forms are made to exist by their combination in the actual world of time and space is a step forward in his analysis of predication, which he now defines as the combination of words in speech. Dialectic is the art of combining things in discourse to correspond exactly with the combination of Forms in fact. A brief investigation of these “combinings” leads Plato to say that if he has discovered three things necessary to them—rest,

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 247E.

¹¹Dr. Eslick is not, therefore, justified in his departure from Fowler’s translation (which he quotes unchanged in most places) of 255E. He alters “classes” to “Forms” as a rendering of the protean γένος, though it obviously refers to these five γένη collectively.

¹²Dr. Eslick denies this of “being,” saying that “if there are no absolute self-existents, no being which has being unto itself, then being must be altogether abolished” (“Dyadic Character of Being in Plato,” p. 17). Here again a foreign emphasis on being as the *most real* Reality has been imported into the context of this dialogue. Recast to fit that context, his statement should read: the preservation of discourse demands

that there be absolutely self-meaningful terms, which have one meaning unto themselves, lest meaning be abolished in discourse. But if there are self-meaningful terms at the source of our knowing process, there must be self-enclosed Forms at the source of Reality. As the dialogue makes clear, *existence* is another (and less important) matter—not a Form; univocal, as Dr. Eslick points out, yet applied also to material things and so not possessed “unto itself” by any Form; a “power,” or δύναμις, in the definition which Dr. Eslick quotes in both articles.

¹³“Dyadic Character of Being in Plato,” p. 17.

¹⁴255C-E.

motion, and being—he must also be granted a fourth and a fifth. For in every combination there is an *assimilation* of things with different *identities*. Thus sameness and difference (“the other”) must join the three categories already mentioned.

These five categories or classes (γέννη) are, therefore, the five things Plato thinks necessary to preserve the possibility of discourse—that is, of the combination of Forms. *Therefore* they exist, since the fact of discourse is as fundamental to him as the perception of outside realities is to the Thomist.

What, precisely, *are* the five things listed? First, since they are the elements which make the combination and changing of Forms possible—explaining what cannot be explained solely in terms of the Forms, as Socrates protested in the *Parmenides*—they are not themselves Forms.¹¹ Furthermore, they are all five present in every existent thing, every combination of Forms. And, since they are not Forms themselves, no one of them has a separate and unmixed reality. The five things are functions of the Forms in their combined state—omnipresent but always *in alio*.¹² Dr. Eslick makes much of this fact as applied to “other,” as if it were a distinction all its own among the five.

There is some evidence that the question of whether it is strictly proper to refer to the other as a Form at all was hotly debated in the Academy in Plato’s lifetime. For the Forms, as true beings, must have the dyadic character of existing both in themselves and in relation, whereas the other is distinct from all beings precisely in the fact that it is quite literally nothing in itself. It has no essence of its own.¹³

But none of the five are fully *true* (that is, stable) beings. Truth, along with the intelligibilities of which it is constructed, can be permanent as meaning only in the Forms, not in these media of change. These media, including “being” itself, exist only in relation—that is, *within* the Form-combinations—and have no pure essences of their own. They are, like “prime matter” to the Thomist, *principles* of reality, not themselves real things. Thus there is no reason to contrast “other” with “being” in this respect.

The five “classes” of this dialogue are not Forms. Two pairs of them are relative and functions of each other: motion and rest, other and same. They are defined by Plato so as to differentiate them from the “fundaments” of each relation, Eternity and the One.¹⁴ The fifth thing in the list is

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linked with them in their omnipresent and impure kind of reality, being. We are not used to thinking of "being" in such company and on such a level. Yet that is where and what it is in this work. These five types of "thing"—Plato can get no more specific than that—are necessary to constitute the charged atmosphere in which Forms combine and act and *are*. Despite their mysterious quality, Plato is compelled to accept them because of the unimpeachable demands of discourse. Realizing this, A. L. Peck calls these γένη 'pseudo-Forms' in his articles on the *Parmenides*.¹⁵ And in his treatment of *The Sophist*¹⁶ he maintains that just as nonbeing, so called, is merely not-*this*, so all the other γένη are mere functions of higher realities.

There is thus no true γένος 'θάτερον', but only "parts" or "pieces" of θάτερον—θάτερον than X, Y, Z. . . . The three γένη which "permeate" all the other, viz., ταῦτόν, θάτερον (τὸ μὴ ὄν), and τὸ ὄν, are defective in structure, and must be completed into ταῦτόν πρὸς ἑαυτό, θάτερον πρὸς τι (τὸ μὴ ὄν X), and τὸ ὄν X.¹⁷

But Peck supposes that, in order to argue from the sophists' own terms, Plato uses the γένη as poor and partial phrases describing the Forms from one aspect and in incomplete statement. The whole dialogue, however, shows that these dynamisms must exist in all Forms and be no single Form. The γένη are not concessions to one viewpoint but necessary parts of his later theory of the Forms. From this it can be seen that "the other" is not the reverse and negation of "being" in this dialogue. Rather,

¹⁵See the *Classical Quarterly*, Vol. XLVII, No. 3; Vol. XLVIII, No. 1.

¹⁶"Plato and the Μέγιστα Ἔννη of the *Sophist*," *Classical Quarterly*, Vol. XLVI, No. 1.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 53.

¹⁸*Sophist* 257B. For the same thing restated, see *ibid.*, 257C; 258A, B, and E; 259B. These definitions of the term "nonbeing" explain the ambiguous section which Eslick quotes ("Plato's Dialectic of Non-Being," p. 48) from a later paragraph in this unambiguous treatment of the term. The passage, quoted in Fowler's translation from the Loeb, is from 259A-B: "The other, since it participates in being, is by reason of this participation, yet is not that which it participates, but other, and since it is other than being, must inevitably be non-being." This is what Dr. Eslick

calls the existent nonbeing that enters into conflict with being to create the dialectic of existence. But since all four of these classes are called *this* kind of nonbeing, even "the same" must—by the same logic—be in conflict with being as its opposite. So must all the Forms, since they are, none of them, the same thing as this γένος, "being." Plato is here giving an example of the fallacy he has exposed at the beginning of the paragraph from which this quotation is taken: "Therefore let no one say that we claim 'non-being' is the opposite of being, nor that we dare to say a 'non-being' exists." The negative represents something *else*, not something *opposed* to being.

¹⁹*Sophist* 257D-258B.

²⁰"Dyadic Character of Being in Plato," p. 14.

being always accompanies and acts with otherness in the network of five interwoven "things" which link and degrade the pure Forms in their active and changing state. In this sense, being is an *imperfection*.

III. TESTING THE THESES AGAINST THE TEXT

A. Dr. Eslick nowhere in his two articles quotes that passage from *The Sophist* which is related most directly to the existence of "the other." In 256C-257B Plato explains the only sense in which the term "nonbeing" can be used with meaning. He says that (in one sense) all of the four classes considered—omitting, of course, the fifth "thing," being itself—are "nonbeing" since they are not essentially and primarily that fifth thing. Yet they all *participate* in being. Therefore

when we say that a "nonbeing" exists, it is clear that we do not mean this is opposed to being (ἐναντίον τι . . . τοῦ ὄντος), but merely other than existence itself (ἕτερον μόνον).¹⁸

The other *is*, but indefinitely. It can be any other existent thing than the one it is opposed to but no nonexistent thing. Other than *a* is *b-to-z*.¹⁹ "Other" is not nonbeing but non-*this*-being or non-*that*-being; and falsehood is explained by this kind of "other" as well as the seeming validity of the loose term "nonbeing." Thus Plato solves the dialogue's original problem of error. An erroneous statement does not state something that *is not*; it enunciates a predicate which *is not the subject's*. *Is* is here merely a copulative, not an absolute verb. (We can say the same of the meaning of *is* in Plato's whole system as expounded in this dialogue. *Is* is not, to him, an absolute, an assertion that can stand alone. It is a mere copulative; existence joins, prods, and disturbs the Forms with action.)

B. Dr. Eslick takes the definition of being as δύνανμις to mean that "no being is wholly self-enclosed and separated in complete isolation from others" and that, therefore, there are no stable and separate elements which can be joined in discourse to give certain knowledge.²⁰ But he is again allowing "being" to stand equally for "existent" and "reality," two different things in Plato's thought. A Form is self-enclosed and stable and one in *meaning*, in pure intelligibility; its relations in *existence* are a different matter, explained on an altogether different level than that of essence and truth—the level of the five extra-Formal (and infra-Formal) categories.

C. If "the other" were nonbeing, then being would be "the same," and there would be no need for five categories but only for four. Actually,

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Plato says explicitly that "being" is different from all the other four (including "the same") yet can be joined with them all (including "the other").²¹

D. By making "being" a Form, Dr. Eslick defeats the purpose Plato means it to serve in this dialogue. The reason he analyzes the five "things"—and being among them—is to set them up as the media of combination between the Forms, showing how the stable Realities can become the source of fluid existence. He would not have attempted a solution to this problem by introducing an equally rigid and real Form to serve as the agent of change and combination. "Being" has something of the same *vehicular* position in his system that "prime matter" has in the Thomist.

E. Because Plato's relative "nonbeing"—that is, indeterminate "other-being"—is *absolute* nonbeing to Dr. Eslick, it immediately destroys all reality and truth whenever it is mixed with Forms or with words which stand for pure formal essence.

The other when intermingled with the one produces many images of the one. Now, part of these imitations of the one is non-being itself . . . There are, therefore, for Plato no intrinsic differences between things in the essential order . . .²²

And the essential order is the most important thing in Plato's philosophy! No wonder Dr. Eslick dares, after this statement, to claim that Plato became a complete skeptic. After all, how can anything else result when the ability to predicate depends directly on a perception of "otherness"—that is, of nonexistence itself!

But not only does "other" not mean this; the whole argument of the dialogue depends on the solid *fact* that man knows in the predicate. This dictates Plato's entire approach to metaphysics, which is that of a logician and an essentialist. His reason for accepting the five genera of combination is that these are necessary to preserve the unquestioned and undoubted fact of discourse and knowledge. This is the prime, irreducible, irrefutable *datum* of all his philosophy, the fact that *man knows*. It marks the difference between his philosophical system and that of Aquinas, whose existentialist starting point is the fact that *things are*. Both philosophies bear, in all their ramifications, the mark of their different starting points. Despite the value of his articles, and the metaphysical depth of his analyses (at times, perhaps, *because* he moves on a more profound level than most critics of the later dialogues) Dr. Eslick seems

²¹*Sophist* 258E-259B.

²²"Dyadic Character of Being in Plato," p. 17.

to have confused these starting points. Only so could he make "being," "other," and "discourse," as used in this dialogue, bear the definitions which he gives them.

Plato on Being: A Reply to Mr. Wills

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The issues between Mr. Wills and myself are not too clear. I think this is principally because Mr. Wills has given a version of my position which is not only fragmentary and truncated, but which also misrepresents it on some important points. As a preliminary, therefore, to what I hope might be a more fruitful dialogue between us in the future, let me try to clarify certain areas of misunderstanding.

First, I am not attributing to Plato a sort of "dialectic between being and nonbeing," in the sense in which Mr. Wills seems to be understanding it. According to him, my position hinges upon finding in Plato a radical *opposition* between being and nonbeing. This I have never maintained, and no conclusions I have drawn depend in any way upon such a premise. Nonbeing, as the *relative*, is not of itself opposed to being, although it is distinguished from it, as the text in *Sophistes* 255 C-E makes clear. Plato is maintaining that the exclusive ground of differentiation is relationship rather than essential unity. There is, indeed, an opposition in Plato between the One and "nonbeing," as the Other or Indeterminate Dyad. The latter is defined precisely by its radical privation of unity. As Aristotle many times points out, Plato is one of the philosophers who find their first principles in *contraries*. But the *relative* is not opposed to being as its contrary. Indeed, there is no being which does not exist in relationship, although this is not of the *essence* of any being.

Secondly, Mr. Wills seems to suppose that, in my understanding of Plato, there is a need to make the Forms "exist in time" and that this is accomplished by an entry into the realm of predication. I have never supposed that Plato believed that Forms existed *in time* or that such a mode of existence, which would be *becoming* rather than true being, is even possible for them. That which exists *only* in relationship and consequently lacks the mode of *indivisible* being, sameness, and difference mentioned in the *Timaeus*, exists in time indeed. The second hypothesis of the *Parmenides* is dealing with such a mode of existence. It cannot possibly be that of the Forms. On this hypothesis, everything is predicable

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of everything, and nothing possesses either the self-sameness or true otherness which are the joint foundations both for a universe of being and a universe of discourse. The Forms, on this hypothesis, would utterly lack *ousia*. Sensibles, however, do have this degraded mode of existence, involved in time and flux. In talking of them Plato tells us in *Timaeus* 49E that we should not even refer to them "as 'this' or 'that' or by any phrase that exhibits them as having permanent being." Unlike the Forms, sensibles cannot be objects of scientific knowledge but only of opinion. They are precisely the sensible "copies" of the *Timaeus*, moving across the face of the Receptacle.

Even a scientific knowledge which makes no claim to moving on the plane of essence but is *perinoetic*, to use Maritain's term, concerned only with quantitative relationships, and in this way achieving a precise measurement of the *differences* of things—even this scientific knowledge cannot have such sensibles as its object.

The kind of being or existence which is found in this sensible flux is certainly only that of a degraded image of true reality. The existence of sensible things is only qualitative, to use the language of the *Timaeus*, not substantial. They exist at all only by existing in *another*, the Receptacle. But to suppose, as Mr. Wills seems to be doing, that this is the exclusive meaning of being for Plato is wholly unwarranted and is, indeed, a remarkable error. The *divisible* being, sameness, and otherness of the sensible flux is precisely *image* being and is radicated finally in the non-being of the Receptacle. Unless there existed indivisible being, sameness, and otherness *on the level of the Forms*, even such fleeting images would have nothing to image.

I do not think Mr. Wills has understood, however, the problem of scientific knowledge for Plato on the level of the Forms themselves. Mr. Wills is devoted, it seems, like the "Friends of the Forms" in the *Sophistes*, to the earlier Platonic version of the Forms as simple, immobile unities, enjoying a splendid isolation not only from sensibles but from each other. I have tried to show, in the two articles he is concerned with, that being even on the plane of archetypal reality demands for Plato composition and dynamic inter-relatedness for Forms to exist and to be intelligible. The primary problem of the *Sophistes* is certainly that of the second part of the *Parmenides*—the intercommunion or interparticipation among the Forms themselves. There is here no question of their presence in sensibles or of a purely *logical* composition and division of them to be effected by categories not themselves belonging to the domain of the really real. Indeed, the first part of the *Parmenides* shows that participation understood as any kind of "physical" presence or inherence of Forms in sensibles is impossible; and the radical *chorismos* of the Forms from the

sensible realm is vindicated. The ultimate intelligibility of sensibles is borrowed or reflected from a higher realm and is not intrinsic to them. But for this higher realm of Forms to have real intelligibility they must have within themselves a power of acting and being acted upon, of standing in an ordered context of relationships which will alone truly differentiate them from each other. This dynamism of Forms has nothing to do with an ingression into the stream of sensible flux and temporal existence. It is rather the indispensable *metaphysical* foundation for Plato's later dialectic of Collection and Division.

Mr. Wills, our new "Friend of the Forms," seeks to preserve their simple unity and purity unsullied by any dynamism. And, indeed, there is a sense in which the Forms remain, in Plato's later thought, simple in *essence*. For their essence is Unity itself, the "Form" of all Forms. It is, of course, as Aristotle and St. Thomas point out, not the One which for them is convertible with Being but rather the utterly simple and indivisible unity which is the principle of number in the genus of quantity. (This is why the Forms become *numbers*.) But while such a principle of essence functions to measure, determine, and establish *orderly* relationships in a manifold, its radical simplicity and univocity prevents it from being the ground either of the existence of a manifold or of *relationships* in it. Such entities exist as an inter-related (and hence differentiated) many not in virtue of their essence, therefore, but by virtue of a principle in them which is *other* than their essential unity. They are differentiated and scientifically knowable because of their position in an ordered series.

I think Plato in his last period became profoundly convinced that a multitude of simples could neither exist nor be known, and that in such hypothetical "entities" there could be no foundation for any ordering relationships. This is surely the lesson of the first hypothesis of the *Parmenides* and of the third hypothesis of the *Theaetetus*. It also, unfortunately, entails the consequences which seem so distasteful to Mr. Wills and other "Friends of the Forms." It means the abandonment of the dream of the dialectic of essence which is proposed as the ideal in the central books of the *Republic*. The dialectic of Collection and Division of the later dialogues is a very different kind of knowledge indeed. But for Plato it is nevertheless real knowledge about the real relations of the Forms. It seems to me that on the basis of Mr. Wills's interpretation neither the dialectic of essence nor the "second best" type of the later dialogues can be saved.

In order to see how Mr. Wills's interpretation of Plato entails such a double skepticism, let us examine the consequences of his theory of the

five genera of the *Sophistes*. Being, Same, Other, Motion, and Rest are not Forms, according to Wills, but merely *logical* connectives or categories not themselves on the level of the really real. Their function seems analogous to that of the Kantian forms of sensibility and categories of understanding. The Kantian categories constitute objects of knowledge by organizing the inchoate rabble of the manifold of sense, imposing upon them the alien order and relationship of mind. It is an order which is not ontologically grounded in the data themselves, and the resultant "knowledge" never attains a metaphysical plane. It makes little difference whether such purely logical connectives organize a manifold of sense or of Forms. In neither case is there any genuine knowledge either of things in themselves, in their essential reality, or of the *real* relationships of ultimate realities. Mr. Wills, in his effort to maintain the purity of the Forms uncontaminated in their own realm by either existence or relationship, has very effectively removed them from the possibility of any knowledge whatsoever. I do not believe such an interpretation of Plato is tenable.

Mr. Wills seems implicitly to agree with me that the Forms are not intelligibly bonded in virtue of their essence. But unless there is a foundation in the Forms themselves for such bonding, a foundation which is really distinct from their essence, they can neither exist nor be known. To reduce the combinatory "genera" to merely logical bonds, with no ontological status, is to leave us not only unable to look upon Beauty bare but incapable of anything save logical exercises "combining and contrasting meaningless counters".

The Odyssey of an Augustinian Text

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In commenting on Psalm 145 St. Augustine asks, "Who is it who says *lauda, anima mea, Dominum?*" It is not the body, which is inferior to the soul; it cannot counsel its superior. By that part which is called *mens rationalis* the soul counsels itself when it

notices that certain of its inferior parts are disturbed by worldly motions, and by the pull of earthly desires goes out towards exterior things, and leaves its interior God. Then, it recalls itself *ab exterioribus ad interiora, ab inferioribus ad superiora* and says *lauda, anima mea, Dominum*.¹

The rational soul stands in a middle position. All earthly goods and man's body itself are inferior to the soul. The soul is superior to the body, and God to all created things. The soul has received a law to adhere to the superior and rule the inferior.

Gilson has called the formula "from the exterior to the interior, from the inferior to the superior" in the above text "famous."² But, it seems, it was not famous enough. An erroneous tradition, use, or translation of this formula has led some philosophers to claim it in support of their doctrine, or of their interpretation of Augustine's doctrine, on the method of obtaining knowledge of the transcendent. These present notes will attempt to show that this claim is not justified.

In facing the problem of transcendence in the early part of his career, Maurice Blondel was convinced that with the fragmentary data of perception and scientific reflection as unique materials there would be no means to reconstruct beings and remake the concrete in our minds. But each aspect, which we disengage from things with the aid, and to the profit, of our personal experience, opens up new perspectives to our knowledge and action. We come to think the real and to realize thought more, if we go

ab exterioribus ad interiora, ab interioribus ad superiora. But, if the intermediary of these three terms which St. Augustine points out is suppressed, the bridge would be broken and only incommunicable entities would be present. From objective knowledge to the reality of subjects there is no direct passage by the theoretical way and abstract

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dialectic. One can attain and define transcendence only by the way of immanence, exteriority by interiority.³

Blondel did not list the source of the Latin formula in the works of Augustine, nor, as is evident, did he quote him accurately. Either he did not actually read our text but borrowed it from another in its mistaken form, or he read the text but mistook the letter "f" for a "t" in the word *inferioribus*. But the latter does not seem likely. The whole passage of Augustine's commentary makes it clear that there is no "intermediary term." It is true that Augustine said that "the rational soul has a middle position" between God and all that is inferior to it. But there is no exact identity between the *interiora* and the *inferiora*. Some of the *inferiora* (St. Augustine mentions earthly things as gold, silver, animals, trees, and the sun, moon, and stars) are also the *exteriora*; some (man's body and the inferior parts of the soul) are not interior, strictly speaking. Further, the term "superior" is not limited to God because the soul is superior to the body. This, it seems, is why St. Augustine used the neuter gender for all these terms. But the main point is that we are not dealing here with a single movement of three distinct terms but with two successive movements involving four terms. The soul first enters into itself (*revocat*) and then, finding God there, praises Him who is superior to all created things.

In all probability Father Pierre Scheuer, S.J., who was much indebted to the thought of Blondel, read the work just discussed. In treating the problem of the proper mode that the affirmation of God takes in human intelligence, Scheuer wrote:

St. Augustine has a happy formula which sums up our doctrine—*ab exterioribus ad interiora, per interiora ad superiora*. This formula expresses the three degrees of being which are given indivisibly. The human self is first of all exterior to itself. As the 'I-object' it is the body with its relations; the self is identified with the material element. The second moment: it enters into itself and knows itself as such, as a self. Third moment: in knowing itself, it seizes at once the necessary identity of the real and the intelligible, because it is itself a parallel affirmation and transcends itself.⁴

¹*Enarratio in Psalmum 145:5* (Migne PL, XXXVII, 1887).

²Etienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York, Random House), p. 594.

³M. Blondel, "Le point de départ de la recherche philosophique," *Annales de philosophie chrétienne*, Series 4, II (1906), 237.

⁴"Deux textes inédits," *Nouvelle revue théologique*, LXXIX (1957), 825.

⁵*Enarratio in Psalmum 145:5*

⁶*Introduction à l'étude de St. Augustin* (2nd ed. Paris: J. Vrin, 1943), p. 24.

⁷*History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, p. 77.

Apart from the minor point that Scheuer has introduced a new preposition (*per*) into the formula, we must hold that his thesis finds no support from it. The body of man is certainly not one of the *exteriora*; it is one of the *inferiora*. Most important of all, St. Augustine is not concerned here with any proof for the existence of God but with the praise of Him by the soul, which "already adheres to the Lord and aspires to Him . . . the interior God."⁵

The same observation may be made about Gilson's use of the formula as a summary of Augustine's method for proving the existence of God: [his thought] *va de l'extérieur à l'intérieur et de l'intérieur au supérieur*.⁶ As a good historian, Gilson is not ignorant of the original text which is cited in a footnote. However, he justifies a three-term translation because he interprets the term *inferioribus* as "what is inferior in the interior." In one sense of the word this is legitimate. St. Augustine does speak about the "inferior parts of the soul." But if this were its only meaning, the word should have been put in the feminine gender. In fact, as we have already seen, most of the *inferiora* are also the *exteriora*. Even if in a later work Gilson literally translates the formula,⁷ he is still not justified in taking it out of its original context and linking it up with any proof of the existence of God.

Eleventh Annual Meeting of the Missouri State Philosophical Association

J U L E S B R A D Y, S.J., *Rockhurst College*

The Missouri State Philosophical Association met for the eleventh time at Stephens College in Columbia on Friday and Saturday, October 17 and 18.

The program followed the traditional association pattern: three independent papers on Friday afternoon, the presidential address after the association dinner on Friday evening, and a symposium, consisting of three papers about the same subject, on Saturday morning.

The first paper on Friday was a development of John Locke's subject-object relationship by S. Morris Eames (Washington University). In a relational theory of meaning, symbol meaning must be tested by sign signification. The connection between symbol meaning and sign signification is existential involvement or feeling.

The second paper, by Reverend William S. Rossner, S.J., (Rockhurst College), presented a metaphysics of love based on a recent article of Maritain's "The Sin of the Angels." Prior to an act of free choice by which the rational creature loves God there are four moments in the will. The first is the ontological love of nature for God. The elicited love of nature for the good, identical with the intra-elicited ontological love of nature for God, is the second. These moments can never be lost. The last two, elicited love of nature for God and the inclination to love of free option for God, can be lost by the rational creature that sins. If the rational creature loves God by an act of free choice it loves God immediately and it has the four moments mentioned above.

The third paper was a clear analysis of evil, being, and consciousness in the philosophies of Leibniz, Plotinus, and Aquinas by Edward B. Costello (Missouri University). In the *De Malo*, Aquinas compares evil in the will to evil in the work of the carpenter. When a carpenter does not look at the rule, no evil is involved. There is evil, a privation of due good, when the carpenter cuts without looking at the rule. When the will does not move the intellect to look at the rule of human actions, right reason, no evil occurs. But moral evil, a privation of due good, results when the will acts freely without moving the intellect to look at the rule.

At the association dinner, John A. Gates (Westminster College), the retiring president, proposed that paradox and myth have a meaning. The paper provoked a spirited discussion of the criterion of truth for a myth. Before one can ask about the criterion of truth for a myth, one must define what a myth is.

The title of the symposium on Saturday morning was "Representation, Form, and Expression in the Arts." Papers were read by Lewis E. Hahn (Washington University), James G. Rice (Stephens College), and Arthur Berndston (Missouri University).

Leonard Eslick (Saint Louis University) is the president for 1959; and James A. Reagan (Saint Louis University) will retain his position as secretary-treasurer. The next meeting will be held at Rockhurst College, Kansas City, Missouri. A vote of thanks was extended to Stephens College for its cordial hospitality.

Analyse critique de la notion de validité. By Paul Frankard. Louvain: Nauwelaerts; Paris: Beatrice Nauwelaerts, 1958. Pp. 138. Paper, fr. b. 120.

This study of psychological tests aims at clarifying the notion of "validity." The author concludes that "validity" depends essentially on the process of validation. This is viewed as a special case of the more general principle that the validity of a scientific theory rests on the quantitative data obtained, and the validity of a test on the value of the theory it confirms. The author therefore urges a more rigorous analysis of the results of tests in relation to their use and the criteria employed.

Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine, a Fourteenth Century Augustinian. By H. A. Oberman. Utrecht: Kemink & Zoon N.V., 1958. Pp. [xi] + 246. Paper, fl. 10.

This study of Bradwardine is, as the author intends, entirely theological; preceding studies of the Oxford doctor have been primarily philosophical and to that extent defective—and by this view Dr. Oberman seems to imply that Bradwardine's philosophy is not adequately harmonized with his theology in certain points.

The study begins with a general historical background and particular brief surveys of the thought of Aureolus, Durandus, Occam, Holcot, and Woodham. In these chapters the author makes good use of the best of recent scholarship (and, in general, also throughout the rest of the book). Chapters III and IV deal with the (primarily philosophical) ideas of the sovereignty of God and the freedom of the will. Here the author shows that Bradwardine insists on both of these ideas—on the first against the Pelagians, on the second against the Averroistic determinists. It also becomes clear that Bradwardine's solutions are governed by theological considerations and lack a suitable philosophical coherence. The next three chapters are more theological still, dealing with predestination, prescience, sin, grace, and justification. Particularly in the last point Bradwardine's thought appears philosophically weak. The final chapter considers Bradwardine's influence, and the author finally concludes that he was not really a forerunner of the Reformation.

In spite of careful scholarship, there are many points where the author's interpretation seems defective, especially in points of Catholic theology; the author's command of the English language is not always adequate, and the proofreading has been quite ineffective. These deficiencies obviously lessen the value of the work, but it should be repeated that the book contains much sound scholarship and presents a balanced picture of its subject.

***Aristotle on Art and Nature.* By M. J. Charlesworth. Auckland: Auckland Univ. College, 1957. Pp. 40. Paper.**

This is a brief textual and philosophical study of Aristotle's theory of art. Admitting that Aristotle does not have a complete theory expressed in any one place, the author contends that enough can be found to remove the alleged contradictions and to provide an intelligible framework for the *Poetics*. He investigates the meaning of "art" in Aristotle, the kind of causality found in "making" something, and the imitation of nature by art, and then considers the Aristotelian theory of the fine arts. The study is an excellent one, well grounded in textual analysis, and should do much to remove some of the still current misunderstandings of the Aristotelian theory of art.

***Aufgaben der Philosophie.* By Emerich Coreth, S.J., Otto Muck, S.J., and Johann Schasching, S.J. Ed. Emerich Coreth, S.J. Innsbruck: Felizian Rauch, 1958. Pp. 210. Paper, \$3.30.**

The first essay, by Father Coreth, is entitled "Metaphysics as Problem." After a brief historical consideration, he maintains that contemporary thinkers demand a scientific metaphysics which can only arise through a transcendental investigation. This can be accomplished through the method of transcendental reduction (upon which a later deduction can be based). This involves finding in the experience of actual being the conditions of being itself: the first principles, the scope of being, the perfection of being in the perfection of the self, and interpersonal relations.

The second essay, by Otto Muck, S.J., deals with methodology and metaphysics. Father Muck considers that the special sciences are distinct from metaphysics but that metaphysics must have a unifying function. In a metaphysical theory of method, metaphysics is to establish the inter-relationships of the special sciences, and that theory is to be the best which is the most realistic.

The third essay, by Father Schasching, deals with the relationships be-

tween sociology and philosophy. He recalls the origin of sociology in a breaking away from philosophy and follows its history to a point where the question of interrelations can again arise. In discussing this relation, he relies for his examples on Georges Gurvitch, Sorokin, Leopold von Wiese, Helmut Schoeck. On the philosophical side, he presents the analysis of Johannes Messner. He concludes that most of the work remains to be done.

***Connaissance et amour. Essai sur la philosophie de Gabriel Marcel.* By Jean-Pierre Bagot. Paris: Beauchesne, 1958. Pp. 248. Paper, fr. 1,450.**

This study of Marcel's thought is the only extensive one that views it chronologically. In a brief historical introduction, Kant, Jacobi, and Hegel are seen to provide a background from which the work of Marcel emerges. This work has three phases. In the first period, Marcel accepts the idealistic and rationalistic conception of knowledge, and contrasts it completely with faith and love. But such an opposition makes thought sterile and love unintelligible. Checked in his attempt to rediscover man and God through the way of noncognitive love, Marcel next turned to a phenomenology of experience, in which sensation, one's own body, and the existence of, and relationships to, other persons imply an intentionality of knowledge as well as a realism of love and consequently a realistic metaphysics. In the third stage, Marcel elaborated his views on reflection, being and mystery, freedom, faith, and love. In these analyses, reason begins to receive an authentic place and function; and the mutual interplay of knowledge and love is recognized and used to surpass both rationalism and voluntarism. The author, however, points out that the exigencies of logical analysis have not yet been fully satisfied in Marcel's work and that it must therefore be viewed as in some very important ways unachieved.

***Der dialektische Materialismus und das Problem der Entstehung des Lebens. Zur Theorie von A. I. Oparin.* By Gustav A. Wetter, S.J. Munich: Anton Pustet, 1958. Pp. 71. Paper, DM 4.40.**

Oparin's theory of the origin of life is arousing widespread interest. Though he bases himself on the unquestioned validity of dialectical materialism, he brings to the discussion a good knowledge of biochemistry and shows an adeptness in explaining how the conditions of life can be progressively made possible. His critique of mechanism is excellent—so

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good, in fact, that the author can turn Oparin's remarks against him. Oparin's criticism of vitalism is also for the most part good, except that he blandly assumes that if one is not a materialist he is necessarily an idealist and holds that the vital principle is spiritual.

The present work is a good summary of Oparin's theory, developed from official German translations checked against the original Russian work. The criticism is brief but often quite pointed. On the other hand, the failure to distinguish an Aristotelian "entelechy" carefully from all vitalistic theories sometimes interferes with this criticism. So also does the total rejection of chance.

It would be a good thing if the present work were translated into English and made available to the same readers who now have the opportunity to read Oparin in translation.

***Diccionario de Filosofía.* By Walter Brugger, S.J. Trans. José María Vélez Cantarell. 2d. ed. Barcelona: Editorial Herder, 1958. Pp. 626. \$7.00; paper, \$6.20.**

The first Spanish translation of Father Brugger's dictionary was published in 1953; since then the fifth and sixth editions of the German original have added a number of new articles, expanded the historical section, and brought the bibliographies up to date. This second Spanish edition incorporates all the new matter of the latest German edition. The translation seems to be very good.

***Les échelles de mesure en psychologie de la sensation.* By A.-M. Perreault, O.P. Rome: Angelicum, 1957. Pp. 84.**

This is a reprint of an article published in *Angelicum*, 1957. It deals principally with psychological facts and techniques; in a few paragraphs the author shows that such measurement is not in conflict with the principles of St. Thomas.

***Die Erkenntnistheorie des dialektischen Materialismus.* By Josef de Vries, S.J. Munich: Anton Pustet, 1958. Pp. 188.**

This is a careful and detailed study by an author already well known for his contributions to epistemology. The book is divided into two parts. In the first part, the general theory of knowledge of Marxism is presented from the writings of Marxist authors. The presentation begins with the Marxist interpretation of realism as materialism. Next, sense experience is

considered as a reflection of reality. The criterion of truth as "praxis" is fully explored. The nature of thought is considered in itself and in relation to language; the axioms or principles receive special consideration. Relative and absolute truth are studied, and it is seen that Marxism denies relativism. Finally, the notion of ideology is explored and compared with the absolute validity claimed for dialectical materialism. In the second part the author takes up his criticisms. After pointing out that there are few chances for any common ground, he finds that Marxists accept formal logic. Hence, he examines their theory of knowledge in the light of formal logic, centering his analysis around the following points: the identification of realism and materialism, the criterion of "praxis," the ground of the axioms, and the contradictions contained in the notion of ideology. Next he takes up the ontological foundations offered by the Marxists, considering the notion of experience and thought; then he takes up the soul, mind, and God. This is a very thorough study, one of the few attempts to consider Marxist epistemology on purely philosophical grounds.

***La Filosofía de Ortega y Gasset.* By Santiago Ramírez, O.P. Barcelona: Editorial Herder, 1958. Pp. 474. \$5.30; paper, \$4.50.**

This is an exposition and criticism. In the first section of the first part (pp. 17-154), Ortega's philosophy is presented by way of direct quotation and organized around the themes of the reform of the bases of philosophy and of the various parts of philosophy. In the second section (pp. 155-81), the author repeats in summary form and in less rhetorical fashion the ideas presented in the first section. The second part is an evaluation of this philosophy. The first section considers Ortega's philosophy philosophically, again organized around much the same themes (pp. 185-368). The second section criticizes this philosophy from the viewpoint of Christian faith and theology.

According to the author, the main ideas of Ortega are the notion of being as human existence, the notion of man as not having a nature but as a being-in-progress through life, the notion of the ego as the individual "project" of man in his world, the notion that man's good lies in society. This philosophy is described as "culture-vitalism" and as "race-vitalism." It entails a denial of objective science, of logic, and of metaphysics as traditionally understood, as well as of natural theology, ethics, and Christian faith.

The presentation is accurate; the author pays tribute to the real skill

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of Ortega in writing and to his penetration in laying bare modern problems. The criticism is detailed and many readers will feel that it is not quite sympathetic; it will be admitted, however, that Ortega is not misrepresented.

***Friendship in Saint Augustine.* By Marie Aquinas McNamara, O.P. Fribourg: University Press, 1958. Pp. xix + 231. Paper, fr. s. 16.60; DM 16.**

This is a study of the friendships which St. Augustine had, with only a brief summary of what he had to say—mostly in passing—about the nature of friendship. According to the author, St. Augustine's attitude went through four stages: (1) a confusion of friendship with pleasant association, (2) the classical ideal of friendship, (3) the transformation of the classical ideal into a Christian conception, (4) Christian friendship as a form of charity. The study is detailed and carefully worked out; it constitutes a real contribution to our knowledge of St. Augustine as a man.

***Die geistige Einwirkung des Materialismus und die Wissenschaft des Ostens.* By Joseph Meurers. Munich: Anton Pustet, 1957. Pp. 46. Paper, DM 2.20.**

The author begins by showing that the belief in the truth and inevitable success of dialectical materialism is a real force and traces it to a reliance on the totalitarian collectivity as a protection against insecurity. He next argues that as materialism Marxism favors natural science, especially physics, but as dialectical it advocates a method suited only for social and psychological sciences. The result, he maintains, is that physical research is fostered but is mixed with *ad hoc* hypotheses and claims that distort the very meaning of science as a whole and prevent even the scientific achievements from working for man's good.

***Histoire de la philosophie moderne.* By Roger Verneaux. Paris: Beauchesne, 1958. Pp. 204. Paper.**

This work is intended as an elementary textbook on its subject. It covers Descartes, Pascal, Spinoza, Malebranche, Leibniz, Wolf, British empiricism, Kant, and German idealism. Bibliographies indicate the best French edition, suggest one or the other basic writing, and mention one or two secondary sources which can be used with the least possible background. The presentation aims at clearness, simplicity, and fundamental accuracy. Conceived as a volume in a "Course of Thomistic Philosophy," Verneaux

takes a critical stand toward his subject from the viewpoint of Thomistic realism.

Hyle. *La Materia en el Corpus Aristotelicum.* By Luis Cencillo, S.J. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, 1958. Pp. xix + 197. Paper, 60 ptas.

This study of *hyle* accepts the chronological views of Jaeger and tentatively refuses to exclude the multiple authorship theory of Zuercher. These views make the author prepared to see quite different meanings of *hyle* and even perhaps irreconcilable views. The author begins by insisting that the problem of the subject of first philosophy cannot be decided completely from the extant writings attributed to Aristotle and that even the problem of substance remains obscure. Next he investigates the pre-Aristotelian doctrines of matter. After this he examines what the texts have to say about *hyle* and finds three functions: that of physical source, of logical negation, and ontological potential principle. In terms of these functions he examines the various attributes of matter. The author next turns to a linguistic investigation. Matter is discovered as foundation for substantial change or (analogously) for change of place; matter is discovered by abstraction from qualities and from individuality; matter may be proximate or ultimate. In this last phase the author questions the accuracy of the interpretation by the Scholastics that form is always united directly to prime matter.

In an appendix the author discusses the chronology of the Aristotelian works as given by various scholars and concludes with his chronology of the *Metaphysics*. There are also a classified bibliography and indices of passages, authors cited, and subjects.

The study is detailed and provocative. There is one questionable procedure, that of naming one type of Aristotelian analysis "logical." It would be more accurate to speak of a "predicational analysis" and to recognize that for Aristotle a predicational analysis had a metaphysical (ontological) bearing.

Kleinere Schriften. Vol. III, *Von Neukantianismus zur Ontologie.* By Nicolai Hartmann. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1958. Pp. 395.

This third volume contains seventeen papers, one (on the philosophical problems of biology) running over a hundred pages, several other long ones (on various logical and "ontological" problems), and the rest quite brief. Six book reviews are added in an appendix.

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All these materials are necessary for an understanding of the work of Hartmann, and many of them had become unobtainable. The complete edition is a great contribution.

***Das Menschenbild des dialektischen Materialismus.* By Hans Köhler. Munich: Anton Pustet, 1957. Pp. 31. Paper, DM 2.20.**

This short study is very helpful in understanding the Soviet view of man. Not only is man understood to be material; he is also entirely bound to society. In the beginning, the individual was entirely integrated into society; then society became alienated from man (the class society, the antithesis); finally, society and man will become integrated again in the new classless society. In this final synthesis, the individual will become absorbed in the collectivity and find therein his fulfillment. Thus, the author explains, it is possible for Communist spokesmen to say that there is perfect freedom in the totalitarian state—not a freedom of choice—and by no means a freedom from, or in, society—but in the sense of a freedom from other individuals.

***Metaphysica Operationis Humanae.* By Johannes B. Lotz, S.J. Rome: Gregorian Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. xxiv + 228. Paper, \$3.50.**

This analysis of human action is a systematic exposition, in a positive and pedagogical form, of the nature of knowledge and of the transcendentals, containing ideas which Father Lotz had previously published in textual, historical, and critical books and articles. Though in a sense there is nothing new in this book, the systematic presentation makes for completeness, provides an opportunity for understanding the doctrine as a whole, and allows it to be related to other aspects of metaphysics and theory of knowledge.

In an introductory section, Father Lotz gives a clear account of the transcendental method as used by him; he points out that it presupposes that we have established the fact of true knowledge, as well the nature of man and especially of the intellect, and the existence and intellectual nature of God. In this context, he asserts that the transcendental method uncovers the formal a-priori conditions of knowledge in such a way as to justify the previously discovered fact of true knowledge.

The analysis of knowledge is especially an analysis of judgment. Beginning with a general analysis of activity and knowledge, the author proceeds to consider the judgment as most formally a knowledge of the *esse* of being. He then compares the analysis and synthesis present in the judgment. Based on this study of judgment is the study of the a-priori

conditions of judgment. Here the author first studies the senses, and here he lays great stress on the a-priori, synthesizing forms of the *sensus communis*, the imagination, and the *vis cogitativa* (to which he ascribes a knowledge of singular substance, or thing, or a sensible schema of "thing"). These synthesizing forms, especially the last, find their completion and meaning in the judgment, especially as the latter attains *esse simpliciter* and *esse subsistens*. Indeed, the objectivity of human knowledge is finally explicable only as a participation in the Divine intellect, whose knowledge is creatively constitutive of its object.

In the second major part of the book, Father Lotz considers the transcendentals as attained by human activity. In an introductory section, he places the problem textually in St. Thomas and historically. Next, he approaches the attributes according to the transcendental method, beginning with the study of unity. In a transitional chapter, he studies activity itself, phenomenologically and ontologically, paying special attention to its relation to *esse* and its essential structure. In the study of truth, he refers to the doctrines of Heidegger and Hegel, analyzes the nature of truth, and relates truth to being and to subsistent truth. In the study of the good, he also studies appetite in general, and especially freedom, considering the latter as a way to come to transcendental goodness. Finally, he gives a transcendental deduction of the convertibility of being and the good, and of subsistent good.

Newman's Idee einer Universität. By Wolfgang Renz, O.S.B. Fribourg: Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. xxii + 338. Paper, fr. s. 18.65; DM 18.

This is a thorough and detailed study. It begins with an analysis and comparison of the various editions, and investigates the extent to which Oxford served as an example. The doctrine of the *Idea* is then examined under four heads: the theory of science, theology, the purpose of a university, and the relation between a university and the Church. The analysis is careful and fully documented. The author shows that Newman's ultimate principles are often merely implicit and that sometimes, when an argument is advanced, it is misleading, at variance with the implicit principles. But he contends that Newman's practical insights were far ahead of his time and suggests that they could with profit be considered as guides to contemporary problems. This is particularly the case with regard to the notion of "general" or "liberal" education with which Newman often identifies "philosophy"

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Ontologie du langage. By Gustav Siewerth. Trans. with introd. and notes by Marc Zemb. Preface by Brice Parain. Bruges: Desclée-de Brouwer, 1958. Pp. 187. Paper, fr. 960, fr. b. 104.

This translation of *Wort und Bild* (1952) includes the original German text on facing pages. Brice Parain in his brief preface (pp. 7-16) compares two modes of philosophizing with algebra and arithmetic. The long introduction (pp. 19-73) begins by explaining the differences between the German and French titles, and gives a brief biography and bibliography of the author. Then comes an analysis of the metaphysics contained in the work (pp. 29-42), which is said to have three main phases: essential form, intentional form, and expressive form. This is followed by a detailed analysis of the vocabulary of Siewerth (pp. 43-54), which points out the great preponderance of verbs and nouns, the difference of modes of thought arising from this difference, and the problems of translation. The notes (pp. 151-87) most often concern problems of translation.

In the thought of Siewerth, language is not only the tool of thought and of metaphysics but in a way also the cause of reasoning and the source of metaphysics. This latter relation is to be understood not in the sense of logical positivism but rather after the manner of Heidegger and Husserl. This problem deserves the attention it has been getting in contemporary thought.

Il Pensiero Americano Contemporanea. Filosofia, Epistemologia, Logica. Ed. Ferruccio Rossi-Landi. Milan: Edizioni di Comunità, 1958. Pp. xi + 340. L. 4,000.

Il Pensiero Americano Contemporanea. Scienze Sociali. Ed. Ferruccio Rossi-Landi. Milan: Edizioni di Comunità, 1958. Pp. 11 + 390. L. 4,000.

The point of view taken in fastening upon topics is that "American" thought is only entirely native and original thought—with a consequent distortion of the picture of what is being done in American learned circles.

The volume dealing with philosophy considers semantic therapy (Francesco Barone), sociality in the educational theory of John Dewey (Lamberto Borghi), symbol and metaphor in aesthetics (Gillo Dorfles), historical method (Paolo Rossi), universes of discourse and ideal languages (Ferruccio Rossi-Landi), language analysis (Uberto Scarpelli), operationalism in physics (Vittorio Somenzi), strict implication and modal logic (Giuseppe Vaccarino), and transactionalism (Aldo Visalberghi). Most of these authors have had contacts with American writers but very limited ones.

The volume dealing with social science takes up culture, personality, constitutionalism, pragmatism, motivation and perception in psychology, positivism and juridical realism, institutionalism, the Kinsey report, and American democracy.

There are bibliographies in both volumes; the principle of selection is not discoverable.

***Problemi Filosofici in Marsilio Ficino.* By Michele Schiavone. Milan: Marzorati, 1957. Pp. 327. Paper, L. 2,500.**

This study of the philosophy of Marsilio Ficino takes up three points: his conception of reality, his conception of the Absolute, and his theory of knowledge. On the basis of a careful and quite full quotation and analysis of texts, Schiavone shows the basic Platonism of Ficino and the modifications introduced from various sources. Among these are the notion of the world as a living animal, the special treatment of act and potency in the analysis of change, the importance of space and time. In the conception of God, Platonism also shows up, mingled with theological concepts that are presented by Ficino as if derived from purely philosophical reasoning. In theory of knowledge, Ficino holds for the spirituality of sensation, caused by the vital, spiritual power in things. Intellect differs from sense inasmuch as it reaches the universal and the substance of things. In very many instances, the author quotes parallel passages from William of Auvergne.

***Riflessioni su Temi Filosofici Fondamentali.* By Louis De Raeymaeker. Milan: Marzorati, 1957. Pp. 96. Paper, L. 800.**

This is an Italian translation of a series of lectures given by the Louvain scholar at the University of Genoa in March, 1956. Of the four essays, three were published in *Humanitas*, the fourth in *Giornale di Metafisica*. The first topic is that of the transformation of the ontology of antiquity into the metaphysics of being by St. Thomas. The second is that of the experience of being and its metaphysical significance. The third is the problem of causality. The fourth is that of Thomism, neo-Thomism, and philosophical diversity.

Salzburger Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Psychologie. Ed. Faculty of the Philosophisches Institut of Salzburg. Munich: Anton Pustet. I (1957), 248; II (1958), 240.

This new publication has made an auspicious beginning. In the first volume, the following articles appeared: "Ontologie der Zeit nach objektivierender Betrachtungsweise," by Dom Beda Thum, o.s.b.; "Ein Aristoteles-Fragment der Stiftsbibliothek," by Albert Auer; "Glossen über den gemässigten Realismus," by Johannes Bauer; "Geschichtslehre aus Philosophie und Theologie," by Joseph Bernhardt; "War Aristoteles 'Aristoteliker'?" by E. Joseph Schächer; and "Naturrecht heute," by Albert Auer. There are also two articles on psychology. The article of Dr. Schächer is a long study of the thesis of Reverend Josef Zürcher, s.j., the reactions of the reviewers to it, and his own evaluation.

The second volume contains the following: "Eckehart-Studien," by Albert Auer; "Zur 'quarta via' des Aquinaten," by Johannes Bauer; "Naturtendenz und Freiheit nach Duns Scotus," by Walter Hoeres; "Stensen—Spinoza—Leibniz in fruchtbaren Gespräch," by Ildefons Betschart; "Die Stellung der Psychologie in der Gesamtheit der Wissenschaften," by Benedikt von Hebenstreit; "Ontologie der Zeitrelationen," by Beda Thum, o.s.b.; and "Zur Dialektik der Reflexion bei Husserl," by Walter Hoeres. There are again several articles on psychology. In addition, there is a brief account of the Catholic University of Salzburg and a few short book reviews.

Sein und Ursprünglichkeit. By Hans-Eduard Hengstenberg. Foreword by L.-B. Geiger, O.P. Munich: Anton Pustet, 1958. Pp. xxiv + 168. Paper.

This is an attempt to give a philosophical exposition of the idea of creation. The author contends that for a modern the word "cause" does not mean what it meant for medievals or ancient philosophers; that in its contemporary usage it necessarily involves space and time, reciprocity, and limitation. He concludes that for moderns a causal proof for the existence of God is meaningless and is considered impossible. He proposes instead to use phenomenological insights to ground a new proof. This he does through the notion of the *Sinn* (untranslatable by any single word) of things. Things have *Sinn*, and this *Sinn* cannot be explained by the things themselves or from any other limited thing; it must therefore come from a *Sinnurheber*, who is necessarily personal. The author claims this as an advantage over proofs that conclude merely to an *ens a se*. (In addition to the author's use of the term "cause" in a Kantian sense, one should also note his use of the term "analogy" to mean an a-priori argument.)

That the effort undertaken here is important and significant cannot be doubted; that the fourth and fifth "ways" of St. Thomas could be elaborated through the use of phenomenological starting points seems possible; that the present book is entirely successful seems doubtful.

Ser Participado y Ser Subsistente en la Metafisica de Enrique de Gante.

By José Gómez Caffarena, S.J. "Analecta Gregoriana," Vol. XCIII.

Rome: Gregorian Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. xi + 283. Paper, \$3.50.

Henry of Ghent, the author concludes, is basically an Augustinian with Avicennan modifications. He draws this conclusion from a study of being in Henry. He begins by considering being as known; as conditions for metaphysical knowledge, he finds Henry insisting on divine illumination as a guarantee of truth and on the intentional world of essence as the object of metaphysics; this world of essence is constituted by the *esse essentiae*. The *esse existentiae* of participated being is an "accident" of essence, distinct from essence by an "intentional distinction." *Esse essentiae* is also an internal principle of finite essence. Connected with these points are considerations on the various compositions in a finite essence, the logic of the universals as analyzed by Henry, the relation between finiteness and contingency, and the historical sources of these ideas.

Next the author studies Henry's doctrine on subsistent Being. Here a question arises about the relation between infinity and necessity. Henry's special notion of the analogy of being is considered as consisting mainly in the possibility of predication about God. Henry's proofs for the existence of God are studied at length, and the special character of the proof from exemplarity is noted.

In a series of appendices, some texts are transcribed (another redaction of *Summa*, 21, 4; a passage from a commentary on the *Liber de Causis* attributed to Henry, which the author thinks is either inauthentic or very early). There are also a bibliography of sources, an index of texts cited, and an index of names.

Thèmes et textes mystiques. Recherche de critères en mystique comparée.

By Louis Gardet. Paris: Alsatia, 1958. Pp. 219. Paper.

The subject of mysticism can be treated only inadequately by a philosopher, but he can learn much of philosophical importance from a profound theological treatment such as the present work. This book is built on the

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distinction between natural and supernatural mysticism, previously proposed by the author and by other specialists. Here, however, the emphasis is rather on the criteria of "authentic mysticism." The illusions and deviant forms, according to the author, are characterized by esotericism (with its tendency to reduce all statements about transcendent reality to myth or allegory), by the substitution of a psychological technique deemed to be infallibly efficacious in place of the asceticism of love (and, as far as supernatural mysticism is concerned, even in place of the free gifts of God), and finally by the confusion between the two, or even the preference of the natural mysticism over the supernatural.

The larger part of the book (pp. 79-216) is devoted to the presentation of texts in French translation arranged according to exposition of the first part.

Unamuno. *Bosquejo de una Filosofía.* By José Ferrater Mora. Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1957. Pp. 141. Paper.

This revised edition has been in large measure rewritten. The last two chapters (on the idea of fiction and that of reality) are new, and the bibliography has been brought up to date. The presentation is highly sympathetic—the author insists that Unamuno's thought cannot be adequately understood except by a process of "interiorization." The work is useful for the understanding of Unamuno's thought and to the same extent for similar themes in contemporary thought.

***Weltbild und Metaphysik.* By Albert Auer and Beda Thum, O.S.B. Munich: Anton Pustet, 1958. Pp. 143.**

The two authors offer quite different approaches to one and the same problem. Professor Auer views the notion of "the world image" as an infra-philosophical stage. He begins with a consideration of "the world" and "my world" in a phenomenological sense, pointing out that its function is to give meaning to individual things and events. He next maintains that most German "world images" are of an idealist character, showing this with many examples. He concludes with an effort to show that an adequate "world image" is impossible without a sound metaphysics and in particular without a Christian world picture.

Dom Beda Thum has a quite different point of view. He first criticizes sharply all positivistic explanations of science, saying that M. Maritain's view is "almost positivistic" and then forgetting the qualification. Science is to be interpreted realistically, he claims (a forced realism of the objects of science or a realistic acceptance of science as it is?). From this

point of view, he holds for a critical realism; he holds that philosophy must give the ultimate interpretation of science and thus also of the "world image." In this, he also criticizes sharply the whole notion of "philosophy of spirit" (*Geistphilosophie*) and maintains that we must go back to a view of being which includes both the nonliving and the cognitive agents.

BOOK REVIEWS

ALDEN L. FISHER, *Saint Louis University*

Freud and the 20th Century. Ed. and selected by Benjamin Nelson. New York: Meridian Books, 1957. Pp. 314.

Faith, Reason and Modern Psychiatry. Sources for a Synthesis. Ed. Francis J. Braceland. New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons, 1955. Pp. xv + 310.

Le chrétien devant la psychanalyse. By Maryse Choisy. Paris: Librairie P. Téqui, 1955. Pp. 216.

Each of the following books is representative in its own way of a significant intellectual phenomenon of the mid-twentieth century: the continuing and growing impact of depth psychology, and particularly Freudian psychoanalysis, on disciplines far beyond the confines of psychiatry and psychopathology proper. These books (and parts of them—two are symposia) are not of equal value in themselves or of equal interest to the philosopher, but not one of them fails to raise some issues and pose some problems of real concern and interest to the intellectual historian as well as to the systematic philosopher.

The first of these, *Freud and the Twentieth Century*, represents another achievement on the part of the publishers of Meridian Books in presenting important works in original paper-back editions. Competently edited by Benjamin Nelson, it brings together a truly outstanding group of collaborators whose contributions are arranged into six groupings: "Mid-Century Perspectives," "Men and Times," "The Sciences of Mind and Health," "Society and Politics," "Literature and the Arts," and "Philosophy and Religion." Besides the careful documentation of the articles contained in each of these sections, the volume is also equipped with a well-selected bibliography of genuine value to the specialist as well as to the general reader.

It would be impossible in a short review to list, much less discuss, each of the interesting and valuable contributions to this symposium. Rather, we shall confine ourselves to a few remarks concerning those articles of special interest to philosophers.

Frederick J. Hacker, in his stimulating article, "Freud, Marx and Kierkegaard," undertakes the somewhat unusual task of comparing the thought of these very disparate thinkers. Freud's familiarity with Marx facilitates somewhat the first comparison. Both Freud and Marx sought to

uncover the hidden but scientific laws of human development—the one individual, the other social. Both men, in their own way, sought to bring about the liberation of mankind. But, in the end, Freud and Marx parted ways over the latter's "idealism." Freud had no sympathy for Utopias and was well aware that a classless society would not eliminate human aggression. Freud could not but consider the Marxian dream another illusion, another attempt of man to deceive himself.

Superficially there would seem to be nothing but extreme contrast between both the personalities of Kierkegaard and Freud and their thought. It is the author's thesis, however, that they are complementary thinkers. Taking as a common theme their deep concern with the problem of anxiety, Hacker goes on to show that Freud attempted to describe in great clinical detail *how* anxiety comes about; the Kierkegaardian analysis concentrates rather on an elucidation of the existential significance of anxiety, contending that man must be anxious if he is to be free—that anxiety is freedom. Both Kierkegaard and Freud deplored all attempts to escape from concrete reality. But here the fundamental difference between Freud and Kierkegaard would seem to be more radical than Hacker would suggest. For Kierkegaard, freedom and anxiety go hand in hand; only by a "leap of faith" can man escape anxiety; in so doing he also loses freedom. But, if for Kierkegaard to be free is to be anxious, for Freud to be anxious is to be enslaved; by overcoming anxiety through personal insight a measure, at least, of freedom is attained.

This raises the issue, touched on by several other writers in the books under consideration here, of the relation and differences between pathological anxiety discovered and dealt with by psychiatry and "existential" anxiety, a theme common to Heidegger and Sartre as well as Kierkegaard. It does not seem to this reviewer that this problem has been successfully resolved.

In his usually perceptive fashion, Will Herberg ("Freud, the Revisionists, and Social Reality") attempts to assess something of Freud's impact upon the social sciences and their present understanding of man. He gives a careful comparison of the thought of Fromm (a revisionist) and Freud, in which, for all the shortcomings of both, Freud comes off the better because of his ability to look reality in the face—to avoid Utopian hopes of achieving a perfect world as seems to be the dream of Fromm. Finally, with sure insight into the significance of both psychoanalysis and religious faith, Herberg shows that many of the recent attempts on the part of neo-Freudians to legitimize religious faith within psychoanalytic theory end in a perversion of the true import of "biblical faith." (Herberg speaks of

Masserman, but his remarks often apply equally well to Jung.) "Incredible as it may seem, Freud, with his *rejection* of religion was closer to, or at least less distant from, the biblical position" than many of the "pro-religionists" who attempt to vindicate it.

Although one may disagree rather completely with the conception of philosophy put forward by Abraham Kaplan in "Freud and Modern Philosophy" ("philosophy is culture become self-conscious; the business of philosophy, to rationalize revolutions in culture") and consequently with some of his conclusions, one must admire his systematic examination of the relevance of Freudian discoveries to the traditional problems of philosophy in the areas of epistemology, aesthetics, ethics, social science and social philosophy, and religion. One inconsistency, however, cannot be overlooked. Kaplan very ably defends Freud against the genetic fallacy as concerns the significance attached to the moral conscience; yet, in spite of his claim to the contrary, he seems himself to fall into this same fallacy with respect to religious belief.

Maritain's contribution, "Freudianism and Psychoanalysis—A Thomist View," is a revision of an essay which appeared in *Scholasticism and Politics*. Readers are undoubtedly aware of the excellence of this carefully critical but nonetheless sympathetic confrontation of Freud and Thomism. Suffice it to note here that one could scarcely ask for a more perceptive exposition of the aims and methods of analytic therapy in a few short pages than Maritain presents in the first section of his essay.

In his article, "Human Creativity and Self-Concern in Freud," Reinhold Niebuhr first compares Freud with the thinkers of "the Age of Enlightenment," with whom Freud must, in a sense, be counted but with whom his realism forced him to disagree radically over their shallow, even sentimental, optimism. Without wishing to do so, Freud thus forced a return to a more traditional view of man which in many ways comes close to the Christian notion of "original sin." But Niebuhr justly criticizes him, as does Maritain, for neglecting the positive and spiritual dimensions of human freedom with the ancillary possibility of self-transcendence.

These brief remarks cannot, of course, do justice to the diversity and general excellence of all the contributions to this symposium. But it is hoped that enough has been said to indicate that this volume makes a uniformly high-level contribution to the formidable task of placing Freud in perspective in the intellectual history of the twentieth century.

The remainder of the books to be considered here have this in common, that they are all the works of Catholic thinkers. This would seem to indicate on the part of Catholic thinking in general a growing maturity with respect to the positive importance of psychiatry and clinical psychology as opposed to the "supernaturalism" so prevalent a few years ago.

Faith, Reason and Modern Psychiatry is an impressive volume edited by F. J. Braceland, eminent Catholic psychiatrist and past president of the American Psychiatric Association. The aim of the book is to continue the dialogue between psychiatry, philosophy, and religion. To further this aim five outstanding practicing psychiatrists—Braceland, Rudolf Allers, Juan J. Lopez Ibor, Gregory Zilboorg, and Karl Stern—contributed papers concerned with the broader implications of their work. The first section of the book is entitled "Physician and Patient Confront the Cosmos." The second section, "Essays toward Interpenetration," is made up of papers by philosophers and theologians—Vincent E. Smith, Dorothy Donnelly, Pedro Lain Entralgo, Noel Mailloux, O.P., and Jordan Aumann, O.P.,—who carry on the dialogue from the viewpoint of their own specialties. While all of the authors share a common background of religious commitment, they differ markedly in their theoretical approach to psychiatry and their philosophical views. This, of course, is one of the values of a symposium of this kind.

It is interesting to note (whether any generalizations can be drawn from this is another question) that the contributions of the psychiatrists to this volume make for more significant reading for philosophers and theologians than do the contributions of the specialists in these matters. Whereas the psychiatrists seem very well aware of the nature of philosophical and theological problems and methods of reasoning, the reverse is much less true.

Each of the psychiatrists, while recognizing his deep indebtedness to Freud, makes efforts at re-evaluating Freud. Particularly, they are in common agreement concerning the need to reinterpret his findings in more adequate frames of reference than his own reductionist mechanism. All commonly recognize that, in the last analysis, Freud, correctly understood and interpreted, is much more compatible with Christian faith than many neo-Freudians and especially Jung. The misconception that Jung's religious and mystical speculations make him more acceptable to true faith is gradually but forcefully being dispelled.

Another noteworthy fact is their common interest in the contributions of the existentialist thinkers to a better understanding of their own specialty. This is not to say that there is any wholesale acceptance of existentialist philosophy; but there is a recognition that the subtle analyses of the human existent by the existentialists have brought about a richer and deeper understanding of man's concrete reality—in contrast to the abstractions of the idealists and rationalists on the one hand and the equally abstract but reductionist views of scientific empiricists on the other. Reading these essays tends to confirm the conviction that existentialism and

phenomenology may help to provide the necessary bridge between traditional philosophy and the "sciences of man" which is so badly needed.

The "Thomistic" point of view is represented in this volume by Vincent Smith in "The Study of Man: An Essay in Reconstruction". Dr. Smith begins with a discussion of Aristotle's theory of "science" and demonstration. He contends that Aristotelian science is the only true science and that modern science is either false or a dialectical extension of Aristotle's natural philosophy. He then outlines his conception of Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophy of human nature, a part of natural philosophy. Various modern psychologies are analyzed to show how they fall short of the certitude necessary for "true science" and in what way they are mistaken in the light of the Aristotelian-Thomistic view. Finally, Dr. Smith attempts to point out elements of modern psychology which can be made "scientific" if interpreted within an Aristotelian frame of reference.

That this represents one Thomistic view of the relations between philosophy and science is certainly the case. This view has, however, undergone serious, if not devastating criticism. In brief, this view fails to respect the analogous character of human ways of knowing and denies to modern science any proper principles of its own. Such a view inevitably leads to a kind of intellectual imperialism (which Dr. Smith correctly deplores on the part of certain modern views) which will scarcely lead to fruitful co-operation between philosophers and scientists, whether physicists or psychoanalysts.

Le chrétien devant la psychanalyse, the latest work of Maryse Choisy, eminent French psychoanalyst, is a difficult book to evaluate, for it is really several books (or should have been)—not all of equal value. It is, first, a defense of the compatibility in therapeutic practice of psychoanalysis and Christianity (in the case at hand, Catholicism). Quoting liberally from the address of Pope Pius XII to the fifth International Congress of Psychotherapy and Clinical Psychology meeting in Rome (April 13, 1953), the author effectively argues that analytic technique can be divorced from some, at least, of Freud's theoretical and philosophical views. The author's attempt to resolve the knotty question of the positive role of value within the analytic situation is less successful. Secondly, Mme. Choisy gives a popular but excellent exposition of the aims and methods of analytic therapy (including certain recent changes of emphasis). A third part of the book, by far the most questionable, is devoted to an exposition of the author's latest theoretical speculations concerning the instinct of aggression. (One wonders what possible relevance the reactions of senile cats to certain rejuvenating drugs can have for an understanding of human behavior.) Finally, the author attempts to trace the boundaries between the roles of analyst and confessor, scientist and theologian. While her conclusions are

not particularly new, they are cautious and carefully drawn. Since much of this book makes valuable reading for the nonspecialist, it is unfortunate that the author has seen fit to include in one volume both popular exposition of well-established positions and highly tentative technical theory.

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The Coming World Civilization. By William Ernest Hocking. New York: Harper & Bros., 1956. Pp. xiv + 210. \$3.75.

After Utopia. By Judith N. Shklar. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. x + 309. \$5.00.

The Origins of Marxian Thought. By Auguste Cornu. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, 1957. Pp. viii + 128. \$3.75.

The Urge to Mass Destruction. By Samuel J. Warner. New York: Grune & Stratton, 1957. Pp. xii + 188. \$3.50.

Citadel, Market and Altar. By Spencer Heath. Baltimore: Science of Society Foundation, 1957. Pp. xxiv + 259. \$6.00.

The first book is typically Hocking: an intellectually integrated continent, mystical, with a sincere and fervent purposefulness. The thesis, that Christianity must be the core of world unity, more broadly implies that religion is the heart of any matter. Hocking rejects the political and legal state as impotently inadequate, as well as the rhythmic view of history; the memory of his *Rethinking Missions* and his frequent references to *The Meaning of God in Human Experience* reassure the reader of the empirical background of his mysticism and idealism. He explicitly emphasizes these major implications: the integrated personal character, the cumulative accretions of history, and the timeless qualities of meaning. We wish that this tough-minded philosopher could be added to our soldiers and politicians and businessmen to deal with men like Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung.

Mrs. Shklar's book is a pessimistic contrast to Hocking's. Her thesis, that we are experiencing the decline of political faith, is supported by her apparently compendious bibliography and her well-documented text. But even so, her relatively limited selections of materials and periods of time recall Danny Kaye's remark to King George VI, "The trouble with you, King, is that you don't run around enough with the right people." The book begins with the enlightenment period; hence the author requires some close-knit chapters to include previous pertinent events; and the last

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century or two of apparent decline in political thought are too short in the over-all span of history to be significant. Even during this more recent period there have been some brilliant outbursts of political behavior and thinking. The answer to what the author terms "romantic frustration and Christian fatalism" may not be only her "skepticism." It may also lie in the persistent individual efforts—say, to realize constitutional democracy—which Bacon held to be the secret of advancing natural science.

Cornu bites deeper into history than does Mrs. Shklar; at least he goes back to the Renaissance. It is not until he is half way through his book, after developing romanticism and following the Hegelian left into liberal and social radicalism, that he comes to Marx's own works, which he then copiously annotates. Underlying the whole work is the problem of implication. How much can be developed a priori, and how much depends on the pragmatic results? Marx delved into the problem of heredity versus environment, but he never resolved the problem to the extreme of a Lysenko. And though he experienced successively the different stages of industrialism in Germany, France, and England, he nowhere seemed to anticipate the a-fortiori methods of Lenin or Stalin—or even the differential analysis which Djilas, in *The New Class*, makes of materialistic as well as cultural developments, geographically as well as historically.

From its title, one would expect in *The Urge to Mass Destruction* an analysis of the present world crisis; and this it perhaps implies. Warner, a psychotherapist, makes three approaches to the problem: a set of clinical individual diagnoses, a historical-literary analysis of the "satan" concept, and a well-documented study of Nietzsche. Through a reference to Bertrand Russell's warnings, Warner stresses the danger of the "making of a philosophy of life out of the convulsive upheavels of mental disease." He regards the present trend to be "against the Judaic-Christian principle of love and toward a principle of individual power." Therapeutically, he also holds, the worst thing that one can do to such people is to scold or threaten them—with guns, one may add, especially when they themselves are armed!

Citadel, Market and Altar is a valiant attempt by a benevolent Quaker engineer to make rhyme or reason out of the "booming, buzzing universe." Echoes of Herbert Spencer, John Fitch's *Meaning of Infancy*, and Maine's *Ancient Law* result in another Walter B. Cannon's *Wisdom of the Body* or Plato's *Republic*. And why not? We should welcome all attempts, especially from professional amateurs, to set the world right. Perhaps there is a connection between the mathematical accuracy of a snowflake or a beehive and its human or social significance. But the author regards land ownership as the basis or sum-total of economics, and he pays little or no

attention to corporate or industrial developments. And citadel and altar are regarded too largely as instrumental to market, without considering their good or bad functioning as ends.

NICHOLAS RESCHER, *Lehigh University*

***Methods and Criteria of Reasoning.* By Rupert Crawshay-Williams. New York: Humanities Press, 1957. Pp. 296. \$5.00.**

This is an avowed treatise on philosophical methodology, a genre not conducive to easy readability, let alone fascination. True to type, the book is slow going. There is, however, a reward in the presentation of a coherent and significant conception of analytical method. But unfortunately the materials for a first-rate paper may lack the flexibility to stretch out into a good book.

The point of view propounded by Crawshay-Williams is epitomized in the following passage:

Suppose, for example, that I have in my house two printed and bound bundles of paper with grey covers, both marked *Mind*, Vol. LX, No. 238. If I refer to these bundles of paper and ask whether they are the same, my question as it stands will be indeterminate, since they are the same for some purposes and different for others. For the purpose of reading them, they are the same; for the purpose of marking ownership they may well be different (pp. 48-49).

This example is generalized in the present work into a doctrine I propose to term "linguistic contextual pragmatism." Outside of mathematics and the exact sciences, it is contended, statements have no meaning *per se* but derive their meaning from their specific context and are thus purpose-dependent. To ignore this and to suppose that statements are meaningful in abstraction from their concrete contexts is to commit what Crawshay-Williams condemns as the fallacy of "universal context assumption." He recommends that wherever disagreement persists despite agreement on all strictly factual considerations, "we should treat the statement as inadequately determined at least until we have made its context clear enough to transform the question at issue into one which is plainly a question of method" (p. 251).

The fallacy of universal context assumption is, it is charged, inherent in all traditional philosophizing. Take the problem of personal identity. Is

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Smith "the same person" that he was ten years ago? In the context of his relations with his estranged spouse, the answer may be no, while in regard to criminal liability it must be yes. The philosopher who raises the question *in general*, in abstraction from specific contexts, is concerned with a question that is quite futile—not quite "meaningless" (as with the positivists) but rather merely "indeterminate." In such context-detachments, Crawshay-Williams finds the reason "why certain kinds of theoretical and philosophical controversy are so oddly intractable." Philosophers mistakenly assume that categories and conceptual classifications can be established *simpliciter*, a situation which is, in reality, quite different. "Given that we are paying attention to two qualities A and B, we will need—in some contexts and for some purposes—to class them together. But—in other contexts and for other purposes—we will need to differentiate them" (p. 32).

A tacit, unargued, hidden assumption which, to my mind, wholly vitiates the philosophical implications drawn by the author from his linguistic contextual pragmatism is that only *practical* purposes and contexts can render statements determinate, and never such theoretical or intellectual purposes as, for example, those of the philosopher. Thus even if we grant, as I think we ought, the thesis of the context-dependence of meaning, we are by no means constrained to follow Crawshay-Williams down the road of dismissing traditional philosophy as discourse rendered "indeterminate" through context-abstraction. For the implication is not this but rather the need for a careful and detailed study of philosophical writings to master *their* contexts and *their* purposes. There is no hope of understanding a philosopher if we lazily resort to the Procrustean device of fitting *his* language to *our* verbal contexts.

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***Dominant Themes of Modern Philosophy.* By George Boas. New York: Ronald Press, 1957. Pp. vii + 660. \$6.75.**

So frequently has modern philosophy been written in the form of the Hegelian system that many tend to conceive the actual situation by imposing the system frame of reference upon the problems of the major philosophers—with, of course, some attempt at showing how the minor philosophers are merely corollary phases of the major systems. This book adopts a firm position in opposition to the Hegelian-Windelband interpretation. Writing from the position of the "history of ideas," the author is concerned not with the man but with the "unit ideas" (a term used

by A. O. Lovejoy, to whom the author is indebted). Consequently there is not a primary concern with the profound thinkers, except in those cases where such men most adequately represent the tendencies of an age. And these tendencies of an age, from the philosophical perspective, can be seen in the philosophical problems or themes. This book therefore does not purport to be a complete exposition of any system. The author selects what appears to him to be the "most frequently recurring questions or the most influential answers" (p. v). The starting point is the rejection of authority during the Italian Renaissance; the concluding chapter is on the existentialism of Kierkegaard, Jaspers, and Sartre.

The modern period of philosophy is rooted within unresolved tensions in the medieval world. These tensions center around the problems of authority and the relationship of reason and faith. In this area the author surpasses Gilson in insight but not in explicitness. The more immediate roots of modern philosophy are located within the problems posed by the Italian Renaissance: the limits and scope of authority; the ground of truth; and the distinction, at least politically, between what *is* and what *ought*. The first half of the book—up to Leibniz—shows generalized concern with both the epistemological problems posed as a consequence of the questioning of authority and the implicit and presupposed nature of the universe which permitted epistemological investigations. Both of these reach something of an explicit awareness in Leibniz. The chapter entitled "Les philosophes" shows the author at his best. Here we find a consideration of Bayle, Montesquieu, Voltaire, d'Holbach, and La Mettrie. These men, although they proposed a total re-examination of all things, even their own past, still had the implicit belief that there was a unity, a harmony, within the totality. In spite of the fact that at times Boas is not explicit enough, he surely does point to, and takes into vigorous consideration, the implicit beliefs within which a philosopher can pose questions. In opposition to the impression most frequently conveyed—namely, that a person can actually be a total skeptic—Boas certainly emphasizes that skepticism can function only within a total frame of belief. It is not a question of whether a thinker is skeptic or believer. One must know toward what objects or ideas a thinker overtly expresses belief or skepticism, and toward what objects or ideas a thinker holds belief or skepticism that is beyond direct examination.

An extended treatment of Kant and his problems—over one hundred pages—sets the theme for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Kant's examination of problems in the area of epistemology involves the entire nature of the universe and consequently has its effects in the rapidly

growing natural sciences. One has the feeling that Hegel is disposed of too readily. The author makes no attempt at detailing the course of philosophy since Hegel; merely the general direction is indicated. This results in a passing over of such movements as neo-realism, critical realism, logical positivism, and neo-Thomism; but then this is an option reserved for an author.

The author has the humility of a philosopher who is making a very conscious, deliberate, and personal search into the history of philosophy, as opposed to those who would prefer us to believe they are merely transcribing while the historical facts speak for themselves. This is a fine book; one can only hope it will get the wide attention it deserves.

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***Bradwardine and the Pelagians. A Study of His 'De Causa Dei' and Its Opponents.* By Gordon Leff. Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 282, with index. \$6.00.**

Chaucer immortalized the name of "the learned Doctor Bradwardine" in his *Canterbury Tales*, but English scholars have been strangely incurious about the doctrines of this fourteenth-century theologian and the reasons for his popularity at that period. This is all the more remarkable because of the influence of Bradwardine upon Wyclif and English theology of the Reformation. As Gordon Leff says in his introduction, "A study of Thomas Bradwardine has been long overdue."

Mr. Leff divides his book into two parts. In the first he examines the central teachings of Bradwardine's *De Causa Dei*—an immense book which none but the bravest would attempt to digest in a few pages. An analysis is presented of its main ideas, including the existence and nature of God, creation, sin, grace, merit, free will, and God's knowledge of the contingent future. As the title indicates, Bradwardine was preoccupied with upholding God's cause and with refuting errors opposed to His freedom and omnipotence. Like so many other theologians living in the aftermath of the condemnation, in 1277, of Averroism and other forms of naturalism, he jealously protected the rights of God against every supposed encroachment of nature.

Bradwardine selected for special criticism those whom he called "modern Pelagians." The second part of Mr. Leff's book concerns Pelagianism old and new, the reasons why Bradwardine so vehemently opposed the revival of Pelagianism in his day, and finally the identification of the "modern

Pelagians." Pelagius exalted man's natural powers and denied the necessity of grace for salvation. The Pelagians of Bradwardine's day did not deny the need of grace for salvation in the present scheme of things; what they did deny was God's inability to make other arrangements for man's salvation if he chose to do so. Thus Ockham taught that God can, if He wishes, "accept a man as deserving of eternal glory without his possessing grace, and, correspondingly, He can damn him without his having sinned" (pp. 191-92). Of course, Ockham did not think this to be true in the present plan of salvation, so that one should not say, as Mr. Leff does, that "habits, for Ockham, therefore, have no part to play in leading a man to God" (pp. 193-94). Ockham was thinking of a possible world and not the one in which we live. He wished to ensure the freedom of God in planning man's salvation. As Mr. Leff rightly remarks, "It would be more precise to say that it is not man so much as God who is free from grace: because His acts are not made conditional upon it, neither are His creatures" (p. 197). A strange kind of Pelagianism indeed!

Some of the most enlightening sections of the book are devoted to the little-known theologians Durandus, Peter Auriol, Robert Holcot, Thomas Buckingham, and Adam of Woodham, as representative of Bradwardine's modern Pelagianism. The current nominalism was leading these men to skepticism and the denial of any necessity within the created order. The sphere of nature tended to be disregarded; and this, coupled with an acute awareness of the absolute freedom of God, led to their bizarre conclusions and opened the way for the theological errors of the Reformation concerning grace and free will.

Incidentally, it seems likely that the name of Henry of Harclay should be added to the list of Bradwardine's Pelagians. According to Franz Pelster, Harclay taught that created grace is not an absolute necessity for salvation; God can freely accept man's acts as meritorious without grace (*Scholastik*, 1953, p. 238).

Throughout the book the author's handling of theological problems does not equal his ability as a historian. His misunderstanding of the issue of grace and free will leads him to attribute conclusions to Bradwardine which the learned doctor himself denied; for example, that man strictly speaking does not merit (p. 85) and that he is not really free (p. 52). He claims that Bradwardine's system radically breaks with tradition by ascribing everything to God as its most immediate cause (p. 51), but this is in conformity with Thomism. Mr. Leff uses the term "divine participation" to describe the immediacy of God to every created effect. As H. Oberman points out,

Bradwardine's own term, "divine coefferency," is better, for it is not God but creatures that participate in causality. (Cf. *Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine. A Fourteenth Century Augustinian* [Utrecht, 1957] p. 77. n. 1.)

Some of the author's judgments in philosophical matters are no less open to question. It is hardly exact to say that Bradwardine's "opinion of God's relation to His creatures moves on Aristotelian lines" (p. 18), for Aristotle knew nothing of creation. The proof of God's existence as Necessary Being is clearly Avicennian and not Aristotelian (pp. 25-26). For St. Thomas, a universal has no "metaphysical entity" besides its logical entity (p. 89).

These and similar flaws mar the quality of the book and make it impossible to recommend it without serious reservations. It does, however, throw light on some aspects of Bradwardine's thought, and it will be useful to students of late medieval philosophy and theology.

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ST. THOMAS'S CHANGING ESTIMATE
OF AVICENNA'S TEACHING
ON EXISTENCE AS AN ACCIDENT

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In the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas there is frequent reference—sometimes implied, sometimes clearly expressed—to existence as accidental to created quiddities. “I can understand what a man or a phoenix is, without knowing whether they have an existence in reality.”¹ The same notion recurs constantly in the works of Avicenna, to whom St. Thomas frequently acknowledges his indebtedness on this score. And yet in his later writings in which references to existence as an accident still occur, St. Thomas seems gradually to have modified his opinion, not on the doctrine itself but on the use of Avicenna as an authority for it. Why did he at first interpret the Arabian philosopher's words in a favorable light and end by seeing in his statements on this subject only falsity and contradiction? Did St. Thomas's final estimate of Avicenna's doctrine on existence as an accident correspond to the latter's real teaching?

Over a period of approximately eighteen years St. Thomas in eight texts invokes the Arabian's authority when noting that existence is extrinsic to the adequate concept of created essence. The first of these references in chronological order² occurs in the *Commentary on the Sentences* dating from about 1255. Here St. Thomas, discussing the

question, "Is existence properly predicated of God?" answers as follows:

'He who exists' is among all names the one most proper to God. . . . A reason can be drawn from Avicenna's words: Since in everything which exists there is to be considered its quiddity, by which it subsists in a determined nature, and its existence by which it is said to be in act, the name 'thing' is given it from its quiddity, according to Avicenna; and the name 'which exists' . . . is given from the act of existing. But in anything created, essence differs from existence, and so the creature is properly named from its quiddity and not from the act of existing. . . . But in God existence is His quiddity: accordingly a name taken from existence is proper to Him.³

According to Avicenna, then, objects are named from what marks each off as determined in nature or essence, not from something which is merely accidental. But the creature is specified and determined by its quiddity, the existence being other than the quiddity and accidental to it. In God, however, existence is not accidental to quiddity; His quiddity is existence, and so "existent" is His proper name.

A little later, in the *De Ente et Essentia*, existence is again described as extrinsic to any given essence conceived as such.

It is true to say that man precisely as man has existence neither in this or that singular nor in the mind. Hence man's nature, absolutely considered, abstracts from any kind of existence.⁴

Although Avicenna is not mentioned in this citation, his authority is invoked at the beginning of the chapter from which it is taken, and Roland-Gosselin has shown that the text of the *De Ente* here closely

¹*De Ente et Essentia*, cap. 4; ed. Roland-Gosselin (Paris: J. Vrin, 1948), p. 34.

²This is according to Mandonnet's arrangement which, in general, is undisputed as regards St. Thomas's earlier works. See Louis De Raeymaeker, *Introduction to Philosophy*, trans. Harry McNeill (New York: Joseph F. Wagner, 1948), pp. 259-63.

³*In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 1.

⁴*De Ente*, cap. 3; ed. Roland-Gosselin, p. 26.

⁵Avicenna, *Metaphys.*, V, 1 and 2 (cited by Roland-Gosselin, *De Ente*, p. 24 n.).

⁶*Ibid.*, 2 (p. 25 n.).

⁷*De Ente*, cap. 4; ed. Roland-Gosselin, pp. 33-34.

follows Avicenna's discussion of the same point in the *Shifa*'⁵ where the following parallel is found:

Animal, as it exists in sensible things or in the mind as something understood, is 'animal' [essence] plus something else not animal [existence]. . . . Clearly, since it is animal plus something else not animal, animal [essence] will then be in this [composite] as its part. Yet animal [essence] can be considered in itself, even though it is [conjoined] with something [existence] other than itself; for its essence is with something other than it. . . . But to be with something else [existence] is accidental to it or something that accompanies its nature . . .⁶

In the next chapter of the same treatise, St. Thomas, after mentioning Avicenna as his authority in a related problem (essential composition in material things), speaks of the composition of essence and existence proper to all creatures.

The essences [substantial forms] of composite things, by being received into . . . matter, are multiplied. . . . But since the essence of something simple is not received in matter, no such multiplication is possible . . . but in this case there are as many species as there are individuals, as Avicenna explicitly says. Yet such substances . . . are not wholly simple . . . but have a mixture of potency. . . . For whatever is not of the concept of an essence . . . comes from without and enters into composition with the essence. . . . Now, every essence . . . can be understood without anything being understood of its existence. . . . Clearly, then, existence is something other than essence . . . unless there be something whose quiddity is its very existence.⁷

Created essence, then, can be adequately understood independently of whether it exists. Hence as far as essence is concerned, existence is something "coming from without"; that is, outside the adequate concept and in that sense adventitious or accidental. The theme of existence as a "concomitant" or "accident" of created essence, as will be seen presently, is commonplace in Avicenna's works and recurs

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whenever there is need of distinguishing the necessary being from the possibles.

The next reference to existence as an accident is found in *De Veritate*, composed between 1256 and 1259. In rejecting the theory that an angel knows material things by knowing his own essence, St. Thomas argues that a likeness of a material thing must come ultimately from the one who caused the material thing. But whatever one has from a cause is over and above one's essence; for example, existence in creatures is over and above their essence, and so creatures derive existence from a cause. Similarly, the likeness of a material thing is something over and above the essence of an angel and so must be caused in his essence by God.

The parallel drawn is between entitative act in created essence and the *species impressa* in the angelic essence. The existence which is conferred on created essence, as its act in the order of being, is a logical accident, since it is "over and above" and therefore adventitious to the essence; but in no sense is it a second formal act or predicamental accident. The *species impressa*, however, is both a logical accident (since it is over and above the angel's essence, which can be adequately understood without this particular *species*) and a predicamental accident of quality. The similarity between existence and any given *species impressa* in creatures lies in the fact that neither is part of the essence. This is the only point that St. Thomas wishes to make here, and it is his only reason for citing Avicenna. Later, after becoming convinced that the latter considered existence in creatures also as a predicamental accident, he will explicitly reject this supposedly Avicennian notion.

Avicenna's conception of existence as accidental to created essences is, therefore, in this context, introduced only as an example. The passage reads as follows:

All that something has . . . from another is over and above its

⁸*De Veritate*, q. 8, a. 8.

⁹Mandonnet puts *Quodlibet* IX between 1256 and 1259, Pelster between 1260 and 1265, and Glorieux in 1257. See De Raeymaeker, *Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 260.

¹⁰*Quodlibet.*, IX, a. 6, ad 4.

¹¹Mandonnet's dates for the *De Potentia* are 1259-63, Grabmann's 1265-67, and both Van Steenberghen's and Glorieux's 1265-68. See De Raeymaeker, *Intro-*

duction to Philosophy, p. 260, and Etienne Gilson, *Le thomisme* (5th ed., Paris: J. Vrin, 1947), p. 534. The later dates are more likely.

¹²Maurice Bouyges, "L'idée génératrice du *De Potentia* de saint Thomas," *Revue de philosophie*, II (1931), 128-31, 247-67 (cited by Beatrice Zedler, "Saint Thomas and Avicenna in the 'De Potentia Dei,'" *Traditio*, VI (1948), 107-9.

essence, and so Avicenna proves that the existence of each thing, except the first being, is over and above its essence, because all [creatures] have existence from another.⁸

Several years later in *Quodlibet IX*⁹ St. Thomas once more makes reference to Avicenna's placing of existence outside the concept of created essence, but here for the last time with unqualified approval. The objection is raised that angels must be composed of matter and form. In the logical order, one might argue, the specific difference is the determining principle and the genus the determinable. Difference has its origin in form; but, since an angel is noncomposite in essence, the only determining principle possible in him is existence. On the other hand the difference of a thing is part of its essence and must enter into the definition of the essence. But

. . . in every creature existence differs from essence and does not enter into its definition, as Avicenna says. Therefore the difference of an angel cannot come from its existence.

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Granted, for the difference comes, not from existence, but rather from the relation of the substance itself to existence.¹⁰

St. Thomas grants the objection because, as he has already shown in his answer to the previous difficulty, essence in an angel is not matter in the proper sense but can be compared with matter insofar as it is a potential principle in the order of being, just as matter is such a principle in the essence of material things. But in the logical order the genus of angels is taken from the nature of their substance—created and determinable intellectuality. Each angel is differentiated by the proportion his substance bears to existence, one angel having more potency capable of actuation, another less.

It is in the *De Potentia*, composed between 1265 and 1268,¹¹ that St. Thomas first makes a distinction regarding Avicenna's teaching that existence is accidental to created essence. It is not surprising that reserve should appear for the first time in this work, if, as Father Maurice Bouyges, S.J., suggests,¹² the *De Potentia* was intended by its author as an attack on Avicenna and his Neoplatonic theory of emanation.

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tion which explained the origin of finite beings as a necessary overflowing from the One.

Taking up the question of whether things created will ever be annihilated, St. Thomas proposes and answers a difficulty based on a teaching of Avicenna and St. Hilary of Poitiers that, since existence in creatures is accidental, no creature will exist forever. The answer merely distinguishes the two senses of accident, the logical accident (which can be but is not necessarily permanent) and the predicamental accident.

Nothing which exists accidentally is infinite. But existence belongs accidentally to every creature, as Avicenna says. And so Hilary, too, to distinguish God from the creature says: For God existence is not an accident. Therefore no creature will last forever. . . . Response: If we speak of the existence of a substance, existence is not said to be an accident in the genus of [predicamental] accident (for it is the act of an essence), but [existence is an accident] by a certain similarity, because it is not part of the essence, just as a [logical] accident is not.¹³

Several years later in the *Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics*¹⁴ St. Thomas expresses doubt about the correctness of Avicenna's teaching on this same point. Now the Arabian's statement that existence is other than created essence and therefore entering into composition with it is interpreted to mean that existence is added just as a predicamental accident is added to substance. This cannot be, says St. Thomas, because existence is not an accidental act but the substantial act of essence and is proportioned to its essence as act is to potency.

Avicenna . . . said . . . that . . . being signifies not the substance of a thing but something added. He spoke so of being,

¹³*De Potentia*, q. 5, a. 4, ad 3.

¹⁴Mandonnet dates this work from 1265, Grabmann from 1271-72, Mansion not before 1271. See De Raeymaeker, *Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 261. Grabmann's estimate is more probable. See Angelus Walz, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, trans. Sebastian Bullough (Westminster: Newman Press, 1951), p. 121.

¹⁵In *IV Metaph.*, lect. 2, nn. 556 and

558. Gilson in *Le thomisme*, p. 58, n. 1, comments on the use of *quasi*.

¹⁶Mandonnet places this work between 1269 and 1272, Pelster in 1272-73. De Raeymaeker, *Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 260.

¹⁷*Metaphysics*, VIII, 6 (1045 b 2). St. Thomas quotes this text elsewhere; for example, in *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 61, a. 1, ad 2.

¹⁸*Quodlibet.*, XII, q. 5, a. 1.

because in everything which has existence from another the existence of the thing is other than its essence.

But . . . he does not seem to have spoken correctly. For the existence of a thing, though other than its essence, should nevertheless not be thought of as something superadded like an accident. Existence is rather, so to speak, constituted by the principles of the essence.¹⁵

The final reference to Avicenna in connection with the question of existence as an accident occurs in *Quodlibet* XII, composed not long before the death of its author in 1274.¹⁶ After asking whether existence in an angel is accidental, St. Thomas cites Avicenna's axiom that "one" and "existent" are always such. Apparently Avicenna is merely repeating Aristotle's teaching that in immaterial beings neither "existent" nor "one" is to be found in their definitions,¹⁷ from which it would follow that existence and unity, being outside the adequate concept of the essence, would be predicated of such beings as logical accidents. In his earlier works, as has been seen, St. Thomas always interpreted Avicenna in this latter sense, but now he understands him to mean that existence in an angel is a predicamental accident—which opinion, of course, he rejects absolutely.

Is the existence of an angel his accident? Avicenna's opinion was that *one* and *being* always signify an accident. But this is not true, because *one*, as convertible with being, indicates the substance of a thing, just as *being* does.

As for Hilary's saying, I answer that an accident in a broad sense is said to be anything not part of the essence—for example, existence in created things—for in God alone is existence His essence.¹⁸

The period, then, in which St. Thomas shows increasing disapproval of Avicenna's teaching on existence as accidental to created essence would fall roughly between 1265 and 1273. Finally, as has been seen, he is unwilling to make in Avicenna's favor a distinction which he

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made even in *De Potentia* and which he is here still willing to make in favor of Hilary. Moreover, at least twice in *Quodlibet* II, written during the latter part (1269-72) of this same period, he himself set forth the doctrine which, in the last three texts above cited, he refused to admit as Avicenna's. There, in the first article of the second question, St. Thomas asks: Is an angel substantially composed of essence and existence? After answering affirmatively he notes in the body of the response that existence is not part of the definition of anything created but outside the essence, and continues:

Since everything outside the essence of a thing is called an accident, existence . . . is an accident. So the Commentator [Averroes] says that the proposition, "Socrates is," belongs to accidental predication.

As for the second objection [that no accident enters into substantial composition] I answer that existence is an accident, not like a [predicamental] accident but as the actuality of every substance . . .¹⁹

Averroes, of course, regarded "existent" in the example as a logical accident of Socrates and constantly argued against Avicenna's teaching of existence being really distinct from created essence.

In the next article of the same work St. Thomas contrasts existence in God and creatures. In God it is identified with essence, but in an angel existence is not part of his essence but accidental to it. An angel, moreover, has other logical accidents, such as any particular act of the intellect or will, which belong to his supposit and are separable from it in somewhat the same manner as existence, as entitative act, belongs to created essence and is really distinct from it.

In God alone there is found no accident in addition to His essence, since His existence is His essence . . . but not . . . so

¹⁹*Ibid.*, II, q. 2, a. 1.

²⁰*Ibid.*, a. 2. Cf. *De Anima*, a. 12, ad 7.

²¹*De Ente*, ed. Roland-Gosselin, p. xxi.

²²Averroes, In *IV Metaph.*, cap. 2, com. 3 (cited by Aimé Forest, *La structure métaphysique du concret selon saint Thomas d'Aquin* [2nd ed. Paris: J. Vrin, 1956]), p. 41.

²³Averroes, *Destructio Destructionum*

(Venetiis, 1550), fol. 34 v. (cited by Zedler, *Traditio*, VI, 156, n. 57).

²⁴Zedler, *Traditio*, VI, 152.

²⁵Averroes, *Disp. Metaphys.*, V, p. 176 r. (cited by Forest, *La structure métaphysique*, p. 143, n. 2).

²⁶Munk, *Maimonide, Guide des égarés*, I, 231, n. a (cited by Forest, *La structure métaphysique*, p. 143, n. 1).

in an angel. In addition to his specific essence there is something accidental to him, for the existence of an angel is over and above his essence or nature. He has other accidents too, all belonging to the supposit but not to the nature.²⁰

Existence, then, is a constituent and necessary part of the formal supposit, actuated and individual; but it is accidental to a finite essence which can be adequately conceived without existence.

The reference to Averroes in *Quodlibet* II, q. 2, a. 1, also points to the reason for St. Thomas's growing opposition to this teaching of Avicenna. The latter strongly influenced the thought of St. Thomas's earlier writings, especially the *Commentary on the Sentences* and *De Ente et Essentia*.²¹ But in his later works, at least regarding existence and unity in creatures, St. Thomas seems gradually to have sided with Averroes's accusation that "Avicenna erred greatly in saying that one and being signify dispositions added to the essence of a thing."²² Apparently convinced that Avicenna considered the two principles of finite being as really separable, Averroes had concluded that the only alternative was to deny any kind of real distinction between them.²³ Moreover, in purporting to present Avicenna's doctrine, he had made it appear that the latter held existence to be a real predicamental accident of essence and indicated, as the source of Avicenna's error, his confusing of the logical with the real order.²⁴

To say that existence is added to the quiddity . . . is an extremely fallacious assertion because from this it follows that the name of being signifies an accident common to the ten predicaments outside the mind. And this is Avicenna's opinion.²⁵

Averroes had even supplied an etymological reason for Avicenna's supposed confusion—the fact that the Arabic philosophical term for existent being, *mawjud*, is a passive participle of "to find" and so might be thought to indicate some kind of real accident.²⁶ St. Thomas in his later works and the Scholastics in general adopted this interpretation of Avicenna's doctrine and rejected the notion, attributed to him, of existence as a predicamental accident of essence.

But Averroes seems to have drawn from certain statements of

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Avicenna meanings which the latter never intended and his original words do not support. The misinterpretation in question here is all the more striking because Avicenna himself had warned against confusing the two kinds of accident:

The property and the common accident are among the accidental predicates. . . . An example of the common accident is "white" with a man of the white race. . . . Some modern logicians [the Arabs, as contrasted with the Greeks, the ancients] think that this accident is the one mentioned as opposed to substance, but it is by no means so. . . . These five expressions, genus, species, difference, property, and common accident . . . are attributed to particular things which are their [logical] inferiors.²⁷

Moreover, to be a predicamental accident, being would have to be one of the supreme genera capable of univocal predication of its own inferiors. But Avicenna repeatedly denies that existence can be considered in this light.

The existence which is not in itself a quiddity . . . is not a genus for anything.²⁸

In these categories existence is distinguished from essence, because the existence is accidental, not essential. . . . Existence, then, is neither the genus nor the property nor anything else of these ten categories.²⁹

²⁷Ibn Sina, *Livre des directives et remarques*, trans. A. M. Goichon (Paris: J. Vrin, 1951), pp. 100-102.

²⁸Ibn Sina, *'Uyun al-hikmah* (Al-Qahirah: Al-M'had ul'ilmi il-Faransi, 1954), Al-ilahiyat, 5, p. 53.

²⁹Avicenna, *Le livre de science*, trans. Mohammad Achena et Henri Massé (Paris: "Les Belles Lettres," 1955), p. 116.

³⁰Ibn Sina, *Livre des directives et remarques*, p. 369.

³¹*De unitate*, ed. Parma, Vol. 16, p. 215, col. 2. Expressions like "Averroes perverse exponit," "Peripateticæ philosophiæ depravator," recur constantly throughout this opusculum.

³²The first major philosophical work of Avicenna is the *Shifa'* ("Remedy") which contains four principal parts dealing with logic, physics, mathematics, and metaphysics. The *Najat* ("Salvation") is an abridgment of the *Shifa'*,

following its order and sometimes reproducing its text. The third and last, *Kitab al-isharat wa't-tanbihat* ("Book of Directives and Remarks"), follows the plan of the *Shifa'* but substitutes a treatise on mysticism for that on mathematics. Besides these three major works, Avicenna composed a large number of minor philosophical treatises. One of these latter, *Danesh-name* ("Book of Knowledge"), written in Persian, synthesizes the contents of the *Shifa'* but follows a different order. Chronologically it comes between the *Najat* and *Kitab al-isharat*. *'Uyun al-hikmah* ("Sources of Wisdom"), written in Arabic in the last years of his life, briefly summarizes his philosophical thought, following the order of the *Shifa'*.

³³Avicenna, *Metaphys.*, V, 2 (cited in *De Ente*, ed. Roland-Gosselin, p. 25, n.).

Since actual existence is not one of the categories known as a genus, it does not become, by a relation established between it and a negative idea [that which is not in an actual subject, viz., accident], a genus belonging to something. For certainly existence, not being a constituent of quiddities but one of their concomitants, does not become a part of the constituent merely by not being in a subject.³⁰

It is hardly credible, therefore, that a philosopher of the stature of Averroes failed to grasp the true sense of Avicenna's conception of existence as accidental in finite beings. It is more likely that his account of the latter's teaching on this point is another example of what St. Thomas himself accused him of in *De Unitate Intellectus contra Averroistas*—a deliberate perversion of another's thought. "Averroes . . . deliberately misinterpreted the words of Alexander, just as he took those of Themistius in a way contrary to his intended sense."³¹

Avicenna, then, warned in general of the danger of confusing real accidents, opposed to substance, with logical accidents, opposed to constituents of created essence adequately conceived. Moreover, by denying that existence is a genus, he excluded the possibility of regarding it as a predicament. On these grounds alone any interpretation of his words that would make existence a real accident seems indefensible. But the Arabian philosopher still more explicitly, both in his more important works, the *Shifa'* and *Kitab al-isharat wa't-tanbihat*, and in his minor treatises, '*Uyun al-hikmah* and *Danesh-name*,³² treats created existence as a logical accident, associating it with the other predicables and contrasting it with the constituents of any particular finite essence.

Reference has already been made to the passage in the *Shifa'* in which the accidental relation of existence to essence in finite beings is proposed.

Animal, as it exists in sensible things or in the mind . . . is animal [essence] and something else not animal. . . . But to be with something else is accidental to it.³³

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The same point is developed more fully in *Kitab al-isharat*:

Everything possessing a quiddity is ascertained to exist in individuals or is merely conceived in the mind. . . . If it has an essence which does not exist by one of these two existences and is not constituted by one of them, then "existence" is a concept related to its essence as a concomitant or otherwise. . . . If existence were a constituent of humanity, it would be impossible to conceive humanity in the mind as deprived of what would be its constitutive part.³⁴

In the chapter immediately following this description of finite essence in its relation to existence, Avicenna explains the sense in which he understands "concomitant" (*lazim*):

As for the nonconstituent concomitant, which is properly named concomitant (even though the constituent is also a concomitant), it is that which accompanies the quiddity without being part of it.³⁵

The "concomitant" may be compared, on the one hand, with the constituent, inasmuch as both are inseparable from the essence, and, on the other, with the accident, insofar as both concomitant and accident are over and above the essence adequately conceived.³⁶ Existence is a concomitant in both respects, since it is inseparable from the essence of any actual finite individual and yet not part of that essence considered precisely in itself.

Composed not long before its author's death in 1037, *'Uyun al-hikmah* represents a later stage of his philosophical thought than

³⁴Ibn Sina, *Livre des directives et remarques*, pp. 87-88. The *Najat* has a parallel passage, "Existence is not owed to a thing (that begins to be) in itself" (Avicenna, *Metaphysiques Compendium*, trans. Nematallah Caramé [Rome: Pontifical Institute of Oriental Studies, 1926], p. 63).

³⁵Ibn Sina, *Livre des directives et remarques*, p. 89. Cf. S. Thomas, *In V Metaph.*, lect. 22, no. 1142.

³⁶See A. M. Goichon, *Lexique de la langue philosophique d'Ibn Sina* (Paris: Desclée-de Brouwer, 1938), p. 367.

³⁷Ibn Sina, *'Uyun al-hikmah*, "al-

ilahiyat," 5, p. 58. On the translation of *'anniyah* as "actuation," see Caramé's translation, p. 113, n. 1. A. M. Goichon, *Lexique de la langue philosophique d'Ibn Sina*, p. 9, believes that Avicenna was not precise in his use of the term; but here, by explicitly making it a synonym of existence, he leaves no doubt about its meaning. Achena and Massé also translate the word by "existence" (Avicenna's *Livre de science*, p. 116). Cf. Ibn Sina, *Livre des directives*, p. 365, n. 2.

³⁸*Livre de science*, pp. 147-48. Compare the citation from the same source referred to in note 29.

do the two works just mentioned. In the final chapter of this brief treatise, Avicenna contrasts caused being with the self-existent and says of the latter:

Because he is not divisible in any way, he has neither part nor genus. Since he has no genus, he has no specific difference. And because quiddity is his actuation (I mean the existence), it is not a quiddity to which existence is accidental.³⁷

The import of this passage, which deals with predicables, shows that the term "accidental," which in the last clause is predicated of existence, is to be understood as referring to a logical accident. The clear implication is that in beings whose quiddity is not their existence, existence, in the order of predicables, is a logical accident.

In the *Danesh-name*, finally, perhaps more definitely than elsewhere, Avicenna plainly distinguishes logical from predicamental accidents and classes existence in finite beings with the former:

The Necessary Being is not a [predicamental] substance and is not part of any category. The reason is that the existence of all the categories is accidental and joined to the quiddity, in which it is not contained. But the existence of the Necessary Being is His very quiddity. Therefore it is evident that the Necessary Being, having no genus, has also no specific difference, and consequently no definition.³⁸

In brief, then, existence in finite beings is outside the adequate concept of the essence; and therefore, in relation to the essence, existence is extrinsic, adventitious, and in that sense accidental. Hence Avicenna, despite the doctrine attributed to him by Averroes, does not teach that existence is a predicamental accident like quantity or quality; but he equivalently states that any given finite being is fully understandable even though not thought of as existing, and that existence is thus never part of its definition. Existence, then, may be conceived as present or absent while the finite essence remains unaltered.

Such teaching did not originate with Avicenna. Alfarabi explicitly taught that "existence is not a constitutive character; it is

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only an accessory accident.”³⁹ Aristotle implies as much when he distinguishes human nature as one thing and human existence as another⁴⁰ and says that the term “existent” is not present in the definition of finite beings without matter.⁴¹

The word “accident” as here used cannot, of course, be understood in any other order but that of predication, as Avicenna himself warned. In the physical order existence is not an accident but the act of the passive potency, essence, to which it is transcendently related.

It is precisely in this latter relation that the disagreement between St. Thomas and Avicenna has its root. Although Avicenna seems to have come close to it, he never explicitly formulated the relationship of finite essence, as subjective passive potency, to existence as act to which the essence is positively ordered. Analyzing finite essence and realizing that existence is not contained in its adequate concept, he logically concludes that existence is conferred from without by creative activity. Saying that existence in such a case comes from without does not mean that it is added as a predicamental accident but merely indicates its origin from an efficient cause. This analysis of finite being is proposed in two passages of *’Uyun al-hikmah*:

What is in itself possible does not have existence from itself. Otherwise it itself would necessarily be from itself. Consequently its existence is from another.⁴²

That which begins to be has existence after it did not exist. Its existence after nonexistence is not the [substantial] act of the efficient cause. But its existence depends exclusively on something else, since in itself it [whatever begins to be] has only this—that it did not exist. Hence, if the existence depends on something else and if it is impossible that existence should derive from a cause which is not the very act of existing, then the

³⁹Cited by Gilson, *Le thomisme*, p. 55.

⁴⁰*Analytica Posteriora*, Bk. II, chap. 7, 92b.

⁴¹*Metaphysics*, Bk. VIII, chap. 6, 1045b.

⁴²*Uyun al-hikmah*, 5, p. 55.

⁴³*Ibid.*, 5, pp. 52-53.

⁴⁴For example, the *Najat*, trans. Carame, pp. 37-38.

⁴⁵Gilson, *Le thomisme*, p. 56, n. 1.

⁴⁶*Najat*, trans. Carame, p. 37, n. 1.

⁴⁷F. Ehrle, “L’Agostinismo e l’Aristotelismo nella Scolastica del secolo XIII,” *Xenia Thomistica*, III (1925), p. 520

(cited in Aimé Forest, Fernand Van Steenberghen, and M. de Gandillac, *Le mouvement doctrinal du ix^e au xiv^e siècle*, Vol. 13 of Fliche et Martin, *Histoire de l’Eglise* [Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1951], p. 255, n. 3).

⁴⁸Forest, Van Steenberghen, and de Gandillac, *Le mouvement doctrinal*, pp. 255-56, and Fernand Van Steenberghen, *The Philosophical Movement in the Thirteenth Century* (London: Nelson, 1955), p. 78.

existence must be ordered—as is evident—ultimately to the first [efficient] causes.⁴³

In saying here and elsewhere⁴⁴ that a finite thing, if its essence alone is considered, has only nonexistence, Avicenna has opened himself to the charge of making finite essence indifferent instead of positively ordered to existence as potency to act.⁴⁵ He seems, however, merely to have wished, by stressing the fact that existence is never contained in the adequate concept of created essence, to show the ultimate need of a necessarily existent cause to explain the existence of finite beings.⁴⁶

The Arabian philosopher's teachings differ from those of St. Thomas on many points, but existence as a predicable accident in finite beings is not among them. Why, then, did St. Thomas oppose Avicenna on this ground? Certainly the answer must take into account Averroes's misrepresentations, but the whole reason is not to be found there. St. Thomas was equally or more opposed to many of Averroes's doctrines and never accepted his strictures on Avicenna for the reasons which Averroes himself gave—reasons that always suppose the real identification of existence with created essence. Very probably the fuller motivation for St. Thomas's growing hostility towards Avicenna's teaching on this point must be sought in the light of the doctrinal conflict that occupied the latter years of the saint's life.

In point of fact, the gradual rejection of Avicenna's views parallels in time the growing polemic in the Church against heterodox Aristotelianism in general and Averroes and Avicenna in particular. Some set the starting point of this polemic as early as 1263, when Urban IV renewed the prohibition of Gregory IX against teaching Aristotle—in recognition, it is said, of the growing danger to orthodoxy offered by Arabian misinterpretations of his works.⁴⁷ Canon Van Steenberghen, however, regards this injunction as a mere manifestation of conservatism without relation to the real doctrinal situation then prevailing at Paris and maintains that the first reaction there to Neoplatonic Aristotelianism did not antedate 1265 or 1267.⁴⁸ In any case, it is roughly within this period, 1263-67, that St. Thomas first manifests disagreement with Avicenna on a teaching hitherto accepted, and this in the *De Potentia*, a work written, as seems likely,

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in refutation of Avicennian Neoplatonism.⁴⁹ At the end of 1268, St. Thomas was recalled to Paris and there, until 1272, he strenuously defended his doctrinal positions against the heterodox Aristotelianism of Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia. The two works in which he finally rejects Avicennian teaching on existence in relation to finite essence are also the products of this period—the *Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics* dating from 1271-72 and *Quodlibet* XII from 1272-73. The opposition to Avicenna on this subject, beginning in *De Potentia* and accentuated during the period of controversy with Siger, is the more understandable in view of the fact that Siger himself drew at least as much upon Avicenna as he did upon Averroes.⁵⁰ There seems good foundation, then, to regard this change of attitude on the part of St. Thomas as part of the larger battle waged against Arabian philosophy and the heterodox interpretations of Aristotle which it largely inspired.

Avicenna, as has been seen, never seems to have conceived the relation of essence to existence as that of subjective potency to its actuating principle in the order of being. Some, as has been noted, have held that this lacuna in his thought led him to make finite essence indifferent instead of positively ordered to existence.⁵¹ St. Thomas's developing insight into the essentialism that would follow from such a view of finite being would then have provoked, in his later works, the less benevolent interpretation of Avicenna's statements regarding the accidental character of existence in created things. It may well be that such considerations influenced St. Thomas, but his aversion seems also to be part of the general reaction against the dangerous errors of heterodox Aristotelianism which drew its inspiration both from Avicenna and Averroes. The parallel chronology of the doctrinal disputes at Paris and of St. Thomas's philosophical writing in the latter years of his life would seem to impose some such conclusion.

⁴⁹Grabmann dates *De Potentia* from 1265-67, Van Steenberghen and Glorieux from 1265-68. Mandonnet allows the year of Urban's prohibition, 1263, as the latest date, but this is probably too early. See note 11 and Walz, *St. Thomas Aquinas*, pp. 104 and 121.

⁵⁰Forest, *Le Mouvement doctrinal*, pp. 278, 281-82; and Fernand Van Steenberghen, *The Philosophical Movement in the 13th Century*, p. 80.

⁵¹Gilson, *Le thomisme*, p. 56. n. 1; and Zedler, *Traditio*, VI, 154-57.

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II

SOME CRITICAL REMARKS

A

IN GENERAL

Effective exposition means criticism and evaluation. Dr. Radhakrishnan himself does not think it necessary to abstain from criticism in order that he may give a fair and impartial statement.¹ If so, he will certainly allow us also to make a few remarks on his view of experience and of reality. It is not easy to be comprehensive and impartial; but one can be sincere, broad-minded, and imaginative in the consideration of views with which one is not in sympathy or agreement.² Still more encouraging is that Dr. Radhakrishnan himself, as a true and unselfish *guru*, or teacher, exhorts us to discuss freely not merely concepts by postulation but also concepts by intuition.³ "We would be unworthy disciples if we do not question and criticise our masters . . . and think for ourselves."⁴ He himself gives us the lead.

Loyalty to ourselves, to our intellect and conscience, requires us to withhold our assent from propositions which do not commend themselves to our conscience and judgment. We must respect our own dignity as rational beings and thus diminish the power of fraud. It is essential that we should subject religious beliefs (and experiences as these too are just beliefs ultimately) to the scrutiny of reason.⁵

It is just this that I shall try to do.

Now, philosophy is defined by Radhakrishnan as "a logical inquiry into the nature of reality."⁶ And as it is natural to man to philosophize—at least implicitly—he justly argues against Swami A. Bharati and other logical positivists when he says: "Metaphysical emptiness does not exist, for it is itself a metaphysics, a sceptical metaphysics. To refuse to philosophise is in itself a kind of philosophy."⁷

Again we must grant that philosophy is a sustained attempt to understand the universe as a whole and not merely some sections of it, as other sciences do.⁸ It must be a synthetic and coherent view of the whole of reality; it must interpret and co-ordinate all the significant aspects of experience. It must reckon, therefore, with religious experience also.⁹ *Philosophia est scientia rerum omnium.*

Moreover, it is true that philosophy in its fullness is not just logical reflection; it is love of wisdom. *Sophia, jnana*—wisdom—is not mere knowledge; it is knowledge loved and lived; it is a way of life in which valid knowledge is the condition of just action.¹⁰ And if it is genuine love of true wisdom, it will naturally lead the student to a life of true religion and love. Dr. Radhakrishnan decries all sham religions: "Almost all of us deny God's existence in everything we do. We bow down before the world, flesh and power."¹¹ If we are religious, he justly exhorts, we must live our religion. If we do not live our religion, our religion is a phantasy or a documentation.¹²

Dr. Radhakrishnan does not cease to act as a philosopher even while appealing to the *scruti* or the Vedas as an authoritative source of knowledge. This appeal to the Vedas, he says, does not involve any reference

¹*Indian Philosophy* (1923), I, 9. *The Philosophy of S. Radhakrishnan*, ed. P. V. Schilpp ("Library of Living Philosophers Series," No. 8. New York: Tudor Pub. Co., 1952), p. 815.

²*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 815.

³*Ibid.*, p. 823.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁵*The Idealist View of Life* (1932), p. 219.

⁶*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 816.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 789.

⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 817.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 22.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 23.

¹³*Indian Philosophy*, I, 51.

¹⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 129 f.

¹⁶*Idealist View of Life*, p. 89, and *The Heart of Hindustan* (1936), p. 48.

¹⁷*Cf. Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 817.

¹⁸*Cf. Radhakrishnan's reply to Swami A. Bharatti, ibid.*, pp. 465, 814-20.

¹⁹*Cf. ibid.*, p. 817.

²⁰*Cf. "My Search for Truth"* (offprint, 1948), p. 30.

²¹*Cf. Indian Philosophy*, II, 517.

²²*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 825.

²³"The Spirit in Man," *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, ed. S. Radhakrishnan and J. H. Muirhead (1936), p. 486.

²⁴THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, XXXVI, 41-56.

to an extra-philosophical standard.¹³ For the Vedas are only *aptavacanas*, the sayings of the wise. They are the experiences of seers more fortunate than the normal man, which we are called upon to accept¹⁴ if we are convinced of the genuineness of the experience and of the veracity of the testimony. They are human testimony, the inspired creations of men as are poetry and art; they are not an infallible revelation.¹⁵ Their authority, if any, is but the authority of facts.¹⁶ Dr. Radhakrishnan would not hold beliefs simply because an authority, a scripture, church, or dictator announces them.¹⁷ That is why he would like to be called not so much a "theologian of Hinduism"¹⁸ as a "philosopher offering rational evidence in support of his conclusions."¹⁹

And even when Radhakrishnan appeals, as he often does, to intuition, integral knowledge, spiritual experience, he does not want to be an obscurantist.²⁰ He wants the intellect to be used as a critical weapon against all untested assumptions, to probe even scriptural views and spiritual experiences.²¹ Even if the saving experience is ineffable, yet it is most rational; "the highest type of mysticism is most rational."²² Thus even intuition is not independent of thought but emphatically dependent on it.²³

In general, however, this may be said—and any intelligent student of philosophy will soon perceive it without much difficulty—that nearly all, or most, of Dr. Radhakrishnan's fundamental statements are true at least in some sense or other. They need, however, to be made philosophically more precise and complete. To do full justice, therefore, to Radhakrishnan, I should have analyzed and evaluated each one of his important propositions that I presented in Part I.²⁴ Given my scope and resources, though, I could not do so or even discuss in detail the various problems that call for a consistent solution in the author's writings. Hence, I content myself with asking a few questions and making a few remarks on his description of spiritual experience and on his interpretation of spiritual reality. Are not these two the basic and principal notion of our author's *jnana* or spiritual wisdom?

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First and foremost, against all crudely materialistic and purely naturalistic theories, Dr. Radhakrishnan justly defends a new set of phenomena in man quite distinct from the physical or the vital or the merely conscious.²⁵ Unfortunately, however, he is content with merely stating facts and defending activities like a scientist; he does not enquire further like a philosopher into their distinctive ontological bases, even at the relatively real or pragmatic level.

Again, he is inclined on occasions to depreciate sensitive and intellectual knowledge; but he does this, I should say, only to bring into greater relief the need and fact of a higher knowledge that is integral. Sensitive knowledge, it is true, does not give us reality and truth formally and ontologically; but it must and does give them materially and ontically.²⁶ We must esteem and accept sensitive knowledge for what it is worth; otherwise all our scientific knowledge based on observations and experiments would be just castles in the air.

As regards intellectual knowledge, it seems to me somewhat arbitrary to limit, as Radhakrishnan does at times, intellectual knowledge to a mere discursive one, or, worse still, to equate it to a common, systematized scientific knowledge of physical sciences such as physics, biology, astronomy, and so on. In this sense, surely man is more than pure reason. He has obviously intellectual apprehensions of primary objective realities, of first principles of thought and of conduct, of internal concrete facts, of the act of existing, *esse*, in the act of judgment, and so on, though by reflexion he often tries to confirm them by sound reasoning too. We would gladly, therefore, repeat with Radhakrishnan that any sound rationalism will recognize the need of some sort of intuition.²⁷ Even while we confess that normally and naturally we have no strictly intuitive intellectual

²⁵*Idealist View of Life*, p. 262.

²⁶St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate*, q. 1, a. 9.

²⁷"Spirit in Man," p. 485.

²⁸"Semper supremum infimi ordinis attingit infimum supremi, ut patet per Dionysium" (St. Thomas Aquinas, *De Spiritualibus Creaturis*, a. 2).

²⁹"Personally, I use intuition for integral (non-inferential, non-hearsay) knowledge" (*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 791).

³⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 790 f.

³¹*Idealist View of Life*, pp. 175 and 200.

perception, we must affirm that our natural reason at its highest shares something of a higher, intuitive intellect.²⁸

In other words, man's intellect is also intuitive and as "higher reason" is a guide not merely in empirical knowledge but to intuition itself. It is the unique check and verifier of all interpretations, even of spiritual experiences which would otherwise be just "ineffable" or even be subject to errors and illusions. Radhakrishnan, therefore, is right in defending against all positivists like A. Comte and pure rationalists like Ch. Wolff man's possession not merely of sensitive and discursive or hearsay knowledge but also of something of the intuitive type. And he does well to call it "integral," after Vivekananda, rather than "intuitive" knowledge,²⁹ as it includes, besides the cognitive, the emotive and conative also. When intuition is defined as integral insight, the suggestion is that the whole mind is at work in it.³⁰

If we therefore take integral knowledge in its generic sense, we cannot but admit that many a genius at different places and times has claimed to have had some such experience even to a marked degree. Intense artistic or poetic experiences, for example, are not very uncommon.

Dr. Radhakrishnan indeed classifies his integral experiences into scientific, artistic, philosophical, and religious types. This I take to be in the ascending order since he calls the religious experience the highest, the one that includes all the others.³¹ He does not, however, tell us explicitly the norm of that classification; it is perhaps taken to be obvious. Now, since, on the part of the experiencing subject, the whole is said to be at work in an integral experience, if this latter varies, not merely in degree, but also in kind, this variation must be due to the variation of the object experienced. One experience may and often will run into another; and yet one is by no means the other and is therefore explainable only by the determining object or reality. This is confirmed by the few examples our author gives, such as the highest art, charming rhapsody, sublime poetry, ecstatic love of God. If things, therefore, were not real in themselves or did not differ specifically but only superficially, as would be the case in formal monism, the qualitative difference between the artistic and the religious, for example, would hardly be explained.

Turning to the spiritual or religious experience itself, Dr. Radha-

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krishnan, I think, rightly contends that any sincere lover of truth must admit not merely the possibility but even the occurrence of some extraordinary spiritual or religious phenomena all over the world, all along the centuries. How can we reject wholesale as pathological or illusory the testimony of thousands of intelligent, ascetical men, who claim to have had some unique experience at some time of their lives?³² Truly, it seems to me, "the evidence is too massive to run away from."³³

And according to Radhakrishnan, these spiritual or religious experiences are "mystical" ones. Now, can they really be called—are they truly—mystical in any exact sense of the word? Radhakrishnan indeed describes them as some sort of connatural, nonconceptual, fruitive experiences: "Tasting nothing, comprehending nothing in particular, holding itself in emptiness, the soul finds itself as having all. A lightning flash . . . a rapture beyond joy, a knowledge beyond reason . . ." ³⁴ And there seems to be some sort of absolute, too, the extranormal consciousness of which renders the experience singular and mysterious: "It is not a consciousness of this or that thing"; ³⁵ "it is just turning inside and seeing the self." ³⁶

So if mystic experience be defined, as it should be, as a "fruitive experience of an absolute" ³⁷—prescinding, therefore, from the intimate nature of the absolute experienced—then with J. Maritain, O. Lacombe, and L. Gardet, Dr. Radhakrishnan is justified in calling the above experiences mystical if and when they are genuine.

With regard to the nature of the thing experienced, however, our author seems to be led away unaware by the strong currents of old tradition. Because it is perceived by a method of intellectual nescience that bypasses all interrelations of things, the particular absolute is seized as if it were *the* absolute. Not attending to this special coloring of the perception because of the specific mode that is adopted, Radha-

³²Cf. J. Maritain, *Quatre essais sur l'esprit dans sa condition charnelle*, pp. 155 f.

³³*Idealist View of Life*, p. 91.

³⁴*Eastern Religions and Western Thought* (1939), p. 50.

³⁵*Indian Philosophy*, II, 512.

³⁶*Katha Upanishad*, II, 1, 1, quoted in Radhakrishnan's *The Principal Upanishads* (1953), p. 95.

³⁷Cf. *Revue thomiste*, LIV, 298.

³⁸Cf. L. Gardet's article, "Recherches

sur la mystique naturelle," *Revue thomiste*, XLVIII, 94.

³⁹*Indian Philosophy*, I, 177.

⁴⁰*Idealist View of Life*, p. 94.

⁴¹Cf. L. Gardet's article, "Vraie et fausse mystique," *Revue thomiste*, LIV, 308.

⁴²*Principal Upanishads*, p. 104.

⁴³This is a happy, significant expression of M. Eliade's (*Techniques du yoga*, p. 97 and *passim*).

krishnan, like most Hindus, arrives at the easy but unwarranted solution that the reality experienced is no other than the Supreme Spirit, the Unique Absolute Itself.

It is unwarranted, I say, because it is an illegitimate transition and interpretation of the seer from the negative, psychological unawareness of limitation to positive, ontological exclusion of limitation in the absolute experienced. The grandeur of the Indian experience is its own limit, snare, and fall. The seer, owing to his special technique of reaching his experience, is not and cannot then be aware of the limitation of the absolute he is enjoying, of this metaphysical wonder of his soul's substantial *esse*; and so, after the experience, he thinks he has attained ontologically the Absolute Itself.³⁸ "He does not know what it is when he reaches it";³⁹ but when "the vision is no more, he strives to recapture and retain in memory . . . the process of reflection starts."⁴⁰ My *atman*, spirit or self, he argues, the thing I experienced, is absolute, just like *Brahman*, the Supreme; it is Brahman. I am Brahman, therefore: *aham brahmasmi*. This sort of musing, however, is no longer experience but interpretation, and so is subject to the verdict of logic. And sound logic forbids us to pass from mere distant similarity and analogical *amsatva*, participation, to simple identity and univocal unity.

It is unwarranted, again, because scientific induction forbids us to postulate more than what is strictly necessary to explain the various elements of the experience. All the elements of that fruitive, mystical experience can be explained adequately and scientifically by a natural, finite absolute; namely, the substantial act of existing of one's own spiritual soul, which, notwithstanding its limitation, is a true absolute, being an image and likeness of the Supreme Absolute.⁴¹ It is the awakening, the realization of the self, *svanubhava*; "it is the possession of the soul or it is the soul that penetrates into its own ground and depth and becomes essential being."⁴²

The soul, it is true, bound up as it is now with the body, normally never sees itself directly: it knows itself always in and through its acts. But why is it not possible for the spiritual soul, by a drastic process of purification and concentration, by a method of nescience, to transform in an extranormal act of pure entasis⁴³ the ordinary existential knowledge it has of itself into an extraordinary, secret,

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strange, and wondrous experience? "The human individual in the contemplative sight, strips himself one after the other, of the outer sheaths of consciousness . . . untill all else fades away into illimitable darkness, until he is alone in the white radiance of a central and unique ecstasy." ⁴⁴

I am not denying, however, that these spiritual experiences may serve as special means to lead us to the very throne of God. I maintain that it would be unwarranted—nay more, contrary to sound reason itself—if man by his own force and endeavor attained God as He is in Himself. Some holy men, I believe, even among my Hindu compatriots, have really come to enjoy a sublime union with the Divinity itself, to share its light and love, to relish that loving contemplation. But that is only because "the Transcendent Self [not merely 'as it were,' but in very truth] stoops down and touches their [spiritual] eyes." ⁴⁵ The *jiva*, self, can perhaps be experienced by self through a special initiation and technique; but the Divine Self, *Atman*, can never be experientially and affectively realized unless that Self "chooses" ⁴⁶ and calls us unto Him by His loving grace, as the millions of Hindu *bhaktas* themselves affirm.

Of course all this distinction between the self and the Self, the spirit and the Spirit, would be meaningless if ever, even for a minute, we experienced or were able to experience mystically our essential identity with the Supreme. But *that* we are never aware of. "When we reach it, we do not know what it is; we seem to be in touch with reality other than matter, life or mind [*manas*] . . . the idea of God [as the reality experienced] is an interpretation." ⁴⁷ But if we do not know what we were experiencing, how can we draw any definite conclusions from it? How can we interpret it as a union with *Brahman-Atman*, the Absolute itself, unless under a fallacy or a prejudice? "It is essential that we subject all these religious beliefs to a careful scrutiny of reason." ⁴⁸ And reason and logic tell us for certain that, naturally speaking, any secret intuition of man, even at its highest, can only be of a creaturely absolute and never of the Supreme Absolute and that

⁴⁴*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 63.

⁴⁵*Indian Philosophy*, II, 512.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, I, 234, and *Principal Upanishads*, p. 102.

⁴⁷*Idealist View of Life*, p. 86.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, p. 219.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, p. 307.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, p. 310.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, p. 310. Cf. also *Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 46, and *Principal Upanishads*, p. 131.

⁵²*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, pp. 85-111. This article is a very good inventory of Radhakrishnan's ideas.

⁵³*Ibid.*, p. 110. (*Italics mine.*)

God alone can know God as He is and he to whom God graciously communicates Himself. Dr. Radhakrishnan may hold and try to defend absolute monism as a logical necessity; but he can never draw any conclusive proof for his monism from mysticism, not even of the Hindu type.

Finally, even the integral saving knowledge, as described by Radhakrishnan, does not seem to be wholly integral and saving. For subjectively the individuals continue to be born, to suffer, and to die; it is only their spirits, *ananda*, that are then said to be in communion with a greater Self; the intellectual, which is also characteristically human, seems to have no essential part in the experience itself. Our author's mystics or seers, therefore, "only touch the fringe, but do not enter the clouds; they only enter the light, but do not touch the flame."⁴⁹ Objectively also these freed souls are not fully saved unless and until the whole cosmos is saved; that is, dissolves into the Absolute. Man in fact will be completely integrated, perfected, saved only when he is no more.

But here let it be noted that Radhakrishnan sees the utter futility of this individual and cosmic evolution since it all disintegrates finally. "Is the spirit of man to be brought to fruition," he asks, "only to be broken for ever?"⁵⁰ But he *does not* and *cannot* give a reasonable and satisfactory answer to this point, which is so vital and crucial. He evades an answer by simply affirming that there may and will be others, other such futile cosmic manifestations or purposeless *lilas*, sports of the Supreme.⁵¹ By thus refusing to give us the required answer, he unwittingly brings down, it seems to me, all the mysterious and somewhat fascinating house of cards he has been constructing so laboriously up to now. Professor G. P. Conger is right when he concludes his brief survey of "Radhakrishnan's World"⁵² by saying that "Radhakrishnan's integral experience points *the way*, even if it misconstrues the *goal*. It needs to be purged of its inconsistencies and shorn of its extravagancies and to become genuinely integral."⁵³ And Dr. Radhakrishnan's integral experience will, in my opinion, be more consistent and genuinely integral only if man, as the *bhaktas* hold, not ceasing to be essentially man, is held to become actively "godlike" through the loving gift of his God.

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At the very outset, the high aspirations and noble ideals that animate Dr. Radhakrishnan, as well as most of our Indian thinkers, must be acknowledged and given credit to. First, as absolute plurality is metaphysically repugnant, Radhakrishnan does well in rejecting philosophies such as the Samkhya that set up two or more absolute and ultimate realities. All true philosophy must in truth be "fundamentally a monism" in the sense that it acknowledges the fact that "the reals are [truly and wholly] dependent, *para-tantra* on God who alone is [absolutely] independent, *svatantra*!"⁵⁴

Again, Radhakrishnan wants not to preach a dogmatic theology but to expound an integral philosophy, a philosophy, namely, which offers an interpretation of the universe and which is at once rational and depending on logical reflection and not acts of faith.⁵⁵ To philosophize thus is certainly a commendable thing.

Lastly, true to the Indian tradition which is "essentially and intensely spiritual." Dr. Radhakrishnan insists, against all species of materialists, that Spirit and Spirit alone can be the true and ultimate explanation of the whole universe.⁵⁶ Surely, all of us must agree that "the non-conscious cannot be the cause of the conscious. If anything, the consciousness must be the cause of the nonconsciousness."⁵⁷ Here one can also see and admire the longing of the human spirit to soar back to, and be at rest in, its ontological Source—a longing that has haunted our Indian ancestors right from the Vedic times. And this spirituality flowers forth in intense, interior, and personal religion, tending not merely to contemplate, but even to be united with God in personal love.⁵⁸ Dr. Radhakrishnan boldly exclaims: "The one fact of life in India is the Eternal Being of God."⁵⁹ Obviously this is an exaggeration; but it contains a grain of truth which we can treasure.

Nevertheless, as students of philosophy we are interested more in the concrete results achieved by thinkers than in their mere good

⁵⁴*Indian Philosophy*, I, 40.

⁵⁵*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 820.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁵⁷*Indian Philosophy*, II, 481.

⁵⁸*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 799.

⁵⁹*Indian Philosophy*, I, 42.

⁶⁰*Eastern Religions and Western Thought*, p. 32.

⁶¹*Indian Philosophy*, I, 170 and 194.

⁶²*Ibid.*, 195.

⁶³*Principal Upanishads*, p. 66.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, p. 67.

intentions. And so we ask, Does Radhakrishnan really give us a synthetic, rational, spiritual vision of *all* facts and realities?

All vague or ambiguous expressions aside, Dr. Radhakrishnan himself gives us the fundamentals of his world-view: "Supreme being is one in all, including [and especially in] our real self. It is our business to discover and consciously become That."⁶⁰ *Brahman-Atman*, Absolute-God, is the sole reality and somehow includes the universe and all *jivas* too. Every subject and object are ultimately identical. This nondualism, Radhakrishnan contends, is not a vague hypothesis but a necessary implication of all relevant thinking, feeling, and willing.⁶¹ However obscure that may be, we have no right, he says, to deny it, for any other position would be illogical.⁶²

In this "personal" philosophy of his, however, Dr. Radhakrishnan hardly succeeds in synthesizing even the different systems of the Vedanta, not to speak of the different views of the world. As a matter of fact, there is no synthesis at all but only a vigorous re-presentation of the later *advaita* in a Western dress, in the terminology of Plato, Plotinus, Kant, Bradley, Bergson, and others. It is but the old drug served under a new label.

Do we at least find some unity? During the cosmic evolution, *sristi*, Radhakrishnan shows us his Supreme as being simultaneously Absolute and God, the World-Spirit and the Matter-World, spirit and matter, all contrary qualities and perfections. It is the one real subject (Self) that thinks and acts ultimately in all, that helps its own part in another, that blasphemes itself in one human frame, that commits adultery and murder in another; it is the all-inclusive whole that cages all "appearances" formally. Is this philosophical unity? The Supreme, however, Radhakrishnan protests, is not a sum of all these but is in itself an ineffable unity separable only in appearance.⁶³ Yet he adds, "If [only] we are able to hold them together"⁶⁴—these really different standpoints of the same reality! The real difficulty is just that. We surely admit that the Divine must be and is in itself ineffable. Just as an artist is not formally the work of art he creates or the pianist the harmony he strikes forth—though the artist is his artistic creation eminently and the musician his melody—so also the Divine must be eminently perfect, having in one perfect act all perfections; and yet the Divine cannot be essentially or formally identified with

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limited, sinful subjects. This would be no longer divine ineffable unity but a congeries of implicit contradictions and hence no unity at all.

During the cosmic involution, *pralaya*, however, we seem to get a suprarational but unproved unity. For when the cosmos, God, and souls lapse into the Absolute, just as they once came out of it, there will be then some sort of unity or even unicity. This, though, will be a unity which *we* shall never be aware of, a oneness which the Absolute itself "knows or else it knows it not."⁶⁵ No; it is not the ordered unity of all facts and realities we sought for. It is not by despising or suppressing real plurality of limited perfections but with, and in, that plurality that we must get our fundamental unity. And the only valid and intelligible unity in diversity is to be found not in the direction of *advaita* which Radhakrishnan takes but in the opposite direction of "fundamental monism" which he discards.

What of the rational account and consistent explanation of all reality he promised? Although we see and experience with undeniable certainty our own individual nature as limited by, and distinct from, other selves and nonselves, yet the ultimate explanation of all these, according to him, is not individual but cosmic delusion, which lasts for some indefinite time and then vanishes like a soapbubble in a basin of water. The how and why of it all is *anirvacaniya*, inexplicable; it is a *lila*, sport of Brahman; it is all *maya*, mystery. Not only Brahman, therefore, but even the cosmos we started with is ultimately a complete mystery. Indeed, as an *advaitin*, one can dodge all arguments and answers by saying that all is *maya*; but by that very procedure one renounces one's claim to give a rational, philosophical explanation of the whole universe with its source, the real and living God.

Often indeed, "without conforming to the strict philosophical position" of *maya* or mystery,⁶⁶ Dr. Radhakrishnan tries to give some explanation of the universe and even of the ineffable Brahman. But, even according to him, they are neither ultimate nor satisfactory; they are tentative and perhaps not quite self-consistent.⁶⁷ They are a fall, a precipitate from the real,⁶⁸ not the real itself; they are only the

⁶⁵*Rig Veda*, X, 129, 7.

⁶⁶*Indian Philosophy*, I, 184.

⁶⁷*Idealist View of Life*, p. 306.

⁶⁸*Indian Philosophy*, I, 166-69.

⁶⁹*Principal Upanishads*, p. 84.

⁷⁰*Brh. Upanishad*, II, 1, 20. These comparisons, however, should not be pressed too far, at least in the Upanishadic writings.

⁷¹*Indian Philosophy*, II, 532.

distorted truth seen in the mirror of our mind that has been broken up into a hundred pieces by the "irreal" logic of mankind. The truth is just this: "The Real is One without a second, *Brahman-Atman*; and That thou art, *tattvamasi*." It is true that Radhakrishnan defends the reality of the world, like Samkara, against the Vijñanavadins; but in doing so, he is just defending the reality of Brahman that underlies them all. Of course the world "is unreal *of or by itself*"; ⁶⁹ but is it real *in itself*? And we are given the old answer: There is the Real and nothing beside It.

Certainly, like Samkara, Dr. Radhakrishnan must be praised for trying to maintain the perfect unity and immutability of the Supreme even while it is somehow the source and goal of all being. But in his attempt at some explanation, taking creation somewhat mechanically and anthropomorphically, he naturally rejects it and so prefers the spontaneous transformation of the Supreme. "As a spider moves along the thread, as small sparks come forth from the fire, even so from this Self come forth all breaths, all worlds, all divinities, all beings."⁷⁰ Radhakrishnan is indeed able to hold that the Absolute *transforms itself* into *real* through "derived" multiplicity *without* undergoing any *real transformation whatever*—an implicit contradiction in terms unless the transformation or the multiplicity be purely illusory. And yet Radhakrishnan does not see that his and Samkara's strictly philosophical position is better explained by the correct notion of creation according to which actual finite beings which are completely dependent on the Almighty but are not themselves essentially identical with Him are brought into existence, without any change in Himself. He has no *real*, dependent relation to creatures; but these latter are essentially related to Him; these are *from* Him but are *not Himself*. We do indeed admit that there is somewhat of a mystery about the act of creation, since it is an eternally free act of the all-powerful God that is identical with Himself. Reality may be mysterious, but "it should at least be self-consistent."⁷¹

In his philosophical treatment as a whole, Dr. Radhakrishnan would have done better service if he had paid more attention to clarity, precision, and the consistency of his ideas and expressions. Though he is careful to translate all the Sanskrit words he uses, yet the English equivalents are apt to lead astray all but the careful students of *advaita*.

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Many a fundamental philosophico-religious term like "being," "real," "God," "person," "mysticism," and so forth, do not have exactly the connotations that they have in the Aristotelian or in the Thomistic system of thought. No wonder, therefore, that the brief conspectus which we presented in Part I of this article seemed harmless and consistent, for we were reading into terms a meaning other than the author's. But in an absolutely nondualistic philosophy, they are not quite consistent. Expressions like, "When the creator and the created coincide, God lapses into the Absolute"⁷² and "Until the cosmos is saved, God is partly *in potentia*, partly in act"⁷³ may be harmless in Radhakrishnan's view; but they will never be accepted by the common man or by world philosophy.

Dr. Radhakrishnan is quite adept in argumentation. He can attack and even be pungent at times, but unfortunately his logic does not seem to be always faultless. Occasionally and, it seems, unconsciously he glides into what are called fallacies of accident. Without direct evidence or logical guarantee, how can he pass, as he does at times, from the possible to the actual, from the similar to the identical, from the subjective to the objective, from a heterogeneous part to a homogeneous whole? For example, "Though the present order of things must pass away, there will be other world orders in an endless series: for God is infinite possibility";⁷⁴ the Absolute has infinite possibilities of manifestation and therefore it *will* go on indefinitely "expressing" itself. Again, "God is life and is in us."⁷⁵ If God were not in us, there would be no sense of need in us for the infinite,⁷⁶ for all that is great and divine.⁷⁷ We are not ourselves alone; so we are God-men.⁷⁸ Not that Dr. Radhakrishnan does not know that presence is not identity: "The indwelling of God in the universe," he says, "does not mean the identity of God with the universe";⁷⁹ and yet in the above argument he seems to forget it.

We have indeed great admiration for our classical teachers like Samkara and Ramanuja; for, on a religious, theologico-philosophical basis they at least tried to construct a logical, coherent system, ready to sacrifice anything that marred the unity of the system. But we can-

⁷²"Spirit in Man," p. 500.

⁷³*Ibid.*, p. 501.

⁷⁴*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 46.

⁷⁵*Eastern Religions and Western Thought*, p. 22.

⁷⁶*Heart of Hindustan*, pp. 51 and 55.

⁷⁷"Spirit in Man," p. 484.

⁷⁸*Idealist View of Life*, p. 158.

⁷⁹*Hindu View of Life*, p. 70.

⁸⁰*Indian Philosophy*, II, 638.

⁸¹*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 828.

⁸²*Indian Philosophy*, I, 195.

not say as much for Radhakrishnan. Indeed, this sort of classical love of logical precision does not even seem to please Dr. Radhakrishnan, who calls it "excessive attachment."⁸⁰ Naturally, the conclusions of the classical teachers cut away the ground on which he stands; but, instead of disliking their logical precision, he would have done better if he had scrutinized and corrected the premises and postulates from which such conclusions flow.

Obviously, in this background of absolute nondualism, *advaita*, true spirituality, and religion turn out to be not self-forgetting charity but perforce a disguised form of self-seeking. It is not ultimately humble and loving consecration of self to an all-knowing, all-loving God but seeking, communing with, and worshipping the "self," which is somehow a fragment of a characterless, impersonal Thing. The ego-sense which is denounced so violently and so often in the empirical world finds its *ersatz* in the transcendental plane itself. "Religious people the world over aim at a knowledge of God"⁸¹ and not of their own smaller or bigger self. True religion demands two at least, God and soul, who are distinct and yet bound together by knowledge and love. Many an *advaitin* indeed is often religious; but he is so in spite of his *advaita* theory, only because his heart is stronger than his head and most naturally yearns for his Maker and God.

My last reflection on Radhakrishnan's philosophical view touches a point that radically blurs the beauty even of his true and good ideas; namely, his doctrine of the relativity of truth. We are all perfectly aware of the limited and imperfect nature of our knowledge of realities, each one of which is a "mystery" in itself; but we do know at least something that is objectively in reality, and from this conscious conformity of our intellect to the reality we judge the truth of our knowledge. We are also convinced that there is something of an absolute nature in our judgments, something which is eternally true—at least the fact that we made these judgments. Even for Radhakrishnan, the "truths of his eternal religion, *sanatana dharma*" are absolutely true: "*Atman* is the sole reality and includes the universe too . . . Any other position would be illogical."⁸² Radhakrishnan's works are filled with such categorical statements about reality and conduct; and yet he casts them all overboard by saying that all truth is relative. The convictions of our ancestors "stirred their hearts and quickened their

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breath,"⁸³ devoted as they were to eternal truths. They did not, and neither should we, deny that there could be different views, more or less perfect, on a subject matter—and this because of our limited, imperfect, composite nature. But they did, and we with them should, deny that two absolutely contradictory propositions about the same reality from the same point of view or formality could be true at the same time. Great men like Samkara would not tolerate even a particle of falsehood to stain what they believed to be pure truth; their vigorous commentaries, for example, are a continuous protest against the relativist tendency of modern times. Truth is neither mine nor thine; it is universal; it is for all; and ultimately God is subsistent Truth. All philosophies and all religions should be challenged to produce their credentials and asked to defend their doctrines in a logical and convincing way.

I am indeed sorry to be unable to bring out here in detail the real merits of Dr. Radhakrishnan, who succeeds to a large extent in purifying some of the fundamental, traditional notions of Hindu ethics, such as *karma*, *samsara*, and human freedom. These he corrects and elevates. *Karma* is for him not an impersonal ultimate or absolute; it is the expression of God's will and purpose. Rebirth of man as an animal or plant is to be taken not literally but figuratively. We are really free: "We are not puppets moved hither and thither by blind impersonal necessity of omnipotent matter or the sovereignty of divine providence."⁸⁴ These, however, are but instances that show how modern Hindus react to the impact of Western philosophy and Christian education. Many of them prefer to patch up the old views rather than rebuild on a solid ontological basis.

Dr. Radhakrishnan has great talents as a successful writer, a master orator, a passionate social reformer. He starts philosophizing with high aspirations and healthy optimism; but he fails to give a really synthetic, consistent, philosophical, and spiritual view of the world

⁸³*Ibid.*, 27.

⁸⁴*Philosophy of Radhakrishnan*, p. 42.

⁸⁵*Indian Philosophy*, I, 51.

⁸⁶*Ibid.*, 55.

⁸⁷*Ibid.*, 53.

⁸⁸To prove the fact of integral experience by authority, Radhakrishnan quotes: "The ultimate truth which is the criterion by which we measure all other

relative truths is only to be experienced, not to be demonstrated" and gives the reference as *Summa Theol.*, q. 46, a. 2 ("Spirit in Man," p. 485). I do not, however, find the second part of the clause about the experience there. Moreover, faith in St. Thomas has not the same meaning that it has in Radhakrishnan.

⁸⁹*Indian Philosophy*, I, 31 f.

and of its God, which we rightly expected from a man of his stature and standing.

What perhaps has prevented Radhakrishnan from making great strides towards a harmonious philosophy? It is the fact, I should say, that he does not shake off fully "the burdensome wealth of tradition that clogs."⁸⁵ The "sense of perfection that is ancient"⁸⁶ and Hindu seems to oppress him as though in spite of himself. His vision, his philosophical view of the world, is essentially limited to the *advaita*, though it is embellished accidentally with ideas and expressions taken from diverse systems of the world. What makes his view less coherent and therefore less acceptable is the fact that he wants to defend *philosophically* (that is, by pure reason) what most of our Hindu ancestors defended *theologically* (that is, on the authority of the supposed revealed word of God). The "faith of his fathers,"⁸⁷ he believes, has almost everything to give to others but has nothing, at least nothing substantial, to receive from them. This exaggerated respect, therefore, for the Hindu tradition in general and for the *advaita* shorn of its theology in particular seems to account at least in part for the deficiencies of Radhakrishnan's ideas.

Besides, his study of philosophy and of religion seems to neglect almost entirely a serious consideration of the fact of religion whether among the primitives or among the civilized, the fact that demands a real personal supreme Being as the author and aim of all creation. Hardly, if ever, does he seem to have studied with an open mind other philosophies such as that of St. Thomas, whom he quotes once or twice but not quite accurately.⁸⁸ Even if "monistic idealism" (as our author understands it) is the highest truth revealed to India⁸⁹—which millions of Hindus even would not accept—it does not follow that it is the truest and the highest form of philosophy or religion revealed to the entire world and for all times. At any rate, a philosopher, to be true to his name, must seek truth with the widest possible vision extending to the whole world and finally to the ultimate Truth, God Himself.

Chronicle

MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY has announced a four-day philosophical institute in the teaching of philosophy, June 15 to 18. The topics and discussion leaders are the following: first day—demonstration, the Reverend William Baumgaertner; second day—demonstration in the philosophy of nature, Dr. Francis J. Collingwood; third day—demonstration in metaphysics, Dr. James F. Anderson; fourth day—demonstration in moral philosophy, the Reverend William E. Dooley, s.j. Further details can be obtained from Mr. James T. Murphy (Department of Philosophy, Marquette University, Milwaukee 3).

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY (Chicago) held a series of evening roundtable conferences on business ethics on February 17, February 24, March 3, and March 10. The conferences were directed by the Reverend Theodore V. Purcell, s.j. Guest lecturers included the Reverend Bernard Dempsey, s.j. (Marquette University), the Reverend Henry Wirtenberger, s.j. (Xavier University), the Reverend James T. Mangan, s.j. (St. Mary's of the Lake, Mundelein), and the Reverend John R. Connery, s.j. (West Baden College).

THE REVEREND MAURICE R. HOLLOWAY, s.j., will become the Editor of THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN starting with the November, 1959, issue. The Reverend George P. Klubertanz, s.j., will remain on the staff as an associate editor.

ARISTOTLE AND THE IDENTITY OF INDISCERNIBLES

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In an earlier article comparing the views of Leibniz and Plato in terms of the problem of the identity of indiscernibles,¹ I proposed that this problem can be considered as providing a useful instrument for measuring the distance between philosophical positions. The issues raised by the famous Leibnizian doctrine are of central metaphysical importance, involving the ancient mystery of the One and the Many. More precisely, they concern the principle of *differentiation* of being which functions in a given metaphysical system. From this point of view, I tried to show, in the Venice Congress paper, that Leibniz and Plato are polar opposites. The identity-of-indiscernibles principle leads Leibniz to make all differentiation formal or essential. Universally applied, on every level of being, the Leibnizian principle results in the elimination of all real contingency and of all material, as opposed to formal, difference. In Plato, on the contrary, the exigencies of the *chorismos* or separation between sensibles and their essential principles, the Forms, and the further *chorismos* between the Forms and their single essential principle, the One, make all differences fall outside of essence into the domain of *relation*, of existing nonbeing. Where the essence of beings is simple unity, they cannot be a differentiated manifold in virtue of their essence but only by the power of a principle other than essence and contrary to it, which receives by way of imaging.² The Platonic "material" principle of otherness and differentiation is indeterminate quantitative relationship.

If the identity-of-indiscernibles problem is to provide an instrument

by which the intervals separating different metaphysical systems can be measured, one must first fix the extremes between which other positions will lie. Thus, in the "Two Cratyluses" paper, I tried to exhibit the Platonic and Leibnizian positions as defining these limits of doctrinal variation. The location of a particular system on that scale will be dependent upon the extent to which existents within the system are identified with, or distinguished from, their own essences. This will determine how operative the Leibnizian principle of identity of indiscernibles is in a given system, and for what levels of being.

If there are to be many individuals possessing the same essential nature but distinct in number, their essence cannot itself account for their numerical distinction. Such an accidental multitude will only be possible if there is some lack of identity between the individual subjects and their own essence. But is there more than one way in which this lack of identity can be conceived? We have already seen the classic Platonic doctrine of separation, in which an accidental multitude is possible only by the defective imaging of the essential perfection in a receptacle which is itself defined by privation of form. Such a receiving subject has no potentiality for becoming the essential

¹⁴"The Two Cratyluses: The Problem of Identity of Indiscernibles," *Atti del XII Congresso Internazionale di Filosofia*, Venezia, 12-18 Settembre, 1958 (Firenze, Sansoni).

²This implies that Platonic beings involve a kind of composition of really distinct principles of being. But it must not be confused with the composition of act and potency involved in Thomism and least of all with the famous Thomistic "real distinction" of *esse* and essence. The Thomistic doctrine of the limitation of act by potency is not of Platonic origin, in spite of recent attempts to so derive it. The supreme principle of act in the Platonic metaphysical order is not *esse* but is rather a principle in the order of essence, understood precisely as the simple unity which is the principle of number in the genus of quantity. As such, it is not even the transcendental, analogical unity which in St. Thomas is convertible with being. Such a univocal and essential principle of act is incapable of being received proportionately and intrinsically in many different subjects, so as to confer upon them a *proper* unity,

in a sense comparable to that in which every being in Thomism has an act of existing which is proper to it. There is no potency for simplicity. Consequently, the limitation of act in Platonism is effected not by potency but by that which is the privative contrary of the One. In Plato, as in Spinoza, all determination—all differentiation—is by negation. This is to receive by way of defective imitation.

³Cf. Aristotle: "This thinker [Plato] means by the notbeing which together with Being makes existing things a plurality, falsity and everything of this nature . . ." (*Metaphysics* N. ii. 1. 9 [1089a20-24]).

⁴*Ibid.*, Z. vi. 1031a15.

⁵*Ibid.*, 1031a28-b18.

⁶*Ibid.*, xv, 1040a-b4; also, x-xi, 1036a2-6.

⁷*Ibid.*, xiii, 1038b10-17.

⁸*Ibid.*, vi, 1031b19-23.

⁹*Ibid.*, 1031a28-30.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, A. viii. 1074a32-38.

¹¹*Ibid.*, Z. vi. 1032a5-6.

¹²*Ibid.*, xi. 1037b2-5.

¹³*Ibid.*, 1037b5-7.

perfection really and intrinsically. It can only mirror or reflect it in terms of a shadowy, unreal, plane of existence.³ Short of this complete separation, which defines one of our doctrinal limits, is there any intermediate ground which can be occupied, which will not collapse into the other Leibnizian extreme?

Aristotle is a significant test case. In the *Metaphysics*⁴ he asks the question whether each thing and its essence are the same or different. The immediate context in which this question is raised involves criticism of the Platonic theory, in which not only sensibles are separated from their own essences, the Forms, but the Forms themselves have an extrinsic essential principle. The Platonic theory of *chorismos* is rejected by Aristotle on a double ground⁵ as undermining both the knowledge of reality and the reality of things. The individual whose essence is separated from it is unreal, and the separated essence is unknowable. As separated from matter and subsistent in its own right, the Form becomes a unique and indefinable individual.⁶ Not only is it indefinable, but it is impossible for it to be predicable of many.⁷ In the light of these criticisms of *chorismos*, Aristotle tells us "that each individual thing is one and the same with its essence, and not merely accidentally so."⁸ The reason given is that to have knowledge of the individual is to have knowledge of its essence.

Such an assertion seems to place Aristotle at the Leibnizian extreme of our scale, but we must not be too hasty in drawing such a conclusion. The context of the passage in question indicates that Aristotle's primary reference is to substances such as the Platonists conceived the Forms to be, having no other substances prior to them⁹ and existing in separation from their sensible images. For Aristotle such immaterial, separated substances, whether regarded as Forms or unmoved movers, will be identical with their own essences; and no accidental multitude—no plurality within a species—will be possible for them.¹⁰ The essence and the individual are in these cases strictly the same; this is true in every case of that which is not dependent upon something else but is self-subsistent and primary.¹¹ By "primary," Aristotle tells us he means "that which does not imply the presence of something in something else as a material substrate."¹² Things "which are of the nature of matter, or of wholes that include matter" are said not to be the same as their essences.¹³

Aristotle and the Identity of Indiscernibles

Leonard J. Eslick

What, then, are we to conclude about sensible substances? It seems clear that they are not identical with their essences. There is no difference between "Socrates" and "to be Socrates,"¹⁴ since in either case the individual whole including individual sensible matter is designated. Nor is there a difference between "soul" and "to be soul," since both expressions designate form or actuality. But "to be man" and "man" are not the same.¹⁵

There is, nevertheless, a distinction between the way in which the concrete whole individual substance, Socrates, differs from his essence and the kind of difference found in an accidental unity—for example, "Socrates" and "cultured."¹⁶ Both the accidental term and that of which it is an accident are "cultured," so that in one sense (considered from the point of view of the accidental form itself) there is identity, and in another sense difference, since the essence of the accidental term is not the same as "the man" or "the cultured man."¹⁷ Although Socrates is not identical with his essence, humanity, it is still *his* essence, in a way in which "cultured" or "white" is not. The essence or *to ti en einai* which is the object of definition is in the individual as his intelligible or definable being, the mode of being signified by the category of substance.

This will involve, for Aristotle, a fundamental departure from the Platonic view of essence as incomposite. It is not possible for essence conceived as radically simple—as pure form alone—to be intrinsically and properly possessed by many numerically distinct individuals. It is precisely because the Platonic essential principle is simple, indivisible unity that the *chorismos* is necessitated. Such an essential principle is radically incommunicable to many save by way of negation and extrinsic reference. Consequently, the essences of sensible substances are, for Aristotle, composites of matter and form. Plato had introduced a "material" principle of differentiation—the relative nonbeing of the *Sophistes*—into the heart of being itself. But he had been careful to exclude matter in this sense from the *essence* of being. Where the principle which differentiates and multiplies is *privation*, it cannot be

¹⁴*Ibid.*, vi. 1032a7-10.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, H. iii. 1043b2-5.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, Z. xi. 1037b5-8.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, vi. 1031b23-28.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, H. iii. 1043b28-33.

¹⁹"Aristotle's Theory of Predication" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of

Philosophy, Saint Louis University) chap. 5.

²⁰As Blackwell points out (*ibid.*), this seems to be the basis of Father Joseph Owens's theory of the meaning of *tode ti* in *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian 'Metaphysics'* (Toronto, 1951).

²¹*Metaphys.*, Z. viii. 1033b7.

introduced into the order of essential perfection and metaphysical act without contradiction. If the Platonic *chorismos* is to be overcome, so that sensible things can have an essential core of intelligible and necessary being in their own right in spite of their contingency and change, the ratio of matter to form must be *potency* rather than privation. Matter must be potential *ousia* and *tode ti*. So conceived, it can enter the order of essence itself, and the sensible flux can acquire a proper substantiality and scientific intelligibility.

Indeed, it is only essence in this composite sense which is definable, since in order to be definable, essence must be composed of parts related as differentia to genus, as act to potency. If the essential parts were themselves definable, they would in turn have to be composed of further parts to infinity. Consequently, the essence which is the object of definition cannot be either the matter or the form of the composite. Hence Aristotle writes:

Therefore one kind of substance can be defined and formulated—that is, the composite kind—whether it be perceptible or intelligible; but the primary parts of which this consists cannot be defined, since a definatory formula predicates something of something, and one part of the definition must play the part of matter and the other that of form.¹⁸

Essence in the case of sensible substances cannot, therefore, be identified with form alone. The form as such is both incomposite and a “this,” and both characteristics render it undefinable. As Dr. R. J. Blackwell remarks,¹⁹ any attempt to identify substance as essence with substance as form in the area of sensible things leads to insuperable difficulties. Among them is the Platonic dilemma in which the form would have to be both singular and nonsingular at the same time.²⁰

But although Aristotle opposes to the Platonic separation of essence a doctrine of immanence which demands a composition of act and potency within the order of essence itself, he still refuses to identify the concrete individual composite of matter and form with its essence. There are significant differences. Individual composites are generated, whereas essence is ungenerated.²¹ The concrete composite is a “this,”

Aristotle and the Identity of Indiscernibles
Leonard J. Eslick

but it is impossible to define the singular as such.²² The definable essence cannot include *individual* perceptible matter—this flesh and these bones as found in Socrates—but only *common* perceptible matter.²³ Individual matter and individuating accidents constitute an addition to the essential principles, an addition or determination which is not in the line of essence or caused by it. There is, therefore, in Aristotle's view of the physical cosmos (at least here on earth), a factor of purely material differentiation and accidental multitude which is irreducible to essential intelligibility. And since no agent intends material multiplicity as such, since the *indefinite* is incompatible with the character of an end, material multiplicity within the species of physical substances falls into the shadowy area of chance and luck and of the *accidental being* which is the subject matter of no science whatsoever.²⁴ There are no causes and principles of accidental being of the same kind as there are of the essential—if there were, Aristotle tells us, all would be necessary; and the possibility of a thing's either occurring or not occurring would be entirely removed from the range of events.²⁵ Of accidental being, and hence of accidental multitude, the causes are unordered and indefinite.²⁶

Let us now summarize the results of our experiment in placing Aristotle on our scale. The transformation formulae by which Aristotle overcomes, on the level of sensible existents, the complete Platonic separation of a thing from its essence have been described. They consist in the introduction of a composition of form and matter into essence, and the substitution of potentiality for privation as the material principle. So transformed, matter in Aristotle can, within limits, function as an *essential* principle of being. It acquires a certain intelligibility in relation to form, even though, in itself, in its radical indeterminateness, it is unintelligible. It is, indeed, the source of contingency, of the possibility of being and not being, which flaws the substances of this planet. It is a potentiality which alternates between the transient acquisition of formal perfection and privation. It is the root source of chance and luck, and even, on occasion, of the kind of failure of formal embodiment which is called a monster. Science, for Aristotle, deals with the necessary, with things which cannot be other

²²*Ibid.*, x 1036a2-6.

²³*Ibid.*, 1035a17-22.

²⁴*Ibid.*, K. viii. 1064b15-1065a6.

²⁵*Ibid.*, 1065a6-20.

²⁶*Ibid.*, 1065a21-35.

²⁷*Posterior Analytics* I. vi. 74b5-6.

²⁸*De Partibus Animalium* I. i. 639b20—640a12.

²⁹*Metaphys.*, K. viii. 1064b24-29.

than they are.²⁷ Nevertheless, physical substances admit of scientific knowledge, by virtue of *hypothetical* necessity,²⁸ though they lack the absolute necessity and intelligibility which only the separated substances, completely identical with their own essences, can possess. It is hypothetically necessary that matter be disposed and ordered in certain ways in order that there might be forms of such and such kinds. In the very *essences* of such entities this disposition of matter in relation to form is included.

But there is still much that escapes this ordering of matter to form. And included in this irrational surd factor of purely accidental being is the material multiplicity of individuals within species of physical substances. There can be for Aristotle no per-se causality of material distinction. In principle, moreover, even a *divine*, providential knowledge and ordering of such material individuals is excluded. Only the Sophist, Aristotle tells us, pretends to knowledge of accidental being; and "Plato is not far wrong when he says that the Sophist spends his time on nonbeing."²⁹

Even in Aristotle, then, as in Plato, nonbeing in a sense has entered into the realm of existence as a cause of material differentiation irreducible to any essential principle. The existence of real contingency involves the existence of real irrationality. Where form and essence constitute the supreme source of intelligibility, an honest recognition of contingent facts implies that there is in the world a stubborn residue of unreason, opaque to mind, an aboriginal source of disorder which is only partly open to rational "persuasion" and ordering. Even when this dark principle is converted from privation to potentiality in the order of essence (like the Furies, who were enshrined on the side of the Athenian Acropolis, where they were honored as benevolent deities), the transformation is only partially successful.

There is, therefore, for Aristotle a residual irrationality in the physical cosmos which exhibits itself in the sheer material or numerical distinction of individuals of the same species. These individuals, while not as shadowy and evanescent as the images moving across the face of Plato's Receptacle, still must be said to stand near the frontier between being and nonbeing. On the other hand, in the divine substances, the unmoved movers, which exist apart from matter and motion, there is the fullness of being and actuality. Each is identical

with his essence; and no possibility exists of a plurality within a species, since no matter is present in them.³⁰ The very essence of such a separated substance is actuality. It is on this level that the Leibnizian identity principle is verified. Here only formal distinction is operative. Can we say, however, that such purely formal distinction on this level has achieved complete metaphysical intelligibility? There remain serious questions.

Aristotle's assertion of a plurality of immaterial substances is founded in what he regards as physical or astronomical exigencies. But is a multitude of utterly simple forms, in a system where *form* is the highest principle of metaphysical act, metaphysically possible? It is not, one should note, a problem of *numerical* distinction at all—the forms differ precisely as forms. The criticism sometimes made of Aristotle that he postulates a *number* of immaterial entities in contradiction of his doctrine that *matter* alone brings about numerical distinction³¹ misses the point. There is here no question of sheer numerical distinction within a species, but solely of formal difference. The real metaphysical difficulty is one to which Plato seems to have been more sensitive than Aristotle. Is it really possible to have a plurality of absolutely simple entities, each identical with its essence and enjoying the fullness of unlimited actuality? The problem is the same whether the entities in question are the Forms of Plato's earlier theory or the simple unmoved movers of Book Lambda.

Perhaps they might be regarded as simply diverse, rather than different, since difference implies some kind of generic or at least analogical community of being in respect of which difference can be asserted.³² This, however, would seem to postulate at the metaphysical summit a sheer diversity of disconnected and essentially unordered principles of being. It would be difficult to see what meaning the common predication of "being" of them all could possess. If simply diverse forms in the plural constitute the ultimate norm and fount of metaphysical intelligibility, how can being qua being possess the unity of object necessary for a science of it to be possible? Even in the pattern of *pros hen* equivocals, the reference of the term "being" would no longer be to *one*.

³⁰*Ibid.*, A. vii. 1072b18-22. Cf. also *ibid.*, viii. 1074a32-38.

³¹Hugh Tredennick, for example, makes this criticism in his Loeb Library edition of the *Metaphysics* (Cambridge:

Harvard Univ. Press, 1947), II, 160. The plurality of unmoved movers has occasioned difficulty since the time of Theophrastus.

³²*Metaphys.*, I. iii. 1054b24-32.

If the simple separated substances differ in some generic respect in which they are alike, then composition would be implied—indeed, matter-form composition in their very essence. If there is no common genus, then presumably they differ in their *being*, regarded as a perfection analogically common to all. But this seems to imply, if there are many such beings, that that which differentiates and restricts them in their being is indeed their form, but form now considered as a potency to an act higher than form itself. Some composition in such entities of act and potency in an order other than essence seems demanded.

Aristotle seems never to have faced these questions on a properly metaphysical terrain, nor does he possess the principles which would make possible a solution on this level. The Platonic option, which did indeed postulate a principle of act higher than forms—the One—was not open to him, since the consequences would include a reversion to *chorismos*. This would place the ultimate *act* of being beyond being itself and, in doing so, would diminish and weaken the very reality of being so that it becomes an image of its own essence. Is another metaphysical option possible—a new set of transformation formulae—which will not entail such consequences? I will leave this problem for a future article on St. Thomas Aquinas and the identity of indiscernibles.

We saw also that the metaphysical primacy of form in Aristotle necessitated as a consequence that the existence of real contingency in the world should be also the existence of a real irrationality. In particular, the material distinction of physical substances becomes the result of chance. There is no possibility of a providential knowledge and ordering of individuals on this level. In the next exercise in doctrinal measurement on our scale, St. Thomas, we will encounter a position which holds real contingency and denies the existence of real irrationality.

WALTER E. STOKES, S.J., *Saint Louis University*

***Whitehead's Metaphysics.* By Ivor Leclerc. New York: Macmillan Co., 1958. Pp. xiii + 234. \$3.75.**

This study is based on the conviction that there is a need for an introduction to *Process and Reality* precisely because Whitehead in that work faces a new set of problems on a specifically metaphysical level. This need is acute, since Whitehead presents his metaphysical notions in the early part of that work without giving much indication as to how he has arrived at them. For *Process and Reality* begins with a highly condensed summary of Whitehead's metaphysics that cannot be understood until the remainder of the book is mastered; furthermore, the detailed explanation of each notion in turn presupposes an understanding of all the other notions given in the summary.

Because Leclerc rejects the position that Whitehead's metaphysics is merely the development of earlier theories of the philosophy of science into a more comprehensive scheme, he is convinced that those who find the needed introduction in *Science and the Modern World* and the two lectures, *Nature and Life*, are mistaken. Rather, Leclerc believes that in these places Whitehead is interpreting the data of mathematical physics in the light of philosophical concepts that have been arrived at by a specifically philosophical procedure. The view that a specifically philosophical procedure is at work in the later writings is the key to understanding Leclerc's opposition to interpreting Whitehead's metaphysics as a philosophy of twentieth-century physics which attempts to provide the fundamental theory for physics of relativity, electro-magnetism, and quanta. He cites Lawrence's work, *Whitehead's Philosophical Development: A Critical History of the Background of Process and Reality* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1956) as an able presentation of the interpretation to which he is opposed.

Leclerc's main thesis is, therefore, that in *Process and Reality* Whitehead meets an entirely new set of problems which are properly metaphysical. And so, in the first chapter, Leclerc shows how Whitehead's earlier interest in problems of the philosophy of science finally led him to other questions that were properly metaphysical. In the next chapter, Leclerc takes up the crucial point of establishing the specifically metaphysical

nature of Whitehead's endeavor. To do this, Leclerc assembles and underlines explicit statements of Whitehead himself. Leclerc concludes that Whitehead places himself in the philosophical tradition of Aristotle when he says that *the* problem of *Process and Reality* is "to conceive a complete [παντελής] fact." Leclerc thinks that this is essentially the same problem as the one posed in Aristotle's metaphysics. Also, Leclerc points out that, in agreement with Aristotle and opposition to Plato, Whitehead holds that it is "fully existent" things which are the principal concern of metaphysics. For this reason, what Whitehead terms the "ontological principle" becomes the keystone of his metaphysics.

The third chapter gives a more refined exposition of the metaphysics proper to Whitehead. In terms of procedure, Leclerc describes this as "precisely the elaboration of a scheme of ideas and the testing of that scheme, internally by the criteria of coherence, logical consistency, and necessity in universality, and externally by its applicability and adequacy" (p. 48).

In the chapters that follow, the author carefully selects the central notions of Whitehead's scheme and explains them one at a time, introducing only the related ideas that he judges really essential to grasp that particular notion. Throughout, he calls attention to any simplifications made for the sake of clarity, and later on he tries to rectify the simplification so far as he can within the limits of an introductory exposition.

There can be no doubt about the quality and usefulness of Leclerc's study. Although this book is exclusively a work of exposition, Leclerc's appreciation of Whitehead's metaphysics is apparent. In view of this fine piece of exposition we can look forward to the critical study that Leclerc mentions in the preface. And we can hope to see fully treated some thorny problems touched upon in the course of this exposition; for example, the sense in which "actual entity" is preferable to "being" because the latter term is thoroughly ambiguous (p. 19); how it is that Whitehead is not inevitably driven to incoherence to account for the difference of things (p. 166); how God can be a unique "actual entity" and yet not be an exception (p. 193). Finally, we must look to the critical study for a full discussion of the adequacy of Whitehead's metaphysical scheme that is closed to the possibility of a transcendent God and so ends, not in mystery, but in the obscurity of God as an accident of "creativity."

***Reality, Reason and Religion.* By Arthur Anton Vogel. New York: Morehouse-Gorham Co., 1957. Pp. xi + 208. \$3.00.**

In our scientific age it is important for philosophers to show how and why the positivistic approach defaults in its attempt to give adequate explanations even of our empirical world. Dr. Vogel does this, not by giving pat, desiccated answers so often associated with the Scholastic tradition but by confronting the positivistic-minded with a vital metaphysics having its roots in Aristotle, enriched by Aquinas, and freshly interpreted in our own times by such men as Gilson, Maritain, de Finance, Klubertanz, and Wild. The last-mentioned is singled out by the author as a special influence on his own thought. For those who have followed the growth of metaphysics in the above-mentioned men there is little of the positive development that is new. Yet those who have breadth of mind and leisure to ponder Vogel's confrontation of modern thought with an existential metaphysics will find this book a stimulating and not unrewarding challenge.

Though at first glance the various topics seem loosely strung together, still, after considering the purpose of the book—namely, “to examine, explicate, and criticize the type of explanation called metaphysical, which had its definite origin in the thought of Aristotle”—the reader finds a close unity. Vogel, laying the foundations in Aristotle, singles out for special emphasis the theory of logical concept, the subject of metaphysics, and the notion of necessity and causal explanation. In the next two chapters, the author, recalling the positivistic criticism of the Aristotelean tradition, brings to light grave misunderstandings on the part of the positivists; and this he does by examining the assumptions and foundations of the positivistic viewpoint. Next comes the core of the book, an all-too-condensed justification for the metaphysical explanation of reality. The author applies the consequences of his existential and causal analysis of reality to certain contemporary theories in the philosophy of religion which are in sympathy with the positivistic approach. In turn he treats irrationalism, the extravagant claim for man's possible knowledge of the singular, and the “scientific” rejection of causal arguments for the existence of God.

The defense of the metaphysical approach involves not only the disposal of objections from the outside but also the solution of the knotty problems from within. Thus Vogel in a straightforward manner considers the problem of the omnipotence and omniscience of God and the freedom of creatures. First he attempts to show that the explanation of the *praemotio physica* brings only confusion and no positive solution of the problem.

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Even when we look at this problem from the viewpoint of God, we are likely to be troubled with double vision. With this caution he attempts a solution by sounding the depths of the existential principle of being—a solution that will not be as conceptually satisfying as the doctrine of physical premotion. “The energizing, dynamic, constantly flowing act of existence serves as an ever-present and continuous activating injection into the essential staticism of a finite being, from a source which is intrinsic to the being of a thing considered as a whole” (p. 165). Thus for the author neither physical premotion nor any kind of concurrence is required. Too much weight seems to be credited to the “energizing force of the act of existing.” Some influence over and beyond the creative and sustaining power of God seems to be called for in the operation of creatures, for in creatures operation and the to-be are simply not identical. However, since the to-be of limited being is also to-be-ordered-to-a-good, perhaps the resolution of the problem can be found in a more profound consideration of tendency, as the author suggests. This involves the simultaneous consideration of both efficient and final causes, a procedure that involves difficulties analogous, to some extent at least, to the difficulties that Heisenberg formulates in his uncertainty principle. We can hope that the author will elaborate on his abbreviated exposition.

Because he is human, the metaphysician finds it difficult to avoid slips into essentialism. On page 110 Vogel, in dealing with contingent being, says, “. . . such being is defined as that the essence of which does not imply its existence.” Though the context does not mislead the reader, it would be more accurate to say “exercised existence.” Again, on page 82 Vogel states, “. . . there would seem to be no crucial issue involved in contradicting Gilson and returning to the more usual view that every judgment at least implicitly links two concepts together.” Such a consideration would not exactly be contradicting Gilson, for he says on page 231 of his *Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas*, “Now judgment is an operation of reason associating or dissociating concepts.” A point for a bit more concern is the author’s attitude towards Aristotle. Even though the author states that his metaphysical explanations go beyond Aristotle, still it seems to me that Vogel unduly credits Aristotle with an existential metaphysics because of the distinction that Aristotle makes in the second book of the *Posterior Analytics* between the questions whether a thing exists and what a thing is. (Cf. pages 10 and 11.) Aristotle’s approach is open to an existential development, however, and so this insistence in no way detracts from the value of the book.

To single out all the points deserving of praise would take us beyond the confines of a short review. Worthy of note, however, are the author’s insights into the primacy of the act of existing, the place that intentionality

of concepts and judgments has, and the function of tendency in finite being. We fondly hope that moderns of a positivistic cast of mind will take the trouble to study this work.

LINUS J. THRO, S.J., *Saint Louis University*

***The Church and Modern Science.* By Patrick J. McLaughlin. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1957. Pp. 374. \$7.50.**

Students and the general educated reader will be grateful for this collection of the principal allocutions of Pope Pius XII on modern science and technology. As was to be expected, they concern themselves with the proper Christian attitude toward new discoveries and their possible relations to Christian doctrine and morality, and do not pretend to develop a strictly philosophical theory of science. The translations, which are done by the compiler, are quite readable and seem on cursory examination to be accurate and adequate. A useful bibliography of all the papal pronouncements from 1939 to 1956 upon science and related subjects is appended. Another appendix gives a selected bibliography on science in relation to philosophy and religion. A name- and subject-index completes the apparatus.

The book as a whole is unlikely to appeal strongly to the non-Catholic scientist or philosopher of science. The lengthy introductory part of the book, whose structure is that of commentary and elaboration upon papal pronouncements on the place of science in the Christian perspective, proposes to facilitate communication between the scientist and the philosopher. In this aim, the author might have been successful, if his exposition met with no basic religious differences and with sufficient philosophical indifference (or ignorance). If, in other words, the scientist is a Catholic, the presentation of "some philosophy for the scientist" may promote communication, but not at a high level of understanding; for the philosophy offered by Father McLaughlin is at best that common patrimony of accepted terms and theses wherein we may "all say the same thing" and meet in superficial agreement. If the Catholic is a philosopher, he may well find the expositions of the theory of science informative; he will probably consider the epistemology and metaphysics eclectic and philosophically spineless, and the popularized treatment of the proofs of the existence of God quite inadequate; he will surely be disconcerted at the placid fashion in which diametric oppositions of philosophical appraisal are brushed over or ignored. His rueful reaction may be that science and

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philosophy will never sail together in harmony and mutual aid, if philosophy is first dismantled and scuttled.

EDWARD MACKINNON, S.J., *Weston College*

***Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy.* By Michael Polanyi. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1958. Pp. xiv + 428. \$6.75.**

Polanyi was originally trained as a doctor of medicine and later achieved fame as a physical chemist. For the last nine years he has served as a nonlecturing professor at the University of Aberdeen working almost exclusively on the present book. The resulting highly ambitious work presents a novel interpretation of knowledge in general and of scientific knowledge in particular, develops a theory of reality consonant with this epistemology, and indicates the place of the individual in this framework and his consequent obligations. In the brief outline that follows we shall concentrate on the general theory of knowledge presented.

The opening section, entitled "The Art of Knowing," is intended to be a refutation of *objective* theories of knowledge. Though the term "objective" is never clearly defined, it seems to refer to the general tendency to envisage science as an impersonal collection of facts and theories, and to refer especially to any attempt to reduce the creative insight of scientific discovery to a few pat rules of procedure. Such prescriptions of scientific method work only in simplified presentation of the paradigms of science: Copernicus against Ptolemy, the rejection of phlogiston and the mechanical ether. Through various examples Polanyi shows that the solution of live issues depends on the personal insight of a competent scientist. Such insights form the subject of the present study.

Polanyi begins his critical examination of personal knowledge on an elementary level. The swimmer's skill, the pianist's touch, the weaver's art, and the wine-biber's connoisseurship all represent knowledges which scientific study can penetrate only by the most painstaking effort. The author uses Gestalt psychology to explain these skills in terms of a focal awareness on objects, or goals, and a subsidiary awareness of parts, or of tools as extensions of self. Even intellectual tools, such as the premises and interpretative framework of science, are known only through a subsidiary awareness. These premises are articulated only by changing their nature, making them objects of focal rather than subsidiary awareness. Accordingly, the next point to be examined is the interrelation of the articulate and tacit components of knowledge.

Experiments on animal learning and the author's own interpretation of

the semantic problem point to the same conclusion. The tacit component of knowledge, comprehension striving to achieve articulation, is responsible for all progress. The paradoxical fact that language molds the mind of the educated man and ultimately determines the structure of thought is reconciled with the primacy of the tacit component by a reinterpretation of language. Language is not a mere set of symbols manipulated according to rules of grammar. It has a depth of meaning acquired through the insights that shaped its usage and modified the meaning of words until language could express what it had previously been incapable of expressing.

Such language, embodying a collective understanding, is a premise of science. Another premise is the "community of scientists." Any given individual can acquire competence in but a tiny corner of science. Yet, by becoming accepted as a member of this self-accrediting community he participates in the body of knowledge and the developing dialogue that constitute science. What is the basis on which such knowledge rests? Ultimately it is a-critical. The act of understanding carries its own standard of rightness, which is not reducible to any set of rules and incites intellectual passions for a beauty which betokens the reality of its conceptions. Thus an act of understanding is implicitly a personal commitment to the superior culture which molded the basis of understanding. Truth, for this author, is nothing but the explicitation of this identity between expression and commitment. One can learn and know only by accepting the accidental circumstances, right or wrong, of one's personal existence as the concrete opportunity for exercising intellectual responsibility. Through this line of reasoning the explicit purpose of the book is fulfilled. "The principal purpose of this book is to achieve a frame of mind in which I may hold firmly to what I believe to be true though I know it might conceivably be false" (p. 214).

In a further section the author gives a detailed discussion of the ascending levels of biological life. From the proper activities of individuals he argues to the existence of "centers," new units, which cannot be explained by reduction to their component parts. This biological hierarchy leads to a supreme level, an ultrabiology, which is the superior culture with its concomitant commitments.

The final justification of his philosophical system is given in his theory of evolution, a dynamic process of achievement leading from the simple elements in the primordial incandescent gas—which, he hints, may have some kind of consciousness—through the development of higher centers of activity to the formation of the *noosphere*. The logic of the evolutionary achievement points to an unknown future. Man must commit himself to realizing its achievement, for he has no other meaningful alternative.

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This carefully elaborated and highly integrated work is presented as a complete philosophical system. As such, it merits respect and deserves careful study. However, it also deserves criticism. The road to idealism generally begins with exclusive preoccupation with the structure of knowledge. In such a system the bridge between knowledge and reality must be found in some aspect of knowledge itself, such as consistency or, as here, the intellectual passion excited by the beauty of knowledge. Polanyi is obviously striving to be a realist rather than an idealist. Yet his attention is focused on the frontiers of scientific theory where hypothesis rather than sure knowledge of an extramental world is the guide. Here realism looks untenable. Idealism, or complete skepticism, is circumvented by the act of commitment. If this is accepted a-critically the whole intellectual edifice rests on an explicitly irrational foundation. To put this commitment on a critical realistic basis the author must make a more careful examination of what he calls "the paradox of self-set mental standards." These self-set standards rest on the fact that man not only can know reality directly, but in such direct knowledge he can also have a critical awareness of his own ability to know reality correctly. This criticism notwithstanding, the present book offers a theory of knowledge based on extensive scientific experience, a theory which has a surprising number of points in common with the Thomistic doctrine of knowledge and intellectual habits. Those interested in the problem of knowledge or the philosophy of science can find much of value in this work.

VERNON J. BOURKE, *Saint Louis University*

***An Inquiry into Goodness.* By F. E. Sparshott. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1958. Pp. xiv + 304. \$5.50.**

This book was written by an Oxford scholar who has taught ethics at the University of Toronto for several years. Sparshott is to be a visiting professor at Northwestern during the coming year. The theme of this work is much the same as that of dozens of British treatises in ethics: What do we mean when we say that *X* is good? This is an inexhaustible subject of discussion, as G. E. Moore, W. D. Ross, R. M. Hare, S. E. Toulmin, A. C. Ewing, P. H. Nowell-Smith, and many others have shown.

Actually Sparshott's work is a good introduction to the literature and methods of contemporary ethical theory in England. It is less helpful on American ethics; R. B. Perry and C. L. Stevenson come into the picture, but Dewey, Edel, and Riesman are merely mentioned. The book completely ignores Continental thinking, except that of the classical or mediaeval

writers. At one point (p. 255), it is stated that English philosophers are reared on Kant, Plato, and Descartes; oddly, Plato is the only one of these writers who deserves mention elsewhere in the book.

Common language analysis, in a broad sense, is the method used by Sparshott, plus borrowing from miscellaneous thinkers from the history of philosophy. The discussion centers on the ways in which various philosophers have used the word "good" and the ways in which it is used in the ordinary speech of England today. Some of these analyses are reminiscent of Plato in the early dialogues. A formula is set up and then criticized because certain accepted usages or examples do not seem to fit under it. The reader should also be forewarned regarding the "humour"—things vanish into thin Ayer; there is an intricate problem involving Mr. Dandrough and Mr. Swetband, and some possibly amusing references to the local scene in Toronto which escape even this former Torontonians.

Chapter 6 contains the meat of Sparshott's thinking. He there presents this formula: "To say that x is good is to say that it is such as to satisfy the wants of the person or persons concerned." This is offered as a statement of the univocal meaning of good. Each part of this formula is then discussed at some length. The notion of "wants" is operative in the whole thing; and Sparshott is rather close, at times, to portions of the classic Greek analysis of the needs of human nature. However, he finds it hard to make up his mind about persons; some brute animals may be persons. In the course of the discussion, Aquinas's views on the meaning of good are described and criticized (pp. 205-7). One Thomistic approach to goodness is that of desirability, another that of perfection. In Sparshott's judgment these are not reconciled by St. Thomas Aquinas. The point is difficult: How relate the transcendental good of metaphysics with the moral good? It can hardly be settled in two pages.

The last part of the book is devoted to a comparison of the above formula of the good with other positions in ethics. Some American readers may find the work lacking in seriousness and precision. This is deceptive. Sparshott is probably interested in what he is doing, but one of the fundamental rules of British philosophical gamesmanship is never to say anything which will enable a critic to catch you off base.

Hegel und Blondel. By Peter Henrici. Pullach bei München: Berchmanskolleg, 1958. Pp. xix + 206.

The dialectical methods used by Hegel in his *Phänomenologie des Geistes* and by Maurice Blondel in his *L'Action* (1893) are here compared in an attempt to find some solution to the problem of the relation of a philosophical system and the fact of the Christian revelation. Without any actual historical dependence, both philosophers, it is claimed, sought to construct a philosophy of the concrete (the union of the universal and the singular) in the form of a panlogism (reason for Hegel and the reintegration of life into thought for Blondel). But how is a dialectic to be constructed which will allow all possible data to be introduced into strictly philosophical thought? Hegel's method on a one dimensional level of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis led him to identify reason and reality, and hence to exclude the possibility of accepting mystery and historical witnesses and truths. Blondel's method of a genuine antinomy between fact and necessity, which is resolved by a transcendent on the third dimensional level, allowed his philosophy to be "open" to them.

Henrici has made good use of the recent studies on Hegel's *Phänomenologie* and his early theological period. There is very little to say by way of comment on the author's presentation of Hegel's method, which is rather well known. My remarks then will be limited to his interpretation of Blondel, who may not be so well known in this country.

Blondel, in the introduction of his book, clearly states that he intended to use the "indirect way," or the method of science which eliminates all possible solutions to a problem except one. This method is operative from the very beginning. It seems very arbitrary, if not false, to make the method operative only with the problem of sense knowledge (p. 43 of *L'Action*) just to make it similar to Hegel's starting point. Henrici requires Blondel's dialectic to rest on the presuppositions expressed in the first forty-two pages. The novelty of Blondel's method was that it rested on no suppositions.

There is no need for Henrici to distinguish a "direct way" (the study of action) and an "indirect way" (an analysis of subjectivity) to show how Blondel executed the second step of his dialectic (p. 70). At this stage of the book action is subjectivity. In several other places (p. 105 and p. 112) Henrici draws general conclusions about Blondel's thought and method from data which can be properly judged only at the end of *L'Action*. The mention of Blondel's "metaphysics of the second power" (p. 151, footnote) is out of place in connection with the proofs of the existence of God. Blondel does not speak of such a metaphysics (which Henrici does not

mention) till page 464 of his book and there only as something yet to be constructed, because it would deal with an approach to being not assumed in his thesis but given in the public edition as incorporating his replies to the objections of his examiners. Hence it is also difficult to appreciate the importance Henrici assigns to what he calls Blondel's "metaphysics of judgment" (p. 173). This is using modern language to describe a situation which it does not fit. The use of the word *existentiell* (though defined on p. 36, footnote) in this same context, in addition to the above criticism, forces one to conclude that the thought and method of *L'Action* have not been clarified but rather obscured by the author.

JAMES COLLINS, *Saint Louis University*

***Critique of Religion and Philosophy.* By Walter Kaufmann. New York: Harper & Bros., 1958. Pp. xvii + 325. \$5.00.**

Walter Kaufmann is a professor of philosophy at Princeton University and the author of numerous articles and books, especially on Nietzsche and existentialism. In the present work he seeks to offer a general critical evaluation of philosophy and religion. One major problem facing any such ambitious project is to find a way of dealing with the wide variety of actual philosophies and religions. Kaufmann follows a fourfold program for meeting this difficulty within the covers of a single volume.

First, he takes his start not with what the history of philosophy shows to be the main currents but with the two most prevalent philosophies in our own day: analytic philosophy and existentialism. By regarding these as expressions of two permanent philosophical tendencies of man, he attains a certain level of generality about philosophy as such. Next, he chooses for the present to confine his scrutiny to three major religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Buddhism (especially the presently popular Zen Buddhism). Since they contain typical religious responses to man's situation, a study of them also achieves a certain type of generality about the religious mind. In the third place, the philosophies and religions under consideration are approached by means of long aphorisms, somewhat in the style of Nietzsche rather than through a laborious systematic argumentation. The aphorisms express the author's direct reactions to the themes under discussion, with stress upon his awareness of weak points in the existing positions and upon his own aspirations toward a more adequate view. Finally, as the book develops, it becomes clear that the analysis of philosophy is being definitely subordinated to the analysis of

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religion. Everything else in the book is instrumental to the religious concern and the polemic it engenders.

To appraise the present critique, each of these points of method must be examined for its effectiveness in dealing with philosophy and religion. Only the first seventy pages deal formally with the theme that existentialism and analytic philosophy express the permanent directions of philosophic thought. The hypothesis is not tested through the usual means of comparing it with the chief types of philosophy known through conventional histories. It remains in the status of a genial suggestion which will probably sharpen our reading of familiar texts hereafter but which will also have to undergo some rigorous testing and prosaic qualifying in the light of other specific ways of philosophizing. But if one leaves aside the historical claim and concentrates upon the direct treatment of existential and analytic views, then one will find here many witty and perceptive remarks.

The analysts are generally most reliable in single sharp analyses; but when they attempt to construct a larger picture, whether of ethics or the mind, their partiality stands revealed. Existentialism, on the other hand, suffers from two great dangers. First, it tends to ignore the ordinary for the extraordinary and to mistake the uncommon for the rule. Secondly, it does not demand of itself, let alone achieve, the greatest possible clarity of which its often difficult subject matter is capable. Obviously, existentialism is more interesting for nonphilosophers, while professionals can learn more from the analysts.

It would be difficult to sum up the comparison more concisely and more pointedly.

In dealing with religion, Kaufmann's main negative aim is to show that Western theistic philosophers have failed to provide an adequate rational justification for the truth of God's existence. He criticizes Plato, Anselm, Aquinas, Pascal, and Kant. The handling of Aquinas has several noteworthy features. It is confined to the *Summa Theologiae*, a move which enables the author to exclaim about how the "five ways" seem to stand alone and yet how they depend upon so much and entail so much else for their proper understanding. Kaufmann feels somehow tricked by the circumstance that the demonstrative force of these ways depends upon a prior metaphysical analysis of things, whereas the whole point of the treatment in the *Contra Gentiles* is precisely to make us so sharply aware of this metaphysical basis that we will never forget about it. He also adds that since the article in the *Summa Theologiae* recommending that heretics be turned over to the tender mercies of the civil authorities is

proved by exactly the same format as the truth of God's existence, one who has qualms about the former should extend his doubts to the latter demonstration. But this criticism is not so much a solution as the beginning of a problem in interpretation of the relation between literary form and demonstrative claim. The careful historical attention which we would want to accord to the problem of how statements are related in Hegel and Nietzsche should also be applied in the case of Aquinas, who does not have a wooden uniformity of intent and reasoning in these two cases. Kaufmann advances an interesting objection drawn from American political practice against the third way. He suggests that just as senators have staggered terms, so contingent beings are staggered so that at no time are they all nonexistent. The question then is to examine the factors which determine the particular arrangement of staggered terms in existence on the part of composite beings.

The author has some subtle thoughts concerning the use of aphorisms. He notes that in Nietzsche's case this literary form was due to a superabundance of insights which kept cropping out and to an excess in penetration into the many facets of a question. On the other hand, aphorisms sometimes signify one's inability to build a coherent structure of thought. Kaufmann indicates that, in his own case, he would rather express what he has seen and do so in a somewhat gappy fashion than to worship the finely wrought system. This is a choice which both analysts and existentialists recommend. It also fits in with the author's teaching that truth cannot be reached except through aspiration and expectation. If truth is a "correspondence of promise and performance, a consistency that is not established once for all but continuing and open toward the future," then the use of long aphorisms is fitted to the search. Yet the drawbacks of this form also have to be accepted. Whatever the disadvantages of Kant's style and organization, he did develop a critical approach which cannot be matched for thoroughness of argument and presentation of evidence by a critique developed along aphoristic and lecture-period lines. Zarathustra can dance around Kant and pierce his moral theism with a brilliant psychological observation, but the stolid old plodder is back at his post the next day and the painful work of long-range analysis and inference goes on.

Kaufmann touches upon a thousand points in Biblical criticism and religious psychology that lie beyond the present reader's competence to evaluate. One would have to inquire, for instance, about whether it is still advisable to rely upon Albert Schweitzer as the authority on the issue of Christ's eschatological consciousness. On a more general plane, however, the difference of treatment accorded to Judaism and Zen Buddhism

on the one side and to Christianity on the other is quite noticeable. As far as Buddhism is concerned, the author takes the attitude of the careful reporter, quoting long passages for the purpose of increasing our historical understanding of this movement. Excesses are attributed to other forms of Buddhism than Zen, which is presented in a sympathetic light. Similarly, the Jewish tradition of the Old Testament and later writings is sympathetically studied. The nondogmatic, humorous attitude of the rabbinical masters is conveyed through several genially presented stories. The only critical stiffening occurs when any definite statements about God are drawn from the Old Testament by Jewish and other theologians. But the New Testament, the Christian church, and the Christian theological tradition are insistently criticized at every turn.

Behind this difference of treatment is the philosophical alternative that man either hypostasizes and objectifies his highest aspirations or tries to lift himself to a higher level of being. The former is the way of idolatry, and it is followed by all religions except nondogmatic, moral Judaism and Zen Buddhism. This alternative (although not its special religious form) is a traditional one in existentialist circles since the time of Feuerbach. It rests on the supposition that every objectively formulated proposition involves the consequence of claiming to reduce the reality in question to the condition of a thing subordinate to our mind and its proposition-forming function. But this entailment does not hold necessarily by the simple fact of making the judgment and giving it propositional formulation. Reduction to a thing-object is a distinct issue and requires separate consideration. In the case of our human thoughts about God, the concurrent use of the way of transcendence is an indication that this reduction is explicitly refused as being improper and unfounded in our experience.

Toward the end of his treatise, Kaufmann hazards the (non-objectifying) statement that "philosophy is poetry with an intellectual conscience, poetic vision subjected to rational scrutiny." This is a propositional sentence, which is nevertheless not intended to transform the philosophical effort into an object cut off from subjective aspiration and the expectations of truth-seeking. Moreover, this sentence stresses the need for rational scrutiny of the evidence in favor of this particular conception of philosophy and of religion. The work of studying the relevant data and presenting the results in humanly communicable form requires some propositional formulations. They are not automatically tagged hypostasizations and objectifications of the spiritual reality into a dead thing, because this latter question is a separate matter and has to be determined on its own merits. In the case of philosophies and religions which diverge from Kaufmann's standpoint, it is also impossible to attach a wholesale tag of

objectification and idolatry. One must first inquire whether any safeguards are provided against such a consequence.

VERNON J. BOURKE, *Saint Louis University*

***Medieval Thought. Saint Augustine to Ockham.* By Gordon Leff. Penguin Books, 1958. Pp. 317. Paper, 85¢**

Gordon Leff is a young British scholar, a graduate of Cambridge now lecturing in medieval history at Manchester University. His book surveys the history of ideas in the period indicated in the subtitle. As another sketch, in the style of which the British seem so fond, it does not contain much that will be of interest to specialists. Indeed, Leff has reviewed his own work in his preface:

In writing this book I have throughout been only too aware of my dependence upon previous scholarship; although the emphases are mine, I make no claim to novelty in what I have written, except on certain aspects of fourteenth century thought. My debt is at once too general and too vast to be acknowledged individually.

This modest self-judgment is just. If one has read Gilson or Father Copleston, there is not much point to going through this book. On the other hand, students and teachers of medieval history may find this dependable digest less demanding than a technical history of medieval philosophy.

In treating the fourteenth century Leff emphasizes the problem of faith and reason. He sees the period of Scotus and Ockham not as a new battleground for the adherents of realism and nominalism but for the respective claims of revelation and natural experience. As the century progresses, there is a gradual freeing of faith from the domain of reason. Bradwardine (of whose thought Leff has made a thorough study) is presented as the climax of this emancipation of God from nature, of primary causality from secondary, of the teachings of revelation from those of reason. (It comes as no surprise to find Portalié listed in the brief bibliography as the only study of St. Augustine; faith and reason constituted the focal point of Portalié's interests.) In point of fact, as the author says, "there is much in Bradwardine's reliance upon Scripture and the irrevocability of the divine will which is to be found in the Reformers of the sixteenth century" (p. 299).

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It is difficult to find one theme, or problem, which unifies and brings clarity to an exposition of a thousand years of human thinking. Were the thinkers of the Middle Ages most concerned with the one and the many, or with the problem of universals, or with the relation between what is contingent and what is necessary, or with the harmonization of the speculative and the practical—or with any of a dozen other key problems? Certainly the faith-reason theme is one of these central questions running through the whole period.

ROLAND J. TESKE, S.J., *Saint Louis University*

Le dilemme du concours divin: primat de l'essence ou primat de l'existence? By Louis Rasolo, S.J. Rome: Gregorian Univ., 1956. Pp. 134.

Father Rasolo has added to the still-growing literature of the Thomist-Molinist controversy by re-examining the problem of general concursus in the light of modern Thomistic existentialism. He concludes interestingly that the Molinists have held the true existential view of St. Thomas and that the Bannesians are essentialists giving priority to determination. He justifies the a-posteriori approach of Molina and identifies Neo-Molinism with indifferent concursus and the *scientia media* without discussing the latter. The main point of the book is that in terms of proper causality God causes the existence of the will act—an *esse accidentale*—and man causes the limitation of the will act to the choice of one of the means to the end.

The author believes that the Bannesian tendency to make not only the act of being but also its determination dependent upon the divine will either in the order of being or in the order of activity destroys the duality of the determination and the act of being. The creature depends upon God in two lines of causality, exemplarity and efficiency; in its essence the creature depends upon the divine intellect, but in its being the creature is dependent upon the divine will. To destroy this duality is to destroy the meaning of essence and nature as the immutable foundation and norm of human morality. Hence, Bannesianism is voluntaristic inasmuch as it makes determination dependent upon the divine will. Bannesianism destroys the essential autonomy of the creature as well as its proper causality.

With regard to the act of the will, Bannesians maintain that the determination of the will is a positive perfection of being. The act

of choice is new perfection and actuality that remove the potentiality of the indifferent will-to-end. Thus, in order to remove this potentiality of the indifferent will-to-end, a further *praemotio* is needed for the act of choice, and this premotion is physically predetermining. The indifference of the will-to-end, according to Father Rasolo, is not the indifference of potentiality but of transcendent act. In willing the end the will is in full act; the act of choice merely limits the will act to the willing of one of the means to the end. It is by one and the same motion that the will is moved to the willing of the end and to the choice of one of the means to the end. Hence, the act of choice is the proper effect of the created will; no new premotion is required since the will is already in full act. Thus only one premotion is required to move the will to intend the end, and this cannot be a physical predetermination of the act of choice. Thus the author concludes that indifferent premotion that moves the will to intend the end is the sole possibility.

Father Rasolo's analysis of the relation of the will-to-end and the act of choice as one of transcendent act to limited act seems correct and valuable inasmuch as it removes the unnecessary physically predetermining motion by which the Bannesians claim the will is moved to the act of choice. The emphasis on proper causality is also valuable for working toward a solution to this problem. However, the assumption of an accidental act of being really distinct from the substantial act of being is a weak point in the argument that remains unproved and certainly does weaken the unity of being, as the author admits. Moreover, even granting the accidental act of being and the analysis in terms of proper causality, the act of being must nonetheless be related to its determination as act to potency. Thus even in terms of proper causality indifferent concursus is impossible, since God causes the actuality of the operation that is naturally prior to, and proportioned to, the limitation caused by the will. Certainly, with temporal simultaneity God causes the actuality of the *velle*, and the creature causes the limitation of the *velle* to this or that particular good; but the causality of God is naturally prior to that of the creature as *esse* is to *essence*. Hence, only in the former and not in the latter sense can one maintain indifferent concursus and the Thomistic act-potency relation between *velle* and its limitation. Finally, though it is true that the Bannesians were essentialists at least in the sense which the author has pointed out, Molina too was an essentialist: and to claim that Molinists have maintained the existential import of the doctrine of St. Thomas whereas the Bannesians have not is to lose historical perspective.

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(Continued on inside cover)

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For the purposes of this bibliography, "philosophy" will be understood in a very broad sense. It will include works in other fields—such as sociology, aesthetics, and politics—that involve philosophical principles and problems.

"Current" books will be understood to include new books, revised editions, and reprints if the previous printing had been out of stock for a notable period of time, or if there is a notable difference in price, format, and the like.

"Publication in North America" will be understood to refer not only to works originally published in that area, but also to works originally published in some other country and simultaneously or subsequently issued by some North American publisher under his own imprint. In the latter case (if it is known), the book will be marked by the symbol ‡ in the left hand margin.

The procedure is as follows:

1. Books announced for publication will be listed in the issue which next appears after the announcement is received.
2. Books actually published will be listed in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 above.
3. Books received by THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN will be listed with full bibliographical information and a descriptive and/or critical note in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 and/or No. 2. This will be done even if a full review is to appear later.

ABELARD, PETER. *The Story of My Misfortunes*. Trans. from the Latin by Henry Adams Bellows. Introd. by Ralph Adams Cram. Glencoe: Free Press, 1958. Pp. 96. \$3.50.

ABRAMS, M. H. (ed.) *Literature and Belief*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. xvii + 184. \$3.75.

ADLER, ALFRED. *The Education of the Individual*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1958. Pp. [7] + 143. \$3.50.

The purpose of the author is to show that each individual is a unique person, with his own value and his own development. He tries, moreover, to show concrete ways in which such uniqueness can be recognized and encouraged. The basic doctrine is built on the individual psychology of the late Alfred Adler. The method, as the author himself suggests, is influenced by Marcel Proust and Zen. The author is a humanist and shows some good ways to make literary passages relevant (or, perhaps, to draw out a child's potentialities by means of literature). Yet he does not live merely in books and the past; he insists that present and simple events and situations can present the same deep lessons. The book concludes with some stimulating thoughts on teaching, the influence of home life, and the function of love. There is a tendency to interpret religious truth as mythology.

There is no index.

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- ALTMANN, A., and STERN, S. M. (eds.) *Scripta Judaica*. Vol. I, *Isaac Israeli, A Neoplatonic Philosopher of the Early Tenth Century*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press; Nov., 1958. \$4.80.
- [ARISTOTLE.] *On Poetry and Style*. Trans. with introd. by G. M. A. Grube. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958. Pp. xxxii + 110. Paper, 80¢
- This is a new translation of the *Poetics* and of Chapters 1-12 of the third book of the *Rhetoric*. The text followed is usually that of Butcher. The translation is always excellent and often brilliant.
- The introduction is one of the best, in spite of its brevity. Professor Grube judiciously observes that the value of the *Poetics* lies more in scattered observations and germinal ideas than in completeness or the adequacy of its treatment as a whole. He takes up for special comment the major points singled out by previous editors and commentators; his own remarks are always moderate, scholarly. In numerous footnotes he comments on the text or the translation, supplies background, elucidates a critical point. A final appendix (pp. 101-10) identifies and describes the proper names used in the texts.
- This is an edition that both classical scholars and philosophers will buy with pleasure and use with profit.
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- ASHLEY, BENEDICT M., O.P. *Aristotle's Sluggish Earth: The Problematics of the 'De Caelo.'* River Forest, Ill.: Albertus Magnus Lyceum, 1958. Pp. viii + 73. Paper.
- This extract from a doctoral dissertation was first published in the *New Scholasticism*, XXXII (1958); the present edition has a very brief introduction and a seven-page bibliography. It is a careful, detailed analysis and defense of the Aristotelian method of demonstration and an attempt to relate the Aristotelian science of nature to modern science.
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This volume, in the well-received "Pelican Philosophy Series," is intended to serve as an introduction to Hume as a man, but principally to his philosophy. After a brief account of his life and writings, succeeding chapters present Hume's aims and methods, his doctrine on the imagination and on understanding, the relation between reason and morals, his statements about the nature of things (reality), and his thought as a skeptical philosophy.

The author's viewpoint is that of analytical philosophy. He assumes that Hume's contribution to philosophy is a great one and in many ways correct. Occasionally he challenges a particular conclusion; often he criticizes the arguments for conclusions which he nevertheless considers to be entirely correct.

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BAYLIS, CHARLES A. *Ethics: The Principles of Wise Choice*. New York: Holt & Co., 1958. Pp. 384. \$4.00.

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This is a translation of a lecture first published in the *Revue scientifique* of June, 1901. The author provides a historical introduction (pp. 1-20) and surveys the present stage of research on the subject, with some indications for further reading. The translation is clear and idiomatic.

The lecture itself relates the phenomenon of dreaming to Bergson's better known doctrines on time, sensation, and memory, and is an excellent short example of his method. It is a valuable addition to any library.

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- . *Melascientific Queries*. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas; January, 1959.
- [BURKE, EDMUND.] *Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful*. Ed. J. T. Boulton. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1958. \$5.00.
- CAMUS, ALBERT. *The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays*. New York: Vintage Books; Feb., 1959. 95¢
- CARNAP, RUDOLF. *Introduction to Symbolic Logic and Its Applications*. New York: Dover Pubns. Pp. 241. \$4.00; paper, \$1.85.
- . *Logical Syntax of Language*. [Reprint.] Paterson, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams and Co.; April, 1959. \$1.95.
- . *Meaning and Necessity*. [Reprint.] Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press. Pp. 266. Paper, \$1.65.
- CARROLL, LEWIS. *Mathematical Recreation of Lewis Carroll*. [Reprint.] New York: Dover Pubns.; March, 1959. 2 vols., \$1.50 each.
- CHADWICK, HENRY. *Sentences of Sextus*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press; Jan., 1959. \$5.50.
- CHARLESWORTH, MAXWELL JOHN. *Philosophy and Linguistic Analysis*. Pittsburgh Duquesne Univ. Pp. 234. \$5.50; paper, \$4.75.
- CHRISTIAN, WILLIAM A. *Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press; February, 1959. \$6.00.
- [CICERO.] *De Natura Deorum*. Ed. Arthur Pease. Vol. II, Books 2 and 3. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Sept., 1958. \$20.00.
- CICERO. *On the Commonwealth*. Tr. George Holland Sabine and Stanley Barney Smith. New York: Liberal Arts Press; March, 1959. \$3.00; paper, \$1.25.
- COFFEY, PETER. *Epistemology or, The Theory of Knowledge*. 2 vols. [Reprint.] Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1958. Pp. 374, 376. \$4.95 ea.
- COFFIN, CHARLES MONROE. *John Donne and the New Philosophy*. New York: Humanities Press, 1958 (Columbia Univ. Press in 1937.) Pp. 319. \$6.00.
- † COHEN, JOHN. *Humanistic Psychology*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1958. Pp. 207. \$4.25.
- COHEN, MORRIS R. *Studies in Philosophy and Science*. New York: Frederick Ungar Pub. Co.; February, 1959. \$4.50.

COLLINS, JAMES. *God in Modern Philosophy*. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co.; May, 1959. Pp. 484. \$6.50.

———. (ed.). *Readings in the History of Philosophy*. Vol. I, *Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*. Westminster: Newman Press; Nov., 1958. \$2.25.

COPLESTON, FREDERICK, S.J. *History of Philosophy*. Vol. IV, *Descartes to Leibniz*. Westminster: Newman Press; Oct., 1958. \$4.50.

CORTE, NICOLAS. *The Origins of Man*. Trans. from the French by Eric Earnshaw Smith. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1958. Pp. 144. \$2.95.

† COULSON, C. A. *Science and the Idea of God*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 55. Paper, 90¢

CROMBIE, A. C. *Medieval and Early Modern Science*. 2 vols. Garden City: Doubleday & Co.; Feb., 1959. 95¢ each.

CURRY, H. B., and FEYS, R. *Combinatory Logic*. New York: Humanities Press; Nov., 1958. \$12.50.

DAMON, F. *William Blake*. [Reprint.] Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith; Dec., 1958. \$10.00.

† D'ARCY, MARTIN CYRIL, S.J. *The Nature of Belief*. 2nd ed. Saint Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1958. Pp. 236. \$3.95.

[DARWIN, CHARLES.] *The Autobiography of Charles Darwin*. Ed. Nora Barlow. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1959. \$4.50.

———. *Autobiography and Selected Letters*. Ed. Francis Darwin. [Reprint.] New York: Dover Pubns.; February, 1959. \$1.50.

[———.] *Evolution and Natural Selection. An Anthology*. Ed. with introd. by Bert James Loewenberg. Boston: Beacon Press; April, 1959. Pp. 448. \$5.75.

DARWIN, FRANCIS. *Life and Letters of Charles Darwin*. New York: Basic Books; March, 1959. 2 vols.; \$10.00.

DAVIES, ROBERT M. *Humanism of Paul Elmer More*. New York: Bookman Associates; Oct., 1958. \$5.00.

DAWSON, CHRISTOPHER. *The Movement of World Revolution*. Ed. John J. Mulloy. New York: Sheed & Ward; Mar., 1959. \$3.00.

DEWEY, JOHN. *Experience and Nature*. [Reprint.] New York: Dover Pubns.; January, 1959. \$1.95.

DEWITT, CLINTON. *Privileged Communications between Physician and Patient*. Springfield: Charles C Thomas, 1958. Pp. 548. \$11.50.

DICKINSON, GOLDSWORTHY LOWES. *The Greek View of Life*. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1958. Pp. 261. Paper, \$1.75.

† DIXON, WILLIAM MACNEILE. *The Human Situation*. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1958. Pp. 443. Paper, 95¢

DONDEYNE, ALBERT. *Contemporary European Thought and Christian Faith*. Trans. Ernan McMullin and John Burnheim. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. xi + 211. \$5.75; paper, \$5.00.

The French original here translated was first published in 1951 under the title *Foi chrétienne et pensée contemporaine*, and noted in THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, XXX (1953), 250. For this translation, the original has been entirely rewritten. The first two chapters (on existential phenomenology and on the historicity of man) are entirely new; significant changes have been made in the remaining chapters, and the material has been quite differently arranged. In addition to phenomenology, the first part of the work deals also extensively with modern notions and treatments of irrationality. The second part deals with Thomism in relation to contemporary thought and with the relation between faith and reason.

The translators have made an unusual and unusually successful effort. Where necessary, they have indicated the translated word in parentheses; they have not taken the easy way of Anglicizing foreign

terms but the hard way of finding exact equivalents; in some cases they have kept the foreign word where no equivalent existed in English. In addition, they have supplied subject and author indices. It is to be hoped that the reception accorded this work will be in proportion to its significance.

DOWD, DOUGLAS FITZGERALD (ed.). *Thorstein Veblen: A Critical Reappraisal*. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 340. \$5.00.

DUERING, I. *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition*. New York: Gregory Lounz. \$9.50.

DURKHEIM, EMILE. *Moral Education*. Tr. Everett Wilson. Chicago: Free Press; April, 1959. \$6.00.

‡ ECKHARDT, MEISTER. *Treatises and Sermons of Meister Eckhardt*. Selected and trans. from Latin and German with an introd. and notes by James M. Clark and John V. Skinner. New York: Harper & Bros., 1958. Pp. 267. \$4.00.

EDDINGTON, SIR ARTHUR. *The Philosophy of Physical Science*. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1958. Pp. 239. Paper, \$1.75.

EDEL, ABRAHAM and EDEL, MAY. *Anthropology and Ethics*. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas; February, 1959.

ELIADE, MIRCEA. *Yoga: Immortality and Freedom*. Trans. Willard R. Trask. New York: Pantheon Books, 1958. Pp. 530. \$5.00.

ERDAILY, JOSEPH. *Philosophy for a New Civilization*. New York: Vantage Press, 1959. Pp. 318. \$5.00.

The author is a professional plant breeder and shows himself to be well read in the classics, rather well informed in history, and acquainted with philosophy. As perhaps to be expected, the biological bias of his philosophy is strong, so much so that he stresses heredity to an almost extreme extent. In his metaphysics he is a naturalist and a materialist in a rather complex fashion. His "first cause" is an unlimited ubiquitous cosmic energy. This energy "precipitates" (the analogy from chemical reaction is deliberate and recognized by the author) into material things, according to a "cosmic idea" which is something like a Platonic Idea. Evolution is possible only within the limits of the species; the origin of new species takes place by the materialization of a new cosmic idea.

In epistemology, the author is a realist. The origin of ideas, in his explanation, is twofold: ideas either come from teaching or, if they are original ideas, by some kind of contact with a cosmic idea. He holds that belief (religious faith) is simply irreducible to knowledge, and that men are either believers or thinkers by biological necessity. His ethics is conservative; its basis is the noble man, or gentleman, and he deliberately assimilates good morals to aesthetics. The "new civilization" he proposes is to be attained by eugenics, though he lays very great stress on the good morals of the "reproducers" and insists that home training shall be personal, strict, moral, and loving.

The book shows again that good sense, a liberal education, and competence in a particular field can take a man far but are not likely to produce a balanced philosophy.

Essays in Philosophy. Ed. Houston Peterson and James Bayley. New York: Pocket Books; February, 1959. Paper, 50¢

FAGOTHEY, AUSTIN, S.J. *Right and Reason*. 2d ed. Saint Louis: C. V. Mosby Co.; January, 1959. \$6.00.

FAUSSET, HUGH I'ANSON. *The Flame and the Light*. New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1958. Pp. 232. \$5.00.

‡ FERGUSON, JOHN. *Moral Values in the Ancient World*. New York: Barnes and Noble; February, 1959. \$4.50.

- FERM, VERGILIUS TURE ANSELM (ed.). *A History of Philosophical Systems*. [Reprint.] Ames: Littlefield, Adams, 1958. Pp. 656. Paper, \$2.25.
- ‡ FINDLAY, JOHN NIEMAYER. *Hegel*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1958. Pp. 372. \$6.00.
- FISHER, S. S. *Through Natural Laws to the First Great Cause*. New York: Greenwich Book Publishers, 1958. Pp. 133. \$3.00.
- FLEW, A. *A New Approach to Psychical Research*. New York: Humanities Press, 1959. Pp. 169. \$2.25.
- FRANKL, VIKTOR E. *From Death-Camp to Existentialism*. Preface by Gordon W. Allport. Boston: Beacon Press, June, 1959. Pp. 175 (approx.). \$3.00.
- [FRANKLIN, BENJAMIN.] *Autobiography and Other Writings*. Ed. Russell B. Nye. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1958. Pp. 221. Paper, 75¢
- FRIEDLÄNDER, PAUL. *Plato: An Introduction*. Trans. Hans Meyerhoff. Vol. I. New York: Pantheon Books, 1958. Pp. 423. \$5.00.
- FRITZ, KURT VON. *Aristotle's Contribution to the Practice and Theory of Historiography*. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1958. Pp. 24. Paper, 50¢
- FROMM, ERICH. *Sigmund Freud's Mission*. New York: Harper and Bros.; February, 1959. \$3.50.
- GEIGER, GEORGE R. *John Dewey in Perspective*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press; Oct., 1958. \$5.50.
- GIERKE, OTTO. *Political Theories of the Middle Ages*. Trans. with introd. by Frederic William Maitland. Boston: Beacon Press; Sept., 1958. Paper, \$1.95.
- GLANVILL, JOSEPH. *Plus Ultra or the Progress and Advancement of Knowledge since the Days of Aristotle*. Introd. by Jackson I. Cope. Gainesville, Fla.: Scholars Facsimiles and Reprints, 1958. Pp. 216. \$7.50.
- GLEASON, ROBERT W., S.J. *The World to Come*. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1958. Pp. 172. \$3.00.
- This is a theological treatment of "the four last things" (death, judgment, heaven, and hell) with additional chapters on the relation between law and love, sin, redemptive suffering, and the resurrection. Contemporary philosophical themes, however, are prominent throughout, especially in the treatment of love, sin, and death; a full awareness of the most recent biblical theology is manifested, especially in the chapters on hell and the resurrection.
- For English readers, the chapter on death is the first English presentation of philosophico-theological theories that are relatively well known to European philosophers and theologians.
- GORMAN, MOTHER MARGARET. *The Educational Implications of the Theory of Meaning and Symbolism of General Semantics*. Washington, Catholic Univ. of America Press. Pp. 206. Paper, \$2.25.
- GRAHAM, JOHN. *The Universal Military Obligation*. New York: Fund for the Republic, 1958. Pp. 14. Paper, 15¢
- GREENE, JOHN C. *Death of Adam. Evolution and Its Impact on Western Thought*. Ames: Iowa State College Press; May, 1959. \$5.00
- GRENE, MARJORIE. *Introduction to Existentialism*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1959. Pp. 160. \$1.25.
- GUENON, RENÉ. *Man and His Becoming: According to the Vedanta*. New York: Noonday Press; Sept., 1958. \$1.45.
- GUITTON, JEAN. *Make Your Mind Work for You*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1958.
- GUPTA, YOGI. *Yoga and Long Life*. New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1958. Pp. 160. \$5.00.
- HACKER, ANDREW. *Politics and the Corporation*. New York, Fund for the Republic. Pp. 13. Paper, 15¢

- † HADFIELD, J. A. *Psychology and Morals*. New York: Taplinger Pub. Co., 1958. Pp. 226. \$3.50.
- HALLIE, PHILIP P. *Maine de Biran. Reformer of Empiricism*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; March, 1959. Pp. 256. \$4.50.
- HAND, LEARNED. *The Spirit of Liberty*. New York: Vintage Books; Feb., 1959. \$1.25.
- † HANSON, NORWOOD RUSSELL. *Patterns of Discovery*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 249. \$5.50.
- HARRIS, ERROL E. *Revelation through Reason*. New Haven, Yale Univ. Press. Pp. 170. \$4.50.
- HART, CHARLES. *Thomistic Metaphysics. An Inquiry into the Act of Existing*. New York: Prentice-Hall; January, 1959. \$5.50.
- HAWTON, HECTOR. *Philosophy for Pleasure*. New York: Fawcett Pubns.; April, 1959. Paper, 50¢.
- HAYAKAWA, S. I. *Our Language and Our World*. New York: Harper and Bros.; April, 1959. \$5.00.
- HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDERICH. *Selection*. 2nd ed. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1958. Pp. 468. Paper, \$1.00.
- HEIDEGGER, MARTIN. *Introduction to Metaphysics*. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press; March, 1959. \$3.75.
- . *Question of Being*. Ed. William Kluback and Jean Wilde. New York: Twayne Pubs.; February, 1959. \$3.00.
- HEISENBERG, WERNER. *The Physicist's Conception of Nature*. Trans. from the German by Arnold J. Pomerans. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1958. Pp. 192. \$3.75.
- HIMMELFARB, GERTRUDE. *Darwin and the Darwinian Revolution*. Garden City: Doubleday and Co.; April, 1959. \$5.95.
- HIRSCHBERGER, JOHANNES. *The History of Philosophy*. Vol. I. Trans. Anthony N. Fuerst. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1958. Pp. xiv + 516. \$5.00.

This two-volume history of philosophy is well known and highly regarded. It enjoyed a wide circulation in the original German and has previously been translated into Spanish (the Spanish version was noted in *THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN*, XXXIV [March 1957], 205-6). The work is of a medium length for its topic; it treats most of the minor figures as well as the major ones. To see how it is proportioned, one can note that Plato is accorded seventy-three pages; Aristotle, eighty-one; St. Thomas Aquinas, fifty-one. The author is convinced that there is a perennial philosophy and that different philosophers have contributed to a common patrimony. Hence, he points out the lasting value of early contributions and stresses similarities rather than differences. These tendencies lead to what some historians will feel is a consistently benign interpretation; thus, the attitude of the Stoics toward the passions sounds harmoniously Christian; Aristotle is authentically and laudably Platonic in many things, and in turn foreshadows many Thomistic developments.

The first volume begins with the pre-Socratics and concludes with Nicholas of Cusa. The translation is excellent, and the translator has substituted English references and source materials wherever possible. There are both an index of proper names and a topical index; the latter, in particular, is very detailed.

- HOCKING, WILLIAM ERNEST. *Types of Philosophy*. 3d ed. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons; January, 1959. \$5.00.
- HOLLOWAY, MAURICE, S.J. *Introduction to Natural Theology*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts; March, 1959. \$4.00.

- HOLTON, GERALD (ed.). *Science and the Modern Mind*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1958. Pp. 119. \$3.95.
- HOLZMAN, DONALD. *Japanese Religion and Philosophy. A Guide to Japanese Reference and Research Materials*. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press; February, 1959. \$4.00.
- HOOKE, SIDNEY. *Political Power and Personal Freedom*. New York: Criterion Books; April, 1959. \$7.50.
- HUIZINGA, JOHAN. *Men and Ideas*. New York: Meridian Books, 1959. \$4.00; paper, \$1.45.
- HULL, L. W. *The History and Philosophy of Science*. New York: Longmans, Green and Co.; March, 1959. \$5.00.
- HUME, DAVID. *Selections*. 2nd ed. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1958. Pp. 401. Paper, \$1.00.
- HUXLEY, JULIAN S., and OTHERS. *The Book That Shook the World*. Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press; Oct., 1958. Pp. 67. \$1.50.
- JAMES, WILLIAM. *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. New York: New American Lib., 1958. Pp. 424. Paper, 50¢.
- JASPERS, KARL. *The Idea of the University*. Trans. H. A. T. Reiche and H. F. Vanderschmidt. Ed. Karl W. Deutsch. Introd. by Robert Ulrich. Boston: Beacon Press; June, 1959. Pp. 192. \$3.75.
- . *Truth and Symbol*. New York: Twayne Pubs.; April, 1959. \$4.00.
- JEANS, SIR JAMES HAPWOOD. *The New Background of Science*. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press; March, 1959. Paper, \$1.95.
- . *Physics and Philosophy*. Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1958. Pp. 222. Paper, \$1.75.
- JOHNSON, OLIVER A. *Ethics: A Source Book*. New York: Holt & Co., 1958. Pp. 546. \$5.75.
- JOLIVET, REGIS. *The God of Reason*. Trans. from the French by Dom Mark Pontifex. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1958. Pp. 126. \$2.95.
- JONES, HOWARD MUMFORD. *Reflections on Learning*. New Brunswick, Rutgers Univ. Press. Pp. 97. \$2.75.
- JONES, LELAND V. *Scientific Investigation and Physical Evidence*. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas; February, 1959.
- KANT, IMMANUEL. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Trans. from the German with an introd. by Norman Kemp Smith. Abridged ed. New York: Modern Lib., 1958. Pp. 353. \$1.65.
- . *Selections*. 2nd ed. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1958. Pp. 526. Paper, \$1.00.
- KAUFMANN, WALTER. *From Shakespeare to Existentialism*. Boston: Beacon Press; June, 1959. Pp. 400 (approx.). \$5.95.
- † KEITH, ARTHUR. *Darwin Revalued*. New York: Humanities Press, 1959. Pp. 294. \$5.00.
- KELLY, GERALD A., S.J. *Medico-Moral Problems*. St. Louis: Catholic Hospital Assn. of the U. S. and Canada, 1958. Pp. 375. Paper, \$3.00.
- KEMENY, JOHN G. *Philosopher Looks at Science*. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co.; Jan., 1959. \$5.50.
- KIERKEGAARD, SOREN. *Journals*. Tr. Alexander Dru. [Reprint.] New York: Harper and Bros.; March, 1959. \$1.45.
- KINKEAD, EUGENE. *In Every War but One*. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1959. \$3.75.
- KNELLER, GEORGE F. *Existentialism and Education*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1958. Pp. xi + 170. \$3.75.

The purpose of this book is principally to show the relevance of existentialist thought for education. After explaining his purpose, the author shows the reason for such thought and the problems in present-day educational practice, as well as theory, which may make such correlation significant.

The major part of the book is an exposition of existentialist thought—mainly that of Sartre, Heidegger, Marcel, and Kierkegaard—in a relatively nontechnical way. The author concentrates on the themes of existence itself, authenticity, knowledge, value (and especially moral and religious value), freedom, the individual and the group, and death, anguish, and commitment. This exposition is readable and quite good—instructive for the reader not well acquainted with the complex and often conflicting theories being reported.

Next, an attempt is made to show how these theories would have meaning for education. Naturally, most of the meaning lies in a criticism of present practice. In particular, the conformism which flows as much from instrumentalist, “progressive” education as from rationalistically orientated systems—if not even more—is shown to be one of the prime targets of existentialist thought.

Finally, the author attempts an evaluation. He shows that we cannot simply abandon content or standards, that anarchy or merely aristocratic systems will be no improvement, that there are social values. His final conclusion is that the most important contribution of existentialism could be to change the spirit in which education is carried on.

Knowledge and Value. Introductory Readings in Philosophy. Ed. Elmer Sprague and Paul W. Taylor. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1959. Pp. 717. \$6.50.

KOFFKA, K. *Growth of the Mind.* [Reprint.] Paterson, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams and Co.; March, 1959. \$1.95.

LAMONT, CORLISS. *Illusion of Immortality.* 2d ed. New York: Philosophical Lib.; March, 1959. \$3.95.

LANGE, F. A. *History of Materialism.* [Reprint.] Paterson, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams and Co.; April, 1959. \$3.95.

LANGER, SUSANNE K. *Reflections on Art. A Source Book of Writings by Artists, Critics, and Philosophers.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press; Dec., 1958. \$6.50.

LAPIERE, RICHARD. *Freudian Ethic.* New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce; May, 1959.

LAUER, J. QUENTIN, S.J. *The Triumph of Subjectivity. An Introduction to Transcendental Phenomenology.* New York: Fordham Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. ix + 185. \$4.00.

The thought of Husserl is not well known among English-speaking philosophers, even if they are able to read German with some fluency. Hence, a book devoted to an exposition of Husserl is most useful and timely.

The author expounds Husserl's thought, partly according to its genesis and partly according to the requirements of intelligible exposition. Thus, he begins with a general account of phenomenology. He then presents the first development of a “pure” psychology. Next, he stops to discuss basic phenomenological techniques. Then again he follows the development of Husserl's thought, presenting the theory of cognition as a theory of being, the notion of objectivity and that of transcendental subjectivity, and completes his exposition with chapters on the universal phenomenology of reason and the intentional explanation of the other. A last chapter discusses four later philosophers who were strongly influenced by Husserl: Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

Throughout, the author tries to expound clearly and carefully phenomenology as a concrete philosophy; he also attempts to relate it to other movements and ideas, and to show both its strengths and weaknesses.

- LAZOWICK, FRANK E. *One Dimensional System of Philosophy*. New York: Philosophical Lib.; Nov., 1958. \$6.00.
- LEETHAM, CLAUDE. *Rosmini: Priest, Philosopher and Patriot*. Baltimore: Helicon Press; Sept., 1958. \$7.50.
- LEWIS, CLIVE STAPLES. *The Allegory of Love*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 378. Paper, \$2.25.
- LUCRETIVUS CARUS, TITUS. *De Rerum Natura*. Trans. from the Latin into English verse by William Ellery Leonard. Introd. by Charles E. Bennett. [Reprint.] New York, Dial Press. Pp. 336. \$5.00.
- LYNCH, WILLIAM, S.J. *The Image Industries*. New York: Sheed & Ward; Apr., 1959. \$3.00.
- LYNCH, WILLIAM F., S.J. *Approach to the Metaphysics of Plato through the 'Parmenides.'* New York: University Pubs.; April, 1959. \$6.00.
- MAASS, ARTHUR. *Area and Power: A Theory of Local Government*. Glencoe: Free Press; Nov., 1958. \$5.00.
- † MACINTYRE, A. C. *The Unconscious: A Conceptual Analysis*. New York: Humanities Press, 1958. Pp. 100. \$2.50.
- MACKENDRICK, PAUL LACHLAN. *The Roman Mind at Work*. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1958. Pp. 191. Paper, \$1.25.
- MALCOLM, NORMAN. *Ludwig Wittgenstein*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 107. \$2.00.
- MARITAIN, JACQUES. *St. Thomas Aquinas*. Newly trans. and rev. by Joseph W. Evans and Peter O'Reilly. New York: Meridian Books, 1958. Pp. 281. Paper, \$1.35.
- . *The Degrees of Knowledge*. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons; Apr., 1959. Pp. 480. \$7.50.
- † MARTIN, R. M. *Truth and Denotation*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1958. Pp. 316. \$7.50.
- MASCALL, ERIC LIONEL. *The Importance of Being Human*. New York, Columbia Univ. Press. Pp. 124. \$3.00.
- MCCLOSKEY, NEIL GERARD, S.J. *Public Schools and Moral Education*. New York, Columbia Univ. Press. Pp. 327. \$6.00.
- MCDONALD, DONALD. *Religion and Freedom*. New York: Fund for the Republic, 1958. Pp. 48. Paper, 25¢.
- MCWILLIAMS, JAMES A., S.J. *Starman*. New York: Exposition Press, 1958. Pp. 143. \$3.00.

This is a theological as much as, if not more than, a philosophical novel. Cast in the form of reports made by a member of another human race back to his people on a distant star system, it reports his discovery of our earth, his involvements with Christians and Communists, and his final decision to take an active part in earth affairs. Through discussions with persons from both sides, the "starman" reveals a human nature in a hypothetical "pure state of nature" and by contrast learns about the Christian doctrines of the Fall and the Redemption.

- MELDEN, A. I. (ed.) *Essays in Moral Philosophy*. Seattle, Univ. of Washington Press. Pp. 228. \$4.50.
- MEYERHOFF, HANS (ed.). *Philosophy of History in Our Time*. New York: Doubleday & Co.; Jan., 1959. \$1.25.
- [MILL, JOHN STUART.] *Nature and Utility of Religion*. Ed. with introd. by George Nakhnikian. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958. Pp. xxx + 80. Paper, 75¢.

The text of these two works in the standard one; spelling and punctuation have been modernized.

The introduction briefly compares these two works, then turns to each separately. In speaking of *Nature*, the editor rehearses the

standard arguments against the "naturalistic fallacy." Then he tries to show that Mill's arguments destroy all natural-law theories. He refers to St. Thomas Aquinas and contemporary Thomists as holding one of these exploded theories. His argument shows that he simply has not understood—he may well have diligently read—either St. Thomas or any of the better contemporary Thomists. In speaking of the *Utility of Religion*, the editor asserts blandly that neither the existence of God nor the fact of a revelation can be proved. He maintains that they cannot be disproved, either, and holds that acceptance or rejection of these positions is a matter of temperament. Very Millsian views, these; it does not make them critically relevant.

- MILLER, DAVID L. *Modern Science and Human Freedom*. Austin: Univ. of Texas Press; Nov., 1958. Pp. 400. \$6.00.
- MILLER, WILLIAM LEE, and OTHERS. *Religion and the Free Society*. New York: Fund for the Republic, 1958. Pp. 107. Paper, 50¢
- MINNEMA, THEODORE. *The Social Ethics of Reinhold Niebuhr*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1959. \$3.00.
- MIXTER, RUSSELL L. (ed.) *One Hundred Years after Darwin*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1959. \$4.00.
- MONTEFIORI, ALAN. *Modern Introduction to Moral Philosophy*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger; March, 1959. \$4.00.
- MOORE, G. E. *Philosophical Studies*. [Reprint.] Paterson, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams and Co.; March, 1959. \$1.75.
- MORISON, ELTING ELMORE (ed.). *The American Style*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1958. Pp. 435. \$5.00.
- MOSKOWITZ, MOSES. *Human Rights and World Order*. New York: Oceana Pubns., 1958. Pp. 239. \$3.95.
- MUDRY, JOSEPH. *Philosophy of Atomic Physics*. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1958. Pp. 136. \$3.75.

This book is apparently supposed to be a basic (first) philosophy in harmony with, if not based upon, atomic physics. The author calls his system one of "dialectical-atomism." Here is how the author defines it: "The natural significance of this introductory term is two-fold. Predominantly figurative in this exposition will be a dialectical impressionism, which incidentally is nothing new as far as its innovations are concerned. The trend of deviation which will be apparent herein, will be in the sense, in which it will be applied to atomic fundamentalism. By this terminology, it is denoted that the basic structure of atoms will be taken into consideration; hence, the term: dialectical-atomism" (p. 1). On the basis of this, the author continues in similar style to criticize idealism and monism, to build up his notion of the material universe, to take account (?) of relativity and quantum mechanics, and finally to supply an explanation of value. "The awareness of these proclivities, wearing down the resistivity of the other, implies to inform us of the almost insurmountable odds that are associated in the acquisition of the good. . . . What does exhort salubriousness toward the rigidity of a status quo entity, does not equally apply to a general order. What does erectify itself conducive to salubriousness in one entity, may contrarily provoke maleficent instrumentalism towards another" (pp. 121-22). And the rest of the book is similarly mystifying.

- MUNITZ, MILTON K. *Modern Introduction to Ethics*. Chicago: Free Press; Nov., 1958. \$6.50.
- MURPHY, GARDNER. *Human Potentialities*. New York: Basic Books, 1958. Pp. 350. \$6.00.
- MYERHOFF, HANS (ed.). *The Philosophy of History in Our Time. An Anthology*. Garden City: Doubleday & Co.; Jan., 1959. \$1.25.

NAGEL, ERNEST, and NEWMAN, JAMES R. *Gödel's Proof*. New York, New York Univ. Press. Pp. 127. \$2.95; paper, \$1.75.

Nature of the Philosophical Enterprise, The. "Tulane Studies in Philosophy," Vol. VII. New Orleans: Tulane Univ. Bookstore, 1958. Pp. 146. Paper, \$2.00.

There is a general theme to this volume, that of the nature of philosophy. Edward G. Ballard, in "The Subject-Matter of Philosophy," holds that it is "archaic experience." Richard L. Barber, in "Philosophic Disagreement and the Study of Philosophy," states that the study of the history of philosophy requires the student to assume that each philosopher in turn may be entirely correct. James K. Feibleman, in "An Explanation of Philosophy," explains that philosophy is concerned with the totality of all there is, that it consists of a number of disciplines, and that each of them is of value to the student. Harold N. Lee, in "Philosophy and the Categories of Experience," looks on philosophy as the formulation and criticism of categories. Paul Guerrant Morrison, in "The Nature of Analytic Philosophy," gives a short explanation of current analysis. Andrew J. Reck, in "Wilmon H. Sheldon's Philosophy of Philosophy," presents and evaluates Sheldon's work. Louis Nisbet Roberts, in "Is the Study of Aesthetics a Philosophic Enterprise?" asserts that it is. Robert C. Whittemore, in "Philosophy as Comparative Cosmology," considers philosophy as a framing of a categorical scheme, in the manner of Whitehead.

NELSON, JOHN CHARLES. *Renaissance Theory of Love*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 280. \$5.50.

NEWMAN, JOHN HENRY CARDINAL. *The Idea of a University*. Garden City: Doubleday & Co.; Feb., 1959. \$1.35.

[—.] *The Political Thought of John Henry Newman*. Ed. Terence P. Kenny. New York: Longmans, Green & Co.; Mar., 1959. \$5.00.

O'CONNOR, D. J. *The Philosophy of Education*. New York: Philosophical Lib. \$3.75.

O'DEA, THOMAS F. *American Catholic Dilemma. An Inquiry into the Intellectual Life*. Introd. by Gustave Weigel, S.J. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1958. Pp. xv + 173.

Though this book is mainly a sociological analysis and must be judged on that score, some basic suppositions are philosophical in character (and some, as is to be expected, theological). One is the nature of the "intellectual"; the author holds that an intellectual is one who is doing original work in the sciences, humanities, and arts. Another is the social role of such an intellectual specialist; the author sees this role as essentially ambiguous, in that his leadership is both necessary and beyond the competence of the rest of society and so exposed to suspicion. In addition, the author has some excellent remarks on the teaching of philosophy.

OESTERREICHER, JOHN M. (ed.). *The Bridge*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1958. Pp. 383. \$4.50.

OGDEN, C. K., and RICHARDS, I. A. *Meaning of Meaning*. [Reprint.] New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.; Mar., 1959. \$2.25.

OGDEN, C. K. *Bentham's Theory of Fictions*. Paterson, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams & Co.; Mar., 1959. \$1.75.

ONG, WALTER J., S.J. *Ramus and Talon Inventory*. Harvard: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 558. \$10.00.

This inventory lists the original and revised editions of the printed works of Peter Ramus and Omer Talon, together with the present location or major locations (if the copies are still extant). Works are also briefly described, and the relationships of various revisions is pointed out. In addition, there is a descriptive catalogue of the

Ramist controversies and a checklist of the editions and compendia of Rudolph Agricola's *Dialectical Invention*.

The volume should be obtained by all college and research libraries.

- . *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. xix + 408. \$10.00.

This is a study of the thought of Peter Ramus and of the movement known as Ramism. The book begins with a general location of Ramism as an intellectual movement, a brief account of his life, and some remarks about his so-called "reform." Next comes a scholarly, though very compact, discussion of the background: the medieval logic and its movement toward quantification, the logic of Rudolph Agricola, the medieval arts Scholasticism (sharply distinguished from the scholasticism of the theologians), and the role of teaching in the schools. The third part of the book is the analysis of Ramism itself: the dialectic and its functions, the developments through controversy, the importance of method, and the Ramist rhetoric. In a final chapter, the diffusion of Ramist works and doctrine is studied.

The book is amply documented (notes, pp. 321-73; bibliography, pp. 377-91). There is also a detailed index.

Those interested in the history of philosophy, science, humanism, and ideas will find this book valuable and stimulating. Not only does it treat a man and a movement largely unknown, but its author is at pains to understand the movement in terms of larger contexts: the moving forces, the implications for knowledge and culture, the nature of knowledge and the image of man.

- ORTEGA y GACET, JOSÉ. *Man and Crisis*. Trans. from the Spanish by Mildred Adams. New York: W. W. Norton Co., 1958. Pp. 217. \$4.50.

- ORYNSKI, WANDA. *Hegel*. New York: Philosophical Lib.; May, 1959. \$3.75.

- PAPAY, JOSEPH L. *Metaphysics in Process*. Florham Park, N.J.: author [137 Upper Saddle River Road], 1958. Pp. 211. Paper, mimeographed, \$3.00.

This is an experimental edition of a textbook prepared by a professor of philosophy at St. Peter's College, Jersey City. The author believes that metaphysics is best taught and learned the way it was first discovered. Hence the philosophical ideas and arguments are developed out of the history of philosophy from Thales to Aristotle. The book is divided into two main divisions, pre-Socratic and Socratic.

In expounding the doctrine of Thales, the author brings out the basic notion of philosophy and its special characteristics. Through Heraclitus and the Eleatics, he develops the problem of the one and the many, and the basic notion of change. In the Atomists he brings out the distinction between science and philosophy more clearly, and discusses the nature of philosophical compromise.

The most extensive section is that on Plato and the problems of Platonism. Here the author discusses many of the basic problems of the Aristotelian metaphysics. In addition, he shows how the Platonic and Aristotelian views on metaphysics flow into, are connected with, other areas of philosophy and life. The section on Aristotle draws together into a systematic organization the metaphysical ideas previously discovered and explained. An appendix gives a chart of the interrelation of the Aristotelian concepts.

- PARKE, NATHAN GRIER, III. *Guide to the Literature of Mathematics and Physics including Related Works on Engineering Science*. 2nd rev. ed. New York: Dover Pubns., 1958. Pp. xviii + 436. Paper, \$2.49.

This is a revision of a bibliography first published in 1947. It is

intended principally for students and should be very helpful. In a general introductory section, the author explains methods of study and the use of reference materials. He has also a brief but helpful description of the nature of a scientific discipline. The general section includes likewise rules and hints for further research, the building up of a bibliography, and an introduction to the various bibliographical tools which are available. The major part of the book consists of the bibliography proper; each section is preceded by a brief, clear statement of the subject. The section on the philosophy of mathematics and physics is not exhaustive, but it does list a good number of the basic works.

- PARKER, T. H. L. *Calvin's Doctrine of the Knowledge of God*. Rev. ed. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1958. \$3.00.
- PASCH, ALAN. *Experience and the Analytic: A Reconsideration of Empiricism*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1958. Pp. 291. \$6.50.
- PATTERSON, ROBERT LEET. *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1958. Pp. 342. \$4.50.
- PECOTCHE, C. B. G. *Logosophy*. New York: Philosophical Lib.; Feb., 1959. \$3.75.
- [PEIRCE, CHARLES SANTIAGO SANDERS.] *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*. Vol. 7, *Science and Philosophy*; Vol. 8, *Reviews, Correspondence and Bibliography*. Ed. Arthur W. Burks. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press. Pp. 429, 364. \$8.00 each.
- † PETERS, R. S. *The Concept of Motivation*. New York: Humanities Press, 1958. Pp. 166. \$2.50.
- † *Philosophy and Ethics*. New York: Collings, 1958. Pp. 339. \$4.50.
- PIAGET, JEAN. *Judgment and Reasoning in the Child*. [Reprint.] Paterson, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams & Co.; Mar., 1959. \$1.50.
- PLATO. *Complete Works*. Abridged. Ed. Henry L. Drake. [Reprint.] Paterson, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams & Co.; Mar., 1959. \$2.25.
- . *Phaedo*. Trans. R. S. Bluck. New York: Liberal Arts Press; Mar., 1959. Paper, \$1.25.
- . *The Republic*. 2nd ed. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1958. Pp. 426. Paper, \$1.00.
- POINCARÉ, HENRI. *Value of Science*. Trans. George Bruce Halsted. New York: Dover Pubns.; Jan., 1959. Paper, \$1.35.
- † POLE, DAVID. *The Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein*. New York: Essential Books, 1958. Pp. 142. \$2.50.
- POLLARD, WILLIAM G. *Chance and Providence*. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1958. Pp. 190. \$3.50.
- POPPER, KARL R. *Logic of Scientific Discovery*. New York: Basic Books; Mar., 1959. \$7.50.
- Psychoanalysis, Scientific Method, and Philosophy*. Ed. Sidney Hook. New York: New York Univ. Press; May, 1959. Pp. 288. \$5.00.
- † *Psychology*. Rev. ed. New York: Collings, 1958. Pp. 359. \$4.50.
- Psychology: *A Study of a Science*. Ed. Koch. Study 1: *Conceptual and Systematic*. Vol. I: *Sensory, Perceptual and Physiological Formulations*. New York: McGraw-Hill; January, 1959. \$9.75.
- . Vol. II: *General Systematic Formulations, Learning, and Special Processes*. January, 1959. \$10.00.
- . Vol. III: *Formulations of the Person and the Social Context*. March, 1959.
- † RAHMAN, FAZLUR. *Prophecy in Islam; Philosophy and Orthodoxy*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1958. Pp. 118. \$3.50.
- RANDALL, JOHN HERMAN, JR. *The Role of Knowledge in Western Religion*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1958. Pp. 157. \$3.50.
- RANK, OTTO. *Beyond Psychology*. New York: Dover Pubns.; Mar., 1959. Paper, \$1.75.

REESE, WILLIAM. *Ascent from Below: An introduction to Philosophical Inquiry*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.; Apr., 1959.
REGIS, L. M. *Epistemology*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1959.
REICHENBACH, HANS. *Philosophy of Space and Time*. Trans. Maria Reichenbach. [Reprint.] New York: Dover Pubns.; Mar., 1959. Paper, \$2.00.

REISER, OLIVER L. *The Integration of Human Knowledge*. Boston: Porter Sargent, 1958. Pp. [xii] + 478. \$8.00.

The author contends that knowledge must be synthesized, and he considers this to mean that ultimately there is only one knowledge. In his first two chapters he discusses the problems which seem to make a synthesis urgent—these problems are practical as well as theoretical, political and social as well as individual. In his theory, knowledge is a “temple” whose one base is a composite of theory of knowledge, scientific method, and semantics; its pillars are the various sciences; its single cap, unifying all, is philosophy. With this structure in mind, chapters three to eight take up various aspects of the base. In these chapters, guiding principles are semantics, operations’ research, mathematics, field theory, and intuition. In the remaining chapters (9 to 13) the notions of the philosophy held by the author are detailed: induction, causality, and emergence (related to intuition), the field theory of matter with its pantheistic cosmic energy, the notion of society as a kind of superorganism with a “world-brain,” and finally the description of the ideal man as the creative imagination of the cosmic reality.

The author calls this system a “scientific humanism”—“humanism” in that the highest manifestation of the one being which is cosmic energy is man; “scientific” in that science is the only source and tool of knowledge. When all sciences and arts, including politics, are “reduced” to physics, it turns out that the physicists are taken over by the politicians of the electromagnetic society.

In a laudatory foreword, Professor Giorgio de Santillana wonders whether the world as explained and prophesied by Professor Reiser would not be “an air-conditioned nightmare,” or whether this book is Proclus brought up to date. Perhaps it is Proclus with Hegel as read by Feuerbach, master-minding a planned society by means of an electronic brain.

REITH, HERMAN, C.S.C. *The Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas*. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1958. Pp. xvii + 403. \$5.50.

This book consists of two parts, the exposition (pp. 1-199) and English readings from Aristotle and St. Thomas (pp. 200-395). The author begins by demonstrating the dependence of metaphysics on the philosophy of nature (for the existence of its formal subject), as well as the distinction of metaphysics from all other sciences. He next takes up the analogy of being, laying most stress on the analogy of proper proportionality. Various chapters then deal with substance and accidents, potency and act (in general, and also in regard to essence and existence, though the proof of the distinction of these principles is deferred), the transcendentals, the principles of knowledge and the causes (in the treatment of which the author speaks of the principle of causality and the principle of final causality), and, in the final chapter, the origin and end of all (a chapter on the “Five Ways” of St. Thomas; in connection with the Third Way the real distinction between essence and existence is proved).

The readings are arranged according to chapters and are quite extensive. There are separate subject indices to the text and to the readings.

The style is somewhat complex and heavy. The text itself quotes

many passages from St. Thomas. There is no indication, either in text or in the readings, that the chronological relationships of passages have any doctrinal significance.

REXINE, JOHN E. *Solon and his Political Theory*. New York: William-Frederick Press, 1957. Pp. 21. Paper, \$1.00.

RICE, EUGENE F., JR. *The Renaissance Idea of Wisdom*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Dec., 1958. \$4.50.

RIEFF, PHILIP. *Freud: The Mind of the Moralist*. New York: Viking Press; Mar., 1959. \$6.00.

RILEY, WOODBRIDGE. *American Philosophy*. [Reprint.] New York: Russell & Russell, 1958. Pp. 605. \$8.50.

RIVER, J. PAUL DE. *Crime and the Sexual Psychopath*. Springfield: Charles C Thomas, 1958. Pp. 384. \$6.75.

Role of the Christian Philosopher, The. "Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association," Vol. XXXII. Washington. Office of the Secretary of the Association, 1958. Pp. 266. Paper, \$3.50.

The topics of the major papers contained in this volume were previously reported in THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, XXXV (1958), 286. For special attention, the presidential address on causality by the Reverend Allan B. Wolter, O.F.M., can be cited. Father Wolter points out in detail the difficulties raised by modern logicians against considering the so-called "principle of causality" to be simply analytic. He also shows the problems concerning its first discovery by the mind and its epistemological justification.

The "round table discussions" are listed under the heads that have become traditional in the meetings of the association. In the area of logic, Professor Henry B. Veatch pointed out some difficulties and inadequacies in logic as metaphysics, while the Reverend Joseph T. Clark, S.J., contended that modern logic as logic was a very useful refinement of traditional logic. In the area of the philosophy of nature, the Reverend J. Athanasius Wieselhuber, O.P., discussed the relations between St. Albert the Great and the Oxford Platonists; and the Reverend Melvin A. Glutz, C.P., contended that the philosophical study of man and scientific psychology need to be integrated into one discipline. In the area of moral philosophy, the Reverend Thomas J. Higgins, S.J., discussed and criticized modern attempts to define the good; and Professor Desmond J. Fitzgerald examined the state-of-nature theories of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the area of metaphysics, Professor Ralph M. McInerney presented the claim that just as Jaspers's philosophy made metaphysics as a science impossible, so the denial by some Thomists that *esse* can be properly conceived makes metaphysics equally impossible; the Reverend Edmund W. Morton, S.J., studied St. Thomas's texts on the relation of the possible to being. In the area of the history of philosophy, the Reverend S. Y. Watson, S.J., treated univocity and analogy of being in Duns Scotus; and Professor Thomas P. McTighe analyzed the meaning of *complicatio* and *explicatio* in Nicholas of Cusa. In the area loosely called "philosophical problems," the Reverend Robert F. Harvanek, S.J., gave his views on the meaning of the Church's emphasis on Thomism, in which he concurred with Cardinal Ehrle and Franz Pelster, S.J.; and the Reverend Hunter Guthrie, S.J., urged the use of the problem method in teaching philosophy.

RUNES, DAGOBERT D. *Pictorial History of Philosophy*. New York: Philosophical Lib.; May, 1959. \$15.00.

———. *Treasury of World Philosophy*. [Reprint.] Paterson, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams & Co.; Feb., 1959. \$3.95.

- RUSSELL, BERTRAND. *Marriage and Morals*. [Reprint.] New York: Bantam Books; Mar., 1959. Paper, 50¢
- . *My Philosophical Development*. New York: Simon & Schuster; Mar., 1959. \$3.50.
- . *Problems of Philosophy*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press; Mar., 1959. Paper, \$1.25.
- [SAINT-SIMON, CLAUDE HENRI.] *The Doctrine of Saint-Simon*. Trans. from the French with notes and introd. by Georg C. Iggers. Preface by G. D. H. Cole. Boston: Beacon Press, 1958. Pp. 333. \$4.95.
- SARTON, GEORGE. *A History of Science: Hellenistic Science and Culture in the Last Three Centuries B.C.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Feb., 1959. Pp. 544. \$11.00.
- SCHIEFFLER, ISRAEL (ed.). *Philosophy and Education*. Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1958. Pp. 312. \$5.75.
- [SCHOPENHAUER, ARTHUR.] *Selections*. Ed. DeWitt H. Parker. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons; Jan., 1959. \$1.00.
- SCHOPENHAUER, ARTHUR. *The World as Will and Representation*. Trans. E. F. J. Payne. Preface by C. A. Muses. Indian Hills, Colo.: Falcon's Wing Press, 1958. Vol. I, pp. xxxvi + 534; Vol. II, pp. vii + 687. Set, \$17.50.
- The only previous translation of this work (by Haldane and Kemp) was published in 1883-86, prior to the critical editions of Deussen and Hübscher, and in it some passages were omitted. The present translation is complete and is based on the latest printing of Hübscher's edition. The translator has also thoughtfully provided translations for the various foreign language quotations that Schopenhauer and his earlier translators were able to presume could be readily understood. In general, the translation is excellent.
- Professor Muses, in his preface, gives a very general evaluation of the significance of Schopenhauer's work, stressing his moral sincerity. The translator's introduction is more specific and quite helpful. There is a very detailed index (II, 647-87), which is one of the greatest advantages of this new translation.
- † SCHREECH, MICHAEL ANDREW. *The Rabelaisian Marriage*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1958. Pp. 151. \$5.50.
- † SCHRODINGER, ERWIN. *Mind and Matter* "Tarnier Lectures," 1956. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 110. \$2.75.
- [SENECA, LUCIUS ANNAEUS.] *The Stoic Philosophy of Seneca*. Trans. from the Latin with introd. by Moses Hadas. Garden City, Doubleday & Co. Pp. 269. Paper, 95¢
- SEWARD, GEORGE S., and SEWARD, JOHN PERRY (eds.). *Current Psychological Issues*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1958. Pp. 368. \$6.00.
- SHEEN, FULTON J. *God and Intelligence in Modern Philosophy*. Garden City: Doubleday & Co.; Sept., 1958. \$1.25.
- SHEPHERD, A. P. *Scientist of the Invisible. An introduction to the Philosophy of Rudolf Steiner*. New York: British Book Centre; Feb., 1959. \$3.25.
- SITTLER, JOSEPH. *The Structure of Christian Ethics*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press; Oct., 1958. Pp. 96. \$2.50.
- † SMITH, J. MAYNARD. *The Theory of Evolution*. New York: Penguin Books, 1958. Pp. 320. Paper, 85¢
- SMITH, VINCENT EDWARD. *The General Science of Nature*. Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co.; 1958. Pp. xiii + 400. \$5.25.

This is an introductory college textbook on the philosophy of nature. The author calls it "the general science of nature" to indicate its relationship to the "particular" sciences of nature (both therefore being parts of one single science). He maintains that, since human knowledge progresses from the vague and general

to the clearly explicit and specific, the general part of science is presupposed for the particular and should precede it in the order of learning.

Having discussed the nature and distinction of sciences (largely in terms of the orders of abstraction), the author considers mobile being as the subject of the science of nature and follows this with a discussion of method. He turns then to the analysis of mobile being. First is the discussion of change, the first contraries (possession and privation), and their subject. Then comes the discussion of form and primary matter, followed by the study of matter as ground of motion. Having established this point, the author re-examines his definition of the science of nature in terms of nature as internal principle of motion and rest. This is followed by a discussion of the relation between physical and mathematical sciences of nature. Then come the causes: matter and form, agent, and final cause; chance is given a full discussion, and so is the final cause (where the argument for finality includes evidences of external finality). Then come chapters on motion, place (including a defence of natural place), time, the kinds of motion and its parts; the final chapter is a proof for the existence of the First Mover.

The author's style is clear and easy to understand. An excellent feature is the inclusion of readings at the end of each chapter which illustrate divergent views on the problem of the chapter. Each chapter also has excellent review questions. Notes to each chapter supply the place of bibliographies, and the general index at the end is detailed enough to be a real help to the student.

SOLBERG, WINTON U. (ed.) *The Federal Convention and the Formation of the Union of the American States*. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958. Pp. cxviii + 409. Paper, \$1.75.

The documents collected in this book are the declaration of rights of the Stamp Act Congress, two letters concerning the Townshend Acts, the declaration and resolutions of the First Continental Congress, selections from the acts of the Second Continental Congress, the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation and the Annapolis Convention, resolutions for a Federal Convention, Madison's notes on the debates at the convention (selections), the Constitution with its resolutions and transmittal letters, ratification of the Constitution, and the amendments to the Constitution. Appendix I is a biographical register of the delegates to the Federal Convention; Appendix II consists of population estimates.

The long introduction gives the historical background of the Revolution and the formation of the United States. The editor tries to indicate the various currents of thought that influenced the delegates and other leaders, and to give a balanced appraisal of the strength of the various influences. A great amount of historical scholarship is here presented in simple, direct form, with enough documentation to provide sources for even advanced study. There is also a brief, selective bibliography. In addition, the editor has written introductions to the selections and has annotated passages which need further clarification.

The book should be eminently valuable not only for courses in constitutional history but also for political theory and the history of political philosophy. The book is sturdy and beautifully printed.

SPINOZA, BARUCH. *Selections*. 2nd ed. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1958. Pp. 479. Paper, \$1.00.

STALLKNECHT, NEWTON PHELPS. *Strange Seas of Thought*. [Reprint.] Bloomington: Indian Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 301. \$5.00.

- STEBBING, SUSAN. *Philosophy and the Physicists*. [Reprint.] New York: Dover Pubns.; Feb., 1959. Paper, \$1.65.
- . *Thinking to Some Purpose*. Baltimore: Penguin Books; Feb., 1959. Paper, 95¢.
- STERLING, RICHARD W. *Ethics in a World of Power*. Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press. Pp. 329. \$6.00.
- STRAUSS, LEO. *Thoughts on Machiavelli*. Glencoe: Free Press, 1958. Pp. 348. \$6.00.
- SULTAN, PAUL. *Right-to-Work Laws. A Study in Conflict*. Los Angeles: Inst. of Industrial Relations, Univ. of California Press, 1958. Pp. 141. Paper, \$1.75.
- SUZUKI, DAISEI T. *Zen and Japanese Culture*. New York: Pantheon Books; Mar., 1959. \$7.50.
- TALLET, JORGE. *The Absolute Being*. Trans. Beverly Thurman and the author. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1958. Pp. 74. \$3.00.
- This book was first published in Spanish in 1955. The author holds that the absolute being is the sum total of all existence, including not only definite actuality but also possibility and even the absence of actuality. He maintains that only two ideas are absolutely certain: the phenomenal "I" and the absolute being. He considers that both of these are known by intuition. He thinks that existence itself has absolute validity and is its own justification. With regard to definite facts—those discovered by science—he holds that we cannot have complete certitude and that the methods of discovering definite facts cannot be applied to the universe as a whole. It is his view that the absolute being is by its nature imprecise and vague, and that consequently philosophy, which has as its object this being, is likewise vague. For this reason he eschews precise statement and elaborates his thoughts in a meditative essay.
- TERRUWE, A. A. A. *Psychopathic Personality and Neurosis*. New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons; Nov., 1958. \$3.50.
- † THOMPSON, RUTH D'ARCY. *D'Arcy Wentworth Thompson, the Scholar-Naturalist, 1860-1948*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 240. \$4.00.
- THURSTONE, L. L. *The Measurement of Values*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1959. Pp. 384. \$7.50.
- TILLOTSON, GEOFFREY. *Pope and Human Nature*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 282. \$4.00.
- VALLON, MICHEL A. *Apostle of Freedom. The Life and Teaching of Nicholas Berdyaev*. New York: Philosophical Lib.; Apr., 1959. \$6.00.
- VANN, GERALD, O.P. *The Paradise Tree: On Living the Symbols of the Church*. New York: Sheed & Ward; Mar., 1959. \$3.50.
- VERSFELD, MARTINUS. *A Guide to the City of God*. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1958. Pp. 153. \$3.00.
- VIRCHOW, RUDOLF LUDWIG KARL. *Disease, Life, and Man*. Trans. from the German and with introd. by Lelland J. Rather. Stanford, Stanford Univ. Press. Pp. 281. \$5.00.
- WATTS, ALAN W. *Nature, Man, and Woman*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1958. Pp. 221. \$3.95.
- . *Supreme Identity. An Essay on Oriental Metaphysic and the Christian Religion*. New York: Humanities Press; Feb., 1959. \$3.25.
- † WEDBERG, ANDERS. *Plato's Philosophy of Mathematics*. New York: Humanities Press, 1959. Pp. 154. \$5.00.
- WEITZ, MORRIS. *Problems in Aesthetics*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1959.
- WEIZSÄCKER, C. F. VON. *The History of Nature*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1959. Pp. 160. \$1.25.

- † WELDON, T. D. *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 344. \$5.60.
- † WETTER, GUSTAV A. *Dialectical Materialism*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger; Dec., 1958. \$10.00.
- WHITE, MORTON. *Religion, Politics, and the Higher Learning*. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press; Jan., 1959. Pp. 144. \$3.50.
- WHITEHEAD, ALFRED NORTH. *An Introduction to Mathematics*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. 196. Paper, \$1.50.
- . *The Function of Reason*. Boston, Beacon Press. Pp. 90. Paper, \$1.25.
- † WINCH, P. *The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy*. New York: Humanities Press, 1958. Pp. 139. \$2.50.
- WINSPEAR, ALBAN DEWES. *Who Was Socrates?* New York, Russell & Russell. \$3.00.
- † WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG. *The Blue and Brown Books*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1958. Pp. 199. \$6.00.
- WOLFSON, H. A. *The Philosophy of Spinoza*. New York: Meridian Books, 1958. \$1.95.
- WOLSTENHOLME, B. E. W., and O'CONNOR, CECILIA M. (eds.) *Ciba Foundation Symposium on the Neurological Basis of Behavior, in Commemoration of Sir Charles Sherrington, 1857-1952*. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1958. Pp. 412. \$9.00.
- WOODWORTH, HUGH. *Sanity, Unheard Of*. Victoria, B.C.: Sumas Pub. Co., 1958. Pp. 109. \$3.00.

Impressed by the unhappiness suffered by very many people and enthusiastic about the "solution" offered by semantics, the author offers a diagnosis and a cure. Unhappiness, it is urged, is due to anxiety, fear, and ego-consciousness (self-consciousness, in the derogatory sense of that term), and these in turn are the products of thought. The solution is to abandon forethought and memory and to act without reflection upon one's action, to live in complete spontaneity, much as an animal or young child.

As is so often the case, the practical advice is a partial truth—many people "get in their own way," and so their action is never whole-hearted and consequently not a source of joy to themselves or to their fellows. But the author presents his advice in the form of a sweeping generalization and rests it on an equally sweeping theoretical basis. The Rousseauvian "noble savage" appears to be still haunting.

[WRIGHT, CHAUNCEY.] *The Philosophical Writings of Chauncey Wright. Representative Selections*. Ed. Edward H. Madden. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958. Pp. xxii + 145. Paper, 80¢

Wright was one of the important formative figures in American philosophy. Though he lacked the synthesizing genius of Peirce and the popular appeal of James, his philosophy of science is better because it stays closer to evidence and avoids rhetorical amplification. In other ways, he has some of the limitations common to the group—the impression, for example, that Kant can be refuted empirically.

The introduction is relevant and clear. The selective bibliography and the editorial footnotes are invaluable guides to the student. The edition is excellent, from the choice of selections to the printing and binding.

ZUURDEEG, WILLEM F. *An Analytical Philosophy of Religion*. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1958. Pp. 320. \$4.75.

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